[2026 East Asian Institute (EAI) Conference on Diplomacy and North Korea Strategy: New Year Dialogue] ② The Survival Formula of Dictatorship: An Analysis of North Korea's Regime Stability Mechanisms

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xi8R5SHIgfY

Video Script

The Importance of Discussing North Korea's Regime Stability

Today's question is why North Korea's regime stability is important and how it can be assessed. Why is assessing regime stability important? This is the first part of the question. I will briefly touch upon the implications of this issue for North Korea policy. The diagram you see illustrates the correlation between North Korea policy and regime stability variables. "Whose side is time on?" is a direct quote from a speech by Chairman Kim Jong Un.

This implies that strategies will be formulated under the premise that "time is now on our side, on their side." This is a question that applies to all actors, and for example, the same question can be posed to our North Korea policy. First, when we say "time is on our side," it is based on the premise that North Korea will collapse at the end of the timeline. Conversely, if time is on the other side, it means that nuclear development will be completed at the end of the timeline. Below is content related to North Korea strategy.

If we judge that the end of this path is a timeline of collapse, then the status quo strategy, which we have predominantly used, namely sanctions and pressure, would lead to a scenario where the other side either surrenders or collapses. Second, if the timeline is one where nuclear development progresses more than collapse, then a strategy of breaking the status quo is necessary, meaning we must stop the train that is currently running, whether through extreme war or negotiation. And at this crossroads, the question that arises very importantly is, how stable is the North Korean regime, and how long can it last?

The Complexity of the Concept of Regime Stability and the Need for Analysis

So, how can regime stability be examined and assessed? In fact, stability is one of the most challenging concepts in political science. You might think that by stating this at the beginning of the lecture, I am creating an escape route for myself, but the most representative exceptional case related to stability was the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although 32 years have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is still considerable debate about why the Soviet Union collapsed. For example, we think socialism collapsed, but many Soviet historians argue that it was not the collapse of socialism but the disintegration of the Soviet Union due to nationalism. In other words, the concept of stability is very challenging, not only for North Korea but for political science as a whole.

In this regard, the goal of today's lecture is to enhance common sense judgment. The premise of the lecture is to distinguish between regime and state, and between stability and development. The concept of stability I am discussing today does not mean that North Korea will develop well as a nation just because the conclusion is that it is more stable than we think. Can a state not survive even if the regime is maintained? Therefore, the core unit of stability I will present to you today is the regime rather than the state, and the focus will be on whether the regime will collapse or not, rather than on whether it will develop. From this perspective, the first thing to note regarding stability is the need for a more balanced perspective.

Framework for Analyzing Regime Stability: Threats and Response Assets

I believe that stability is not a single variable but a combination of several variables. Among these, the most important is that we should not only look at the threat factors that endanger this stability but also consider the response assets, response resources, and response strategies at the regime level. For example, even if a strong pathogen invades, if the internal immunity is strong, the outcome will be much better, won't it? From this perspective, both factors need to be viewed in balance. So, in what analytical framework will we view these two factors? First, regarding where threats come from, we can divide them into three major dimensions. The first is threats from within.

Internal threats can be divided into two dimensions: the populace and the elite. Next, external threats come from allies and enemies. Enemies are familiar, but we will also examine allies. Finally, there is the issue of political succession, which may be less familiar, so I will explain it together. If I were to visualize what I have just said, the outer square represents the state, and the inner circle represents the regime. The threats are broadly divided into external threats from above, i.e., from allies and enemies, and internal threats from below, from rival elites or the populace. In addition, there is the threat from time, which is often overlooked. That is, when a regime eventually loses power, one of the most feared elements is this variable of time. Whether a democratic leader with a fixed term or an iron-fisted dictator, they cannot exceed their lifespan. All power has an end, and the existence of this end creates a tremendous cycle or dynamic of political power. This is related to the Kim Jong Un issue. I will explain it together.

Second, as I just mentioned, along with threats, we must also consider the response assets to those threats. So, in what framework should we view the response assets to threats? I believe there are three major frameworks. This is not something I created myself, but we can take the example of Max Weber, who is considered the most prominent counter-theorist to Karl Marx, whom you all know well. The book on the right is his work, 'The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.' He discussed the sociology of domination, stating that domination is possible through these three factors. Among these, he prominently argued that we must look at the mechanism of authority based on legitimacy, the third factor. In any case, practical domination is maintained through three major elements: power based on fear, preference based on interest, and authority based on legitimacy. This is the aspect of response assets.

