[2026 East Asian Institute (EAI) Conference on Diplomacy and North Korea Strategy: New Year Dialogue] V. The Multi-layered Structure of War and the Multipolarization of the International Order: The End Game of the Russia-Ukraine War and the Strategic Restoration of ROK-Russia Relations

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0G-HTMGqu50

Video Script

Good afternoon. I am Shin Beom-sik, who was just introduced. First, I will discuss the current status and outlook of the Russia-Ukraine war. Whenever we talk about the Russia-Ukraine war, I always emphasize the need to understand its multi-layered structure. You may have heard this on other occasions. This war fundamentally has a multi-layered structure, referred to as a triple war. The reason this war is difficult to understand simply is that these three wars are intertwined in a proxy war structure, making it difficult to understand and find solutions.

As you well know, the first aspect is the nature of the war between Russia and the West. It is an international conflict. Although European countries are not directly participating, military support, weapons, and actual troops are being provided to Ukraine in various forms. Based on this, Russia views the war from an international perspective, and the war begins with Russia's phản ứng that this is pressure from the West. Therefore, from Russia's perspective, regarding why there is so much criticism from the aggressor nation, the degree and intensity of condemnation towards Russia can vary depending on how this aspect is understood.

The second aspect is the war between Russia and Ukraine itself, as a state-to-state conflict, possessing the characteristics of a true interstate war. The third aspect, which was relatively unknown and became known over time, is its civil war nature. The war between the rebel forces within Ukraine, particularly in the Donbas region, and the Ukrainian government forces has been ongoing since 2014 under the name of the Donbas War for approximately eight years until the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. With nearly 100,000 casualties and 1.2 million refugees, this war was not a minor conflict, even though we did not pay much attention to it beforehand.

The Triple Structure and Outlook of the Russia-Ukraine War

The triple nature of this war, which would be easier to understand with the accompanying diagram, appears much more complex. Please focus only on the colors. The international war is depicted in light blue, the state-to-state war in orange, and the civil war aspect in purple dotted lines. These three wars have been proceeding complexly, intertwined with the proxy war structure of Western support for Ukraine and Russian support for rebels within Ukraine. Therefore, for this war to end, these three dimensions of conflict must be resolved one by one. I will not elaborate on this, but I would like to offer a way to think about it.

The third war, the civil war aspect, has been resolved in Russia's favor through the task of liberating Ukraine and Donbas, from Russia's perspective. The remaining wars are the first and second wars, and how to resolve them is a crucial issue. While I will discuss this in detail later, the positions of Russia and Ukraine are almost entrenched, making it unlikely for the war to be resolved by a change in their stances. Ultimately, the possibility of resolving this war hinges on how the relationship between the West and Russia is managed, which I will elaborate on later. This map, which you have likely seen many times and looks similar after nearly four years, shows that approximately 20% of Ukraine's territory has been occupied by Russia, which has declared it its own territory and proceeded with annexation. Since late 2025, Russian attacks have been concentrated in the western parts of Luhansk and Donetsk (indicated in orange), and Russian forces have been seen slowly expanding their territory in these areas. This was the situation in late 2025.

However, we need to look at this objectively. To those who claim Russia is winning this war, I would say this: If Russia were winning, that territory should be quickly reclaimed. The very fact that Russia continues to hold it contradicts the assertion of Russian superiority. Conversely, to those who claim Ukraine is not defending effectively and Russia is overwhelming the war, I would ask: If Russia were overwhelming, how can the fact that this map has remained largely unchanged for nearly three years be explained? What I mean to say is that while it is true that Russia currently holds a certain advantage on the battlefield and is slowly expanding its occupied territories, Ukraine, with Western support, is also defending with all its might. However, the concern is how long Ukraine's all-out defense can be sustained. Conversely, can Russia completely overwhelm Ukraine and occupy the entire territory? The fact that this map has persisted for three years suggests that Russia does not have the capacity to do so.

So, how will this war end? We are currently in a phase of coexistence between military conflict and diplomatic engagement. As mentioned earlier, Russia's attempt in 2025 to leverage its military advantage into diplomatic negotiation power appears to be a sign of change. Ukraine is formulating a defensive strategy based on support from NATO and Europe. The issue is the United States. Since the emergence of President Trump, there has been a shift in the US position towards prioritizing direct negotiations with Russia over engagement with Europe and Ukraine, and this change may bring about the end or a ceasefire in the war.

