[North Korea and the World] Changes in U.S. National Security Strategy and South Korea's Security Burden

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1nqWMONQ_zo

Video Script

The Trump administration's National Security Strategy (NSS) views alliances not as a clear value but as a transactional relationship. South Korea is no longer a protected entity of the United States but a subject that must jointly perform deterrence and burden-sharing within the Indo-Pacific order. Hello, and thank you for watching Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. Today, we will analyze the National Security Strategy, referred to as NSS. This document was released in the United States last November, and as it has been covered by some media outlets and garnered considerable attention, we will attempt an analysis. In particular, we will compare this newly released strategy with the one from the Biden administration in 2022 to discuss how much it has changed.

First, let me explain what the National Security Strategy, NSS, is. The NSS is the highest-level national security strategy document submitted by the U.S. President to the U.S. Congress. It includes America's national goals, threat perceptions, and overarching strategies in diplomacy, military affairs, economy, and alliances—literally, the national strategy. And subordinate documents such as the National Defense Strategy or the Nuclear Review, known as MPR, the Nuclear Strategy Report, are based on this foundational document. Our country also produces such documents. While not every administration has produced them, the government has nonetheless created such documents.

In principle, the NSS should be released annually. However, in reality, it is not published every year. According to the Goldwater-Nichols Act passed in 1986, it is stipulated that the U.S. administration must prepare and submit an NSS to Congress annually for defense reform. However, in practice, it is not released every year; it is published once or twice during a president's term, or perhaps once in the latter half of a term for an administration. This is because it is not a mandatory provision. It is stated as 'on an annual basis,' meaning it should come out yearly, but there are no regulations for the U.S. Congress to impose sanctions on the administration if it is not released.

Changes in the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and Perceptions of World Order

Looking at the period after 2010, it was released twice during the Obama administration: in 2010 and 2015. Since the Obama administration served two terms, it was released once in the first term and once in the second. It was released once in 2017 during Trump's first term. It was released in 2022 during the Biden administration, and the National Security Strategy Report, NSS, was released in November of the first year of Trump's second term, 2025. Therefore, a total of five times have been released since 2010. Today's discussion will be prepared in about four sections. The first is how the Trump administration perceives the world order and international order as reflected in the NSS. The second is how it views the relationship between the U.S. and China, which is more important to us. The third is what the NSS says about alliances, including the ROK-U.S. alliance. Finally, we attempted to analyze the impact and specific implications for South Korea in four sections.

First, regarding the world order, we anticipated that Trump's 'America First' approach would be significantly reflected. And indeed, the level of reflection was immense. The first aspect is the perception of U.S. foreign relations in the world order. The fundamental perception of the world is that everything is in America's interest. Previously, the U.S. intervened in many global issues as a kind of universal manager or world police. It typically provided public goods in economics and security. Economic public goods included maintaining the stability of the economy by preserving the dollar as the reserve currency, or maintaining stability by producing U.S. vaccines and providing them to the world during the COVID-19 outbreak.

Of course, the U.S. was also the most severely affected country during this COVID-19 pandemic. Security public goods involved the U.S. deploying its military in key regions around the world to uphold security commitments, and in cases of illegal aggression, the U.S. would lead military deployments to repel the aggressors. This is the role of the so-called world police. This document clearly states that it will no longer play that role. A phrase in the 2025 NSS states that U.S. foreign policy has been over-involved and over-ambitious since the Cold War. In other words, it acknowledges that the past over-expansion of the U.S. was a mistake from the perspective of the first aspect of world order perception.

Second, it denies the 'rule-based international order,' often referred to as the liberal international order or a norms-based international order. Of course, the Trump administration, upon its emergence, sufficiently demonstrated its intent to aggressively undermine and deny this. The rule-based international order encompasses free trade, opposition to the alteration of the status quo by force, the rule of law, and open multilateralism. These are concepts very familiar to us, representing the world order that the U.S. has led and established since 1945. This discourse is directly refuted. Consequently, it expresses skepticism about the utility of institutions like the UN, established under President Roosevelt's leadership after 1945 to implement this order, and holds a very negative stance towards international organizations, even going so far as to claim that the liberal international order was a fantasy of the U.S. elite. Therefore, it is judged that it exhibits a stance that denies this liberal international order or norms-based international order.