Let's examine this from the perspective of a complex equation of these two. As mentioned on the left, we will examine it from a comprehensive perspective of the spear and shield I just discussed. For example, why did some countries collapse while others did not, even when facing similar threats, as in the cases of the Soviet Union and China? Another point is the importance of implications through comparison and theory. What does this mean? For example, is a height of 170 cm tall or short? To answer this question, more information is needed. That is, we need to know whether the comparison is with a man or a woman, their age, and theoretically, the characteristics of their growth plates. For instance, in the case of North Korea, would a thousand defectors be a sign of collapse or instability? Or not? Comparison and theory are needed to judge these things.

For example, if we consider North Korea's population of about 26 million, as you can see on the left, when the cumulative number of defectors reached around 1,000, theories of collapse emerged, and again when it reached about 3,000 at the very top, collapse theories appeared. So, was this an appropriate assessment? Comparison and theory are necessary. For example, in the case of East Germany, as shown in the upper right, 20,000 people defected annually even after the construction of the Berlin Wall. If we combine the total number of defectors since the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is in the 30,000s. However, even with 20,000 defectors annually from East Germany, you have likely never heard of theories of East German collapse. The same applies to Cuba. In Cuba, in 1980, 110,000 people, less than half of the population, escaped in one year. Yet, we have never heard of theories of Cuban collapse, have we? This is a comparison from an empirical perspective, and the same applies to theory. For example, there is the scholar Albert Hirschman. He is very famous for his book 'Exit, Voice, Loyalty.' He proposed that when an organization declines or faces difficulties, there are three options: voice, loyalty, and exit. Regarding the effect of exit among these, while it was previously considered a catalyst or sign of collapse, his research showed that it actually defuses tension just before an explosion, acting as a safety valve and helping the organization avoid collapse. Thus, the question was posed.

Then why did East Germany collapse? The second paper you see proposes a theory that while these two act as safety valves, if there is an explosive exit beyond a certain point, these two can interact and lead to collapse. Now, consider whether North Korea falls into such a case. Furthermore, in the case of Cuba, on the far right, there is a case study of Cuba. This scholar goes beyond this theory and asks, why did Cuba not face a crisis of collapse despite 120,000 people leaving annually? Among the yellow boxes in the middle is the term 'gatekeeper.' That is, if the state can control this outflow, it can actually reduce the number of people opposing the regime and thus increase regime stability. We need to look at the state variable and the regime's response variables. From this perspective, when discussing stability in North Korea, it is necessary to consider comparative and theoretical cases in a balanced manner.

International Political Threats and North Korea's Response

Now, let's specifically examine the three dimensions of crises and threat factors. The first is the aspect related to international politics, which has been discussed extensively in this session. What do both speakers have in common is that they both experienced nearly losing their regimes due to threats from allies. You see Ever Plan Everly, which was a crisis from the United States. On the right, Kim Il Sung's greatest political crisis was the 5.8 factional incident, which came from the Soviet Union and China. In other words, threats from allies are very common. However, North Korea, in particular, has been very sensitive to these threats and has long considered how to respond to them at the foundation of its regime, creating many mechanisms for this purpose.

For example, our Armistice Agreement stipulates the withdrawal of foreign troops from both sides. US forces did not withdraw from South Korea. However, in 1958, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army withdrew first, even though US forces had not withdrawn. Regarding alliance treaties, we signed ours in 1953, but we signed with China much later, and with the Soviet Union even later. These are the reasons why we must consider the terms anti-imperialism and self-reliance when looking at North Korea. That is, while we are primarily familiar with anti-imperialism at the core of North Korea's foreign strategy, North Koreans themselves always use anti-imperialism and self-reliance together.

Threats from Hostile Forces and North Korea's Response Strategy

If so, if anti-missile defense was a device against an enemy like the United States, what was self-reliance a device to prevent threats from? It was a device to prevent threats from allies. In that context, you recently mentioned the new Cold War. Although there is considerable debate surrounding the new Cold War as a phenomenon, there is likely little disagreement that the new Cold War structure has been strengthened compared to the past, in terms of relative trends. This assessment comes from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency's evaluation last year. This is the basis for the assessment that North Korea has reached its strongest strategic position since the end of the Cold War. Another point is that nuclear possession serves as a crucial asset to overcome the fear of abandonment by allies if they do not comply.