However, there are clear obstacles. From Europe's perspective, the significant psychological barrier is the concern that accepting a reduction in support for Ukraine and territorial concessions would embolden Putin's Russia, weaken NATO cohesion, and ultimately lead to further European aggression. From the US perspective, the Trump-era inclination to secure economic benefits quickly, as demonstrated in the midterm elections, influences the approach to negotiations. This leads to a situation where a top-down approach to imposing a negotiated settlement, rather than a gradual process of building consensus, is failing to gain traction. From Russia's perspective, the concern is that if the war ends in an ambiguous ceasefire or peace, it would give Ukraine an opportunity to rearm, potentially leading to a recurrence of the conflict. Therefore, Russia insists on a definitive end to the war and questions the legitimacy of the Zelensky administration.

Meanwhile, Ukraine maintains a firm stance that a ceasefire without security guarantees is absolutely unacceptable for its future. Consequently, as these positions clash, finding common ground on security issues such as US security guarantees, peacekeeping force deployment, or Ukraine's neutrality, as indicated in the upper left, is proving difficult. Reaching an agreement on the Russian economy and frozen assets is also challenging. Recent developments suggest that the US and Russia may be moving towards a compromise in this area.

I should conclude the section on Ukraine by discussing the prospects for peace negotiations. Broadly speaking, the period from February to March 2022, characterized by high-intensity conflict and negotiation, was the initial phase of the Russia-Ukraine war. Support for Ukraine continued, and negotiations between Russia and Ukraine were actively pursued. However, after this month-long period of seeking negotiations, the situation transitioned into phase F, from April 2022 to late 2024 or early 2025. This phase involved high-intensity conflict. While there were no dramatic shifts on the front lines, it resulted in immense casualties, with over a million lives lost combined on both sides.

Since 2025, with direct negotiations between the US and Russia, Russia has again adopted a proactive stance in negotiations, leading to a shift towards the goal of concluding a peace and ceasefire agreement as outlined in column A. However, as mentioned earlier, if the US and Europe had acted in unison in the conflict between Russia and the West, the war should have ended. The issue is that recently, disagreements have emerged between the US and Europe, leading to discussions about Europe's future security orientation. This has strengthened the view that the Ukraine war has significant value as a period to buy time for their own rearmament, effectively leading to phase B, a low-intensity conflict.

Given Europe's limitations in providing extensive military aid alone, the possibility of a prolonged period of low-intensity conflict and protracted negotiations is increasing. In other words, the current situation can be summarized as whether we will move from E to F, F to A, and now to B, or whether A will be concluded. Now, I will briefly discuss what has happened during the ongoing negotiations. To put it simply, there was the Alaska summit last year. Since then, high-level meetings between the US and Russia have continued.

Negotiations began with the exchange of draft agreements on 28 points, including front-line control, territorial issues, sanctions relief, and security guarantees. Putin's press conference on December 20th suggests that at least the US and Russia had agreed on a draft for the cessation of the Ukraine war through the Alaska talks. However, the process of persuading Europe and Ukraine, and coordinating these matters between Russia and Ukraine, proved difficult, and the US diplomatic efforts showed certain limitations. Therefore, although efforts were made to end the war, substantial progress was limited, and the situation has evolved into a phase of war management, stalemate, and negotiation.

What is the outlook? Will Russian domestic politics be a variable? Simply put, Russia's power base remains stable, and its economy is still holding up, so Russia itself is unlikely to be a variable. Russia appears to have the capacity to sustain a medium-to-high intensity war for the next few years. Please note my use of the term 'medium-to-high intensity war.' It is unlikely for Russia to engage in high-intensity warfare. Russia's ability to sustain the war is determined by the intensity of warfare conducted by President Putin, which is a function of domestic political stability and economic manageability. Therefore, the possibility of engaging in high-intensity warfare to the point of destabilizing domestic politics and causing economic collapse is considered unlikely.

