[NATO-IP4 Forum] ① European Security Order Transformed by the Russia-Ukraine War and the Potential for Expanding NATO-IP4 Partnership | Shim Sung-eun, Legislative Research Officer, National Assembly Research Service

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=df9FG23iZLk&si=Zga0769Hn5M29jgu

Video Script

With the release of IP4 in 2022, I took an interest and wrote several reports. My interest then waned, and I was unable to follow up, but I have been studying it further in preparation for this presentation. I am grateful for this opportunity. I am very pleased to be able to study and to visit the East Asia Institute for the first time, as I have been entrusted with this presentation despite my shortcomings. My topic today is the potential for expanding partnerships within IP4. Compared to the presentation topics of others,

I find it a challenging topic as I am presenting first, but I found solace in thinking that it would be the easiest if I were to provide an overview or current status of IP4. My second consideration was whether to view IP partnerships from South Korea's perspective or NATO's perspective. As this seminar is being held with NATO's support in Korea, I decided it would be best to blend both perspectives, so the content may shift back and forth somewhat. I would appreciate your understanding.

Changes in the International Security Order and NATO's Indo-Pacific Expansion

My presentation is broadly divided into four parts. First, why this research was undertaken. Second, how the security order has changed following the Russia-Ukraine war. Third, the current status of partnerships. Finally, we will examine the immediate challenges and prospects. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, the paradigm of the international order has been shifting, and amidst this, NATO expanded its security focus to the Indo-Pacific region in 2022. Specifically, at the Madrid Summit, China was defined as a systemic challenge, and the European and Indo-Pacific regions were linked as security issues.

Nevertheless, following the inauguration of the Trump administration in 2025, a trend of downplaying NATO emerged in the United States, coupled with demands for increased security burden-sharing from allies and trade disputes, which paradoxically weakened the transatlantic alliance and diminished NATO's standing. Therefore, the partnership between NATO and IP4 is also expected to be affected. In the second part, we will examine the paradigm shift in the international order.

Paradigm Shift in the International Order Following the Russia-Ukraine War

As everyone knows, value-centric blocs are confronting each other following the Russia-Ukraine war. When the term 'new Cold War' first emerged, some argued it was an exaggeration, but at this point, it is appropriate to refer to it as a new Cold War. However, it is centered on the US and China, not the US and Russia, and this is where it differs from the past Cold War: economic interdependence is very high. In fact, it is argued that the current state of maximum economic interdependence will lead to a very different trajectory than the previous Cold War era. What is important is that the international order is changing significantly as it shifts from the previous US-centric unipolar system, not even a bipolar G2 system, but rather a multipolar system, with countries in the Global South, such as India, South America, and the Middle East, not following the US-led trend in UN resolutions, sanctions against Russia, or support for Ukraine, but rather acting according to their own national interests.

Among these, let us examine the authoritarian bloc. At the 2022 Beijing Olympics, China and Russia declared a 'partnership without limits.' In 2024, North Korea and Russia elevated their alliance to a level that effectively restores the treaty between them, which was effectively abolished in 1996. With the materialization of practical economic and military cooperation between North Korea, China, and Russia, this alliance among authoritarian states has been strengthened to an unprecedented degree. The transatlantic alliance is not much different. The transatlantic alliance, which was significantly weakened during Trump's first term, began to recover somewhat under the Biden administration and recovered rapidly in 2022.

This led to strengthened cohesion centered around NATO. However, with the advent of Trump's second term, a weakening of this transatlantic alliance is becoming apparent. If you look at this graph, it is from the Ukraine Support Tracker website. Until December 2024, the amount of US support for Ukraine and the support provided by the European Union and individual European countries were at very similar levels. Then, in 2025, US support for Ukraine is virtually non-existent. You might wonder what this is, an outlier, but this is because the Biden administration, in anticipation of the election, front-loaded the support payments for the first half of 2025, leading to an expansion in the amount. Looking at these, one wonders whether the US and Europe, in terms of support for Ukraine and countermeasures,

are going down different paths. Therefore, with this weakening of the transatlantic alliance, the Trump administration continues to demand increased burden-sharing from allies. This graph is from NATO, and as you can see, NATO demands two main things from its allies. First, at the 2014 Wales Summit, it was agreed to increase military spending to 2% of GDP. This was to be achieved by 2024, and the Trump administration began to pressure this.

