[North Korea and the World] The 2026 US National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Changing Alliance Structure

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bk0p6Ry6VHE

Video Script

Announcement and Key Contents of the 2026 US National Defense Strategy (NDS)

South Korea has also decided to increase its defense budget to 3.5% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2035. The important point is that 3.5% in the NDS... Hello. Thank you to everyone watching Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. Today, I will explain the US National Defense Strategy (NDS), which was announced on January 23rd, 2026, local time. This document is typically released every four years. The one released in 2022 under the Biden administration was based on the National Security Strategy (NSS) released in November 2025, which is a higher-level document. It specifies US defense priorities and strategic direction. The content released this time is a public version, and at about 20 pages, it is relatively short. As those watching this broadcast may know, I uploaded a related video in the first half of last year.

In March of last year, a draft defense strategy guidance was leaked and reported by The Washington Post. In May, the defense strategy guidance was partially confirmed through a speech by Secretary of Defense Peter Beck at the Shangri-La Dialogue. To get straight to the point, there is a significant gap between the content announced then and the content announced on the 23rd. The content related to China, in particular, shows a large difference. I will present my analysis and interpretation. The introduction begins with a critique of the previous administration's security and defense policies. President Trump himself, and one of the characteristics of administrative documents, is to always criticize the previous government. It shows criticism not only of the Biden Democratic administration but also of the previous Republican administration. The core of the criticism of the previous administration's security and defense policies is that the United States has been neglecting its core interests for too long.

Consequently, it criticizes the 'rule-based international order' that the United States has valued most. It argues that it only talks about vague concepts like the 'rule-based international order.' One of the most significant characteristics of the Trump administration is its departure from and criticism of the liberal international order, or what is also called the 'rule-based international order,' which the US has built and developed since 1945. This has now been officially reconfirmed. The rule-based international order includes free trade, respect for sovereignty, opposition to changing the status quo by force, the rule of law, and freedom of navigation. We are already seeing much of this, aren't we? Yesterday, Trump announced he would reinstate a 25% tariff on South Korea, causing considerable concern and tension in South Korean society. In this manner, Trump is crudely undermining even the basic principle of free trade through tariffs. I believe we have been observing this trend since Trump's emergence last year.

However, it is now officially and publicly stated that it will no longer talk about vague concepts like the 'rule-based international order.' After criticizing the previous administration, Trump states that he is different. He then lists several things he will not pursue, each carrying significant meaning. First, he uses the phrase 'endless wars,' meaning he will not engage in wars that drag on or involve deploying ground troops. He will only engage in wars that are very cautious, calibrated, and related to core interests. We saw this in Venezuela as well. He will clearly only undertake operations where they can achieve victory. Third, he states he will not pursue 'regime change.' Trump had voiced criticism of interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan even before becoming president.

He called them very expensive and foolish, questioning why one would try to change the regime of another country. He considers efforts to transform authoritarian or theocratic regimes into democracies to be very foolish. Therefore, it has now been officially stated that regime change will not be pursued. Next, he also talks about 'nation-building.' Nation-building is also linked to regime change and was attempted in Afghanistan and Iraq. He states that nation-building will no longer be undertaken. Instead, he will prioritize 'practical and clear benefits for the American people.' The phrase 'practical and clear benefits' will appear repeatedly. It is one of the core keywords that runs through the entire document, and it is presented as the core concept of 'peace through strength' as articulated by the Trump administration. He then adds, 'This is not isolationism.'

The stated goal is to respond more intensely to threats that undermine core interests. They call this 'flexible and pragmatic realism,' which is another key phrase. It appears they are presenting their ideological stance. From an academic perspective of realism, 'flexible and pragmatic' does not seem to represent a distinct school of realism. In any case, they have announced that they will refer to it as 'flexible and pragmatic realism' this time.

US Security Priorities and Strategic Shifts

Next, it outlines priorities, starting from the introduction, moving to the security environment, and concluding with policy recommendations. This can be seen as representing US priorities. The first priority is 'the US homeland and the Western Hemisphere.' This was consistently mentioned in the National Security Strategy (NSS) released last November, and the US now states it will place the highest priority on the Western Hemisphere, including South America, North America, and Greenland. The second is 'China.' It states that it will deter China from fully dominating the Indo-Pacific region, showing a very different approach to China. It says, 'This is not a confrontation with China.' Therefore, while building relationships with China is important, they will not confront or consider China an adversary.

However, the Indo-Pacific region is considered important, making it the second key priority. The third is 'allied responsibility and increased burden-sharing,' which is directly related to South Korea. This is a recurring and central argument of the NDS. The fourth is 'rebuilding the US defense industry.' To reiterate the order: first, the US homeland and the Western Hemisphere; second, the China issue in the Indo-Pacific region; third, allied responsibility and burden-sharing; and fourth, rebuilding the US defense industry.

The introduction then provides detailed explanations. I will briefly explain only the content that warrants our attention. First, it emphasizes the importance of 'defending the US homeland and the Western Hemisphere.' This brings up 'Golden Eye.' It is a missile defense system. Trump aims to build this Golden Eye, which he claims will be 100 times better than Israel's defense system. Golden Eye will be built to protect the US homeland and the Western Hemisphere, and it is one of the means to achieve this.

Another concept is 'spear and shield,' where the shield refers to this defense system, and the spear refers to maintaining a powerful and modern nuclear deterrent. In other words, it is the modernization of nuclear weapons. This has been a crucial aspect since the first Trump administration. In fact, strengthening the 'spear and shield' has a direct bearing on our security. If the US homeland is securely managed, and if a powerful and modern nuclear deterrent is maintained, not only through the Golden Eye shield but also through other means, the US's capability for nuclear deterrence against North Korea could significantly improve. Consequently, the utility of North Korea's nuclear weapons could relatively decrease. While the primary reason for the US undertaking these measures is not explicitly stated, it is undoubtedly to counter China. The US is responding to China's efforts to develop, enhance, and proliferate its nuclear arsenal. Therefore, if the US enhances its capabilities to deter nuclear weapons from countries at a much higher level than North Korea, such as China, it will naturally possess a significantly strengthened deterrent against North Korea. To reiterate, the utility of North Korea's nuclear weapons is bound to diminish.

Furthermore, it discusses the 'Western Hemisphere,' specifying regions of core interest. President Trump has consistently spoken about controlling Caribbean nations, the area referred to as the Gulf of Mexico, which they are now calling the 'American Sea,' and Greenland. These areas are designated as key strategic strongholds, and the US will ensure its military and commercial access to them. This reaffirms the importance of this region. The document refers to all of this as 'Trump's supplementary doctrine to the Monroe Doctrine,' calling it a doctrine that includes Trump within the 'Monroe Doctrine.'

The Monroe Doctrine, declared in the 19th century by President Monroe when the US was not yet a global power, aimed to counter European influence in the Americas by asserting that the American continent was within the US sphere of influence. The term 'Monroe Doctrine' signifies that Trump is speaking within that tradition, and this has been reaffirmed in the current NDS. The term 'coronary' itself, in Korean, means 'consequence,' 'natural result,' or a conclusion that naturally follows from a principle or proposition. Therefore, 'Trump's coronary' is presented as a natural consequence of the 'supplementary doctrine to the Monroe Doctrine.' To rephrase, it means that if US interests in the Western Hemisphere are threatened, the US has the right and obligation to take coercive measures, including direct military action, without hesitation. In simpler terms, it asserts that the Western Hemisphere is within the US sphere of influence, and military means can be employed to protect it. This has been clearly incorporated into the current defense strategy guidance.

China Deterrence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region

Secondly, it discusses China, with the subtitle 'Deterring China in the Indo-Pacific through Strength, Not Confrontation.' This is the most crucial part, and China is discussed using much more restrained language than before. President Trump has stated, 'We have pursued a relationship based on stable peace, fair trade, and mutual respect with China. Therefore, to achieve these goals, we have also shown willingness to communicate directly with President Xi Jinping.' This is a significant departure. During Trump's first term, he referred to China as a 'bankrupt communist country' and even stated that while President Xi Jinping holds the title of 'President,' they would refer to him as 'Secretary' because he is the General Secretary of the Communist Party, thus emphasizing China as a communist nation. The message in the current NDS is that they aim to coexist peacefully with China.

It also includes the statement, 'Our goal is not to dominate China. It is not to pressure or humiliate China. America's goal is simple,' which is also a remarkably restrained statement. 'To ensure that no one, including China, can dominate the United States or its allies in the Indo-Pacific region' is the stated objective. The recurring phrase is, 'Achieving a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region to enjoy a dignified peace' is the core objective of deterring China.

Therefore, the overall message is quite different. As recently as March of this year, the draft defense strategy guidance reported by The Washington Post stated, 'China is the pacing threat. It is a pacing scenario for threats in the Taiwan Strait.' 'Pacing threat' means it is the most important threat and a 'benchmark threat,' and the term 'only' is also used. In other words, China's threat is the most significant threat that the US must address, and all means, including military force, must be employed to counter it. This was the stance then, but the tone has significantly softened now. The perspective and perception of China, and the level of deterrence, are much more restrained compared to what was presented in March and in Peter Beck's remarks in May. This is a continuation of last year's NSS. The NSS also did not refer to China as an adversary or threat. It stated that negotiations and peace are possible with China.

