[NATO-IP4 Forum] ④ Beyond Alliance to Ecosystem: The Future of NATO-IP4 Civil Cooperation on Advanced Technologies and AI | Yoon Jeong-hyun, Senior Researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sNcvEriepLE&si=wt7nMDW6hOecYdmU

Video Script

Hello. This is Yoon Jeong-hyun from the Institute for National Security Strategy. Today, I am primarily researching new security issues, particularly technological security and emerging technology security related to AI. Today's session was insufficient for me to present, and rather, it was a time when I learned a lot. Through the preparation process and participation in the previous sessions, I was able to understand the flow and think about where to focus my presentation. This is my first time attending an East Asia Institute (EAI) event, and I realized that unlike typical events where presenters and attendees interact, we could breathe in close proximity, not metaphorically, but physically. Even though I was in the audience, it was so interesting that I couldn't think of anything else. I had no choice but to concentrate, and it was very good.

Emerging Technology Security and the Limitations of Traditional Alliances

In particular, as Professor Kim Kyung-soo and Professor of Advanced Science were discussants, I was too ambitious and covered too broadly, so I could not delve deeply into the crucial AI and other technologies. I believe comments on these aspects would be helpful for improvement. Since the rise of the NATO IP4 network was already discussed in the previous session, I can highlight three points. First, the limitations of the traditional alliance model.

The traditional alliance model, centered on visible national military forces, is no longer sufficient. Furthermore, the speed of technological development and innovation adoption is becoming extremely important. Missing this can lead not only to a simple technological lag but also to a severe power vacuum, which can spill over into the private sector, breaking the virtuous cycle. Therefore, there is a need to structurally innovate traditional acquisition processes. The role of the private sector, where actors are becoming subjects beyond mere partners in security, is also becoming very important. Among the various agendas of the NATO IP4 network, the issue of private sector cooperation is particularly important. Another important aspect is the approach from a resilience perspective.

In other words, we are no longer in an era where the battlefield and non-battlefield are clearly distinguished. In the hybrid era, cyber terrorism, communication network disruption, disinformation, and systemic chaos become daily threats, and they can serve as precursors to full-scale war. Therefore, the traditional collective defense system, which begins after the outbreak of war, has limitations, and an approach to strengthen resilience through enhancing the peacetime ecosystem in line with the evolution of the battlefield is necessary. I believe this aligns with the future direction of the NATO IP4 network.

Nuclear deterrence is similar. In the past, it meant deterrence to prevent the outbreak of war with weapon systems or conventional forces, but now it includes deterrence against economic security and economic coercion. If one can sufficiently prevent or secure alternative means against the opponent's use of economic coercion, there is no reason to exercise deterrence. In other words, its efficiency decreases.

The Role of the Private Sector and Changes in Governance

Therefore, defense capabilities and the ability to endure deterrence are being expanded, which inevitably extends to the private sector. Furthermore, there are limitations in governance that demand a reorganization of security actors centered on the ecosystem. The conflict between technological evolution and institutional rigidity, that is, the development and application of continuously evolving technologies like AI, software-based technologies, and the design of data utilization and regulations, must be very sophisticated. While prioritizing by sector is important for innovation, a comprehensive approach leads to delays. The reason for the delayed implementation of the EU AI Act, despite being the first comprehensive legislation, is also here.

The shift in the Trump administration's policy, which created an atmosphere of deregulation and innovation promotion that shook the global AI order, also led South Korea to postpone the implementation of its AI basic law. Due to these issues, the role of private tech companies as intrinsic core variables is becoming important. NATO and IP4 are looking at network-based governance, and the scope is expanding beyond the private military sector to the operational coordination agenda of the private technology ecosystem.

Beyond integrating and balancing military power, while not reaching the level of close military operational alliances like Japan or Australia, there is a scope of roles in policy coordination, technology standards discussion, technology demonstration, review and utilization, and application areas.

These aspects align with our role from the perspective of ecosystem resilience. Because it is not a rigid treaty, it can be a driving force that can be effectively pursued based on connectivity and trust mechanisms, and through this structure, sustainability can be secured. Connectivity and data trust mechanisms are acting as driving forces for ecosystem resilience in the NATO IP4 network. Furthermore, as an non-institutional space, there is room for flexible utilization due to the absence of strict regulations and uniformity, and it actively functions as a collaborative learning ecosystem.

