[Global NK Commentary] Background and Significance of the 9th Party Congress: Stabilizing and Consolidating the Foundation for Permanent Hostile Coexistence between South and North Korea

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The significance of the 9th Party Congress lies in two aspects. First, it reaffirmed North Korea's future grand strategy, namely the strategy for establishing a permanent hostile coexistence relationship between South and North Korea, which was outlined during the 8th Party Congress. Second, compared to the timing of the 8th Party Congress, it presented policy tasks for the next five years based on the stabilization and consolidation of North Korea's capabilities and systems for pursuing its long-term grand strategy.

This article analyzes five aspects that constitute the macro-structural background for the convening of the 9th Party Congress. First, North Korea's worldview on international politics is based on hard structural realism. Second, the strategic significance of nuclear capability has shifted from a security tool to the cornerstone of regime identity. Third, the advancement of North Korea's nuclear capability structurally causes long-term hostile coexistence between South and North Korea. Fourth, the hostile two-state theory is intended to prevent internal security threats to North Korea arising from the continuous widening of the inter-Korean gap. Fifth, for a considerable period to come, inter-Korean relations will be characterized by a permanent hostile coexistence relationship based on a high level of military deterrence between the two sides, fragile crisis stability, and North Korea's high level of hostility towards South Korea.

Hard Structural Realist Worldview of International Politics

Since 2017, the increase in nuclear capabilities has reinforced North Korea's hard structural realist worldview. That is, the world is dangerous, strong states dominate weak states, and only power, not trust or agreements, guarantees survival. If North Korea possesses power, adversarial states will respect it, but vulnerability leads to pressure or attack. Since declaring the 'completion of state nuclear force' in 2017, North Korea has been able to guarantee its own security solely through its own efforts, without relying on anyone or the adherence of any promises. Immediately after the 'declaration of completion of nuclear force' in 2017, during 2018-2019, North Korea was able to achieve summit diplomacy with the United States, and also with China, Russia, and South Korea.

A series of strategic principles are derived from the hard structural realist worldview. First, nuclear weapons must not be abandoned. Nuclear weapons can only be abandoned when the entire hostile environment surrounding North Korea disappears. In other words, nuclear weapons are permanent insurance. Second, diplomacy is pursued only to gain short-term benefits, as negotiations cannot permanently alter relations with adversarial states. In particular, agreements or promises with great powers cannot be trusted. Third, it is demonstrated that North Korea will attack first if necessary. The purpose is to preemptively deter adversarial states by intimidating them, thereby preventing them from taking dangerous military actions. Fourth, political unity within North Korean society must be maintained. As the outside world is perceived as hostile by the North Korean leadership, internal divisions that could weaken the state must be prevented. To this end, information is controlled, ideological unity is emphasized, and external countries are framed as threats. Fifth, the adversarial relationship with hostile states will persist for a very long time. Therefore, long-term military plans must be made, strategic technologies must be invested in, and Party-state organizations must be structured around national defense. In other words, one should not expect reconciliation between South and North Korea anytime soon, but instead, prepare for decades of harsh coexistence.

Shift in the Strategic Significance of Nuclear Capability: From Security Tool to Regime Identity

In the early stages of nuclear development, North Korean nuclear weapons were a means of protecting the regime. The regime existed before the nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons were acquired as a tool to defend the regime.

However, over time, the nuclear program became deeply embedded in the state. Building nuclear weapons required immense national effort. This effort demanded scientists and engineers, military organizations, industrial sectors, political authority, and national resources. As the effort to acquire nuclear weapons continued for decades, the nuclear program became part of the state's institutional system. A large bureaucracy emerged for the nuclear program, political legitimacy became linked to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and national pride became associated with nuclear strategic capabilities.

As this process deepens, the relationship between the regime and nuclear capability changes. Nuclear weapons become not just a security tool, but part of the nation's identity and structure. The state defines itself as a nuclear state. The regime is now not merely protected by nuclear weapons, but organized around the identity of being a nuclear state. National pride and sovereignty are linked to nuclear capability, and military strategy, organizations, institutions, and ideology revolve around this nuclear state status. When nuclear weapons were merely a security tool, they could be a subject of negotiation. However, when nuclear weapons define the political system, the abandonment of nuclear weapons is perceived as equivalent to changing the entire identity of the state. The abandonment of nuclear weapons is perceived as a loss of prestige, a loss of sovereignty, strategic vulnerability, and political humiliation. The reduction of nuclear weapons, even if the leadership desires it, is made difficult by the vested interests of domestic institutions and the narrative of national legitimacy.

