[Global NK Commentary] Prospects Surrounding the US Airstrike on Iran and Rumors of US-North Korea Contact

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In February 1979, the Pahlavi dynasty, which clung to a constitutional monarchy out of touch with the public sentiment, was overthrown by the Iranian people, leading to the establishment of the current Islamic Republic of Iran (I.R.IRAN) following the success of the Iranian Revolution led by Ruhollah Khomeini. The global democratization movement, which began with the Prague Spring in 1968, had landed not only in South America, symbolized by Argentina and Chile, but also in the Middle East. This was the 'Third Wave' that Samuel Huntington proclaimed. The seemingly invisible yet powerful wave of democratization was no exception in East Asia, where it blossomed in the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. The development of democracy worldwide in the latter half of the 20th century is thus macroscopically interconnected. Against this backdrop, some enthusiasts make the somewhat illogical claim that Khomeini's Iranian Revolution led to the assassination of former President Park Chung-hee on the Korean Peninsula in October of the same year.

While 'Trumpism' is not an academic or objective term, nor does it have a universally accepted definition, it criticizes the role of the US as the world's police in foreign relations and dismisses foreign military intervention as an unnecessary cost. However, the reality of Trumpism in its second term shows the opposite. Under the guise of national security, it has advocated for the annexation of Canada as the 51st US state, and the control of Greenland is also justified by the logic of ensuring American and global security. Furthermore, the Trump administration did not shy away from a brief but intense military operation to apprehend the President of Venezuela. The recent invasion of Iran is also inconsistent with President Trump's frequent assertions against foreign military intervention. It is understood that when a country with the global influence of the United States pursues foreign strategy, its direction and content can be modified, and if necessary, fundamentally changed. The core issue is whether we can present a predictable outlook on how the Trump administration's airstrike on Iran will affect the Korean Peninsula issue.

North Korea held its 9th Party Congress from February 19th to 25th, during which Chairman Kim Jong-un stated, "If the United States respects the status of our nation as enshrined in the Constitution and withdraws its hostile policy toward our Republic, there is no reason why we should not get along well with the United States." He also publicly remarked, "The prospect of US-DPRK relations depends entirely on the attitude of the US side." This statement could be interpreted as a very proactive message of dialogue directed at the United States. Moreover, regarding the airstrike on Iran, North Korea has criticized the US administration's actions as acts of war on a principled level, but has not directly mentioned President Trump. This criticism can be considered relatively mild compared to the condemnation issued by China and Russia, authoritarian solidarity states, concerning the situation in Iran.

Therefore, what are North Korea's thoughts on the recent series of military incidents in the Middle East surrounding Iran? First, on the surface, it is likely that North Korea will cling more strongly to its self-secured nuclear arsenal, as seen in past large-scale military actions by the US against Libya, Syria, and Iraq. While fearful of the formidable military power of the US confirmed by the airstrike on Iran, North Korea likely believes that if it maintains the status of its acquired nuclear weapons, the US will not be able to take North Korea lightly. Despite enduring international sanctions and repeated failures in ambitious economic development plans due to resource scarcity, North Korea likely reaffirms that its nuclear arsenal is the most reliable means of ensuring its survival. Furthermore, President Trump cited the failure of nuclear negotiations as the most important factor for the airstrike on Iran. According to Oman, which mediated the nuclear negotiations between the US and Iran, the negotiations were proceeding relatively smoothly, so it is difficult to ascertain the exact truth of either account. However, it is clear that President Trump himself is well aware that the breakdown of nuclear negotiations provides sufficient justification for a large-scale military attack on Iran. North Korea is undoubtedly well aware that this logic of President Trump can be applied to its relations with the US.

Second, North Korea is well aware that its nuclear arsenal has various utility values. While it may learn the lesson from the situation in Iran that it must never abandon its nuclear weapons, it is also likely aware that North Korea's nuclear weapons are a useful tool for bringing the US to the negotiating table. As is well known, in his second term, President Trump has publicly referred to North Korea as a 'Nuclear Power' on several occasions. The issue, however, is that President Trump's acknowledgment of North Korea's nuclear possession is possible when North Korea's nuclear weapons are recognized for their value in negotiations. If the situation were to change drastically and the Trump administration were to emphasize the security threat aspect of North Korea's nuclear program over its negotiating value, then theoretically, there is no guarantee that what happened in Iran would not happen in North Korea. Of course, the author is well aware that the issues of Iran and North Korea are fundamentally different from the US perspective due to factors such as the geopolitical differences between North Korea and Iran, the level of advancement of North Korea's nuclear program, the special diplomatic relationship between North Korea and China, and the division of the Korean Peninsula.

Recently, the possibility of 'late March, early April' negotiations between North Korea and the United States has been frequently mentioned in domestic and international media. This stems from the prospect that high-level contact between North Korea and the US could materialize during the US-China summit in Beijing in early April. Such high-level contact would naturally include the possibility of a summit between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un. At this juncture, two scenarios can be considered. One is a scenario where the situation in Iran leads North Korea to believe that the latter value (negotiating value) of its nuclear weapons is more important than their value as a means of self-defense, prompting a more active response to the dialogue overtures consistently extended by President Trump. Another scenario suggests that, given North Korea's traditional tendency to leverage international security crises for its own survival, it will, as always, become more diplomatically withdrawn, adopting a more closed-off stance in its external relations and clinging more tightly to its existing survival strategy rather than engaging in negotiations with President Trump.

As always, it is difficult to predict North Korea's actions with certainty, but there is a high probability that one of these two scenarios will unfold. Even if we do not give significant weight to the somewhat exaggerated analysis that the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was linked to the death of former President Park Chung-hee within the global democratic wave of the Third Wave, we hope that the recent US airstrike on Iran and the subsequent Middle East events will bring a strong impact to the Korean Peninsula in some form. As a result, we hope that North Korea, which has maintained a rigid stance in its external relations since the Korean War, will engage in unprecedentedly serious negotiations with President Trump, and that such negotiations will ultimately lead to North Korea's transformation and the unification of the Korean Peninsula. ■

■ Park In-hwi_Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Responsible for and edited by: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Research Fellow

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