Next, let's consider threats from enemies. Threats from enemies can be broadly divided into two categories: military threats, which you are familiar with, and politico-economic threats. Regarding military threats, as you know, our defense budget has more than doubled for decades, nearly half a century. What response assets and strategies does North Korea possess in this regard? There are largely three. First, the hostage strategy. If they attack us, the hostages will also die; who are the hostages in this case? The South Korean people. Second, the threat that if we go to war, we will not be the only ones fighting, but it will escalate into a war in East Asia or a world war. Third, the 'deterrence strategy' suggests that if war breaks out, we may all perish, but you must be prepared to lose an arm as well; these are typical strategies related to nuclear weapons. I would like to elaborate further on the politico-economic threat. As mentioned earlier, the most significant threat factor North Korea faces is international sanctions. As discussed, the sanctions strengthened in 2016-2017 and have continued without any change to this day, are commonly assessed as the most stringent sanctions in UN history and in the history of global sanctions.

Despite this, why has it not yet yielded? Sanctions, as a phenomenon, are a very common and long-standing tool in international politics, and extensive research has been conducted on them. In this regard, the keywords I wish to share with you are the distinction between efficiency and effectiveness. Sanctions operate in two stages, not one. The first is the stage of inflicting pain. However, pain is not our objective. Our objective is for the other party to change its behavior due to the pain. This is the second stage. The first stage, how much pain is inflicted powerfully, is a concept related to efficiency. The second stage concerns how the other party responds to that pain; when we speak of high effectiveness, it refers to cases where the other party changes its behavior in the desired direction due to the pain. In fact, even general studies on this topic do not assess the success rate very highly.

What you see here is the most robust and long-cited representative study on sanctions, showing a success rate of only about 34%. However, there is also strong criticism of this study; some research suggests that even this 34% is an overestimation and that the actual rate is below 5%. There are many studies indicating that sanctions, while increasing the suffering of the populace, have shown significant limitations in changing the adversary's behavior. In other words, I want to share the understanding that our failure to achieve effective sanctions against North Korea, despite imposing efficient ones, is not solely our problem. The second issue is efficiency. Beyond effectiveness, which I mentioned earlier, even efficiency is being weakened by various phenomena, although sanctions remain the most powerful tool. This is linked to the strengthening of the North Korea-China-Russia trilateral alliance.

Threats from Within and the Importance of Elite Variables

Now, let's turn to threats from within. Regarding internal threats, purges and politics of checks and balances are frequently mentioned in the media. Therefore, without even reading the main text, you likely get the impression that North Korea is very unstable upon seeing these titles. However, there are other aspects, like the two sides of a coin. Particularly from an elite perspective, while you might perceive the turnover cycle as very rapid, do you know the average tenure of a minister in South Korea? It is about 13 months. When we observe high-ranking North Korean officials frequently appearing in the news, it is difficult to conclude that these purges have occurred within a relatively short period. Personnel policies should be viewed from the perspective of checks and balances, and elites, anticipating future opportunities, will likely seek to maintain the current system rather than making extreme choices.

It is crucial whether elites will make moral and normative choices when their vested interests are respected, or whether they will choose based on their own interests. Since the 2000s, numerous studies on dictatorial politics have been published, and one of them analyzes the elite variable as the most important factor in the collapse of states due to pressure from below. Testimonies from high-ranking North Korean defectors also emphasize the importance of the elite variable. On the left is Secretary Hwang Jang-yop, and on the right is an individual who defected after being apprehended abroad. Secretary Hwang Jang-yop and other high-ranking defectors have stated that there are about 100 people in North Korea who could replace Kim Jong-il, and that the collective interests of the vested structure are more important than individuals. Mr. Park Byung used the analogy that even if the mud in hand slips away, the remaining mud can become harder. Such phenomena are not unique to North Korea. A theorist who served as president of the American Political Science Association has identified North Korea as the world's best model dictatorship, arguing that dictatorships can last long if managed well.