The same applies to Ukraine. War fatigue is accumulating, and while they maintain a defensive strategy, they cannot afford to abandon the war. Ukraine will inevitably have to rely on European support if US aid is cut off. While Europe is indeed increasing its defense spending from 3% to 5% across the board, it will ultimately have to maintain a defensive balance, and it is overcoming internal challenges such as troop depletion and logistical bottlenecks. Therefore, it can be anticipated that time is not necessarily on the side of Europe and Ukraine in this war of attrition. Ultimately, I believe the major variable will be the US midterm elections. Trump's approach prioritizes domestic politics and minimizes foreign intervention, but ultimately

this was a key starting point for the momentum of peace negotiations. However, the outcome of the midterm elections, whether President Trump is re-elected or not, will significantly impact the negotiations for the Ukraine war. If he is re-elected, and if the negotiation momentum is maintained, allowing for at least one to two years post-midterm elections, Europe and Ukraine may reach their limits of endurance and be more likely to accept a conditional compromise or a partial peace package. However, if he loses the midterm elections, Russia may be forced to revise its foreign policy, and the negotiation structure could become highly unstable, leading to a prolonged stalemate.

The most significant possibility for complementing Europe's will and capacity is likely the potential for strategic division. That is, if Europe can maintain a unified stance in continuing to support Ukraine, low-intensity resistance can persist. However, if divisions emerge within Europe, a significant change is likely. Therefore, I believe that the resolution of the international structure, as discussed earlier, is more likely to be determined by variables related to the US and Europe rather than those related to Russia and Ukraine.

I will conclude by saying this. Some of you look as if you are wondering why I am rushing to the conclusion. If you ask for my personal opinion, as a professor and scholar, I am cautious about making predictions. However, I believe that efforts towards a compromise will be more strongly pursued in the first half of this year, and the possibility of ending the war will increase depending on how effectively President Trump can persuade Europe. Therefore, I optimistically project 2026, with the aim of finding a negotiated settlement in the first half of the year and implementing it.

De-polarizing and Multipolizing World Order

I hope that will be the case. It may not happen, so please do not blame me too much if it doesn't. Second, I will briefly discuss the changes in the international situation and Russia's foreign policy strategy. As you are well aware, the era of US unipolarity is waning, and de-polarization is underway. The geopolitical landscape of 2025 can be assessed as a turning point where the US-led liberal international order has weakened, and the international order is being reorganized into a multi-layered and decentralized power structure. Consequently, intense great power politics and the restoration of a hegemonic order are likely to be difficult for the time being. Nevertheless, the US, still the most powerful nation, is pursuing a strategy to maintain its position as the number one great power, rather than regaining hegemony. I believe President Trump's era can be assessed in this way. The US will still

The US will realize its strategy of maintaining its top position through its strong military power, the dollar financial system, and its alliance network. However, unlike in the past, strategic cooperation and compromise with Eurasian powers such as Russia, China, and India will be difficult. Furthermore, the linkage between security and economy in the reorganization of supply chains will be further strengthened. This part will be discussed in more detail in Session 2, so I will briefly move on. Third is the rise and structuring of the Global South, which is a point to note in the changes of the international order following the Ukraine war. In the past, they were grouped as developing countries, and while they had a strong voice, they lacked substantial power.

However, the biggest miscalculation by Russia and the US at the outbreak of the Ukraine war was Russia's overconfidence in a swift victory and the US belief that the world would unite to bring Russia to its knees through economic sanctions. The combination of these two miscalculations has made the war even more tragic. Tracing the causes of the US miscalculation reveals that the Global South, while condemning Russia's war of aggression, did not participate in the economic sanctions. If the Global South were insignificant, their non-participation would not have been a major issue.

However, by not participating in the economic sanctions, the Global South dealt a significant blow to the US's ability to suppress Russia, which was hindering the maintenance of its hegemonic order. This signifies that the Global South has become an entity capable of influencing the global order through a balanced middle-ground approach that pursues pragmatic interests. Therefore, the Global South is no longer just a group with a loud voice; by uniting and acting with a single voice, they can exert structural influence on the global order. Finally, it is necessary to pay attention to the risk of forming regional new Cold War structures.

Of course, a new Cold War structure desired by North Korea might guarantee North Korea's security. However, from China's and Russia's perspectives, a global new Cold War structure is not particularly beneficial, as both China and Russia have many points of compromise with the US. However, if a new Cold War structure in Northeast Asia, particularly around the Korean Peninsula, is deemed to be in Russia's interest, it raises the question of whether Russia would accept it.