Furthermore, it speaks of alliances as follows: Alliances are assets, U.S. assets. However, allies must share the costs. Alliances will be maintained, but unconditional protection will be rejected. President Trump has consistently voiced these sentiments, making them familiar to us, and this is reaffirmed in the current NSS. Alliances are transactional relationships. Therefore, in matters of defense cost-sharing and burden-sharing, the argument is that since the U.S. provides protection, you must pay the costs accordingly, and since the U.S. no longer intends or has the capacity or will to act as the world police alone, allies in the region must now bear greater responsibility. This represents a significant departure from the 2022 NSS. While the 2022 NSS emphasized alliances as a community sharing values and moving in the same direction, the 2025 NSS under the Trump administration, as mentioned, views alliances as transactional relationships rather than shared values.

Next, it advocates for a principle of non-interference and non-coercion regarding the systems of other countries. The U.S. will no longer actively seek to change or overthrow the systems of other nations. It even states that promoting democracy will not be a foreign policy objective. In other words, regardless of whether a country's system is authoritarian or dictatorial, the U.S. will no longer intervene. It argues that promoting democracy is highly inefficient and questions why the U.S. should undertake such a task.

This is also considered one of the most significant differences from the 2022 NSS. The 2022 document stated that the world was at a turning point of great change, a critical juncture where democracies and authoritarian states were competing. However, this is entirely absent in the 2025 document. It states that the primary objective of foreign policy is to protect core national interests. In other words, it openly and explicitly declares that regardless of the authoritarian leader of a regime, anything can be done as long as it aligns with U.S. interests.

Finally, it frames the units of world order around the nation-state. This appears to be implicitly targeting the European Union (EU). The EU is an entity where sovereign states have come together to form a community union. This document denies such constructs, asserting that the fundamental unit of international politics is the nation-state. Therefore, it refutes the idea of global governance, which emphasizes integrated progress across the entire world system to address global peace, security, and climate change issues through cooperation. Instead, it emphasizes the paramount importance of individual sovereign states and the concept of balance among these states. To summarize the perception of world order, the 2025 NSS can be seen as a declaration of the end of the liberal international order. The U.S. is redefining itself not as an order manager but as a great power focused on national interests. Alliances, norms, and international organizations are presented as means, not ends.

Changes in U.S.-China Relations and Threat Perception of China

Second, I will discuss U.S. policy and perceptions toward China, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. As you are well aware, the U.S. began to focus on China's economy. This began during the Barack Obama administration, and from 2018 onwards, during Trump's first term, China was described as a significant threat. According to the National Defense Strategy released during Trump's first term, China was identified as the nation posing the most significant challenge to the U.S. Department of Defense.

The 2022 NSS referred to it as the most significant geopolitical challenge. It also described China as a 'pacing challenge.' This 'pacing challenge' is a crucial concept. The term 'pacing challenge' or 'pacing threat' is used. On March 29, 2025, The Washington Post reported on a nine-page draft U.S. defense strategy guidance they had obtained, which stated that China is the sole 'pacing threat' for the U.S. Department of Defense. In other words, the term 'pacing' is used, and simultaneously, the Taiwan Strait crisis is referred to as the sole 'pacing scenario' for the U.S. Department of Defense. We also have this 'pacing threat.' Our pacing threat is North Korea. It means that by setting North Korea as the pacing threat, the structure of military power, strategy, and training are organized accordingly. Therefore, designating the Taiwan Strait crisis as a pacing scenario implies that it is the most realistic possibility of war.