US-China Competition and Technological Bloc Formation

The recent shift in the US-China competitive landscape and the emergence of the Trump era have accelerated the development of NATO IP4. Currently, it can be seen as an era of total warfare of ecosystem systems, beyond military competition. Technological superiority not only serves as national competitiveness but also as deterrence, becoming a key factor in determining hegemony.

Technological industry supply chains can be diverted to dual-use technologies not only from an economic security perspective but also from a military security perspective, and they also serve as a driving force for private sector innovation. As confrontations between camps solidify, a trust-based technological bloc structure is being created. Therefore, the NATO IP4 network relationship can be seen as encompassing not only military aspects but also economic security and trust-based bloc formation of supply chains.

Synchronization of Security in Europe and the Indo-Pacific

It is also important that security in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region is strategically synchronized. North Korea intervened in the Ukrainian war, directly intervening on the European battlefield. Recently, there was curiosity about North Korea's AI level, and our research team conducted related research and seminars. Since 2024, AI-related articles have been mentioned 17 times in the Rodong Sinmun, indicating a perceived need for national-level leadership.

This is not just rhetoric; North Korean soldiers deployed in the Ukraine war are becoming familiar with drone warfare and operating their own drones, indicating they are acquiring practical experience and military data. They are securing lower-tier chips, if not advanced ones, through China, and cooperation with Russia is also underway. We must be cautious about the potential formation of an AI learning data and technology procurement network among China, Russia, and North Korea. Chairman Kim Jong-un's inspection of drone factories and his mention of advanced technology demonstrate this trend.

Increased Uncertainty and NATO's Strategic Autonomy

This has implications for AI adoption and weaponization, and it can extend to the European battlefield. Even looking at the Korean Peninsula issue alone, we can confirm that the Indo-Pacific region and European security can be strategically synchronized. Regarding the recent increase in uncertainty, NATO, the transatlantic alliance, has fallen into great uncertainty due to the aggressive rhetoric of the Trump era. Discussions on self-reliance within the European Union are ongoing, and the issue of strategic autonomy is also being raised within NATO.

The possibility of seeking indirect cooperation centered on technological resilience norms, rather than a single China economic framework, is also being secured. This does not mean going it alone without the United States, but rather expecting a role as a cooperative partner until the capabilities required by the United States are developed. Amidst these challenges, the current IP4 content at the private cooperation ecosystem level can find practical applicability. The NATO IP network structure allows us to examine the potential mechanisms of private sector participation in security ecosystem cooperation.

Action-Oriented Cooperation and the Assetization of Private Technology for Security

As an orientation towards action-oriented cooperation, there is R&D, specifically the rapid adoption execution plan. The operational deployment of military technology involves significant regulations, verification, and time, but efforts are being made to shorten this. NATO is operating its Defense Innovation Accelerator Program to prevent technological lag and capture opportunities for operational deployment, demonstrating activities to rapidly introduce new technologies. The key is not for the military to directly lead R&D, but to utilize the role of private companies as an acceleration platform program that assetizes private dual-use innovations for NATO's security, and then demonstrates, verifies, standardizes, and operationalizes them.

This includes the participation of companies from IP4 countries, not just European Union companies. It also has the effect of mitigating technological risks and provides a space for maturing private new technologies in actual operational environments using testbeds. It also has significance as a security demonstration system for private solutions for normative consistency and strategic assets.

Discussions on responsible AI were led by South Korea and the Netherlands last year and the year before. Responsible AI discussions in the military domain require many norms and play a role in integrating normative ecosystems, ensuring safe operation in military environments and aligning with NATO's complementary ethical standards. Efforts to assetize security by non-traditional actors are also reflected. It functions as a hub and a multi-layered experimental ground for assetizing private advanced technologies for security. AI plays a crucial role as a meta-technology and is a very important area of interest in the NATO IP4 network. In addition to performance, operating conditions, reliability, and controllability are reviewed, and issues such as the scope of automation, responsibility management, operational verification coordination, and the speed and complexity of innovation are addressed jointly by government discussions and the roles of private companies.

Risk of Dependence on US AI and Digital Sovereignty

Absorption of private innovation and verification of operational coordination of technology standards are also underway. One of the important reasons for its recent rise is the risk of dependence on US AI.