Among the cases where nuclear capability defines national identity, North Korea presents a particularly strong example. First, North Korea has suffered from sanctions and external pressure for decades. Nevertheless, the nuclear program has survived. This has reinforced the belief that nuclear capability guarantees survival. Second, the disparity in national power between South and North Korea remains severe. South Korea is economically stronger than North Korea, technologically significantly advanced, and backed by a powerful ally. Nuclear weapons have helped to compensate for this unfavorable balance, underscoring their indispensability. Third, there is the issue of political legitimacy. The achievement of nuclear capability is a testament to successful leadership, a symbol of national strength, and evidence of technological accomplishment. In other words, the political legitimacy of the state or individual political leader is linked to the success of the nuclear development program. Fourth, there is institutional internalization. All sectors of the state revolve around missile development, nuclear engineering, and strategic weapons command. These organizations and institutions have a strong vested interest in preserving the nuclear system.

The process by which nuclear capability transitioned from a security tool to part of national identity and institutional systems has been gradually strengthened since Kim Jong Un came to power. Key examples in this regard include the following: Following Kim Jong Il's death in December 2011, North Korea cited nuclear development and satellite launches as his greatest achievements. In 2012, the constitution was amended to include nuclear armament, and in 2013, a law on self-defensive nuclear armament was enacted. In 2017, North Korea declared the 'completion of state nuclear force' and proposed the theory of a strategic state. Subsequently, the 2022 Law on Nuclear Weapons codified the irreversibility of nuclear armament status and the conditions for nuclear weapon use, the 2023 constitution stipulated nuclear armament policy, and the 9th Party Congress in 2026 proclaimed the irreversible status of nuclear armament while also mentioning Kim Jong Un's achievement of 'building revolutionary armed forces capable of proactively responding to any invasion threat and fully prepared for any form of war' as justification for his election as General Secretary.

Advancement of North Korea's Nuclear Capability and the Structuring of Long-Term Hostile Coexistence between South and North Korea

One of the implications of the advancement of North Korea's nuclear capabilities, symbolized by the 'completion of state nuclear force' in 2017, is that if a full-scale war were to break out on the Korean Peninsula, it would mean a nuclear war. This would result in catastrophic consequences for both South and North Korea, making both sides extremely cautious about initiating a full-scale war.

This situation has brought about significant changes in North Korea's security posture. First, regime survival has become more secure. Second, the likelihood of being invaded has become extremely low. Third, armed unification has become unrealistic. Fourth, it can independently balance more powerful adversaries.

However, some things have not changed. The military and political conflict between South and North Korea persists. Militarily, while both sides avoid full-scale war, or nuclear war, due to its catastrophic nature, they continue to compete below that threshold. The expectation that the other side will avoid a catastrophic nuclear war can actually facilitate the occurrence of limited conflicts between the two adversarial sides. Political conflict also persists because the underlying political issues of the adversarial relationship between South and North Korea remain unresolved. The two Koreas have an unbridgeable gap in their political systems, alliance relationships, ideologies, the legitimacy of the two states, and historical narratives, which leads them to deny each other's existence. These issues make reconciliation between South and North Korea extremely difficult, thus ensuring that inter-Korean relations remain hostile.

A situation where war is too dangerous and reconciliation is too difficult, this structured situation makes the adversarial relationship between South and North Korea permanent. Both South and North Korea, assuming the other will exist permanently as an adversary, prepare to manage a protracted adversarial relationship. This signifies the establishment of inter-Korean relations as a long-term hostile coexistence. South and North Korea do not reconcile but also avoid full-scale war, leading to a relationship characterized by tension but stability.

When the leadership of South and North Korea judges that the adversarial relationship will continue in the long term, their internal institutional systems begin to reorganize around this prospect. North Korea, under its long-term nuclear doctrine, prepares strategic missile forces and reorganizes its economic structure around defense capability building. Furthermore, military organizations expand, the influence of security agencies remains at a high level, the national identity narrative emphasizes external threats, and the defense industry desires the continuation of competition. These internal institutional systems have a vested interest in maintaining the adversarial relationship. Over time, these internal institutional systems further strengthen the adversarial relationship, thereby stabilizing the system of inter-Korean adversarial relations and making it more difficult to change.

