[North Korea and the World] Maduro's Arrest in the US and North Korea's Calculations

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oj8_86E6J9U

Video Script

I believe it was difficult to imagine the United States arresting foreign leaders through pinpoint attacks, as if plucking something out with tweezers. Trump was known for talking tough but backing down, but this time was different. Seeing this scene, Kim Jong Un would think that this could be repeated. What are the future prospects for North Korea-U.S. dialogue? Thank you to everyone watching "North Korea and the World" with Director Park Won-gon. Today, I will discuss the situation in Venezuela with Maduro. It is comparable to North Korea in many aspects and has significant implications for forecasting North Korea's future actions. Of course, I believe there are also implications from a political perspective. What I will mainly discuss today is a brief overview of the Venezuelan situation and its implications for North Korea. There may be a time difference between when you are watching this broadcast and today.

Overview of the Venezuelan Situation and Changes in U.S. Policy

I will briefly explain the various developments in Venezuela up to the 7th, the date of filming, and then move on to the implications for North Korea. It was an incredibly swift event. I have been following it with interest, but I believe it was difficult to imagine the United States arresting foreign leaders through pinpoint attacks, as if plucking something out with tweezers. The Venezuelan situation has been ongoing since September of last year. The naval blockade was a very high level of military show of force. I thought that through the naval blockade, the U.S. would continue its coercive policy to bring about a policy shift in Venezuela's Maduro regime to the level the U.S. desired, but in reality, an operation involving kidnapping and arrest was carried out. On the 3rd, U.S. forces, and importantly, the U.S. Department of Justice, acted together at a safe house in Caracas, Venezuela's capital. From the U.S. perspective, this means a violation of U.S. domestic law. On the 5th, at his first court appearance in New York, he claimed to have been kidnapped, which was reported by global media.

The U.S. has brought four charges, all of which it claims are violations of domestic law. The four charges are conspiracy to distribute narcotics, conspiracy to import cocaine, and conspiracy to possess and possess machine guns and destructive weapons. It is known that if convicted of all four charges, he could face life imprisonment. For example, in the 1990s, the U.S. applied similar pressure on Panama's dictator Noriega. There are two differences between that situation and the current Venezuelan situation. The U.S. launched a full-scale attack. At that time, in the latter half of 1989 and early 1990s, it was the post-Cold War era, and the international order was characterized by a unipolar world led by the U.S., the most powerful nation. This is not the case now. The entire military force was not mobilized; it was a special operation to arrest only Maduro. Furthermore, this incident occurred not in a unipolar U.S. system, but within the context of the strategic competition between the U.S. and China, with the U.S.-China conflict surrounding Venezuela being a larger framework. There is a difference in that regard.

The situation in Venezuela is constantly changing. As of today, the 7th, Vice President Delcy Rodríguez has sworn in as interim president for the next 90 days. She has become president. Immediately after the incident, Vice President Rodríguez presided over a cabinet meeting as vice president and issued a strong statement condemning the U.S. along with key figures of the Maduro regime, including the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Interior. She stated that Maduro is the only president of Venezuela. However, on the 4th, local time, President Trump threatened a second attack if Venezuela did not behave properly. He stated that this second attack would be a much larger military operation than the first. While President Trump's words are often exaggerated, he has shown actual action in this situation, and the threat of a second attack implies the possibility of a full-scale invasion. Consequently, President Rodríguez, who had expressed her will to resist on the 3rd, suddenly posted the following in English on her social media: "We want our country to live in an environment of respect and international cooperation, free from external threats. Crucially, we request cooperation on an agenda aimed at common development within the framework of international law to strengthen continuous coexistence with the U.S. government." In simple terms, this means: We will cooperate with the U.S. We have no intention of fighting the U.S. We will not resist the U.S. She posted on social media, which was close to a de facto declaration of surrender. Although the interim president is still voicing criticism and condemnation of the U.S. on the ground, the overall intention not to engage in military conflict or respond militarily while confronting the U.S. has been clearly expressed, and discussions about resolving the issue through dialogue and negotiation with the U.S. are underway.

How, then, should we understand this situation? In a way, it is an extremely radical act that undermines the international order established by the United States. Considering that the UN itself was created in '45 under the leadership of U.S. President Roosevelt, this is a clear challenge to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

The UN has stipulated two circumstances under which such military operations are possible: one is when a country is practically invaded and must respond militarily in self-defense, and the other is when a UN Security Council resolution is passed, as in the Korean War, authorizing the use of armed force to repel an attack. These are the only instances recognized; no others are permitted. Therefore, this situation is clearly a violation of international law.

