[2026 East Asian Institute Conference on Diplomacy with Neighboring Countries and North Korea Policy: New Year Dialogue] ⑥ New Eastern Policy and the Gap in Restoring Russia-US Relations: Strategic Redesign of Korea-Russia Relations in the Post-Détente Era

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f2qwqq4jyvw

Video Script

The Reorganization of the International Order in the Post-Unipolar Era and Two Perspectives

Yes, hello. This is Jang Se-ho from the Institute for National Security Strategy. I study various issues related to Russia's domestic politics and foreign relations at the institute. Earlier, Professor Shin Beom-sik mentioned that the unipolar era is ending and a post-unipolar era is dawning. Others also say that the old order has exhausted its strength, but the specific shape of the new order is unclear. The core essence is that the American hegemony, which we have been familiar with since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, or more actively, since the end of World War II in 1945, the so-called American era, is being seriously challenged. In this context, I would like to introduce an interesting contribution to you. Last year.

As I read this contribution published in Foreign Affairs in June 2025, I was reminded of a book by the same author, 'The Power Paradox.' It is the book by Professor Joseph Nye, who passed away last year. I believe it was published in 2014, and I suspect many of you here have read it. I also recall reading it with great interest. The title of the book was 'Is America's World Over?' In fact, at the time this book was written, the so-called American decline theory was causing quite a stir, and Professor Joseph Nye, among others, reached his own conclusions regarding this decline. He argued that the decline of American power is not an absolute decline in hegemony or national strength, but a relative one, and he enumerated various forces challenging America, pointing out their limitations. In conclusion, he argued that America possesses considerable competitiveness and superiority in terms of hard power, especially soft power, and that if American governments effectively manage smart power, which is a combination of hard and soft power, America's world will continue very stably. This 2014 book contains such content. This is my rough summary. Eleven years have passed, and what did Professor Joseph Nye say in his June 2025 Foreign Affairs contribution? The title of this contribution is very provocative: 'The End of the Long American Century.' Eleven years ago, Professor Joseph Nye 전망ed American hegemony with great optimism, but in his last work, written last year before his passing, he says the following. He sharply criticizes American policy since the advent of Trump, particularly stating that America is withdrawing from international relations.

He explicitly uses the term 'mid-rowing' in international relations, pointing out the significant reduction in smart power and American international leadership at the time, and issues a strong warning that the 'long American century may truly be ending.' In this context, I am reminded of two conflicting perspectives on the recent changes in the international order. Some may point to the US attack on Venezuela just a few days ago, on January 3rd, and how Maduro was, should I say, kidnapped or arrested? The scene of his repatriation to his home country. It is, in fact, shocking. If not for the United States, what other country could have taken such action? Like it or not, it demonstrated immense influence.

Dispatching its military to a sovereign state and apprehending its president to bring him back to its own country. I believe this is a very important symbolic event demonstrating America's current influence. From this perspective, many people, or some people, argue that 'Given America's power, influence, and leadership, despite various challenges to its hegemony, America will very quickly renew its hegemony and restore the unipolar international order it has led.' On the other hand, some argue the opposite: 'America's decline is already irreversible and inevitable.'

Prolongation of a Transitional Order Rather Than Revolutionary Order Reorganization

Moreover, it is not only China challenging American hegemony, but also Russia, and this has already formed a bloc. Therefore, this is an irreversible process, and a revolutionary reorganization of the international order will occur, leading to the creation of a new, alternative multipolar international order in the near future. In my view, both of these arguments are very persuasive, but as an analyst and someone who studies international politics, I feel there is a certain bias in both arguments.