It appears the NDS has been significantly revised to reflect this. I understand that the NDS was completed around August of last year. There were discussions about its release then, but it seems it was postponed because it was deemed appropriate to release it after the higher-level NSS guidance. It is highly likely that the NDS was rewritten after the NSS. The content, especially regarding China, is considerably different from the draft defense strategy guidance in March and Secretary Beck's speech in May. Nevertheless, the US policy, including the NSS, that has been maintained from then until now is a strategic and defense directive. Those interested in the 'first island chain' will know that it includes South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. Building a robust denial-based defense along the 'first island chain' is described as the core of US defense strategy, particularly for deterring China in the Indo-Pacific region. The aim is to prevent China from advancing into this area.

It also states that the US will not act alone, and that key regional allies and partners must play a greater role. In simpler terms, it means that South Korea and Japan should bear significantly more responsibility and costs regarding the Taiwan issue than they currently do. While the specific terms 'South Korea' and 'Japan' are not explicitly mentioned in this NDS, they are present in the NSS. Therefore, although there is a difference, it is clear that the roles of South Korea and Japan are considered important.

Another significant characteristic of this NDS is the complete absence of any mention of 'Taiwan.' I have read it several times and even performed keyword searches, wondering how this is possible. There is no mention of the Taiwan Strait. This is a stark contrast to the March draft defense strategy guidance, which emphasized the need to protect Taiwan by stating that 'the crisis in the Taiwan Strait is a pacing scenario, the only benchmark scenario the US must respond to.' The fact that Taiwan is not even mentioned suggests that President Trump's thinking has been incorporated. Since taking office, President Trump has never stated that he would use military force in response to a Taiwan Strait crisis, i.e., a Chinese military action, when asked by reporters. This is a significant difference from President Biden, who has stated on at least three occasions that the US would respond with all available means, including military force. Security experts consider the Taiwan issue to be extremely important, perhaps even more so than the North Korean nuclear threat. However, the complete omission of the term 'Taiwan' from the US NDS, despite its indirect mention through the 'first island chain,' is surprising yet understandable from Trump's perspective. Understanding does not imply agreement; it means it is comprehensible from Trump's viewpoint.

Increased Demand for Burden-Sharing by Allies and Defense Spending Standards

Third, there is the 'expansion of burden-sharing by US allies and partner countries.' This has been a consistent demand from the US over the past year. Allies have been excessively dependent on the US. Therefore, such dependence will no longer be tolerated, and allies must primarily take responsibility for threats to their own security. In the Indo-Pacific region, although specific mentions of South Korea or Japan are absent, it is continuously emphasized that allies and partners must make decisive contributions to deterring China and maintaining a balance of power. Regarding defense spending, South Korea has decided to increase its defense budget to 3.5% by 2035, and NATO has also set a target of 3.5% of GDP, although their actual defense spending is 2%. This was due to US pressure on European countries. In our case, it is not due to US pressure; rather, by around 2035, defense spending is projected to reach 3.5%. Considering the annual increase in defense spending, it is difficult to reduce the budget given the exposure to North Korea's actual threat as of 2025, and it is an unavoidable expenditure increase given the declining defense resources and personnel.

The important point is that the NDS once again refers to this 3.5% as a 'new global standard.' It implies that the US will demand this level of defense spending from all its allies in the future, stating that it is the correct approach. This leads me to wonder about Japan's future actions. Japan has committed to 2%, but an increase to 3.5% would be highly significant. Therefore, it is likely to exert considerable pressure on Japan. This concludes the introductory section; the subsequent parts largely repeat the same points and are therefore omitted.

Perception of North Korean Threat and Changes in Extended Deterrence Role

Third, the security environment; fourth, Iran; and fifth, North Korea are discussed. These sections are relatively brief compared to the preceding content, comprising about four to five paragraphs. North Korea poses a military threat to South Korea and Japan, US allies. However, North Korea's conventional forces are largely outdated and poorly maintained. Nevertheless, South Korea must remain vigilant against the threat of North Korean invasion. North Korea's missile capabilities include not only conventional warheads but also nuclear weapons.

It assesses that North Korea possesses the capability to strike targets in Japan and South Korea, and that its nuclear capabilities are increasingly posing a threat to the US homeland. The crucial point is that it does not definitively state that North Korea possesses the capability to strike the US homeland but rather that it is 'developing the capability to threaten.' Nevertheless, it describes these North Korean threats as clear and present dangers to the US homeland. In other words, while acknowledging that North Korea's threat capabilities are evident against South Korea and Japan, it states that the capabilities against the US are still developing, rather than being fully realized. I will compare this with the 2022 NDS.