The U.S.'s New Governance Strategy and the Possibility of 'Regime Change'

Another aspect is the international order based on norms, often created by the U.S., including the UN. This norm-based international order encompasses not only respect for sovereignty, opposition to changing the status quo by force, and the rule of law, but also free trade and open multilateralism. The core principle is this: In this regard, did Venezuela's sovereignty truly get respected? Was the status quo changed by force? Was the rule of law upheld? From this perspective, the act of undermining the norm-based international order that the U.S. itself established is also evident. This is from an international law perspective. So, considering that the U.S. created international law and shaped a norm-based international order that has persisted since '45, and now with the emergence of a figure like Trump, the U.S.-led order is being undermined and weakened, let's consider the practical lessons of this incident. The first is the display of power and a message of deterrence, as in "showing American strength." It demonstrates that if you don't listen to the U.S., it can take actual military action and forcibly bring in those who disobey.

This clearly sent a message to many countries opposing the U.S., even limiting it to South America, such as anti-U.S. leaning countries like Cuba and Nicaragua, that the U.S. can use military force if they cross the line. Especially in the National Security Strategy released last November, mentioning Donald Trump's doctrine, it stated that the Western Hemisphere is their backyard. This refers to the Americas. While it includes Greenland, it signifies a determination to secure influence there so that no one can interfere in the future. Therefore, by demonstrating its power against Venezuela in South America, the U.S. has once again shown the world that the Western Hemisphere is within its sphere of influence.

Secondly, there's the criticism that "Trump just talks and backs down." This time, that was not the case. This is what's called 'Payback,' and while it's a vulgar term I won't fully explain, in Korean it means 'messing around and getting caught.' Trump even posted the photo on his social media with "Payback" written below. This also appeared in a speech by the Pentagon Secretary last year to all U.S. military generals, saying, "Mess around and you'll get caught." This shows that the "peace through strength" is not just a slogan but is backed by actual action. Regional countries are now facing pressure to choose sides. They must clearly define their stance: America or China, anti-U.S. or pro-U.S. Because if they lean towards anti-U.S. and China, as if in a zero-sum game, the U.S. will take action, the pressure on regional countries to make a choice is immense.

Of course, I believe there are domestic political calculations involved. The U.S. midterm elections are in November. Trump's current situation is not good. The Epstein files continue to be linked to Trump's political scandals, and inflation in the U.S. is so high that criticism is mounting, and his approval ratings are falling. He may be thinking of rallying his supporters and claiming achievements through his decisive leadership and actions to carry this through to the November midterm elections. Of course, this involves complex domestic U.S. issues. This is because the MAGA base, which supports Trump, has isolationist tendencies. This isolationism means they strongly dislike interfering in other countries' internal affairs or engaging in wars by deploying troops. Trump himself has stated numerous times that interfering in other countries' internal affairs or attempting regime change is a foolish endeavor.

Trump has previously voiced strong criticism against U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. After being elected president, he stated he would not engage in foolish actions, which garnered significant support from the MAGA base. However, his actions this time are different. Therefore, it is highly likely that Trump will not pursue further military operations, especially deploying ground troops to occupy Venezuela, or what is referred to as "on the ground." Consequently, the U.S. is likely to avoid being drawn into prolonged conflicts like the 20-year war on terror. If this operation is successful, and Venezuela adopts a pro-U.S. stance, allowing Trump to gain control over oil facilities and resources as he constantly talks about, he might declare it another political victory without further military action, and the MAGA base might not raise any objections, possibly even offering positive evaluations.

So, these domestic political calculations were likely at play. Beyond this, governance strategy is also important. This is connected to North Korea, but the Trump administration's policies and the process of arresting Maduro show a very different approach than before. One key difference is regime change versus leader replacement. Previously, as in Afghanistan or Iraq, the U.S. would invade and completely transform the country's regime into a democracy. However, this ultimately failed. After incurring immense costs and sacrifices over 20 years, the U.S. experienced a dishonorable withdrawal from Afghanistan and now appears unwilling to repeat such actions. This is a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy: the existing regime is left intact, and the method used is to remove leaders who are anti-U.S. or do not comply with U.S. directives.

