[2026 New Year Special Visible Commentary] ③ 2026 Korean Peninsula Scenarios: Beyond the Theory of Two Hostile States Towards a Path of Coexistence

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QFeDZUIA6Ag

Video Script

Next, I will narrow the scope to the Korean Peninsula to ask about various inter-Korean situations, South Korea's North Korea strategy, and changes in the international dynamics surrounding the peninsula. It has been over two years since North Korea presented its so-called 'hostile two-state theory,' and it has effectively denied cooperative relations with South Korea across the board, making the formulation of South Korea's North Korea strategy a very difficult situation. Furthermore, although prospects or hopes for a North Korea-U.S. summit have emerged this year, this situation is also not easy.

In-depth Analysis of North Korea's 'Hostile Two-State Theory'

Therefore, an in-depth analysis of North Korea's internal situation and foreign strategy is necessary. I believe that South Korea's North Korea strategy and diplomacy surrounding the Korean Peninsula, looking towards the future rather than temporary responses, are needed. Along with an overall assessment of North Korea's strategy, I will discuss our strategic direction. We have now descended to the Korean Peninsula as our third space. As we look forward to 2020, observing the path being forged by the two Koreas on the peninsula, there are two things I particularly want to discuss. First is the issue of deeply understanding the meaning of the 'hostile two-state theory' officially announced by North Korea at the end of 2023 and early 2024, and how we will navigate it. This will be critically important for inter-Korean relations in 2026 or in the coming period. However, in my personal opinion, is there not too much misunderstanding and confusion surrounding this 'hostile two-state theory'? Second, I want to

discuss whether, if the resolution of the 'hostile two-state theory' is not easy and the outlook towards 2026 is bleak, there is no hope for the Korean Peninsula. Starting the new year with a somber discussion about what the true meaning of unification theory should be would not be a good look for the viewers, so I will conclude with hopeful and optimistic remarks. The 'hostile two-state theory' appears very clear to me, and I don't know why. I am puzzled that it does not seem to be undergoing full-fledged discussion domestically at the policy level or among experts. I think this: Why did North Korea suddenly start talking about the 'hostile two-state theory' on December 30, 2023? Is it because they are contemplating a fundamental shift after long deliberation on inter-Korean relations and unification theory?

Looking at the history of inter-Korean relations, while there was a theory of unification through war in the 1950s during the Korean War, a theory of unification through revolution existed for a long time after the 1960s. In contrast, the 'hostile two-state theory,' if expressed in two terms, can only be seen as a form of unification by occupation, which differs slightly from the theory of unification through war during the Korean War. The interpretation of why the term 'hostile' was specifically added is as follows. I have observed it closely. The 'hostile two-state theory' was formalized on December 30, 2023, in a report presented by General Secretary Kim Jong-un at an expanded meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea. It states that inter-Korean relations can no longer be viewed as relations of homogeneity, and thus must be seen as relations of war.

It proposes viewing the relationship as one between belligerent states, and if taken literally, this points to a very significant aspect. Then, what happens between belligerent states? Until now, because we did not consider it a relationship between belligerent states, our operations towards the South were conducted in a dual manner. There were aspects of war, but also elements of peace. This means reorganizing, restructuring, or abolishing the United Front Department or operations towards the South. Therefore, federal unification or the United Front for inter-Korean relations, as pursued until now, was about unifying a certain front, and there is a front in the South. However, a belligerent party aims to completely eliminate the opponent's front. North Korea itself even uses the term 'annihilation.'

This means complete occupation and total control without leaving any faction. Our concept of 'hostility' is precisely the first reason. We are currently making efforts and proposing to restore the existing framework for improving inter-Korean relations, but North Korea is moving towards reorganizing, restructuring, and abolishing existing organizations. This is the first point. The second point, which I am very concerned about, is that if the United States and South Korea attempt military action, our nuclear war deterrence will transition to unhesitating and continuous action. This is the second explanation. I believe this was probably the core issue. No matter how important I consider the 'hostile two-state theory',

domestically, no one seems to pay close attention. What happens then? In other words, we must carefully consider the idea that the 'hostile two-state theory' is closely related to the tactical mission of nuclear weapons concerning the North and South. The third point is, if we set aside the existing theories of federal unification and united front, and move towards a form that assigns tactical missions, where does it ultimately lead? What does North Korea consider the final destination of the 'hostile two-state theory' to be? North Korea states that it is preparing to align with military actions aimed at pacifying the entire territory of the southern half. This is a form of pacification unification theory, and pacification implies not recognizing the fronts in the southern half. It signifies complete control, translated as 'annihilation' or 'destruction' in English. Kim Jong-un, the General Secretary, repeated this same narrative in a directive speech fifteen days later, pointing out very specific details.