The reason I think so is that we need to look back at the historical experience of how international orders have been reorganized. In fact, international orders have undergone several stages. Historically, the reorganization of the international order has involved shifts in the power dynamics between hegemonic and challenging powers, preventive wars by the hegemonic power to prevent this, or direct military challenges by the challenging power, military clashes and wars between them, and the victorious nation in these wars has created a new order as spoils of war. This has been the history of international order reorganization. However, in the current situation, although we have discussed China extensively, will the United States and China actually clash and go to war like in past international order reorganizations? Earlier,

we discussed China's nuclear arsenal, which is currently around 500 and is projected to reach 700 by 2027. The United States already possesses over 100,000 nuclear warheads. Russia is in a similar position. Therefore, is it likely that the United States and China, or the United States and Russia, will engage in military conflict over international hegemony? I believe the possibility is not high. Ultimately, the struggle for global order leadership or hegemony is likely to unfold over a very long period across various domains, including proxy wars, technology, and trade, in a multi-layered process. In that sense, the future reorganization of the international order is likely to be a long evolutionary process, maintaining the foundation of the existing order, rather than a revolutionary process that completely destroys the old order. Furthermore, the existing order, including the UN and international law,

will maintain a certain inertia, leading to a prolonged period of uncertainty and ambiguity where separate operating principles function at the regional level. When I mentioned the 'bias' earlier, if one believes that the American world order will be quickly restored, then from the perspective of South Korean diplomacy, with whom should we align? With the United States. And if China is expected to surpass the United States and establish a new hegemony in a short period, then South Korean diplomacy should align with China without hesitation. If you have ten eggs, you would put all ten in the American basket, or all ten in the Chinese basket.

However, in such an uncertain, fluid, and variable international environment, the question of what kind of diplomacy South Korea should pursue presents us with a difficult challenge and homework. I would like to add one more point. I had written something down below and considered skipping it, but then I decided to define the current era in my own way. I have come up with two characterizations. The first is, perhaps, 'an era of active pessimism.' When we use terms like pessimism or optimism, we are comparing today, the present, with tomorrow. If we believe tomorrow will be better than today, that is optimism. However, if we believe tomorrow will be more difficult, more arduous, and more challenging than today, that is pessimism. In our perception of this arduous and chaotic international politics and international relations, will optimism or pessimism prevail? I believe pessimism occupies a much larger proportion. Yet, in this pessimism, do people go to plant apple trees? No. Just as individuals do, I believe nations, in this era of pessimism, exhibit proactivity by striving and working tirelessly to ensure their survival, prosperity, and development, without being overwhelmed. In that sense, I call this 'an era of active pessimism.'

I have characterized it this way. Alternatively, I have also characterized it as 'an era of principled opportunism.' Because the world is complex and unstable, many countries operate and maneuver opportunistically. This is not limited to great powers; middle powers, weak states, and developing countries all live in an era where they opportunistically pursue their national interests. However, since it is difficult to do so openly, they often preface their actions with appropriate justifications. In this context, we need to consider our relationship with Russia. First, let's examine the current state of South Korea-Russia relations. South Korea and Russia established diplomatic relations in 1990, so last year marked exactly 35 years since the establishment of diplomatic ties.

And for the past 35 years since establishing diplomatic relations, South Korea-Russia relations have been evaluated as developing slowly but steadily by many experts. However, with the full-scale COVID-19 crisis in 2019 and the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022, South Korea-Russia relations faced serious challenges, and the relationship has been characterized by regression and stagnation. Currently, it is at rock bottom, and it would not be an exaggeration to say it is in the worst situation in history. Intergovernmental exchanges have virtually ceased, and private exchanges have also significantly shrunk. Looking at the current trade volume between the two countries, it has considerably contracted. To my recollection, before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2021, the bilateral trade volume was $27 billion. However, for 2024, the bilateral trade volume is around $11.4 billion. This means

South Korea-Russia Relations: Current Status and the Need for Strategic Redesign

Having thus characterized the era, another characterization is 'an era of principled opportunism.' Because the world is complex and unstable, many states operate and maneuver opportunistically. This is not limited to great powers. Middle powers, weak states, and developing countries alike are living in an era where they opportunistically pursue national interests. However, because it is difficult to do so openly, they advance appropriate justifications or principles. We are living in such an era. In this context, we must consider our relationships, and first, let us examine the current state of Korea-Russia relations. Korea and Russia established diplomatic relations in 1990, so last year marked exactly 35 years since the establishment of diplomatic ties.