While Russia's explicit acceptance of a new Cold War structure is unlikely, the possibility of quietly exploiting such confrontational dynamics cannot be ruled out. Therefore, we need to pay attention to this aspect and respond proactively. Examining Russia's foreign and security policy, on a global level, it will seek to restore its role in overall global security by discussing strategic stability, energy issues, and Arctic issues through communication with the US. In its regional strategy, it will focus on Eurasia, strengthening Russia's position within the Eurasian region through the Eurasian Economic Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

This is one of Russia's unchanging foreign policy strategies. The issue is that after the Ukraine war, the autonomy of Central Asian and Eurasian countries has increased, and their solidarity strategies have been strengthened, posing challenges to Russia. Effectively responding to this has become an important task for Russia. Third, Russia will continue to leverage its strategic trilateral cooperation with China and India. Even during difficult times, Russia has successfully achieved trilateral cooperation among Russia, China, and India by harmonizing the delicate relationship between China and India, based on strategic cooperation between Russia-China and Russia-India. This has resulted in the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS. This challenges the US-led, West-centric international order.

Russia needs to pay attention to the results of the 20 years of Russia-China-India strategic trilateral cooperation and conduct research to explore this area. Russia will continue to utilize this Russia-China-India trilateral cooperation. Finally, in Russia's Far East, it is highly likely to pursue a strategy of strengthening its broad relationship beyond mere military cooperation or a relationship of convenience by developing relations with North Korea and deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.

The very fact that the relationship between Russia and the US is moving towards an adjustment structure that encompasses the entire global security agenda, not just the Ukraine war issue, shows that Russia is attempting to restore its influence on a global scale and position itself as a major actor without being completely isolated. This is intertwined with the aspect that the Russia-China relationship is being utilized to bring about changes in the global order by bringing its significant strategic cooperation to a completion stage, thereby rendering criticisms of a mere alliance of convenience moot. In conclusion, while the US-China relationship is a crucial axis for understanding the global order, attention must now also be paid to the relationship between Russia, the US, and China, i.e., the US-China-Russia trilateral relationship.

South Korea's Strategy for Redefining Relations with Russia

Russia and North Korea will strengthen their strategic cooperation in a more comprehensive and robust form by enhancing multifaceted cooperation agendas through multi-layered communication. So, what should South Korea do? Although 35 years have passed since the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Russia, the relationship has not received much attention due to the war, and expanding economic cooperation between the two countries is difficult. However, according to a survey by the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry late last year, 80% of companies with experience in economic cooperation with Russia expressed a positive stance on Russian sanctions. Even during difficult times, the two countries have maintained private sector cooperation through various channels, including the adoption of the Moscow Declaration for GT international organizations and transition efforts.

Should South Korea then completely abandon its relationship with Russia and pursue an alternative policy of checking Russia-North Korea cooperation in a different way? If not, it is important to pursue a policy direction that strengthens relations with Russia by utilizing South Korea's capabilities and assets, thereby preventing the formation of a confrontational structure in Northeast Asia.

We should pursue a gradual relationship strengthening strategy that continuously deepens management and communication structures to at least avoid breaking the foundation of the relationship. Even during the war, although officially impossible, personal and institutional efforts for strategic communication have been ongoing. It appears that there is a certain shared understanding based on these efforts to proceed with strategic cooperation between the two countries quickly once conditions permit.

The resumption of direct flights between South Korea and Russia, which is emerging as a current issue, will signal the beginning of substantive discussions for the recovery of bilateral relations. Personally, I believe it is necessary to explore ways to overcome the difficult times by utilizing the approximately $200 million in cash repayment that Russia still owes from the $3 billion economic cooperation loan from the time of diplomatic ties, which was suspended due to the war.

Ultimately, the process of managing, reopening, and expanding the blocked relationship between South Korea and Russia must be undertaken with the prospect that the relationship between Russia and North Korea can contribute to creating a balanced structure on the Korean Peninsula, rather than reinforcing a confrontational structure. To this end, it is crucial to consistently maintain strategic communication channels between South Korea and Russia. This concludes my presentation.

■ Author: Shin Beom-sik, Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Contact and Editing: Lim Jae-hyun, EAI Research Fellow
Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhlim@eai.or.kr