Hostile Two-State Theory

The advancement of North Korea's nuclear capability eliminates the risk of war but does not resolve the hostile political relationship between South and North Korea, thus structurally leading to long-term hostile coexistence. The proposal of the hostile two-state theory goes a step further. While structural hostility existed at the political level between South and North Korea even before 2017, it was sometimes possible for them to engage with each other through negotiations. The proposal of the hostile two-state theory after North Korea secured nuclear deterrence is an extreme measure intended to block the structurally inherent hostility at the political level between South and North Korea from being disadvantageously amplified for North Korea through the widening inter-Korean gap.

Since the 8th Central Committee's 9th Plenary Meeting in December 2023, North Korea officially regards South Korea as its most hostile foreign country. Nuclear deterrence has eliminated the possibility of North Korea being absorbed and unified by South Korea, but North Korea remains at a disadvantage compared to South Korea in most aspects other than military capabilities, and there is no prospect of overcoming the internal security threats posed by this disadvantage. The hostile two-state theory is a strategic element that, against the backdrop of military security guaranteed by nuclear weapons, preemptively eliminates the internal political security threats caused by South Korea's growing superiority through heightened hostility towards and complete severance from South Korea. North Korea, instead of pursuing unification which is now impossible, pursues long-term coexistence based on hostility with South Korea. The strategic reorientation of framing South Korea as a hostile foreign country has opened up the possibility for North Korea to use nuclear weapons in its security and diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula.

However, North Korea's hostile two-state theory does not end with a one-time declaration of hostility towards South Korea; it creates a structural need to constantly regenerate and reaffirm hostility between the two Koreas. North Korea's policy of permanent nuclear deterrence structurally leads to international sanctions and isolation, which promises a continued widening of the inter-Korean gap in the future. In other words, the long-term hostile coexistence line based on nuclear capability is a strategic line that structurally perpetuates the North Korean internal political vulnerability caused by the widening inter-Korean gap. The advocacy of the hostile two-state theory demonstrates North Korea's intention to compensate for this structural strengthening of internal vulnerability through heightened hostility towards South Korea. That is, under the long-term hostile coexistence line, North Korea's internal political stability is predicated on maintaining a high level of hostility towards South Korea. However, maintaining a high level of hostility towards South Korea for an extended period is not easy. To make this possible, information shielding, external isolation, and internal political control must be maintained at a high level, and there will be a need to periodically create military crises towards South Korea or manipulate the risk of South Korean infiltration and subversion activities within North Korea. Only then can the de-charismatization or routinization of high-level hostility towards South Korea be somewhat prevented. Nevertheless, maintaining a high level of animosity towards South Korea, especially among North Korea's new generation, will be a difficult task.

Conclusion

Following North Korea's acquisition of nuclear capability, its security posture has changed. North Korea is responding to the new strategic situation with a dual strategy of strengthening and permanentizing its nuclear deterrence and intensifying and permanentizing its hostility towards South Korea. The 9th Party Congress reaffirmed this strategic line, summarized its achievements, and presented new stage objectives.

Briefly summarizing the implications of this regrouping at the 9th Party Congress for the future of inter-Korean relations, we can see the following. First, due to the mutual nuclear deterrence between South Korea and the U.S. on one side and North Korea on the other, the possibility of a full-scale war is very low. However, second, crisis stability is also low. Factors that reduce crisis stability are abundant, including North Korea's high hostility towards South Korea, the severance of inter-Korean dialogue, the high state of readiness on both sides, North Korea's preemptive tactical nuclear strike system, both sides' preparation for preemptive strikes, and both sides' rapid retaliation systems. Once a crisis occurs, there is a high risk of rapid escalation. Third, North Korea is likely to continue improving its military capabilities and periodically engage in provocations against South Korea to prevent its nuclear deterrence from being countered by technological advancements by South Korea and the U.S., and to maintain hostility towards South Korea. Fourth, North Korea's policy of permanent nuclear deterrence is likely to be maintained in the long term, and therefore, the hostile two-state policy, which is inextricably linked to it, will also be maintained in the long term. Fifth, due to North Korea's hostile two-state theory, inter-Korean relations cannot escape hostile coexistence based on a highly militarized deterrence equilibrium. Peace will be maintained, but it will be a peace characterized by a hostile coexistence based on a high level of military deterrence between the two sides, fragile crisis stability, and North Korea's high hostility towards South Korea. ■

■ Park Hyung-joong_Independent North Korea Scholar.

■ In charge and edited by: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Research Fellow, Oh In-hwan_EAI Senior Research Fellow
    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr