[The Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic Hub for Shared Security Challenges Regional Kick-Off] NATO-IP4 in an Unstable Hybrid Order: Middle Powers' Connectivity Against Fragmentation

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dekoc9qP93o

Video Script

Introduction of the Speaker and Analytical Frameworks

I would like to thank Professor Jed Park for allowing me to present, and the Yans and NATO officials. I also thank Professor Rich for moderating, and I am delighted to meet Dr. Igata, Dr. Bristow, Professor Kappy, Ms. Sophie, and everyone else joining via Zoom. I am Inhwan Oh, Director and Senior Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute (EAI) in Seoul. Since last semester, I have also been lecturing at Seoul National University. My presentation today is based on three analytical frameworks that I have been observing since last January.

These frameworks include an article I co-authored with Director Choi Sung-ryul of EAI for the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). The article is titled 'The Domain of a New Order of Conflict,' and it is also part of the CFR’s contributions to the CFR’s members’ response to the official release of the National Security Strategy document in 2025. You can look it up if you are interested. I also drew on insights from other panelists at similar seminars, such as my presentation at the EAI Public Seminar on February 9th.

The Importance of South Korea's Partnership with NATO: Order Fragmentation and the Threat to Middle Powers

I am using this analysis because I believe it directly answers the questions posed by the organizers. So, let's go through them one by one. First, why is it important for South Korea to partner with NATO? In our CFR article, we argue that the world is neither returning to 19th-century balance-of-power politics nor moving towards a concert of great powers, as some experts or commentators suggest. This is because there is no explicit or implicit agreement on the order that great powers pursue, especially between the United States and China.

Instead, we are witnessing an unstable hybrid order where different ordering principles coexist and clash without proper resolution or strategic-level coordination. The greatest threat to middle powers in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, like South Korea, is precisely this fragmentation of order itself, not the dominance of a particular great power or the relative decline of the United States. And there is an urgent risk that the Indo-Pacific could become an exclusive domain of great power privilege, where non-great powers like South Korea lose their strategic autonomy and room for political choice.

NATO-IP4: Maritime Strategy and Security Governance Structures

However, the rationale for partnering with NATO goes beyond these abstract principles. As I presented at the EAI seminar, we are in the midst of a naval power transition between China and the United States. The Chinese navy has surpassed the US Navy fleet in terms of the number of warships, and the US shipbuilding industrial base cannot be rapidly rebuilt. Therefore, Washington is shifting to a 'networked maritime strategy' that relies on the shipbuilding, maintenance, and technological capabilities of its allies, particularly those in South Korea, Japan, Canada, Australia, and Finland.

NATO IP4 is one of the few platforms that can connect maritime capabilities across the Indo-Pacific and the Eurasian Atlantic through this network. Should we seize this opportunity? On the other hand, as other panelists emphasized at the same seminar, we must consider moving beyond traditional alliance frameworks. The scope of security has expanded. For example, over 90% of emerging and disruptive technologies now come from the private sector.

NATO IP4 can evolve into a 'work-based security governance structure' focusing not only on military and naval partnerships but also on resilience, partnerships, technological standards, appropriate AI regulation, and the integration of civil-military ecosystems. Therefore, what South Korea gains from this partnership is not simply becoming a member of a bloc. It is about positioning itself as an essential node in a trusted technological and industrial ecosystem across two regions.

Key Shared Challenges: Geopolitical Convergence and Supply Chain Security

Especially in an era of global de-risking and supply chain reconfiguration. So, what are the key shared challenges? First, as the Ambassador rightly pointed out, the Russia-Ukraine war has triggered a structural convergence of Eurasian Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security. The alignment of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran is not a separate regional issue but a Eurasian-scale geopolitical challenge. Of course, the extent and durability of this alignment are debatable. For example, North Korea's

deployment to Ukraine, combined with China's access to prohibited goods and Russian combat data, could accelerate North Korea's AI and drone capabilities, posing a threat to both regions simultaneously. Second, defense supply chains have become strategic assets in themselves, and the Russia-Ukraine war has exposed severe shortages in NATO's production capacity, ammunition stockpiles, and critical minerals. NATO's 2024 roadmap specifies twelve critical minerals, from rare earths to lithium, making IP4 countries essential partners in diversifying the alliance's supply chains.

Areas for Cooperation: Building Maritime Industrial Networks and Technology Ecosystems

So, what more can we do? I would like to discuss three priorities that emerge from the collective analysis I have observed. The first is the maritime industrial network dimension of NATO IP4. Although the Trump administration is not actively deepening middle-power networking within this framework, the structural demand is immense. Middle powers like South Korea, Japan, Australia, Canada, and Finland could consider taking the lead in building bilateral connections in shipbuilding, joint MRO (Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul) capabilities, and advanced maritime technologies. For this, we can leverage ITP and NATO's Diana accelerators.

Second, building what one panelist called a 'trusted advanced technology ecosystem.' This means moving from declarative cooperation to practical public-private partnership structures, linking South Korean companies' AI semiconductor manufacturing capabilities with NATO's Diana test centers, innovation hubs, and rapid adoption initiatives aimed at bringing new technologies from concept to deployment within 24 months.

Countering Disinformation and Raising Public Awareness

Finally, I would like to address how we can enhance public understanding and resilience against this disinformation. Disinformation about NATO IP4 typically exploits two narratives: one, that this is an 'Asian NATO' for bloc politics, and two, that it drags Asian countries into distant conflicts. The most effective response is not more propaganda but more credibility, transparency, and consistent framing. One of our panelists even suggested explicitly

stating that this partnership is not intended to antagonize China. To avoid falling into the trap of this disinformation, we must consistently communicate that NATO IP4 is building a shared ecosystem for resilience, benefiting ordinary citizens through supply chain stability, cybersecurity, technology access, maritime networks, and conflict prevention. Our hub has already demonstrated an effective approach through hybrid threat simulation exercises with students and professionals, concretizing these threats in ways that policy briefs cannot convey.

We can scale this up into an annual signature event and amplify our impact by building a 'Friends of the Hub' network that includes corporate, media, and defense industry partners. This concludes my prepared remarks. Thank you for your attention.