[2026 East Asia Institute Conference on Korean Neighboring Countries' Diplomacy and North Korea Strategy: New Year Dialogue] I. Multipolar Bloc Politics and the Theory of Strategic States: The Substance of the New Order Drawn by North Korea

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bm_lHZfPe0c

Video Script

North Korea's Multipolar Bloc Politics and Strategic State Theory

Welcome. I am Park Won-gon, a professor in the Department of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University. I would like to state upfront that the content of this presentation is entirely my personal opinion and does not represent the official stance of the East Asia Institute. I believe that the world order envisioned by North Korea, characterized by bloc politics, is a recent development emerging during the Kim Jong Un era. Since 2021, North Korea has begun using terms such as 'new Cold War' or 'multipolar system.' Although the term 'new Cold War' has not been used since 2023, the fact that discussions on a new Cold War and a multipolar system have begun in earnest is highly significant. My presentation is based on North Korea's official statements, and I believe that the world North Korea desires is one of bloc politics, similar to the new Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union that lasted from 1947 to 1991.

During that period, North Korea was able to achieve all its objectives within its bloc until the end of the Cold War. Although there were times of strained relations due to competition between the Soviet Union and China, it secured its international standing without diplomatic isolation and largely resolved its economic issues, thanks to its strong patrons. However, with the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, North Korea began to face isolation. A unipolar system centered on the United States emerged, the Soviet Union collapsed, and China established diplomatic relations with South Korea, among other factors that led to North Korea's exclusion. During this period, North Korea experienced difficult times, including the 'Arduous March.' Since Kim Jong Un came to power in 2012, there have been movements to construct a new bloc.

This is connected to changes in the global order. As seen in recent US National Security Strategy reports, the United States is no longer clearly acting as the world's police and is adopting an 'America First' stance. While the overarching framework of countering China in the Indo-Pacific region increases the possibility of direct intervention, as seen in the Venezuelan situation, the Western Hemisphere is considered the most important region. If the United States concentrates on the Western Hemisphere, North Korea may attempt to build an anti-US and anti-Western bloc in the Indo-Pacific or East Asian regions. Observing the retreat and decline of the US in the international order, North Korea has begun to envision the bloc politics of the Cold War era.

North Korea's Foreign Policy Vision: Strategic State Theory and Nuclear Possession

In a similar vein, North Korea is also advocating for 'strategic state theory.' This is based on the perception that North Korea can deal with the United States on a one-on-one basis. The nuclear weapons North Korea is developing are the most significant foundation supporting this perception. As a nuclear-armed state, North Korea asserts its equal standing with the United States and promotes its strategic state theory by claiming to be a country with considerable influence in the international order, rather than an isolated or marginalized nation.

Therefore, the world North Korea envisions is one where it constructs a bloc as a strategic state and plays a central role. This is the world North Korea is imagining. The reason I mention this is that there is bound to be considerable debate about whether this will actually be realized. I believe the possibility of constructing completely decoupled blocs, as seen from 1945 to 1991, is very low. Therefore, I consider this to be merely the world North Korea envisions.

North Korea's Ideal World Order and Realistic Constraints

From North Korea's perspective, if such a bloc were to be established, it would create a highly favorable environment for them. If an anti-US and anti-Western bloc were to be formed, centered around North Korea and including China, Russia, and global South countries, North Korea could resolve its economic issues and solidify its de facto nuclear-armed status, similar to the Cold War era. Therefore, the establishment of such a world order is advantageous for North Korea, and I believe they are striving towards it. However, as North Korea pursues a very pragmatic foreign policy, there are doubts about whether this can be achieved to the desired extent in the short term. For this reason, North Korea has not used the term 'new Cold War' since 2023. This is because China finds the term 'new Cold War' offensive. Instead, China accuses the United States of building Cold War blocs. Therefore, to accommodate China, North Korea is using the term 'just multipolar order,' which is used by Russia and China, instead of 'new Cold War.'

North Korea's Policy Shift Towards the US and Nuclear Capability Enhancement

Now, I will discuss North Korea's policy towards the United States. The origins of the current policy towards the US can be traced back to the 'frontal breakthrough' declared by North Korea in February 2019. This was because the Korean Peninsula peace process attempted in 2018 and 2019 did not succeed from North Korea's perspective.

In December 2019, North Korea shifted its course and presented four core concepts: self-reliance, ideological struggle, and 'enhancement of military capabilities.' This signifies a long-term strategy, as North Korea recognized through its experiences in 2018-2019 that its deficiency was the enhancement of nuclear capabilities, before engaging in meaningful negotiations with the US or South Korea. Therefore, North Korea declared a 'frontal breakthrough' strategy, which involves distancing itself from the outside world, particularly South Korea and the United States, while cooperating with China and Russia, and internally enhancing its nuclear capabilities through ideological struggle and self-reliance. This policy remains in effect as of January 2026, and it is expected that the upcoming 9th Party Congress will present policies not significantly deviating from this course.

