[North Korea and the World] The US-Iran War and the Changing World Order and the Future of the Korean Peninsula

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zzCMOnDao9M

Video Script

There are concerns that the liberal international order is being undermined, and that South Korea is likely to face increased pressure for active intervention from the United States. Hello, this is Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. Today, we will continue our discussion on the Iran war from last time. Currently, the scope of the battlefield is expanding beyond Iran as the United States and Israel conduct airstrikes on Iran, and Iran retaliates.

While it is still ambiguous to define this situation as a Middle East war, for now, we will refer to it as the Iran war. Today's recording is on March 20th, and the situation may have changed by the time you watch this video due to the rapidly evolving circumstances. We will focus on the meaning of the Iran war, its impact on the world order, and its impact on the Korean Peninsula, rather than the war itself. The current situation is clearly escalating, defying predictions of a short conflict. While President Trump's remarks are difficult to interpret, Secretary of Defense [name redacted] stated that this war would be short and would not involve the deployment of ground troops or regime change.

The objective of this war was for the United States and Israel to strike Iran's nuclear missile capabilities, i.e., its initial warfighting capability, and to destroy military facilities necessary for nuclear weapons development. However, two variables have emerged. First, the hardliner Mostafa Khamenei was elected as the supreme leader to succeed Ayatollah Khamenei. He demanded unilateral surrender and reparations from the United States and urged a halt to the airstrikes.

He threatened to broaden the front by mobilizing his proxies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthi rebels, and Shiite militias in Iraq, and to blockade the Strait of Hormuz if his demands were not met. Indeed, problems arose as the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz progressed, and President Trump declared victory in the war with Iran. However, with Mostafa Khamenei's hardline message and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the war has entered its second phase.

It is judged that Iran is precisely targeting America's Achilles' heel. If the Strait of Hormuz is blocked, oil prices will rise, which could become a political burden for President Trump. President Trump claimed that less than 1% of the crude oil imported by the United States passes through the Strait of Hormuz, but this is not true. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is causing global crude oil prices to rise, leading to an increase in gas prices in the United States. The current average gas price in the US is over $3.80 per gallon, a significant increase from $2.50 to $2.70 at the beginning of the war. If gas prices rise to $4 or $4.50, it will have a significant impact on the economic sentiment of the American people, potentially leading to a decline in President Trump's approval ratings. Iran is exploiting this point by targeting President Trump's Achilles' heel through the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Meaning of the Iran War and its Impact on the World Order

Now, I will discuss the impact of this war on the world order and the Korean Peninsula. First, the liberal international order is being severely undermined. The liberal international order was established under the leadership of the United States after World War II in 1945. At that time, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the United Nations to prevent wars caused by a lack of cooperation among great powers. The UN's core objective was to prevent wars by having the permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, and the United Kingdom) act as world police. This constitutes a crucial part of the liberal international order. Through multilateral institutions, the UN pursues the rejection of changes to the status quo by force, the emphasis on the rule of law, free trade, and the improvement of human rights. In particular, Article 2 of the UN Charter stipulates that all member states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. This means that the deployment of military force is limited unless directly attacked. Therefore, the attacks by the United States and Israel on Iran can be seen as a violation of these principles.

President Trump claimed that Iran posed an imminent threat of attacking the United States within two weeks, but this is not true. While there are debates about Iran's willingness to develop nuclear weapons, unlike North Korea, Iran has not yet developed nuclear weapons. Reports indicate that Iran has enriched uranium up to 60% and possesses 450 kg of it, but nuclear-grade material production requires 90% enrichment, and Iran has not reached the stage of weaponizing it. Furthermore, Iran does not possess the long-range ballistic missile capability to attack the US mainland. It is far from possessing long-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, as North Korea does. Therefore, there are significant doubts about the claim of an imminent threat from Iran, and the Director of Counterterrorism, Kent, has also stated that he does not assess it as an imminent threat. This clearly contradicts the fundamental principles of the liberal international order.

Furthermore, Iran was engaged in nuclear negotiations in Geneva with the mediation of Oman on February 26 and 27, 2026, with additional negotiations scheduled for early March. The attack occurred in the middle of these negotiations. The liberal international order opposes changes to the status quo by force, prioritizes diplomatic means, and allows for the exercise of self-defense only in response to an attack. It is difficult to see these rules as having been followed. A greater problem is that the United States, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, is undermining this order. This is contrary to the role that Roosevelt entrusted to the UN, even granting it veto power at its founding. Not only the United States but also Russia is continuing the war by invading Ukraine. There are concerns that the UN's functions are already significantly weakened and becoming hollow.