If unification theory is federal unification, what kind of unification is it with an enemy state? Is it only occupation for enemy states? This is not the case; because it must exist, they will delineate territory. They will clearly define borderlines and pursue countermeasures, including tactical ones, for what lies beyond. This itself is a political declaration in a sense. So, does this mean they will invade tomorrow? That is not the important point; in my view, the second of these three points seems to have been the starting point for the emergence of such rhetoric. Why do I think so? It was December 30, 2023, and roughly from the latter half of 2022, over about a year, amidst internal discussions, military responses, and various countermeasures for unification plans, the declaration of the 'hostile two-state theory' on December 30, 2023, occurred, and we still do not fully understand why. Therefore,

Nuclear Weapon Enhancement and Tactical Missions in Inter-Korean Relations

Our new government has made various efforts through numerous methods, in UN speeches, and in speeches such as the one on December 2nd, proposing various measures to improve inter-Korean relations. However, is there a lack of in-depth understanding as to why North Korea made such statements on December 30, 2023, and what official steps will be taken in response? How can this be reversed? Therefore, I have contrasted these two aspects. The full-scale reinforcement of North Korea's nuclear weapons has already led to a physical crisis. Although the official decree was issued 13 years ago, the proper North Korean law concerning nuclear weapons policy was passed on September 4, 2022. A particularly cautious aspect of this law is that it points to the possibility of using nuclear weapons in five specific scenarios. More importantly, North Korea's nuclear weapons serve two missions.

One is the deterrent meaning that nuclear weapons are inevitably necessary in response to the hostile policy towards the United States. That's one. However, the real issue is that there is a second mission simultaneously. The most critical part of that law is the tactical mission in relation to inter-Korean relations. Consequently, the US and South Korea inevitably have to explore countermeasures, which led to the conclusion that if North Korea were to militarily utilize inter-Korean relations tactically, the US's extended deterrence would inevitably lead to the end of the Kim Jong-un regime. Therefore, it is crucial not to overlook North Korea's strategic deterrence and its tactical deterrence against South Korea. This is detailed in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review Report, and subsequently, a summit was held in Washington in 2023. Following the summit in Washington, President Biden made these remarks at a press conference. Those remarks...

...immediately triggered an explosive reaction in North Korea, akin to striking a match. To my recollection, Kim Jong-un's statement came out after a three-day delay, and its core message was twofold. First, the talk of ending the Kim Jong-un regime is absolutely unacceptable and considered an unforgivable mistake. In response, North Korea will inevitably require the reinforcement of its deterrence and the refinement of its second mission. This implies strengthening the influence of nuclear weapons for both the US and South Korea. This occurred on April 29, 2023, and since then, amidst the repetition of these discussions, it has become linked to the 'two hostile states' theory on December 30, 2023. This complicates matters significantly. For instance, our new government has proposed initiatives such as the Liberation Day address, the 'Audacious Plan,' the 'Korean Peninsula Peace Process,' and 'Common Growth.' However, for these discussions to begin, the 'two hostile states' theory, as articulated by North Korea, must be nullified, and inter-Korean relations must be restored.

And then, efforts must commence to improve relations, albeit with certain boundaries. From North Korea's perspective, is it feasible to suddenly declare that the 'two hostile states' theory, pursued for the past two years, will be disregarded? This presents a considerable challenge. Therefore, we hold significant expectations for potential breakthroughs, such as the South Korea-China summit and the US-China summit in April. We are concentrating our efforts on these possibilities. From the US perspective, concerning its core interests, it is essential to secure economic and military dominance in areas like the US, the West, and Asia. Failure to do so in Europe and the Middle East could lead to marginalization. In this context, the reason North Korea is not prioritized is quite obvious; it is naturally not a priority.

Furthermore, if we consider North Korea's core interests and the US's core interests, North Korea desires a change in the hostile policy towards it. Specifically, what aspects of the hostile policy towards North Korea should be changed? They demand an end to military exercises, the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, and the elimination of the nuclear threat through nuclear disarmament. If the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons is to be raised, it must be discussed within the framework of nuclear disarmament, similar to how the US operates its nuclear arsenal in the Pacific. If this condition is met, perhaps some progress can be made. The failure of the Hanoi summit was due to freezing North Korea's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, ultimately leading to denuclearization. This was the intended step-by-step process. However, North Korea explicitly states, as recently expressed, that it will no longer be deceived by the so-called 'three-stage parallel development' and insists on meeting with new solutions. North Korea's 'two hostile states' theory is a new approach to denuclearization.

This is a new approach, and North Korea likely perceives that the fundamental changes sought by the US and South Korea are not being addressed. Therefore, even if a meeting were to occur, achieving tangible results would be practically impossible. This is because it is contingent upon the demand to nullify the 'two hostile states' theory, raising the question of how to proceed. Does this mean there is no glimmer of hope for a solution? Since the reinforcement of North Korea's nuclear weapons underpins the 'two hostile states' theory, the reality is that opening channels for dialogue and strengthening exchanges and cooperation, and restoring efforts to ease military tensions in inter-Korean relations, is crucial. Even if we demonstrate utmost sincerity in these endeavors, it is highly unlikely from North Korea's perspective that this would confirm their willingness to abandon the 'two hostile states' theory. Therefore, whether the Trump-Kim Jong-un discussions materialize is of little consequence.

For them to yield tangible results, North Korea's proposed solution must be the culmination of their current approach, leading to a strong push for new solutions. Instead, North Korea has regressed to older approaches, making this issue exceedingly difficult to address. So, what is the path forward? Finally, to conclude this somber discussion, we must consider the following.

Prospects for Inter-Korean Relations Through Self-Reliance and Coexistence

I do not believe there is absolutely no hope, so I cannot end on such a bleak note. The central powers in the world order concerning North and South Korea, narrowly defined by military and economic strength in 2026, have been assessed as the US and China. However, as time progresses, the groups that successfully meet the first and second stages of new civilizational standards will play a more significant role. If this is the case, North Korea cannot abandon its 'hostile state theory.' Consequently, there is no possibility of improving inter-Korean relations. This is the only conclusion possible for 2026. However, looking at a longer horizon, North Korea's pursuit of self-reliance, which it ardently desires, requires finding its place within a new order. Perhaps the time is approaching for North Korea as well, when it must consider its own version of a 'new North Korean solution.' This means that, as I have previously argued, moving from war-time unification to revolutionary unification, and then to coexistence unification, is essential for progress. Paradoxically, the current trajectory appears to be towards occupation-based unification.

So why is there no resolution? Because this approach to unification does not maximize self-sustaining capabilities as a living entity, it is practically unfeasible. What does 'unfeasible' mean in this context? It means that such attempts will be made. What challenges will arise from pursuing occupation-based unification instead of coexistence unification? Will it undermine the guarantee of military survival, the promise of economic prosperity, and the confirmation of self-identity based on existing values? All these will lead to difficulties.

Consider China, our neighbor. In its 15th Five-Year Plan, China emphasizes the need for dual circulation, both domestic and international, particularly in advanced technology. It explicitly mentions international dual circulation. Compared to the 14th Five-Year Plan, the 15th is focused on dual circulation, with the US and its allies potentially joining our side. Therefore, the priority is to maximize domestic circulation. However, the idea of severing domestic and international circulation with these 'bad actors' is never entertained. China's economy cannot survive without this approach. Similarly, North Korea is inevitably bound to dual circulation, particularly in high-tech sectors, which are essential for its development.

The frustrating aspect is that even in the most recent speech on September 21st, it was mentioned that North Korea will soon need to establish a new five-year plan next year. When Xi Jinping formulated the 15th Five-Year Plan, he included a lengthy section detailing their struggles. Despite mobilizing national wisdom, the framework ultimately adopted was more constrained than Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening up. However, in the speech on September 20th, a significant portion of the content for the 9th Party Congress and the 2026 Five-Year Plan appears even more constrained than China's 15th Five-Year Plan. This includes a lengthy explanation of why the inter-Korean relationship must proceed under the 'two hostile states' theory, which seems somewhat misplaced in its importance.