It has more than halved. As the trade figures show, the relationship between the two societies is very poor. In 2021, Russia was South Korea's 12th largest trading partner. However, as of 2024, it has rapidly fallen to around 28th or 29th place. Furthermore, while South Korea-Russia relations have deteriorated politically, North Korea and Russia have become extremely close. And in 2024,

North Korea and Russia finally signed a new treaty. This new treaty involves renewing the existing Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighborliness and Cooperation and establishing a new Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Notably, this treaty includes provisions for mutual military assistance, effectively restoring a military alliance relationship. The restoration of this military alliance between North Korea and Russia is sending significant shockwaves not only to South Korea but also to the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia, and the global stage. From this perspective, I believe there are several issues to consider when we think about South Korea-Russia relations. Additionally, I want to emphasize one more point: since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, as well as the US military attack on Venezuela, Russia cannot escape responsibility for its invasion of a sovereign state that violates or flagrantly disregards international law.

Therefore, it is entirely natural to question whether South Korea should normalize relations with Russia, a country that has committed such an invasion. Consequently, the argument that we must act with a principled stance in our relations with Russia is fully justifiable and should be respected. Nevertheless, all state relations, like human relationships, have aspects that go beyond what is right or wrong. From a realistic perspective, there are quite a few points we need to consider. First, considering South Korea's national identity and the current fluid and variable international relations, South Korea's foreign policy or diplomacy is fundamentally compelled to foster amicable relations with its neighboring countries. What is South Korea's national identity? It is a divided nation. It is a country where peace is paramount.

Therefore, it is entirely natural to question whether Korea should normalize relations with Russia, which has waged an invasion. Consequently, I believe that the position of maintaining a principled stance in relations with Russia, and the arguments put forth for it, deserve full respect. Nevertheless, all state relations are, in fact, similar to human relationships. Moving beyond what is ideal, from a realistic perspective, there are quite a few points we need to consider. First, given South Korea's national identity and the current fluid and variable international relations, South Korea's foreign policy or diplomacy is fundamentally compelled to foster amicable relations with neighboring countries. What kind of national identity does South Korea possess? It is a divided nation. It is a country where peace is paramount.

South Korea is a peninsular nation. It occupies a geopolitical position where continental and maritime powers can clash. However, if managed well, it can also be a geopolitical space where continental and maritime powers can freely meet and cooperate. It is a trading nation. South Korea's identity is such that it must import various raw materials and components, manufacture high-value-added goods, and sell them well in various markets to sustain its prosperity. Such a nation must fundamentally maintain good relations with its neighbors. It must foster amicable relations. At the very least, maintaining non-contentious relations is a natural and crucial task. I believe so. Furthermore, in the context of the variable and fluid international relations I mentioned earlier, placing all of South Korea's eggs in one basket could be a very risky choice. These points must be considered. Second, we need to objectively assess Russia's strategic value. Of course, there are many aspects of Russia that are undesirable and problematic for us, but Russia clearly possesses strategic assets.

These include energy and food self-sufficiency, and it is even the world's largest exporter of these commodities. From our perspective, it is a country with which cooperation is necessary, as is the case with its foundational technologies. Furthermore, including the post-Soviet region, i.e., countries close to Russia in Eurasia, it represents a significant market for goods. In terms of logistics, Russia possesses considerable competitiveness, considering both existing and emerging logistics networks. Additionally, Russia holds a position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and is a leading country in emerging multilateral organizations such as BRICS Plus. We must carefully consider how to shape our relationship with such a country. Next, we must consider Russia's role as a key player that has returned to Northeast Asia. While some may question whether Russia can be included as a Northeast Asian country, and it is undeniable that Russia has historically occupied a peripheral position, recent developments show Russia significantly expanding its influence and presence in Northeast Asia through its strategic relationship with China and North Korea. Its voice is growing considerably. Therefore, we must consider Russia's position as a returning influential actor in the region. So, is South Korea the only one who values Russia and is pursuing a one-sided relationship?