This shows a high level of threat perception towards China, evident in late March and mentioned in Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin's speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in late May. However, the NSS presents a very different narrative. Fundamentally, it avoids terms like 'adversary,' 'enemy,' or 'threat' when referring to China. Expressions like 'threat' or 'enemy' are absent, and China is not explicitly mentioned as the subject. While it is implicitly understood to be about China, the omission of the country's name and the use of terms like 'competitor' or 'challenger' represent a significant softening compared to previous discussions that characterized China as a grave threat. Specifically, China is described not as a systemic rival but as a comprehensive strategic competitor. While acknowledged as a competitor, it is not framed as an ideological enemy.

Instead, China is characterized as an actor that weakens U.S. power across economic, technological, military, and supply chain domains. Furthermore, the U.S. misjudged China as a beneficiary of the rules-based international order. The U.S. believed that by integrating China into the U.S.-led rules-based international order, China would change, and perhaps even democratize. The term 'containing China' was used. Over time, it became apparent that instead of being contained, China rapidly achieved its objectives by exploiting these rules. These perspectives are reflected in NSS 2025.

The document then enumerates specific threat and challenge behaviors, without explicitly naming China, though it is clearly implied. Examples include China's unfair competition and violations of WTO rules, such as issues with intellectual property rights and illegal industrial subsidies. These are presented as threats posed by China. The U.S. emphasizes the importance of standards competition in its rivalry with China. It posits that determining who sets the technical standards in advanced industries like AI and quantum computing will be the primary criterion for global leadership and dominance in the future world order. The U.S. and China are engaged in this standards competition, and the U.S. is currently not in a particularly advantageous position.

How is the U.S.-China relationship framed overall? China is acknowledged as a structural challenger that weakens the U.S., but it is not defined as an enemy. Instead, it is placed within the 'Yellen framework,' which, during the Biden administration, was referred to as a 'guardrail.' This approach entails managing competition within defined boundaries to avoid severe military conflict, which can be described as transactional conflict or long-term strategic competition. Regarding military security, there is no intention of engaging in war with China; rather, China is viewed as a target for deterrence. The crucial issue of Taiwan is also addressed. There is no mention of protecting Taiwan from a values-based perspective as a symbol of democracy. Instead, the strategic, geographic, and economic value of Taiwan is highlighted. While the U.S. reiterates its non-support for Taiwan's independence, it opposes any unilateral change to the status quo in Taiwan.

A particularly interesting phrasing emerges here. The U.S. has consistently stated regarding the Taiwan Strait: 'The U.S. opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by force by China.' This statement has now been altered to: 'The U.S. does not support unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.' Firstly, the subject, China, has been removed. The phrase 'by force' is also gone, and 'opposes' has been replaced with 'does not support.' This is a considerably more softened expression compared to the previous 'opposes.' This aligns with the earlier point about using restrained language that avoids directly naming China. It also means the U.S. has not explicitly stated its intention to use military force in the Taiwan Strait. While the U.S. expresses a commitment to maintaining regional stability through deterrence and denial of aggression, more explicit language has been removed. Therefore, the emphasis is clearly placed on the U.S. objective of preventing war. In summary, NSS 2025 portrays China not as an ideological enemy or a participant in a war of ideologies, but as the most dangerous competitor that structurally erodes U.S. power and autonomy. The response, however, is not war, but the restoration of U.S. advantage in economic and technological supply chains.

Redefining Alliance Strategy and Strengthening Burden Sharing

I will now discuss alliance strategy. The perception of alliances in the 2025 NSS is that they are no longer communities of shared values. Instead, alliances are increasingly viewed as strategic assets that the U.S. can utilize, essentially as tools. The narrative emphasizes that alliances should serve as instruments to advance U.S. interests, rather than being ends in themselves. An interesting analogy is presented: the 'Atlas model,' where the U.S. single-handedly upholds the global order, has ended. In Greek mythology, Atlas, a Titan defeated by Zeus, was punished by being forced to bear the heavens or the celestial sphere on his shoulders. Thus, Atlas symbolizes a being that bears excessive responsibility alone or shoulders burdens on behalf of others. The inclusion of this analogy in the NSS is significant. It signifies that the era of the U.S. alone bearing the entire military, financial, and diplomatic burden of the global order is over. The U.S. will no longer be the world's Atlas. This implies a refusal to bear all burdens unilaterally and a demand for allies to share a substantial portion of the responsibility and costs. Concurrently, it asserts that free-riding by allies, being a structural problem, will not be tolerated. The logical consequence is that maintaining alliances requires defense burden-sharing and minimizing U.S. losses in trade and economic relations, thereby sharing the responsibility and costs.