Therefore, regarding North Korea's new approach, it is likely that as a living entity, it must survive and will, in some form, cultivate its own self-reliance. Since self-reliance alone is insufficient, it will eventually seek to incorporate external elements for coexistence. At that point, perhaps the opportunity will arise for us to join hands, fulfilling our earnest desire for genuine partnership. However, this is expected to take time. To expedite this process, we must consider how South Korea, as a model nation, can navigate this path.

Long-Term North Korea Strategy and Research Agenda

North Korea is not a static regime; it is compelled to move, and there will be a time when our paths align. However, if we push forward imprudently due to domestic political reasons, it will not significantly benefit domestic politics and will yield limited effects on inter-Korean or international politics. Just as we have endured for millennia with patience and perseverance, we must wait, walking our own path of self-reliance and coexistence, for the opportune moment when North Korea chooses to join us in 2026. The Chairman has provided an excellent and in-depth logical analysis of the long and complex chain of events, from North Korea's military policy law to the 'two hostile states' theory and the current inter-Korean relations deadlock. While our grand strategy is a pressing challenge, a long-term strategy focused on how South Korea will respond in the phase of exploring North Korea's future survival possibilities is more crucial than a short-term approach for 2026. Listening to the Chairman's remarks today, I realize that the East Asia Institute has addressed a diverse range of research topics. For example, the US-China nuclear competition, which may not seem directly related to our security, is a topic that must be researched. Today's speech also highlighted various research topics for researchers, including domestic political and economic changes in the US and China, significant international political shifts driven by new technologies like artificial intelligence, and environmental and ecological issues. These, like the US-China competition, may not appear to be immediate national security challenges, but they are indeed critical. Research on the decade-long US-China competition, our security strategy, and new weapon strategies such as AI are essential policy areas that the Institute must pursue. Furthermore, it is crucial to conduct research on various policy areas that will enable inter-Korean coexistence for at least the next decade, in relation to changes outside North Korea and our North Korea strategy. The East Asia Institute has previously produced valuable research on complex North Korea strategies and inter-Korean coexistence strategies. While addressing current challenges is important, research that encompasses the global order and the broader East Asian order, even if it seems distant from the Korean Peninsula, is also necessary. In this regard, we plan to conduct various policy research projects that align with the Chairman's analysis of the current situation, setting our plans for the next decade. I express my gratitude to the Chairman for his insightful remarks today. I will now proceed to discuss the next research topic.

The Chairman of the East Asia Institute, Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University, Ha Young-sun.

North Korea is not a dead system; it is bound to move, and there will be a time when our paths align. However, if we push forward imprudently due to domestic political reasons, it will not significantly benefit domestic politics and will yield limited effects on inter-Korean or international politics. Just as we have endured for millennia with patience and perseverance, we must wait, walking our own path of self-reliance and coexistence, for the opportune moment when North Korea chooses to join us in 2026. The Chairman has provided an excellent and in-depth logical analysis of the long and complex chain of events, from North Korea's military policy law to the 'two hostile states' theory and the current inter-Korean relations deadlock. While our grand strategy is a pressing challenge, a long-term strategy focused on how South Korea will respond in the phase of exploring North Korea's future survival possibilities is more crucial than a short-term approach for 2026. Listening to the Chairman's remarks today, I realize that the East Asia Institute has addressed a diverse range of research topics. For example, the US-China nuclear competition, which may not seem directly related to our security, is a topic that must be researched. Today's speech also highlighted various research topics for researchers, including domestic political and economic changes in the US and China, significant international political shifts driven by new technologies like artificial intelligence, and environmental and ecological issues. These, like the US-China competition, may not appear to be immediate national security challenges, but they are indeed critical. Research on the decade-long US-China competition, our security strategy, and new weapon strategies such as AI are essential policy areas that the Institute must pursue. Furthermore, it is crucial to conduct research on various policy areas that will enable inter-Korean coexistence for at least the next decade, in relation to changes outside North Korea and our North Korea strategy. The East Asia Institute has previously produced valuable research on complex North Korea strategies and inter-Korean coexistence strategies. While addressing current challenges is important, research that encompasses the global order and the broader East Asian order, even if it seems distant from the Korean Peninsula, is also necessary. In this regard, we plan to conduct various policy research projects that align with the Chairman's analysis of the current situation, setting our plans for the next decade. I express my gratitude to the Chairman for his insightful remarks today. I will now proceed to discuss the next research topic.

Thank you very much.

Ha Young-sun, Chairman of the East Asia Institute and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University.