In the field of AI. NATO's ST TREND 2025-2045 report points out that technological concentration on specific countries and companies can limit the alliance's decision-making, autonomy, and crisis response capabilities. This highlights the risk of NATO member states becoming overly reliant on the United States. In the past, discussions on digital sovereignty have elevated beyond the commercial sector to security issues. As seen in the Ukraine war, the role of private companies such as Palantir, a battlefield data analysis company, and SpaceX's Starlink satellite communication was decisive. Microsoft is also similar.

Through cloud platforms, complex battlefield information could be managed. The role of these companies goes beyond mere contribution; if they are suddenly paralyzed or fail to function properly due to disagreements, it poses a serious threat to the battlefield. When Elon Musk stated that he would no longer provide services if costs were not covered, it became known that satellite internet is not free, and the Ukrainian battlefield was severely threatened because of this. Seeing these examples, the perception arose that dependence on specific companies is not only a dependence on a nation but also fatal to NATO's security.

South Korea's Potential and Quantum Technology Cooperation

The need for change in this regard has been raised, and therefore, interest in the coordination capabilities of partner countries excluding the United States has increased. Furthermore, the role of strengthening intellectual property (IP) capabilities as a strategic complement to the private AI ecosystem is also important. In particular, within NATO, there is persistent anxiety about the AI technology gap between the United States and European countries, and interest in South Korea as a partner to mitigate this gap is growing. South Korea is an attractive country as a vertically integrated partner in AI semiconductor manufacturing, telecommunications, cloud, and edge testbeds. Therefore, it can provide practical utility in technology connection, verification, and strategization. Quantum technology is also a very important area. With the advent of quantum computing in the future,

it is projected that all current traditional security measures will be rendered ineffective. Currently, there are about nine countries leading quantum technology, primarily driven by the United States, and South Korea is included in the Quantum Development Group. European countries include the UK, France, Germany, Denmark, and Finland, but they are strong in basic science and physics but weak in practical application and manufacturing capabilities. In fact, only the United States and China possess experimental equipment or cryocoolers, and semiconductors used in sensing technology are produced in some countries, including South Korea. Therefore, roles beyond theory are very insufficient. Since dependence on the United States is high in this area as well, there is great interest in South Korea's role.

Maritime Security and Public-Private Integrated Technology

Cooperation is also important. Furthermore, a role as a partner optimized for the implementation of physical hardware is expected. In particular, South Korea is expected to play a bridging role in resolving the quantum technology gap between the United States and Europe. Great interest is also focused on these emerging quantum science and technology fields. The maritime domain is also important. In the previous session, military operational cooperation in maritime security was discussed, and while this is not a political partnership like with Japan or Australia, our role space could change if viewed as a maritime integrated technology ecosystem.

The nature of maritime security is currently expanding beyond naval power to include shipbuilding industry and technology management capabilities. The maritime domain is gaining attention as a representative demonstration space for public-private integrated technologies where AI, unmanned systems, and smart manufacturing are combined. In this regard, South Korea holds an important role space among IP countries. In particular, the security availability of private maritime infrastructure, meaning not only the operation of naval vessels during wartime or emergencies but also the design of a structure that can quickly incorporate private shipbuilding and logistics platform companies into the crisis response system during peacetime, is important.

These roles can become key nodes in the maritime defense supply chain. Therefore, South Korea's advanced manufacturing and demonstration capabilities can play a role as an important partner for NATO in terms of production, demonstration, and mobilization within the maritime technology ecosystem. South Korea has advantages such as influence in offshore plant automation technology, AI sensors, smart ships combined with communication, demonstration capabilities for unmanned maritime systems, and a private-centric supply chain and Western design capacity compatible with NATO standards. Interoperability is also important. Interoperability includes not only weapon systems but also infrastructure and instrumentation.

Ensuring Time Synchronization and Infrastructure Resilience

When I attended the Core Infrastructure Resilience Enhancement Conference in Poland last November, I heard the interesting keyword 'ensuring time synchronization.' This is because, after the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia launched electronic warfare attacks, jamming, and spoofing attacks along with general cyberattacks against Ukraine, damaging information from satellite-based systems. These attacks damage location information and the corresponding precise time information.