Another key point regarding alliances is that they should not be transnational integrations, like NATO, but rather collaborations between sovereign states. This reflects a renewed distrust of transnational models such as the European Union (EU) or alliances centered on multilateral norms. Furthermore, allies must assume primary responsibility for their own security. They must address threats in their regions proactively, rather than relying on the U.S. The U.S. role is envisioned as that of a coordinator, patron, or ultimate deterrent. In international politics, this involves a 'reverse balance' element, where countries within a region are responsible for managing threats, with the U.S. intervening from outside only when necessary to provide support. This concept of a 'balance' is also evident in the current NSS.

The strategy discussed is one of an alliance network, rather than a Cold War-style bloc or camp. This indicates a preference for flexible, network-based alliances over traditional, fixed blocs. The approach involves issue-specific cooperation and the integration of military, economic, and technological capabilities to better pursue U.S. interests. It also suggests that benefits provided by the U.S. may be differentiated based on the level of alliance participation. In the Indo-Pacific region, the role of allies is shifting from merely supporting U.S. forces to becoming primary actors in deterrence. Key U.S. allies in the region, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, are expected to play more active roles beyond simply providing bases. This necessitates increased defense spending, the acquisition of credible capabilities for deterring China, and ensuring accessibility for U.S. forces.

All of this, I believe, places a significant burden on South Korea. The concept of shared responsibility in alliances includes the 'first island chain' for Taiwan's defense, a defensive line extending from South Korea to Japan and encompassing Taiwan. The emphasis is on Taiwan expanding its use of bases within the first island chain and on Japan and South Korea taking on greater responsibility and roles in containing China. In essence, the alliance policy articulated in the 2025 NSS can be characterized as the establishment of a conditional and highly transactional alliance network, where individual nations bear primary responsibility for regional security, rather than a value-based coalition led by the U.S.

South Korea's Evolving Status and Enhanced Security Role

Finally, let's examine the discussion concerning South Korea. The NSS positions South Korea not as a recipient of protection, but as a responsible state in the region. This implies that South Korea must become a key ally in executing deterrence alongside the U.S., rather than the U.S. unilaterally defending South Korea and maintaining forward bases solely for its benefit. The document explicitly includes South Korea in the Indo-Pacific context and designates it as a nation that must further increase its burden-sharing. Militarily, South Korea is expected to play a significant role in deterrence, primarily by deterring the North Korean threat. Furthermore, to undertake an expanded role in a potential Taiwan Strait crisis, South Korea must increase its defense spending and enhance its military capabilities.

It is explicitly stated that the alliance's operational scope must expand from a bilateral focus on the Korean Peninsula to a broader Indo-Pacific regional alliance. While direct intervention in a Taiwan contingency may be unlikely given South Korea's strategic position, it is being called upon to provide rear support, link its capabilities, and stabilize the theater of operations. In other words, South Korea is expected to be an intelligently participating actor, not a silent neutral party. In conclusion, the NSS redefines South Korea as a key regional responsible state that must jointly undertake deterrence and burden-sharing within the Indo-Pacific order, rather than merely being a U.S. protectorate.

The points I have raised are likely to weigh heavily on your minds. This is because they significantly increase South Korea's roles and burdens while diminishing the U.S.'s traditional defense responsibilities. Overall, the national security strategy is centered on the U.S. and its interests. While the extent to which these policies will be practically realized and implemented remains to be seen, it is clear from this paramount document that this direction will be pursued throughout the Trump administration. From our perspective, it is crucial to accurately assess these strategic perceptions and policy directions of the U.S. and to respond proactively. Thank you for your attention.

■ Author: Park Won-gon, Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Contact and Editing: Lim Jae-hyun, EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhlim@eai.or.kr