Russia's 'New East Policy' and Growing Role in Northeast Asia

Is it trying to restore relations? As Professor Shin Beom-sik briefly mentioned earlier, based on my recent visit to Russia, it seems that is not entirely the case. In fact, since the launch of Putin's third term in 2012, Russia has actively pursued its 'Expanded Eurasian Vision' or 'New East Policy.' This policy is still in effect. The strategic vision behind this Expanded Eurasian Vision or New East Policy includes the recognition that the center of the world order is shifting from the Euro-Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific, and therefore, Russia's future lies not in the West but in the East. This is not a temporary or secondary strategy but one developed from a long-term, strategic perspective. This strategic shift towards the East seems to have become even more solidified after the war in Ukraine. Indeed, based on my reading of various Russian strategists' writings and my business trip to Russia,

even if the war in Ukraine ends, Russia will certainly focus on the East despite the importance of cooperation with Western countries. Russia views its future vision in the East and has consequently strengthened cooperation with China and India. However, cooperation with China has become excessively close, posing a threat of dependence on China due to the war. Cooperation with India is also important, and India can serve as a crucial leverage in its relationship with China. However, India's direction is unpredictable.

India maintains good cooperation with the United States and, despite somewhat strained relations with China, has very good relations with Russia. Therefore, there is doubt as to whether India is a reliable partner. While Russia considers South Korea and Japan as promising partners for cooperation, Japan has a structural constraint in the form of territorial disputes. Ultimately, it is undeniable that Russia considers South Korea a highly promising partner among influential actors in Northeast Asia. Therefore, from South Korea's perspective, the relationship with Russia is not one-sided; mutual communication can be achieved, and the relationship should be established and designed accordingly.

Prospects for the End of the War in Ukraine and Changes in US-Russia Relations

I would also like to point out the possibility of the end of the war in Ukraine. Professor Shin Beom-sik suggested focusing on the first half of next year, and I strongly agree. Furthermore, I would like to state that the war in Ukraine has already ended. Recent discussions suggest that former President Trump believes it is about 95% complete, and President Zelenskyy estimates it to be around 90% complete. One of the Russian Deputy Foreign Ministers described the negotiations as undergoing delicate coordination. The fact that a Russian official, who had previously maintained an uncompromising stance, mentioned delicate coordination is noteworthy.

The war is at a stalemate, and casualties continue to occur on the battlefield, but the basic framework for ending the war has been established. It is merely a tug-of-war over a few unresolved issues. The reason I say the war has ended is that the framework has already been settled. Ultimately, the fight to conclude the war over the final core issues is underway, so the end of the war is a matter of time. However, the outlook may vary depending on the timing of the conclusion, but it is necessary to consider the end of the war in Ukraine. Furthermore, I want to emphasize the possibility of a transactional détente between the US and Russia after the war. The National Security Strategy (NSS) announced by the United States last November was a significant shock to us.

The US described outdated dogmas, ideologies, values, and institutions as obstacles to achieving national interests. The NSS explains the reasons for the decline of American hegemony and national power through an analysis of failure causes, clearly expressing its intention to pursue national interests through strength and transaction by discarding outdated elements.

In particular, unlike the Biden administration's NS, Russia is not described as an enemy or threat. Russia is defined as a diplomatic and economic target to be managed with the goal of restoring strategic stability.

This implies a future change in US-Russia relations. Furthermore, a leaked advanced version of the document suggests replacing the existing G7 with a C5 (Core) comprising the United States, China, Russia, India, and Japan. This implies replacing it with countries possessing significant national power and population, indicating America's considerations, such as Yalta 2.0 or a new cooperation framework. These matters emphasize that US-Russia relations could change considerably after the war in Ukraine. Following Trump 2.0, the US and Russia have held various meetings, the most representative being the summit in Anchorage last August. The main agenda of the meeting was a plan to end the war, but it is often overlooked that alongside discussions on ending the war, areas of US-Russia economic cooperation were also discussed with equal or greater emphasis.