Although Vice President Rodriguez has been sworn in as interim president, if the existing power elite who shared power with Maduro cooperate with the U.S. and adopt a pro-U.S. stance, it would align with the success of the Trump administration's policy goals. When Trump held a press conference, he used the expression "operate Venezuela," which implies operating policies, not the country itself. It's not about the U.S. taking over Venezuela and establishing a pro-U.S. regime and then managing its administrative affairs. Instead, it's about ensuring the existing regime steers and executes policies in a direction desired by the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has reaffirmed that through coercive means, threats, or persuasion, the existing system will be utilized to compel Venezuela to move in the direction the U.S. desires. This is a lesson learned from the mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Furthermore, utilizing Rodriguez could prevent a security vacuum and allow the military and bureaucratic organizations, previously loyal to Maduro, to be leveraged. A key characteristic here is that President Trump is not interested in democracy. If he were truly interested in democracy, considering that individuals appointed by the existing Maduro regime have anti-democratic tendencies and the 2024 election is marred by fraud, he would pursue methods like physical removal or holding elections. For instance, he could have supported a prominent democratic opposition leader like Maria Corina Machado to achieve a change in government through elections. However, he has stated he will not do so. President Trump said, "Machado is not very popular within Venezuela." Therefore, Trump's calculation is that rather than holding elections, it's better to utilize the current power structure to extract exactly what the U.S. wants. In other words, he is not significantly interested in transitioning to a democratic system. This is confirmed by Trump's statement, "Right now, restoring a broken country is a priority over elections." Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also stated, "Elections are premature." This clearly indicates an intention to partner with the current power holders in Venezuela, not the opposition. Therefore, it is believed that Trump is not significantly interested in a transition to a democratic system.

Analysis of Differences and Pressures between the Venezuelan Crisis and North Korea

This is a new facet of the U.S. not seen before, and I will connect it to North Korea to discuss its implications. Could such an operation be applied to North Korea's Kim Jong Un? I believe it is difficult in a broad sense. There are significant differences between North Korea and Venezuela, and the arrest and abduction of Maduro were possible due to three converging conditions. First, he was indicted under U.S. domestic law. He was indicted for violations of the aforementioned four charges under U.S. domestic law. Second, demonization had taken place.

This means that Maduro is widely perceived globally and sufficiently understood within the U.S. as a very bad person. Third, a successful outcome could be achieved with a single operation. Although military force was mobilized, it was not a sustained operation but a single action with a high probability of success without casualties. It is well-known that the operation was prepared for months, and these three conditions were met. However, North Korea currently does not meet these conditions. Furthermore, the biggest difference is that North Korea is a nuclear-armed state.

As a nuclear-armed state, if such a military operation were to be carried out against North Korea, one would have to consider the possibility of an all-out war with North Korea or North Korea's use of nuclear weapons. Can the U.S. afford such a risk? This is the first point. North Korea has its own calculations; its 2022 nuclear law clearly states that even a threat to the Supreme Leader's assassination would lead to nuclear war. Beyond that, North Korea lacks a counterforce. While Maduro had a second-in-command, a vice president, who could serve as a counterforce to lead the country, North Korea operates under a sole leader system where, if the leader disappears, there are no adequate individuals to lead. Moreover, there is no opposition or alternative force present in Venezuela.

In addition, there is China, a bordering country. If military operations were to occur, would China simply stand by and watch? The complex strategic competition between the U.S. and China cannot be ignored. In this regard, the clear differences between Venezuela and North Korea are evident. Nevertheless, the pressure felt by North Korea is likely to be immense. The U.S. has demonstrated through action, not negotiation, that it will act decisively. In other words, "mess around and you'll get caught." Perhaps, upon witnessing this, Kim Jong Un might recall 2017.

In 2017, President Trump spoke of "fire and fury" and threatened to completely destroy North Korea. He exerted direct pressure on North Korea and significantly escalated military demonstrations. In September 2017, he mobilized three aircraft carriers for a show of force. For reference, mobilizing three aircraft carriers is the kind of force the U.S. deploys at the outset of a war. By mobilizing such a large force and exerting maximum pressure on North Korea, Pyongyang felt considerable pressure. This is considered one of the primary reasons why Kim Jong Un engaged in the so-called Korean Peninsula Peace Process in 2018. He is likely reminiscing about that period. Moreover, back then, it was only a show of force, but seeing the Venezuelan situation where military demonstrations led to actual action, it is natural to feel burdened. This burden is not merely a thought but is reflected in North Korea's actual response. On January 4th, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported a response from a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson to a reporter's question.