Changes in North Korea's Willingness to Negotiate Denuclearization and Nuclear Disarmament

This is also linked to the North Korean nuclear issue. North Korea's fundamental assessment is that it gained nothing from its experiences in 2018-2019. Therefore, there is absolutely no willingness to engage in denuclearization negotiations with the United States in the future, similar to the past. North Korea shows an allergic reaction to the word 'denuclearization' and even voices criticism when China discusses denuclearization. Thus, the denuclearization negotiations that North Korea desires are not about future denuclearization, but rather nuclear disarmament negotiations conducted under the premise of acknowledging North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. This will be discussed once the bloc formation mentioned earlier is complete. Even during the post-Cold War era, the US and the Soviet Union engaged in disarmament talks while maintaining hostile relations. North Korea also intends to engage in nuclear disarmament negotiations from the perspective of maintaining hostile relations with the US, creating tension, and preventing accidental conflicts. This is a significantly different approach compared to 2018-2019. The most significant difference is the avoidance of the term 'denuclearization.' The June 2018 Singapore Summit agreement primarily focused on improving US-North Korea relations, the Korean Peninsula peace process, and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At that time, North Korea intended to pursue the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through improved US-North Korea relations and an end-of-war agreement between the two Koreas. However, it is believed that this intention has largely disappeared.

North Korea's Need for Negotiations with the US: Sanctions Relief and Economic Development

Separate from improving US-North Korea relations, North Korea judges it advantageous to maintain hostile relations with the US while possessing nuclear weapons and engage in nuclear disarmament negotiations. Unfortunately, this situation makes it very difficult to entice North Korea through denuclearization negotiations or improvements in US-North Korea relations. Therefore, I believe it is important to understand North Korea's objectives. North Korea is highly likely to agree to negotiations with the US. If so, why would they want such negotiations?

North Korea maintains very close relations with Russia and has recently shown signs of improving its relationship with China. Therefore, one might question the necessity of negotiations with the United States. However, in my judgment, North Korea still needs to negotiate with the U.S., primarily due to sanctions. While there are various opinions on the effectiveness of sanctions, I believe they remain effective. For North Korea, there are two main reasons why the lifting of sanctions is important.

First, sanctions must be lifted for North Korea to be effectively recognized as a nuclear-armed state. Even countries with good relations with North Korea, such as Russia and China, are unlikely to recognize North Korea as a nuclear state under the NPT regime as P5 members, as this would mean losing their monopoly on nuclear weapons. I believe North Korea is well aware of this. Therefore, what North Korea desires is to be effectively recognized as a nuclear-armed state through the lifting of sanctions, similar to the India or Pakistan model. India and Pakistan also faced sanctions when they initially developed nuclear weapons, but after sanctions were lifted, the international community comfortably referred to them as nuclear-armed states.

Second, sanctions continue to hinder North Korea's economic development. This is evidenced by Chairman Kim Jong Un's mention of sanctions five times during his Supreme People's Assembly speech on September 21, 2023. If sanctions were not as burdensome as North Korea claims, there would be no reason to mention them so frequently in official addresses. In other words, sanctions pose significant difficulties for North Korea. Comprehensive sanctions against North Korea began to be imposed around 2016-2017 and intensified from 2018 onwards.

Comparing the economic scale, particularly trade volume, before and after 2016 reveals the impact of sanctions. Before 2016, North Korea's trade volume was very high, as shown in the graph. However, statistics from 2024-2025 show a significant decrease, to about one-fourth or one-fifth, only 20-25% of the previous level. Therefore, sanctions are judged to remain effective. Some argue that cooperation with Russia has allowed North Korea to largely circumvent sanctions, but I do not agree. Russia has provided essential support such as food, crude oil, fertilizer, and some military technology to North Korea, but it is unlikely to have provided the foundation for North Korea's economic development. Furthermore, Russia itself is not in a position to do so.

Prospects for Future North Korea-U.S. Relations and the Possibility of Summits

So, what will be the future of North Korea-U.S. relations? Many are interested in 2026, but to state my conclusion upfront, I believe there is a high probability of a meeting.

Former President Trump has consistently expressed his desire to meet with Chairman Kim Jong Un. Given Trump's personality, I had considered the possibility that he might take strong measures if North Korea did not respond to his invitation to meet. However, he has positively reiterated his desire to meet again. This demonstrates Trump's strong will to resolve the North Korean issue. Chairman Kim Jong Un also showed willingness to meet, mentioning fond memories of former President Trump in his policy speech in September 2023.