The Possibility of US Overextension and the Disorder of the World Order

Second, there is the possibility of US overextension. The United States has experienced difficulties for 20 years due to the War on Terror, which began in 2001, and the hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan under the Biden administration has caused safety issues for its collaborators. This demonstrates the US's intention to reduce its overextension and focus on selectivity and prioritization. This clearly indicates a desire to withdraw from the Middle East. Following the shale gas revolution, US dependence on Middle Eastern oil has decreased, and the US is pursuing a strategy to focus on containing China in the Indo-Pacific region. However, the current war may force the US to intervene in the Middle East again. Additionally, the Russia-Ukraine war continues in Europe, and issues related to the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait exist in the Indo-Pacific region. It is questionable whether the US has the capacity and willingness to intervene in multiple regions simultaneously. Such a situation could be perceived as a hegemonic power unable to end wars in any region, increasing the likelihood that challenging nations might misjudge opportunities for changing the status quo. If this trend intensifies, the world order is more likely to move towards disorder rather than multipolarization, as there is no alternative country or order visible to fill the vacuum left by the US. It is questionable whether China and Russia can replace the norms, institutions, and public goods provided by the US. If the power of the US as a superpower is dispersed, it is more likely that disorder will emerge rather than a stable multipolar order, leading to power vacuums and interconnected crises across regional conflicts.

Iran's Strategy of Horizontal Proliferation and the Possibility of North Korea Benchmarking

Third, there is Iran's strategy of horizontal proliferation. Since weak states cannot confront strong powers one-on-one, they employ a horizontal proliferation strategy that expands the battlefield to the surrounding region instead of a direct confrontation. Following the airstrikes, Iran attacked not only Israel but also U.S. military bases, ports, airports, and hotels throughout the Gulf region. Some oil pipelines and refinery facilities were also targeted, drawing at least nine countries into the battlefield. Interceptor missiles were observed flying over Dubai and Doha.

This war is no longer just a problem between Iran and Israel; it is shaking the Gulf economy, the global energy market, and insurance and investment sentiment. Specifically, Iran is using a strategy of raising oil prices by blockading the Strait of Hormuz and undermining President Trump's domestic political support. This horizontal proliferation is a strategy that exponentially increases the stakeholders in the war, thereby increasing the burden on the United States and its allies. North Korea is highly likely to employ a similar strategy. North Korea also cannot win a one-on-one fight against the United States, and considering the ROK-U.S. alliance, it is possible that in case of emergency, North Korea might attempt a peaceful expansion of the conflict beyond the Korean Peninsula to Japan and U.S. military bases in Japan. The effective use of Iran's horizontal proliferation strategy could provide a learning effect for North Korea, which is a cause for concern.

ROK-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing Demands and Potential for Alliance Cohesion Erosion

Finally, the necessity of alliance politics and the possibility of its erosion arise within the ROK-U.S. alliance framework. The United States is demanding responsibility and burden-sharing from its allies, including South Korea. Regarding the dispatch of troops to the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. has requested participation from various countries such as South Korea, Japan, China, the UK, and France, and a message was conveyed to Japan demanding the dispatch of warships. This indicates a move to strengthen allies' responsibilities and cost-sharing. During the Trump administration, there were increasing demands for an increase in defense cost-sharing and economic pressure through tariffs. From South Korea's perspective, the concern is the demand for an expanded role in the Indo-Pacific region. South Korea is increasingly likely to be pressured to take a more active role in containing China. While South Korea's primary focus is responding to North Korean threats, the U.S. desires an expanded role for South Korea in contributing to Indo-Pacific stability. U.S. Forces Korea Commander JB Abrams also stated that South Korea possesses the capability, experience, and strategic location to contribute to Indo-Pacific stability, implying a demand for an expanded role in containing China beyond the North Korean threat.

These demands will intensify through the current war. Within alliances, there is growing contemplation about how long and to what extent allies should participate in U.S. wars. The perception is spreading that alliances are becoming not a security umbrella but a target of continuous demands. Therefore, there is a sense of crisis that the foundation of alliance trust may be shaken in the future. In conclusion, the Iran conflict could be more than just a Middle Eastern dispute; it could become an event that shakes the post-war world order. If great powers continue to weaken norms and weaker states respond by horizontally expanding conflicts, the world may move towards disorder rather than stable multipolarization.

The Korean Peninsula is also highly likely to become a direct party to this situation. Therefore, it is time for South Korea to reconsider its alliance security strategy and crisis management plan. Thank you for watching.

■ Author: Park Won Gon (Director, North Korea Research Center, East Asia Institute; Professor, Department of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University)

■ Management and Editing: Lim Jae Hyun (EAI Research Fellow)

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhlim@eai.or.kr