The normalization of US-Russia relations is being treated as an important agenda item, suggesting that economic cooperation or transactions between the two countries after the war will be discussed with significant emphasis. Indeed, various fields such as energy resources, financial sanctions, Arctic projects, and space cooperation are being mentioned. At the Anchorage meeting, ExxonMobil of the US and Rosneft of Russia held side meetings and discussed ExxonMobil's return to the Yamal project, in which it participated. Thus, the US and Russia are considering not only ending the war but also cooperation plans for the post-war order. In this regard, it is crucial how South Korea's new government formulates and implements its policy toward Russia. While the current government has not officially expressed its policy stance toward Russia, its five-year plan for national operation, released in August last year, stated in the foreign and security policy section regarding Russia that it would pursue stable management and development of bilateral relations.

South Korea's Relaunch of Policy Toward Russia and the Conception of Northern Policy 2.0

Key aspects include protecting the rights and interests of citizens and businesses, continuing strategic communication for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and expanding consensus for building a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship. One of the reasons for the poor state of South Korea-Russia relations thus far appears to be the difference in perspectives on the reorganization of the international order. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration emphasizes values and likely prefers the restoration or preservation of the existing order, having achieved prosperity by aligning with the US-led order. Conversely, Russia views the US-centric unipolar international order as not aligning with its interests and pursues the creation of a new order. This difference in perception has made establishing a strategic relationship difficult. However, the new South Korean government emphasizes national interests over values, which can be interpreted as a signal of its willingness to adapt to the changing international order. Therefore, it is important to view the common ground between the two countries as widening. To restore and develop South Korea-Russia relations, first, we must exhibit proactivity and initiative. Instead of waiting for conditions to improve, we must actively create them.

Second, waiting for the war to end before improving relations is too late. Unlike the active engagement of the United States before the war, it is premature for South Korea to wait until after the war. We must find what can be done now. Third, we should start with what is easy and highly beneficial. Demanding Russia's cooperation on North Korean denuclearization is unrealistic. It is advisable to prioritize cooperation in economic and trade areas where there are tangible mutual benefits and which are not subject to sanctions.

There is a prerequisite: South Korea must be recognized as a strategic actor. If it is merely seen as an actor that blindly follows the United States, it will be difficult to achieve long-term success in South Korea-Russia relations. Furthermore, various communication channels must be utilized, including summit and ministerial meetings, special envoy missions, and 1.5-track dialogues. If the government finds it difficult to take direct action, parliamentary and local government bodies should also be mobilized.

Most importantly, the new government must ensure that the stable management of South Korea-Russia relations, while considered important, does not become neglected. Tasks that are relegated to lower priority often end up being forgotten. To ensure they are not neglected and are managed, considerable effort is required. South Korea's new government needs to boldly reimagine and formulate its policy as 'Northern Policy 2.0.' To this end, measures such as establishing a Northern Affairs Secretary under the Second Deputy Director of the National Security Office or creating a governance system with a Presidential Special Envoy for Northern Affairs are necessary to continuously consider policy toward Russia, even if it is a lower priority, and to create policy synergy through coordination among relevant departments.

There is a prerequisite: South Korea must be recognized as a strategic actor. If it is merely perceived as an actor that blindly follows the United States, it will be difficult to achieve long-term results in Korea-Russia relations. Furthermore, various communication channels must be utilized, such as summit-level and ministerial meetings, special envoy missions, and track 1.5 dialogues. If the government finds it difficult to take direct action, parliamentary and local government bodies should also be mobilized.

I conclude my presentation by expressing my hope for long-term cooperation in these various fields and by urging that we work towards making it a reality.

■ Author: Jang Se-ho _ Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Strategy.

■ Editor: Lim Jae-hyun _ EAI Research Fellow.

■ Editor: Lim Jae-hyun _ EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhlim@eai.or.kr

■ Editor: Lim Jae-hyun _ EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhlim@eai.or.kr