[2026 New Year Special Visible Commentary] ② US-China Technological Hegemony in 2026 and Civilizational Transition: An Era of New Standards Beyond Competition

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2BkSlBlKdLo

Video Script

Deepening US-China Strategic Competition in the West Pacific Region

Amidst this, regarding the Taiwan issue, strategic competition between the US and China continues fiercely beneath the surface in the broader region of the West Pacific or Indo-Pacific. Particularly concerning Korea, the US-China relationship in terms of military security is crucial. China is striving to secure influence, extending from the so-called First Island Chain and Second Island Chain to, more recently, the Arctic, while the US is engaging in power politics akin to a new form of the Monroe Doctrine, aiming to dominate Central and South America.

The West Pacific region, as a point of convergence for the two countries, is exceptionally important. Therefore, we must pay close attention to how the diplomatic and security competition between the US and China unfolds around the Northeast Asian region where Korea is located. The strategic competition between the US and China is progressing not only in conventional forces but also in nuclear capabilities and new military weapons utilizing cutting-edge technology. We will hear from the Chairman about the prospects and assessments of the situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula, including whether this competition could escalate into concrete conflict, how Korea should respond, and how to manage the relationship with China while strengthening the ROK-US alliance.

It is a significant challenge to interpret the various developments that will unfold in Asia, the Indo-Pacific, or more narrowly, the West Pacific and Asia-Pacific regions, which President Trump emphasized for a second time, and to weave our safety and peaceful prosperity with other major players within that context. Personally, as I observe the issues of war and peace, security, and military affairs occurring in the Asia-Pacific or West Pacific, I believe there are three key changes that warrant attention.

China's Nuclear Buildup and Changes in the International Security Environment

Let's begin with the nuclear aspect. The recent surge in discussions about nuclear weapons is due to the fact that China did not rapidly increase its number of nuclear warheads for a considerable period after its successful nuclear test in 1964. According to estimates from various agencies, including the DI and CIA, while there are slight differences, they generally show the same trend. In particular, discussions and estimates have intensified since 2020 concerning the construction of nuclear-related facilities in western China. China has officially denied this, but its posture during the military parade last fall seemed to acknowledge the accuracy of previous estimates. Therefore, according to these estimates, the number of nuclear warheads is believed to have increased to approximately 600.

An increase from 200 to 600 represents a substantial change. If this trend continues, it is projected to reach 1,000 by 2030, and some US military authorities, in order to secure budget, forecast a potential increase to 10,000 by 2035. To understand why these numbers are perceived as a significant issue, let's look at the data: during the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union possessed close to 30,000 nuclear warheads.

After the Cold War, the number decreased relatively, and currently, the estimated number of deployable nuclear warheads is around 4,000 (3,700 for the US, 4,300 for Russia). China's rapid increase from 200 to 600 is a noteworthy change. If the number of US and Russian nuclear warheads remains constant, an increase from 600 to 1,000 could pose a serious problem. While China acknowledges the increase in its nuclear warhead count, there has been no clear official statement regarding the reasons. However, looking back at past US-Soviet relations, around 200 warheads strongly signified a last resort for China's survival, meaning deterrence. Conversely, a count of 600 or 1,000 warheads inevitably includes the political significance of nuclear weapons.

This is also related to China's global standing. In military terms, considering that the US spends $1 trillion and China spends $300 billion on defense, and their respective GDPs are $30 trillion and $20 trillion, China may seek to possess commensurate nuclear capabilities. How does this relate to Korea? It could have significant implications for Japan. Assuming Japan maintains its security by relying on US extended deterrence in its relationship with China, without possessing nuclear weapons, concerns may arise that China's growing nuclear arsenal could affect the credibility of extended deterrence.

The situation for Korea is somewhat different. We primarily rely on US extended deterrence against North Korea's nuclear threat, which has less direct relevance to extended deterrence against China. Nevertheless, the expansion of China's nuclear capabilities holds significant meaning. We must cautiously monitor the possibility of an increase to 1,000 warheads by 2030, or even 1,500 by the late 2030s. The second change is related to 2026 in the short term and is something that can directly impact us in terms of security and issues of war and peace.

US-China Military Competition within the First Island Chain and Technological Advancements

This pertains to the issue of US-China military deployments and influence related to the so-called First and Second Island Chains, or A2AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) strategies. The reason to focus on 2026 is as follows: Measuring military power is a very difficult task, requiring an approach from various dimensions, including objective quantitative calculations, dynamic analysis, and the formulation of specific operational strategies. It is difficult to make judgments based solely on simple numerical comparisons, as exemplified by the defeat of Qing China, which possessed superior military strength, by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War. Therefore, a cautious approach is necessary, rather than taking sides.

Information on China's military capabilities is most comprehensively provided by the US Department of Defense's annual report on China's military power, rather than by Chinese authorities' announcements. However, this report reflects the US perspective, and China sometimes protests it as an exaggeration. By synthesizing information from both sides, there are areas where a general consensus is reached despite their self-centered viewpoints. First, both the US and China acknowledge that China's military power has grown at a very rapid pace over the past two decades in the West Pacific region, particularly within the First Island Chain (a line extending from the Japanese archipelago to Taiwan and Malaysia). This pace has been much faster than anticipated.

The second point of agreement is that despite the rapid growth, US military power remains superior overall. However, what I focus on is the third point of agreement, namely the changes in military power within the First Island Chain. The First Island Chain is an area within approximately 1,000 km of the coastline, including the Taiwan Strait. To operate in this region, the US must conduct long-range operations. In the past, the US held a significant advantage in this area, but it appears that considerable inroads have now been made. While there are charts illustrating the military deployments of both sides, there is also much debate surrounding them.

Although there is debate about whether the data is US-biased or China-biased, there are clearly areas of caution regarding the First Island Chain. Personally, when considering the First Island Chain, I believe operations in the West Pacific encompass a broad spectrum, from submarines and carrier strike groups to land, sea, and air forces, and even space. Symbolically, aircraft carriers draw attention. Carriers do not operate alone but as part of a carrier strike group, which includes aircraft operations and overall mission execution. The fact that China launched its third aircraft carrier last November is noteworthy.

The US operates three aircraft carriers and maintains six carrier strike groups. Of these, two to three are undergoing maintenance or rotation. Therefore, typically one to two carrier strike groups are deployed in the West Pacific. While China's carriers are smaller in size, considering the symbolic significance of US carrier strike groups, there are projections that China's carrier numbers could double by the 2030s. If the competition does not ease and continues, the US operates six carrier strike groups worldwide, but if China possesses six carriers, complex issues could arise, as we would need to consider the possibility of their deployment in other regions like Europe.

Therefore, 2026 is a year to watch. Notably, the increase in China's nuclear warhead count is a new development when discussing the West Pacific region. The US and China are in an asymmetrical military balance, but a direct one-on-one conflict is a situation they are very cautious about. In this region, there is a risk of localized conflicts or disturbances in areas such as the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. We must consider how these regional conflicts will affect US-China military competition, i.e., the first, second, and third changes, and how we should respond if these changes persist.

AI and Military Technology Advancement and Korea's Response Strategy

Even without direct conflict between the US and China, there is ample room for confusion if their core interests clash. The US considers Asia its core interest region, while China views the West Pacific as such. Confusion can arise from misunderstandings about the extent to which core interests can be encroached upon before being deemed unacceptable. The third significant change is the advancement of AI and military technology. This is deeply intertwined with nuclear weapons and changes in the First and Second Island Chains. A completely new phase is unfolding, with increased transparency in reconnaissance and improved accuracy in threat detection.

In this context, how should Korea respond? Particularly considering the unstable situation in the West Pacific in 2026, the content related to Asia in the Trump administration's National Security Strategy report is interesting. It outlines objectives of economically containing China while militarily avoiding conflict, which generally aligns with the points discussed earlier. Efforts are needed to prevent China's excessive expansion, but this cannot be done alone.

Therefore, cooperation with allies is crucial. It emphasizes cooperation with countries near the First Island Chain and presents several conditions. First, the minimum use of force must be guaranteed. China operates in the First Island Chain region close to its coastline, but must conduct remote operations from the Forbidden City outside the Second Island Chain. Second, flexible movement of deployed forces and resources must be ensured for strategic flexibility.

Japan is a direct stakeholder. In Korea's case, the Pyeongtaek base is primarily related to inter-Korean issues, but it is also connected to the First Island Chain, thus falling under the scope of port and strategic flexibility. Therefore, it cannot be dismissed as a distant problem. Conversely, the idea that the US Forces Korea would be mobilized due to issues in Taiwan or the South China Sea, requiring Korea's participation, might be an overstatement. Rather, it is more important who secures the legitimacy of the assessment of core interests.

From China's perspective, the Taiwan issue falls within a 'gray zone,' with the possibility of its natural incorporation into China over time. Therefore, there is doubt about whether it is necessary to force an operation in 2027 or 2030. If someone makes such a move, active cooperation will likely occur, and the more critical question is whether it can be interpreted as a core interest with broader legitimacy than that held by the US or China. There are also interesting economic aspects. According to IMF statistics, the global economy is approximately $120 trillion, with the US at $30 trillion and China at $20 trillion. This ratio is 3:2, not unilateral.

However, when combined with forces aligned with the US, it reaches $35 trillion. The economic scale of the 27 EU member states is approximately $20 trillion, and Japan, ASEAN, and Korea combined amount to about $10 trillion. Summing these up yields approximately $65 trillion, which is more than half. Therefore, it is possible to analyze that by rallying these forces, China can be contained. A similar logic applies to military power. The US spends about 37-38% of its defense budget, but this suggests that it cannot bear the burden alone.

Korea's Diplomatic Strategy from a Medium to Long-Term Perspective

Therefore, it must be shared. A report on Europe predicts Europe's imminent collapse, stating that none of the 27 EU member states will survive. Despite a rapid increase in military spending, it is still smaller than China's. Thus, the argument arises that all countries, including Korea and Japan, must share the burden. If we only consider issues of war and peace, regional conflicts may intensify even without direct US-China confrontation. However, I do not believe there is significant cause for concern regarding the position Korea should adopt. When viewing the overall landscape, we should not focus solely on 2026 but take a medium to long-term perspective. From this viewpoint, by fully utilizing the forces and countries that can be at the center of the stage and their movements, we too can stand at the center of the stage. Considering it this way, the current situation is why

the economic power is divided 65 to 30, and militarily, why is the majority with the US and its allies? This is difficult to attribute solely to US collaboration. If Trump is currently making a wrong move, China needs to prepare for 2026 in the medium to long term to leverage it as a brilliant move. However, in my view, China is not merely responding to a wrong move with a brilliant one; there are elements of responding to a wrong move with another wrong move. Therefore, it is possible that we will face a situation similar to 2026 again next year.

Therefore, what we must do within this context is to define our core interests as six capabilities—military power, economic strength, technological prowess, and new civilizational standards—and deepen them. In the past two to three years, statistics have shown that Japan's per capita income has slightly lagged behind Korea's. This is not a situation where we are experiencing a similar shift to the 19th century when Japan led the speed of civilization and we missed out. Therefore, we must read the changes very cautiously and recognize that not only are there changes between the US and China, but a shift in new civilizational standards is approaching. While the US and China are leading in this area, they are not in a completely satisfactory state. Thus, what is crucial for us

is to establish it well. In a situation where economic power is divided 65 to 30, choosing the 30 is a very difficult task. Similarly, we may face difficulties in the military dimension. At first glance, it may seem like a very daunting choice, but in my view, it is not so daunting at present. While the gap between the US and China is narrowing in the short term, in the medium to long term, immense efforts will be made by both sides, and within that, we will inevitably act as a nation leading those efforts. Thinking this way, I personally believe there are no major problems.

Yes. You have well explained the importance of the West Pacific region within the overall changes in the international order and the various aspects of US-China strategic competition occurring within it. In particular, the nuclear arms race, the US-China strategic competition surrounding the First Island Chain in the West Pacific, and the US-China strategic competition involving new weapons are very important. If this competition continues for the next decade or so, there could be much more rapid changes than mere stability or managed peace, thus highlighting the crucial trend that we must closely monitor changes in the military balance of power. You also emphasized that US-China strategic competition is not merely a battle of economic and military strength, but that the type of leadership demonstrated within the evolving landscape of international politics is crucial, and that it is important for Korea to find new forms of leadership as a new axis while observing the dynamics between the US and China. You have stated that it is very important to establish Korea's diplomatic strategy by comprehensively assessing the current military and economic strength of the US and China, and the trends of their allies, and to identify where Korea's core interests lie.

It is crucial to establish Korea's diplomatic strategy by comprehensively assessing the current military and economic strength of the US and China, and the trends of their allies, and to identify where Korea's core interests lie.

The Necessity of Establishing a Future-Oriented Diplomatic Strategy

Ha Young-sun, Chairman of the East Asia Institute and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University, defines 2026 as a 'strategic management period' where the US and China will precisely compromise and adjust their core interests according to their respective domestic political schedules. The author predicts that beyond simple economic and military superiority, advanced technological variables such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing will become key drivers determining the future direction of global leadership. Chairman Ha emphasizes that for Korea to respond to the civilizational transition of the 21st century, it must establish a future-oriented diplomatic strategy that possesses six complex qualities encompassing public governance, ecology, and culture, beyond existing power resources.