First, the priority of threat perception has shifted. In 2022, China and Russia were the primary strategic competitors, followed by North Korea. However, in the 2026 NDS, North Korea's ranking has been lowered, falling behind China, Russia, and Iran. Regarding the role of deterrence, the 2022 NDS emphasized US-led extended deterrence, but the current NDS makes no mention of extended deterrence. It suggests that South Korea should play a leading role, with the US providing limited support. Notably, nuclear deterrence is not mentioned. Recently, Colby visited and stated in a speech that nuclear deterrence is important, and he also mentioned it in a Senate hearing in March. I have analyzed this in detail in a video from the first half of last year, so please refer to it. Although LBC Colby verbally stated during his visit to South Korea that the US would continue to provide extended deterrence for nuclear weapons, it was not included in the document. I believe this is the difference compared to 2022.

The following sections discuss allied burden-sharing. It states that excessive dependence will no longer be tolerated. Some interesting phrases emerge here. It mentions that, with some exceptions, many US allies are investing sufficiently, spending on defense, and fulfilling their roles. However, it criticizes many allies, excluding a few, for cutting defense spending and investing in public welfare or other domestic programs. These few exceptions include three countries mentioned by Colby previously: Poland and Germany in Europe, and South Korea.

In a Senate hearing last March, South Korea, Poland, and Israel were also mentioned as countries adequately managing their defense spending and fulfilling their roles. From the perspective of the NDS, particularly LG Colby, it seems appropriate to view South Korea as a model ally. The text then returns to the topic of South Korea, stating that since January 2025, particularly in Europe and South Korea, allies have been increasingly expanding their roles. This suggests that South Korea is once again considered a model ally, as reflected in the NDS. The subsequent discussion emphasizes overall responsibility and burden-sharing, urging allies to play their roles in the Indo-Pacific region.

Changes in the Korean Peninsula Security Environment and Alliance Modernization

The final section outlines policy recommendations. Under strategic approach, there is a discussion of the Korean Peninsula. Although not extensively detailed, it states that South Korea is important, but deterrence against North Korea will be based on more limited US support. This point is consistently emphasized. This is not just a message to South Korea but to all US allies: importance, but limited support. It implies that while the US will support allies in responding to threats, the support will be significantly limited going forward. Therefore, the primary responsibility for threats rests with the nation itself. In Europe, the discussion concerns Russia, and regarding the North Korean threat, South Korea must bear the primary responsibility. US support will be limited.

However, it acknowledges that South Korea has the will and capability to fulfill such a role. This shift in responsibility-sharing aligns with the US's intention to adjust and modernize its force posture on the Korean Peninsula. This is referred to as alliance modernization. Although termed modernization, it signifies that the US will no longer bear the primary responsibility for South Korea's defense and will prioritize the Indo-Pacific region, particularly countering China. Consequently, the role of the US Forces Korea (USFK) will also change. This is the core of modernization. Therefore, although not explicitly detailed, the role of USFK and the US role within the ROK-US alliance will ultimately shift towards countering China. This has been repeatedly stated by General Paul LaCamera, Commander of USFK. For example, the role of USFK is not solely focused on repelling North Korea. To maintain peace through strength, we must sometimes redeploy to other regions, referring to China. This is also linked to the transfer of wartime operational control (SOTG).

Colby has stated that the transfer of wartime operational control should be approached pragmatically, not ideologically. He emphasizes that it must be done in a responsible and well-organized manner. The exact meaning of this is difficult to ascertain. Last year, Colby advocated for the early transfer of wartime operational control, believing that retaining it would not be advantageous for countering China. The thinking was that if South Korea assumed wartime operational control, it would bear the responsibility for the defense of the Korean Peninsula, allowing the US role, including USFK and the ROK-US alliance, to expand within the region. However, since the latter half of last year, reports from Washington suggest a shift towards a more cautious stance on the transfer of wartime operational control. Specifically, General JB LaCamera has emphasized the importance of a conditions-based transfer of wartime operational control. While concerns about the potential impact on his position as a four-star general might be a factor, there are numerous indications that the overall US policy and strategy may have been revised. Further observation is needed.

In conclusion, this NDS presented a very different outlook than anticipated, particularly regarding China. However, the emphasis on the responsibility and costs of allies, including South Korea, remains clear. This is likely to continue throughout President Trump's term, and even if the Democratic Party regains power, the US demand for increased allied responsibility and burden-sharing is unlikely to change significantly.

I believe this document and policy direction have instilled a sense of increased responsibility for us. Thank you to everyone who watched today.

■ Author: Park Won-gon _ Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute. Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Management and Editing: Lim Jae-hyun _ EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhlim@eai.or.kr