Looking at the 2% of GDP target for 2025, most countries appear to have met this target. The second criterion, which is not widely reported by the media, is to allocate 20% of military spending to weapons procurement. Here is the 20% target. As you can see here, with the exception of Belgium, the remaining countries are spending 20% of their defense budgets on weapons procurement. A more interesting aspect is the scores of these countries. Poland is the only country spending 4.5% of its GDP. Its characteristic is that it is a bordering country with Ukraine. Then there are the Baltic states, such as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, Norway, Denmark, and the United States, which are spending over approximately 3%. In other words, countries with a higher geopolitical relationship with Ukraine tend to have higher defense spending as a percentage of GDP. On the other hand, countries that barely met the 2% target, such as Germany, Italy, and France, major Western European countries in the EU and NATO, are barely meeting the 2% target.

This was raised to 5% at the 2020 NATO summit. However, will it be possible to reach this by 2035? It is likely that these countries will be able to reach it, but the question remains whether the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, which possess the core defense and troop systems of Europe, will be able to meet this target. Therefore, has the US demand for increased burden-sharing and trade disputes not continued? As a result, the alliance between the US and Europe has been significantly weakened, and Europe has adopted a direction, which was temporarily abandoned and submerged under the Biden administration, of 'strategic autonomy,' using the term 'open strategic autonomy' in 2021, to gradually reduce dependence on China depending on the situation.

Weakening of the Transatlantic Alliance and Europe's Strategic Autonomy

However, Europe's domestic and foreign politics are in a very unstable situation. The economic growth rates of European countries such as France and the United Kingdom are also barely exceeding 1%. Recently, Germany, considered the engine of Europe, recorded negative growth for two consecutive quarters, effectively entering an economic recession. Furthermore, diplomatic relations between Eastern European countries like Poland and Hungary and Western European member states are a significant immediate challenge. At last year's NATO summit, among the four IP countries, the leaders of all four countries participated from 2020 to 2024, but last year, only the Prime Minister of New Zealand was absent. Looking at this, concerns have been raised about whether the partnership between IP4 and NATO is weakening. So, let's go back to 2022: why exactly did IP4 emerge?

In 2022, people questioned, 'Why the Indo-Pacific region?' First, the outbreak of the Ukraine war fundamentally altered the global order, leading to strengthened cooperation between North Korea, China, and Russia. Although China adheres to the principle of non-alignment and does not speak of alliances, its de facto expansion into an alliance has led to the recognition that security crises in Europe and the Indo-Pacific are closely interconnected. Furthermore, with shortages of various weapons, including artillery shells, for support to Ukraine, our country has significantly increased its defense exports.

Overview and Areas of Cooperation for IP4 Partnerships

So, what exactly is IP4? Let's examine the overview of the partnership. Official documents describe IP as partners and holders of strategic assets who share values of democracy, the rule of law, and market economy. South Korea contributes defense industry capabilities, Japan contributes materials and advanced technologies, Australia contributes energy and logistics bases, and New Zealand contributes value sharing. Given their participation in the Quad, AUKUS, and Five Eyes, they can be considered key countries in US-led security cooperation. South Korea and Japan are countries where a large number of US troops are stationed. With 28,500 US troops in South Korea and 55,000 in Japan, they are the largest host nations for US military presence. US troops are rotationally stationed in Australia, and although New Zealand is not included, it can be said that key US security cooperation partners have effectively entered IP4 in various aspects.

This cooperation was further developed in 2023 with the signing of the ITP. Previously, cooperation programs were maintained under the Individual Partnership Cooperation Program (IPCP), which has now evolved into the ITP. The objectives are strategic communication, practical security, non-traditional security, and advanced technology. In summary, the aim is to strengthen security cooperation currently and to build security cooperation in advanced technologies in the future. The current objective is to enhance security cooperation. When presenting on IP4, each country explains which areas and to what extent they will engage in security cooperation with NATO. South Korea has 11 areas, Japan has 16, and while Australia and New Zealand have not specified exact numbers, they appear to have set cooperation areas at relatively fewer numbers, around 8 and 6 respectively.

Key features include dialogue/consultation and interoperability, which are common to South Korea and Japan. Differences include maritime security and space security, which are not included for South Korea but are a focus for Japan. NATO uses the same designation, IP4, but it is evident that NATO expects different security cooperation from South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. So, the question arises: what has been practically achieved since the signing of these agreements in 2023?