However, there are basic conditions for a meeting. There will be no denuclearization negotiations. Even if nuclear disarmament negotiations were to occur, the minimal prerequisites of suspending joint military exercises and the deployment of strategic assets must be met. This issue can also be linked to the modernization of the ROK-U.S. alliance. If such measures are taken, there is a possibility of another summit between Chairman Kim Jong Un and former President Trump. The timing is uncertain, but I see a possibility within this year. The U.S.-China summit in Beijing in April could be a significant variable. More importantly, the question is whether a meeting can lead to an agreement on denuclearization negotiations or the improvement of North Korea-U.S. relations. This does not seem easy. Former President Trump is calculating and never makes a deal at a disadvantage. Therefore, from the U.S. perspective, it will be crucial to prevent North Korea from acquiring the capability to attack the U.S. mainland. He could return home and declare political victory by saying, 'Finally, the threat to the U.S. mainland has been eliminated.' To reach that point, North Korea would have to abandon its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability, or its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability, and its development path. Can North Korea truly accept this? I believe that the moment North Korea accepts this, the utility of its nuclear weapons will be greatly diminished. Therefore, I believe negotiations are likely to face significant difficulties.

North Korea-China-Russia Alliance and its Limitations

Next, I will briefly discuss China relations and dialogue. As I briefly mentioned earlier, normalization of North Korea-China relations has been sought since the Victory Day commemoration on September 3rd last year, and such efforts are ongoing. However, I believe there are limitations in this regard. People often speak of a North Korea-China-Russia alliance and a new Cold War structure, but I do not think it is that straightforward. First, for cooperation between North Korea, China, and Russia to be sustained, there must be common goals or values. The goal is anti-Americanism. But how long can this simple anti-American goal be sustained? For instance, once the Russia-Ukraine war ends, could relations between the U.S. and Russia be restored? If so, could they maintain a common anti-American goal? Or, if the U.S. and China engage in more cooperative interactions through the four expected summits this year, could the anti-American cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia continue? Even during the Cold War, despite having the ideological banner of communism, if you study history a bit, the cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia was largely opportunistic, with frequent distrust among them. From this perspective, there are limitations.

Another factor is North Korea's pursuit of pragmatic diplomacy. North Korea consistently maneuvers to maximize its own interests in bilateral relations, a strategy often referred to as 'pendulum diplomacy.' In this context, rather than strictly adhering to North Korea-China-Russia cooperation, North Korea might prioritize closer ties with China when necessary, even if it currently shows close ties with Russia. Therefore, a unified North Korea-China-Russia alliance is very difficult. Furthermore, there are inherent limitations in bilateral relations. Critically, I believe their national identities differ. For example, China, especially in Xi Jinping's recent speeches, tends to talk more about a rules-based international order or the international order we are familiar with, even more so than the U.S. does. This includes free trade, for instance.

Of course, whether China acts in accordance with this is a separate issue. However, at least in terms of rhetoric, China appears to be discussing more universal norms compared to Trump's "America First" policy, often referred to as "MAGA." This is what is being said, even if it differs from China's actual policy orientation. In contrast, Russia and North Korea are saying very different things. They are firmly positioned in the anti-U.S., anti-Western bloc, continuously discussing the unfairness and problems of the existing order. Thus, while North Korea and Russia share a certain policy alignment, there is a difference with China. Therefore, I believe there are limitations to the kind of cooperation that is possible under these circumstances. Consequently, we need to closely observe the future of North Korea-China-Russia cooperation. I will conclude by adding a brief remark about a recent weekend development.

Impact of the Venezuelan Situation on North Korea-U.S. Relations

How will the arrest of Maduro affect North Korea? Many are curious about how this will influence future negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. I believe both opposing forces will be at play. First, North Korea's attachment to nuclear weapons will likely intensify. Naturally, North Korea argues for the legitimacy of possessing nuclear weapons, citing the cases of Iraq's Hussein and Libya's Gaddafi, whom they claim they will never repeat, as they were arrested by the U.S. without nuclear weapons.

This could lead to raising the threshold for nuclear negotiations with the U.S. Secondly, and I believe this is more likely, President Trump's demonstrated willingness to take military action, which was likely unexpected by many, including myself. While Venezuela and North Korea are very different countries, and the U.S. is unlikely to conduct a military operation, especially one described as a decapitation strike, against North Korea, there is a high probability of using military force in some form to pressure North Korea. Many may recall that in 2017, President Trump issued severe threats against North Korea, vowing "fire and fury" and to "totally destroy" it. Considering these factors, from Chairman Kim Jong Un's perspective, continuously refusing President Trump's offers for dialogue this year could become a significant challenge. These two implications suggest that the possibility of negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. has increased. Thank you.

■ Author: Park Won Gon _ Director of the North Korea Studies Center, East Asia Institute. Professor of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Editor: Lim Jae Hyun_ Research Fellow, East Asia Institute

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhlim@eai.or.kr

■ Responsible Editor: Lim Jae-hyun, Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhlim@eai.or.kr