"We are paying attention to the growing instability in the already fragile regional situation due to the U.S.'s coercive actions leading to the current situation in Venezuela." This clearly acknowledges that their stance is linked to the situation in Venezuela. Seven hours after the arrest operation, a missile, presumed to be an improved KN23 hypersonic missile (Type 10), was launched from Pyongyang into the East Sea. Subsequently, KCNA reported that Kim Jong Un personally directed a field inspection.

Among Kim Jong Un's remarks there, he stated: "Our overt activities are clearly aimed at progressively enhancing our nuclear war deterrent. The reasons for this are explained by recent geopolitical crises and various international incidents." This statement undoubtedly refers to the Venezuelan situation. To elaborate, it indicates that due to the geopolitical crisis and international incidents like the Venezuelan situation, nuclear weapons are even more necessary and are being prioritized.

Prospects for U.S.-North Korea Dialogue and Implications of North Korean Instability

Finally, regarding the future prospects of U.S.-North Korea dialogue and its impact, there are various judgments and analyses. I believe there are two possible directions. The first is that, from Kim Jong Un's perspective, the justification for and obsession with nuclear weapons will intensify. North Korea has consistently argued that figures like Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya met tragic ends because their countries lacked nuclear weapons. Therefore, North Korea argues that possessing nuclear weapons prevents such a situation from occurring, justifying its development and possession. This incident reinforces that argument. Ultimately, Venezuela, lacking nuclear weapons and power, suffered the humiliation of its leader's arrest, and North Korea is already beginning to argue that its nuclear arsenal is even more essential in an international community dominated by power. Consequently, this could raise the bar for denuclearization negotiations for the U.S. and make North Korea less likely to enter negotiations easily.

I believe the opposite direction is also possible, and I consider this more likely. For Kim Jong Un, Trump's demonstration of "peace through strength," or "action, not compromise," which was not just talk but actual military action, could be a repeating nightmare, reminiscent of 2017. Before the APEC summit last year, Trump visited South Korea and repeatedly invited Kim Jong Un, but the summit never materialized. It is possible that at the U.S.-China summit in Beijing this April, Trump will seriously discuss Kim Jong Un again. If Kim Jong Un refuses Trump's invitation, Trump might suddenly change his stance.

He said something similar about Maduro. He gave him several chances, even suggesting he seek asylum in Turkey, but Maduro continued to travel, which U.S. media reported Trump considered a personal insult. Considering such circumstances, it will not be easy for Kim Jong Un to continue accepting Trump's demands. Furthermore, North Korea has reasons to meet with Trump. It's not just Trump who wants to meet North Korea; Kim Jong Un also needs to meet Trump to achieve sanctions relief through negotiations with the U.S. In his policy speech at the Supreme People's Assembly on September 21st last year, Kim Jong Un stated that his relationship with Trump was not bad at all. Observing the interactions between the U.S. and North Korea, it can be reasonably concluded that they intend to meet. North Korea also has a need to meet.

Therefore, the fact that the Trump administration has shown this behavior in the Venezuelan situation might actually increase the likelihood of a meeting. Lastly, I will briefly touch upon the implications of a North Korean sudden change of state. A North Korean sudden change of state refers to a situation of rapid transformation, and there are three scenarios: leader replacement, regime transformation, and state collapse. Typically, when discussing a North Korean sudden change of state, regime transformation is often mentioned. However, leader replacement alone is considered less likely, yet we have seen signs of leader replacement in this instance.

In any case, Maduro is highly unlikely to return to Venezuela. Consequently, a new alternative force will emerge to govern Venezuela. If this force cooperates with the U.S., it could have significant implications for Kim Jong Un of North Korea, who is at the forefront of anti-U.S. sentiment, in terms of U.S. foreign policy. Today, I have discussed the situation in Venezuela with you. I have also shared my analysis of its implications for North Korea. Thank you for watching.

■ Author: Park Won-gon _ Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute, Professor at Ewha Womans University's Department of North Korean Studies.

■ Managed and Edited by: Lim Jae-hyun _ EAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhlim@eai.or.kr