According to this theory, for a dictatorial regime to endure, it must adhere to five principles. The core is the 'winning coalition,' which refers to the faction securing the minimum votes necessary to become president. The second is the 'selectorate,' a faction that selects a portion of the total electorate. Finally, there are all those with voting rights. Among these, the winning coalition is the most crucial. It is essential to maintain the winning coalition at a minimum, maximize the number of replaceable voters, and ensure loyalty by making them solely dependent on the dictator for rewards, while preventing them from becoming excessively wealthy. Furthermore, dictatorships can last long by adhering to these five principles that do not harm the vested interests of the state and its people. From this perspective, North Korea needs to be analyzed. The nuclear issue, beyond its military aspect, must also consider its political implications.

North Korea has consistently maintained the position that it developed nuclear weapons as a self-defense measure against threats to denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, deviating from this stance for less than six months prior to 2022. On both occasions, in 2013 with the Byungjin line and again in 2022, Kim Jong Un told elites that they would never perish if they possessed nuclear weapons. This can be interpreted as a message to the elites that their vested interests would be maintained. Although North Korea's system is not a paradise for the people and discrimination exists based on social strata, it also functions as a mechanism to guarantee vested interests.

Threats from the People and Control Mechanisms

North Korea has strengthened mechanisms to reward and guarantee vested interests by stratifying classes centered around the party, military, and Pyongyang. Threats from the populace are mentioned as major causes of revolution, collapse, and instability; however, these grievances only gain political power when they coalesce through organization and information. The structure in North Korea, which prohibits alumni associations and ensures rewards only from the Supreme Leader, can be understood in this context. The case of East Germany shows that when dissatisfied elements united, such as in Leipzig's churches, forming a 'sea of people,' the regime collapsed. It is necessary to examine whether such mediums for organization and information dissemination exist in North Korea. Russia's 'Memorial,' a Nobel Peace Prize laureate in 2022, was recognized for its role in information openness, or Glasnost, during the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is worth considering whether such mediums for information openness exist in North Korea.

Furthermore, to counter threats from the populace, North Korea has enacted draconian laws like the 'Pyongyang Culture Protection Act,' under which one can be arrested for calling someone 'oppa,' attempting to control not only the people's actions but also their thoughts. Beyond fear, mechanisms are in place to control the populace in terms of their understanding and preferences. After the collapse of North Korea's planned economy, corruption intensified, which, while a negative factor for regime stability, also serves as a lubricant. In situations outside the system, bribes are perceived as legitimate costs and function as a limited lubricant. According to interviews with defectors, there is a fixed price for bribes, which has a cost-effectiveness. Contrary to expectations that the spread of markets would negatively impact state or regime stability, the emergence of asset holders like 'donju' may present a different scenario. A discussion is needed on whether North Korea's asset holders can play a bourgeois role.

Efforts to Secure Authority and Legitimacy, and Succession Politics

In response to the question of what authority and legitimacy the North Korean regime possesses, North Korea has made efforts to secure authority and legitimacy by having Kim Jong-un imitate Kim Il-sung's tone and voice and by emphasizing patriotism. Unlike Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un attempts to build a people-friendly image, attributing all failures to cadres and projecting an image of closeness to the people, which is reportedly having some effect. In line with efforts to secure authority and legitimacy, the strengthening of the rule of law is also underway. The rule of law can be divided into 'rule without rule' (anarchy) and 'rule by rule' (rules-based); North Korea is showing a trend toward strengthening the latter. The recent graph showing North Korea enacting many laws illustrates this change.

Finally, the perspective on Kim Jong-un's succession issue, or 'succession politics,' is also important. When viewing Kim Jong-un's succession phenomenon, the crucial question is not who, but why succession politics has been activated at this juncture, and what are its effects and intentions. The 'Crown Prince Dilemma' refers to a situation where designating a successor reduces power struggles but increases the risk of the successor overthrowing the incumbent. The most powerful method to mitigate this dilemma is succession. Regardless of right or wrong, succession has rational reasons from the perspective of political effect. Therefore, attention should be paid to the effects of designation and succession. Kim Jong-un's emergence as a successor occurred in November 2022, alongside a discourse shift towards nuclear armament, and this needs to be examined in conjunction with such policy changes. I hope that by contemplating the various points I have raised together, we can make wise choices. Thank you.

■ Author: Ahn, Kyeongmo, Professor, Department of Security Policy, National Defense University.

■ Management and Editing: Lim, Jaehyun, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhlim@eai.or.kr

■ Management and Editing: Lim, Jaehyun, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhlim@eai.or.kr