Practical Security Cooperation Achievements between IP4 Countries and NATO

While not monumental, practical cooperation has steadily strengthened. In South Korea's case, prior to the signing of the ITP in 2023, it joined the CCD COE, NATO's largest cyber security exercise held in Estonia, as an associate member in 2022. Furthermore, it regularly participates in cyber security exercises such as Locked Shields. Since July 2027, South Korea has been exporting large quantities of defense equipment to countries like Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic. These actions suggest not merely arms exports but a strengthening of security cooperation, enhancing strategic alignment and even moving towards common strategic objectives.

For example, as reported in South Korean newspapers, in July 2024, two years ago, mutual recognition of aircraft airworthiness certification was agreed upon. This means that if an aircraft developed in South Korea is recognized as safe, NATO will also recognize it. This has significantly streamlined the procedures and verification processes for exporting South Korean aircraft to NATO, thereby facilitating defense cooperation.

Japan and NATO are also strengthening cooperation. The establishment of representative offices is also underway. Regarding Japan, it is noteworthy that while countries like South Korea and Australia have engaged in IP4 cooperation for a considerable time, Japan's engagement has become more visible since January of this year, utilizing the IP4 framework. Japan and NATO have held cyber dialogues, and cooperation with the Strategic Communications Center (StratCom) has been enhanced. Furthermore, the sharing of security and AI-based detection technologies is being accelerated. Through meetings and enhanced strategies, Japan appears to be actively seeking closer ties with NATO.

As mentioned earlier, maritime security is also a unique area of cooperation for Japan. Australia and NATO have also achieved cooperation outcomes. As previously stated, NATO's expectation from Australia is its role as a logistics base. It is the only IP country to have signed a Support and Procurement Agency (NSPO) agreement with NATO. Australia serves as a strategic hub and logistics support center for NATO. It also plays a role in maritime security. Australia has participated more actively in NATO-led military exercises than Japan or South Korea. NATO conducts approximately 100 small and medium-sized military exercises annually.

As everyone knows, NATO does not have a standing army, so it conducts military exercises with forces dispatched from member states according to strategic objectives. Among these, large-scale military exercises have been conducted approximately every two years to achieve strategic goals. These include Steadfast Defender in 2022 and 2024, and Steadfast Dart, which is currently underway in 2026. South Korea, rather than dispatching troops, participates as a partner observer, while Japan participates more actively than South Korea.

During the large-scale Air Defence exercise in 2022, it dispatched aircraft. Australia participates even more actively than this, while New Zealand has not yet participated. From these observations, it can be seen that the objectives NATO expects from IP4 countries differ somewhat, not only in terms of military exercises. New Zealand, with its small military and anti-nuclear stance, has weaker military cooperation but is strengthening value-based intelligence cooperation. So, what are the immediate challenges? Why is the topic of IP4 gaining prominence recently?

Immediate Challenges for IP4 Partnerships: Strategic Priorities and Interoperability

There are broadly three main points. First, there are differences in the strategic priorities of the IP4 countries. South Korea prioritizes the issue of North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. Japan focuses on China, considering the Senkaku Islands issue and potential contingencies in Taiwan. Australia and New Zealand are concentrating on countering China's expanding influence in the Pacific island nations, particularly Polynesia and Micronesia, through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or security cooperation with the Solomon Islands to establish military bases. Therefore, despite being grouped as IP4, the differing security priorities among these Indo-Pacific nations can be considered an immediate challenge. Second, interoperability and political instability can be cited.

NATO has a Standardization Agreement (STANAG), which all member states have ratified. This agreement aims to standardize weapon systems, communication systems, and data sharing. For example, if ammunition or weapon firing specifications are not standardized, interoperability is impossible. It is like having German weapons that are useless because the shell specifications do not match when trying to use them in France. This system ensures interoperability by standardizing over 1,000 weapon systems, including shell specifications.

Currently, European countries have achieved approximately 90% interoperability. Major defense manufacturing countries such as France, Germany, and Italy have strong nationalistic tendencies regarding their weapon systems, leading them to possess different weapon systems. For instance, in terms of tanks, Germany uses Leopard, while France uses Leclerc. For aircraft, France uses Rafale, but other countries use different systems.

These differences in interoperability systems can pose problems. Although it appears that 90% interoperability has been achieved on the surface, in reality, the issues with STANAG are confined to superficial aspects. For example, even if shells are standardized to the 155mm specification, the actual range and target accuracy can vary depending on the pressure required to fire the shell, the range, or the software used. Therefore, despite having interoperability, there are limitations in hitting fine targets. Some assessments suggest that while European countries claim 90% interoperability, the actual level is only around 50-60%.

What about the IP4 countries? South Korea exports defense equipment to countries like Poland and Romania and is said to meet approximately 70-80% of STANAG standards. However, the actual usability of our shells in Ukraine can vary depending on the situation, and it is estimated to be around 50%. Japan's interoperability is about 10% lower than South Korea's. Therefore, not only NATO member states but also IP4 countries need to further enhance interoperability.

Political Challenges and Response Strategies for IP4

Similarly, NATO member states require systems for sharing classified information and data in areas such as maritime and space security, but IP4, being non-member states, faces access limitations. The most significant political issue is American exceptionalism, which is a well-known fact and will be passed over. The third immediate challenge is internal conflicts within the bloc. China criticizes the strengthening cooperation between NATO and IP4, viewing it as an attempt to create an 'Asian NATO' and a Cold War mentality that poses a security threat to China. Therefore, it is necessary to emphasize that IP4 is not such an entity and to highlight solidarity. As response strategies, first, defense industry cooperation and standardization can be considered.

We have divided this into two aspects from the perspective of South Korea and NATO. In South Korea's case, it serves as an arsenal for democratic countries to build defense supply chains. It is necessary to highlight this strength by leveraging its mass production capabilities and rapid delivery capacity. First, interoperability needs to be enhanced, and second, MRO (Maintenance, Repair, and Operations) aspects need to be strengthened through joint local production. In the contract with Poland in 2022, South Korea completed the delivery of K2 tanks and K9 self-propelled howitzers in four months, a process that typically takes four to five years in Europe.

This was achieved by prioritizing the supply to Poland of a portion of the quantity that was to be delivered to the South Korean military, and by sending repaired weapons that were already in use by the military. Such rapid supply is possible due to the active operations of South Korea's defense companies, which operate 24 hours a day under a wartime system.

Second, it is necessary to further enhance interoperability under NATO's leadership.

Instead of achieving interoperability after producing weapons, it is necessary to consider interoperability from the stage of weapon development. I will provide more details during the discussion session if questions arise. Second, as a response strategy, it is also possible to consider expanding cooperation in non-traditional security areas, not just traditional security cooperation. IP4 and NATO are geographically distant, making military exercises costly, and security conflicts may arise due to the containment of China. Therefore, it is possible to consider strengthening cooperation in non-traditional security areas such as cyber security, space security, and maritime security. We have considered future prospects and measures to strengthen partnerships. Currently, cooperation is being pursued bilaterally between NATO and South Korea, and between NATO and Japan. If the implicit objective is security in the Indo-Pacific region, considering the start of the Trump administration in 2017 and the adoption of Indo-Pacific strategies by France, Europe, the Czech Republic, Italy, the EU, etc., in 2018, it is conceivable to strengthen cooperation by independently uniting the IP4 countries and then deriving cooperation measures with NATO based on this, rather than relying solely on bilateral cooperation. Second, regularizing consultation mechanisms.

Currently, IP4 countries intermittently participate in Foreign and Defense Ministerial meetings; considering regularizing this could be a viable option. Second, there is the method of clarifying strategic messaging. Although not explicitly stated, the word 'China' is clearly visible between the lines. It is necessary to emphasize that while this is security cooperation, it is not traditional military cooperation, and its defensive nature is strong due to the emphasis on non-traditional security. Furthermore, it is necessary to persuade others that European and Indo-Pacific security are indivisible.

In conclusion, security in the Eurasian Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions are indivisible, thus requiring an approach to this security cooperation from a single global perspective. Furthermore, the partnership must be strengthened into a practical security cooperation body. Third, to enhance complementary values, measures such as strengthening manufacturing capabilities, technological prowess, and standardization efforts like STANAG should be considered.

In conclusion, the security of the Eurasian Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific region are indivisible, and thus, this security cooperation needs to be approached from a single global perspective. Furthermore, the partnership must be strengthened into a practical security cooperation body. Third, to enhance complementary values, measures such as strengthening manufacturing capabilities, technological prowess, and standardization efforts like STANAG should be considered.

Thank you.

■ Shim Sung-seong, Legislative Research Officer, National Assembly Research Service.