If this information is compromised, infrastructure cannot operate in a timely manner. This will cause serious chaos not only in power systems, financial markets, and the military but also throughout society. There have been actual cases of substations or power grid systems being attacked. Currently, NATO relies almost entirely on US GPS, so this concentration raises the need for countermeasures. Although ground-based countermeasures are being developed independently, there are limitations in standardization and dissemination, necessitating cooperation with Indo-Pacific countries, and cooperation with South Korea is desired. South Korea is also developing the Korean Positioning System (KPS).

South Korea's Standing and Strategic Challenges

This is a very timely and important issue. Time desynchronization attacks are critical, making this one of the new emerging fields. So, looking objectively, what is South Korea's standing among NATO IP partner countries? As the table shows, the scope of cooperation is not as broad as that of other countries. Japan's is the most comprehensive, and Australia's is also extensive. In South Korea's case, due to the confrontation with North Korea, its interests and priorities are evaluated as being limited to the Korean Peninsula. This has unavoidable aspects. Furthermore, it is rated low in terms of the stability of strategic engagement that can be maintained consistently regardless of changes in administration. Even though this evaluation is from a researcher supported by the Korea Foundation, and considering this,

the actual evaluation may be even harsher. However, if this table were to be redrawn in terms of security format, considering key cooperation assets, strategic standing, strengths in private sector cooperation, contributions to the security ecosystem, and cooperation platforms, it could reflect more positive potential strengths than currently. There are many strengths, including high-tech manufacturing and operationalization strengths, operationalization nodes, defense industry, shipbuilding, mass production and maintenance of semiconductors, rapid operationalization support, and smart factory supply chain cooperation. These strengths need to be well utilized, but there are several problems. Despite these strengths, there is a risk of being stuck as merely a provider of subordinate technologies.

While Japan and Australia participate as strategic planners and designers for NATO, South Korea risks strategic marginalization. South Korea's manufacturing and defense capabilities are essential, but the framework of thinking centered on the Korean Peninsula exists as a limitation in the strategic discussion structure. Furthermore, South Korea's defense capabilities are based not on national capabilities but on defense companies and private infrastructure capabilities that can be diverted to dual-use technologies. However, there is a lack of mechanisms for private-led strategic deployment.

This leads to a weakness in technological, institutional, and strategic mechanisms that can be linked to rapid acquisition programs or strategic innovation programs. The fragmentation of ministries and a focus on short-term procurement capabilities are issues for strategic scalability. In the future, there is a need to closely integrate the fragmentation of national governance and the approaches of each ministry. Furthermore, despite possessing world-class efficient mobility, there is a weakness in public relations capabilities to understand NATO's operational requirements and implement them as security values.

Improvement Measures and Redefining South Korea's Role

The lack of specialized personnel and overseas networks also remains a limitation. Furthermore, the private sector's passive attitude towards the government makes it difficult to consider it a basis for horizontal practical private cooperation, and the space for active participation is limited. Barriers to entry for private actors and high thresholds and risks in the security market still exist. In conclusion, I propose a few improvement measures. First, it is necessary to build a practical basis for active private sector participation. Second, long-term incentives must be established.

First, I propose a name such as 'Global Security Demonstration Hub K-Dynamic Node.' Establishing a domestic final testbed, a testbed that private technologies go through before transitioning to the security sector, will be important for future globalization by building international standardization and verification systems. This will secure a reliable and advanced technology verification base, and South Korea will gain the effect of pre-certifying security suitability. Furthermore, the security incentive system for promoting private sector participation needs to be redesigned.

The contradictory situation where, despite participating in NATO's 24 operationalization programs, our own acquisition procedures are rigid and time-consuming must be improved. Finally, to achieve this, South Korea's status within the NATO IP security ecosystem must be elevated from a mere technology provider to a strategic designer. This means that while K-defense industry is spoken of as a great weapon in practical terms, it needs to be elevated to a higher level. Rapid manufacturing of weapons is important, but beyond that, the core value of K-defense industry as a provider of an efficient security ecosystem platform needs to be redefined and expanded.

A sustainable ecosystem that can convert NATO's military experiment results into actual capabilities and industrial capacity needs to be implemented, and the value of IP core actors performing this needs to be redefined. This will require a long-term government strategy to systematize a comprehensive national interest creation model that integrates the military, industry, economy, security, and diplomacy, not just the private sector.

This cannot be done solely by the private sector; ultimately, it will require a long-term government strategy to systematize a comprehensive national interest creation model that integrates the military, industry, economy, security, and diplomacy.

Yoon Jung-hyun, Senior Researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy.