[Commentary] The Trump Era: The U.S. Is No Longer a 'Reliable Ally'

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JXn4dbZXvsE

Video Script

The first question is your view on the U.S. National Security Strategy. The White House released that document two weeks ago, and you are an expert not only on American politics but also on realism. In the strategy document, they say they will pursue flexible realism, a more pragmatic and flexible approach. But this can sound like President Trump continues to pursue a transactional approach, which is a very unconventional way in the history of U.S. foreign policy. So what is your view on President Trump's foreign policy approach and so-called flexible realism?

A Critical Assessment of Realism in the Trump Administration

I would be very reluctant to attach the label of realism to the Trump administration and its National Security Strategy. I did not see realism in there.

When members of the administration use the word realism, they seem to think of it as synonymous with, we are really tough guys, or the world is a dangerous place, or we are not afraid to use force. But in terms of the academic discipline of realism, understanding how the world works, or following policy ideas that can be derived from the principles of realism, I don't think these people are well-schooled in those ideas. I think they just like the sound of the word. Also, I don't have much to say about it.

I don't have much to say about the National Security Strategy itself. Strategy implies interaction. I do something expecting that others will do something else. When you look at this document, it's like, 'We will do this. We will do that. This is what we want.' And there's not much thought about what the consequences of that will be. So it's strangely named as a strategy.

Characteristics and Priorities of the U.S. National Security Strategy Document

It's closer to a list of declarations or preferences. In that sense, it's very inconsistent. When I read it, I see the administration saying in one sentence something, and in the next sentence saying something that sounds very different. So it's a confusing and tangled document. But we can glean a few very important things from it. This document is very focused on the Western Hemisphere and Latin America. And if there's one lesson to be learned from this document, it's that

this administration makes it a top priority to dominate the Western Hemisphere and therefore will devote more resources to it. And what that means is, if they devote more resources there, they will devote fewer resources to other things. I think it's very strange and even 19th-century worldview to spend so much time on Latin America and South America, but if there's one thing that can be clearly understood and identified from this very confusing document, it's that Latin America is the top priority.

So I think the world should pay attention to this. And the other one is a bit stranger, and that is the obsession with the Middle East, and specifically the Persian Gulf. And here I think the document is somewhat self-contradictory. The document correctly points out that Persian Gulf oil is much less important to the United States than it was 50 years ago, that the United States has achieved energy independence, and that the United States is a major producer of energy. I think they even call it U.S. energy dominance. The document

is a proud and very proud document. So they say that the Persian Gulf is less important than it used to be, and we are an energy superpower. But at the same time, they double down on the U.S. security commitment to the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, most realists, if you want to use the word realism again, try to assess the balance of threats, dangers, and opportunities, and resources for the United States. The Persian Gulf is probably where they would back off. But I think

would rank the Persian Gulf second in the National Security Strategy. And that's not so puzzling, if you think about how much the United States is now governed by a family regime, a family that is in charge. So we may not really think of this as a National Security Strategy, but it also includes elements that are good for the ruling family, that can make the ruling family wealthy. And the ruling family wants to do a lot of business in the Persian Gulf. And that explains more

of the National Security Strategy than it explains the current U.S. position on security guarantees in the Persian Gulf, or a coherent explanation of the major areas of interest for the United States as a whole. Again, I think this is a very confusing document. I think this is a document that is not sensitive to the concept of strategy, but we can glean a few things from it. The emphasis on the Western Hemisphere, the continued concern with the Middle East, and strangely, I think

that it yearns for the conclusion of the Ukraine war, possibly on Russia's terms, which is a pretty dramatic shift from U.S. policy and what we traditionally think of as U.S. best interests. I think those are the three main lessons to be gleaned from this document, which again, I think is not a document that is suitable for outsiders to do sophisticated analysis of.

Trump's Monroe Doctrine and Its Implications

Yes, a very insightful critique. I will ask about the Western Hemisphere. From an outsider's perspective in Asia, I saw it reference the Monroe Doctrine, which I thought was from around 1823. But Trump has revived it with the term Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. That's a political statement, but I think it underestimates the sovereign rights of Latin American countries. So in this 21st century, it's a bit anachronistic and perhaps

will have the effect of inviting other great powers to build their own spheres of influence. This is actually a bad thing, contrary to the liberal international order. So at this point, what is the origin of this mindset in the United States? I think the last point you raised is the most important. So I will start from that point and work my way back to the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Because as you correctly observed, the United States claims the right to dominate its nearby

overseas regions. And it does so on the grounds that it thinks it's appropriate, and that outsiders cannot do so in their hemispheres. And if the United States claims that, then it seems to suggest, as you pointed out, that other regional great powers should also be allowed to dominate their nearby overseas regions without interference. And I think this is a dangerous and unstable precedent to set. But as I said, this is not a document that thinks in these terms, right?

That's when I said it's not a real strategy, but a declaration. If it were a strategy, you would think, 'What reaction will this provoke if I do this? What will be the consequences for the world of such actions?' And you are absolutely right to note that it says, 'The world works this way, great powers dominate their nearby overseas regions, and they can do whatever they want without question.' Well, they might get what I would call a lesson for tyrants. That is, what are the lessons that other military powers will learn when they want to dominate their nearby overseas regions? I know I'm repeating myself, but this is very dangerous and very unstable, and also thoughtless. But now, returning to the first part of your question, it's important, but I don't think it's as important as this huge implicit consequence. This so-called Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, as you said, was originally enacted in the 19th century but was never fully fleshed out. I know I can't explain in one sentence what the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine is. We know that U.S. presidents really enjoy putting their names on things. So perhaps the people who wrote this document thought they would put his name on something to please their boss. We have the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. What it actually means, again, is not specified, and I don't fully understand it beyond a claim of dominance.

beyond a claim of dominance. But with regard to South America, I want to go back into this inherent contradiction again. Because if there is an anxiety that is driving some of this, right? First, there is a will to dominate. This is our space. We will dominate it. Because we are tough guys and tough guys do that. But if there is an anxiety behind that, it is that China has become a very important economic player in many Latin American countries, and many Latin American countries are heavily dependent on their ability to export to China.

a very important part of their economies. Now, if the United States is trying to get Latin American economies out of their 'dependence' on the Chinese market, what would that actually involve? It would involve perhaps reorienting trade relationships to increase trade relationships with Latin American countries. But when you look at the document, and when you look at the general pronouncements of the administration, this is not a pro-import administration. This is

an administration that sees imports as somehow weakening the United States. So from a political point of view, if the United States is hostile to the idea of Latin American countries having closer economic ties with China, it's hard to see how it can induce action from Latin American countries to move away from their economic ties with China. So again, there's a lot of inconsistency there. There's a declaration that 'We will do whatever we want.'

There's a declaration that 'We will do whatever we want.'

There is an administration that sees imports as somehow detrimental to the United States. So if the United States is hostile to the idea of Latin American countries having closer economic ties with China, it's very difficult from a political point of view to see how it can induce action from Latin American countries to move away from their economic ties with China. In other words, there's a lot of inconsistency there. There's a declaration that 'We will do whatever we want.'

in some way that seems appropriate to us, even if it involves what looks like war crimes. We're talking about things like the administration shooting survivors from boats that it had launched off the coast of South America, and not caring what other people think about it. This is again a way of acting that sets a precedent that we should pay attention to. So I don't see realism. I see confusion. I see banging on the table. I see claims of dominance.

Analysis of U.S.-China Relations and Indo-Pacific Strategy

I see posturing, but I don't see well-thought-out or clearly articulated policies or plans. Okay. Okay. Yes, you mentioned China's influence in the Western Hemisphere, and I'm curious about the U.S. policy toward China as it appears in the document. One is to reduce China's influence in the Southern Hemisphere, the Western Hemisphere, Central America. Because for most Latin American countries, China is now their best trading partner. Perhaps it's an attempt to expand their political influence.

This leads to the question when we talk about U.S. policy toward China, the Indo-Pacific strategy. The U.S. says it wants to exercise regional dominance in the Western Hemisphere, while at the same time protecting the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. This means that China can be a great power, but it should not dominate the region, which is in fact the opposite of its own version of spheres of influence. Perhaps China is confused. Is there a deal on great power dominance or spheres of influence, or not?

Demonstrate China's influence in this Pacific region. So what do you think about U.S. policy toward China overall? >> I think the most important thing in the document is how little it says about U.S.-China relations. Again, it was very firm about the potential threat of China being more generally pervasive. But when you look at the U.S. administration in the 21st century, it has understood with some degree of caution and care that China is emerging as a major military power and a potential geopolitical competitor.

This doesn't mean it will lead to war, but there has been a wariness about it. This is a very, very powerful country, and it's becoming more powerful, and it lives in its neighborhood. And a significant part of U.S. policy has been geared toward what will be our political and defensive response to the changing geopolitical environment in East Asia. And again, most administrations have understood this in a very different way.

I think it's one of the major geopolitical challenges facing the United States. And I think it's interesting. Because that challenge, which for most so-called realists might seem like a problem at a very high level, is not a top priority in terms of the U.S. worldview. So I think that's also very telling, and I think regional actors should be aware of that. Again, what we know is that the U.S. has announced

that it will devote more resources to the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. has announced that the Middle East is still very important. Well, what does that mean? I think it means that U.S. engagement in East Asian politics is a lower priority, and that could have quite significant consequences.

>> Yes. Yes. Yes. Okay. So if you read the economic security aspect of the document, President Trump is very focused on economic relations with China, and he's trying to get some benefit from the negotiations in April next year.

Trump will visit China. So militarily, he's trying to maintain the status quo, but economically, he's trying to get as much as he can from China. And the U.S. has a weakness in securing critical minerals like rare earths. President Trump needs to revive the U.S. economy before the midterm elections. >> [Chuckles] >> Well, this may be an exaggeration, but the content of the document is about next year, before the elections, rather than a long-term perspective, as you said. It's very confusing. So

The Unpredictability of the Trump Administration and Foreign Policy

sending confusing signals in Asia. How should we interpret U.S.-China relations? Is it getting better or worse? It's confusing. >> I think it's understandable that it's confusing. I think this is a very personalized administration to an unprecedented degree in modern American history. It moves at the whim of the president, which means that while we've had important and influential and charismatic presidents in history, they were not at the apex of the leadership structure and the person directing policy.

But this president is more capricious than most U.S. presidents, and also relies more on his own instincts than any other president, and also changes his mind frequently on many things.

You cannot call this a deep strategic thinker. I'm not saying this in a partisan way. I never criticized President Nixon, nor did I spend much of my career criticizing him. I did not respect him as a person or as a president, but President Nixon was a deep strategic thinker. He had a masterful command of world geopolitics. He understood what he was trying to achieve, and he took logical steps to pursue the policies he wanted to pursue. I tended to disagree with those policies, but as a thinker, he was smart and insightful and understood how the world worked. I would not apply these things to President Trump. At the same time, he has an unusually confident sense of his own ability to do such things. But some of those things involve abrupt shifts on basic foreign policy questions.

And if I were a foreign country trying to deal with that, I would be a little worried. We see many diplomats choosing an appeasement strategy. They go to the president, say nice things about him, and he seems to really enjoy it, and he feels good for a while.

I'm not sure what the half-life of that is, but it's a strategy that many diplomats have adopted. And it seems to work momentarily. Again, I'm not so sure how that translates into an understanding of the U.S. strategic position. >> Yes, speaking of Nixon, there was great concern in Korea when he declared the so-called Nixon Doctrine in 1969. Asian security must be the responsibility of Asians themselves. Now, President Trump's

Security Dilemmas of East Asian Allies and U.S. Credibility

idea causes great concern for Korea. We are grappling with the North Korean nuclear threat and a rising China. So my last question is, what advice do you have for East Asian allies in a situation where future security is very uncertain? Can we trust U.S. commitments, especially to Korea, regarding nuclear extended deterrence and relations with China?

Well, I'm a little hesitant to give advice, but I'm happy to analyze. The U.S. has an intimate and deep security relationship with South Korea, and it would not be easy for the U.S. to change that relationship.

But on the other hand, if I were a foreign policy decision-maker in East Asia, I would have to assess the confidence that the U.S. will maintain these relationships over time. Will they be there at the decisive moment? And I'm not saying, as an analyst, that the U.S. will outright abandon its traditional allies. I'm saying, as an analyst, that traditional allies should consider that possibility to a much greater extent than before.

We've discussed the fact that Trump is very transactional in his thinking. Alliances are not really about transactions. Alliances are about shared sentiments and partnerships and long-term relationships. And you cannot calculate how much you gain on any given day. Rather, it's a vision of whether this security arrangement, if maintained, makes the world a better place for me and my partners. And

again, this kind of insightful thinking about shaping the world and creating an environment that benefits both the United States and its partners is not how this administration thinks about things. So again, I'm not a predictor. I'm not going to say the U.S. will abandon these alliances. But I will say that the U.S. is posing as a less reliable ally than it has been in the past.

In other words, that kind of forward-looking mindset of creating an environment that serves the interests of both the U.S. and its allies, and shaping the world, is far from how this administration approaches matters. So I'm not making predictions. I would never say that the U.S. will abandon its allies. But I can certainly say that the U.S. is positioning itself as a less reliable ally than in the past.

it won't be the same as in the past. Let's think from the perspective of a European leader. If I were in trouble, I would not have the same level of confidence that my American friends would support me as I would have had over the past 75 years. This is something that every country has to assess, and I think these assessments will play out more importantly on the political dimension than on the military dimension. Because most countries are not at war, but they have to decide on the direction of their political actions. So we will see countries around the world reconsidering the need to re-calibrate their political actions, and to adjust their actions in preparation for the possibility that the U.S. might suddenly abandon everything and leave, except for the Persian Gulf region.

Changes in U.S. Foreign Policy and the Redefinition of Allies' Roles

This is a possible scenario in a way that was not possible in the past. Looking back at the unipolar moment of 30 years, theoretically, even a single country as powerful as the United States would have limits in leading the liberal international order. This is because the demand for international public goods, such as security regimes, is increasing. The same is true for its role as the guardian of an open international economy. Over the past 30 years, the U.S. has borne too much of the burden. So despite President Trump's transactional approach, there should have been more transactions to share the burden in advance with allies, but we have not done so. We have left all the difficult problems for the U.S. to solve. So after this burden-sharing, or adjustment of authority and responsibility with South Korea, there is a movement within South Korea to adjust our role to greater responsibility, despite welcoming President Trump. If we want to maintain the liberal international order, we must step up. We understand that. So, although you say you are not in the prediction business, if you are confident that after Trump leaves, allies will step up and help us, we can engage more actively in world affairs through greater global engagement. Do you think these changes in U.S. policy can be realized?

Kushner: I think that's a healthy thing. And for more than 50 years, no, for longer than that, it has been the claim of every U.S. president that our allies should take on a greater role in their own defense and defense spending. This is something that multiple administrations have been frustrated with for decades. And one can argue that the president has instilled fear in many allies, making them more proactive in their defense spending than any previous U.S. president. If he wants to count this as a success story for the U.S., I think it can be included in his positive assessment.

But your question is more general. Will the cooperation between the U.S. and its traditional allies be strengthened in the coming years, or not? I think that's an open question. It's also a question of U.S. domestic politics. As you pointed out, at some point it will move beyond the Trump administration. So the question is, will the Trump administration have left an indelible mark on how the U.S. imagines its role in the world, or will it be a temporary phase?

The Role of the U.S. After the Trump Administration and Prospects for the International Order

Sitting in the U.S. and thinking about it, it's hard to imagine that there will be no permanent consequences of the Trump administration's policies, even after Trump himself is off the stage. So I think we will see a more dangerous and less stable world due to the new disposition of the United States. I think that's unfortunate. But I'm not here to lament unfortunate things. I'm here to observe that when the U.S. withdraws from the world stage, and when the U.S. adopts a very transactional attitude toward the world again, an attitude that is in many ways exploitative and bullying, it will provoke reactions and elicit actions from other countries. And that will affect the general disposition of world politics and the prospects for international cooperation.

My personal intuition is that it will not be productive for global problem-solving. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you for taking the time to be with us. We have learned a great deal. Thank you for your excellent insights and wisdom.

It was a pleasure talking with you.

■ Go to English Video & Transcript

Q1: Views on Trump's Foreign Policy

Jeon Jae-seong: The first question is your view on the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS). The White House actually released that document two weeks ago, and you are not only an expert on American politics but also have a realist perspective on strategy. The document states that it will pursue 'flexible realism,' meaning a more pragmatic and flexible approach. However, this also sounds like President Trump will continue to adhere to a 'transactional approach,' which is highly unusual in the history of U.S. foreign policy. What are your thoughts on President Trump's foreign policy approach and the so-called 'flexible realism'?

Kushner: Well, I would be very reluctant to attach the label of 'realism' to the Trump administration or its National Security Strategy. I don't see any 'realism' in it. When members of the administration use the word 'realism,' they seem to think of it as synonymous with, 'We are really tough guys,' 'The world is a dangerous place,' 'We are not afraid to use force.' However, realism as an academic discipline means training to understand how the world works or to follow policy ideas derived from the principles of realism.

I don't think these people are well-schooled in those ideas. They just like the sound of the word. Furthermore, there isn't much good to say about the National Security 'Strategy' itself. 'Strategy' implies interaction. It means, 'I do something expecting that the other party will do something else.'

However, this document is merely a list of "we will do this, we will do that, we want this," with little consideration for the consequences of such actions. Therefore, calling it a 'strategy' is itself strange; it is closer to a declaration or a wish list. In that sense, it also lacks consistency. As one reads, the administration might say one thing in a paragraph and then say something entirely different in the very next sentence. It is a very confusing and tangled document. Nevertheless, we can glean a few important points. This document is heavily focused on the Western Hemisphere and Latin America. If there is one conclusion to be drawn from this document, it is that this administration views dominating the Western Hemisphere as its 'number one task' and will allocate more resources there. This inevitably means fewer resources will be allocated to other regions.

I find the extensive focus on Latin and South America to be quite peculiar, even 19th-century in its worldview, but one thing that is clearly identifiable from this murky document is that Latin America is priority number one. The world should pay attention to this. Another point is somewhat stranger: an obsession with the Middle East, and particularly the Persian Gulf. The document is somewhat self-contradictory on this point.

The document accurately notes that Persian Gulf oil is far less important to the United States than it was 50 years ago, that the U.S. has achieved 'energy independence,' and has become a major energy producer. It even calls it 'American energy dominance.' It's a very boastful document. They say, 'The Persian Gulf is less important than it used to be. We are an energy superpower.'

Kirshner: Well, I am very reluctant to attach the label 'realist' to the Trump administration or its national security strategy, because I don't see any 'realism' in it. When administration officials use the word 'realist,' they seem to think of it as synonymous with 'we are really tough guys,' 'the world is a dangerous place,' 'we are not afraid to use force.' But realism as an academic discipline means understanding how the world works or following policy ideas derived from realist principles.

I don't think these people are well-educated in those ideas. They just like the sound of the word. Also, there is little good to say about the National Security 'Strategy' itself. A 'strategy' presupposes interaction. It means, 'I do something based on the expectation that the other party will do this.'

However, this document is merely a list of 'We will do this, we will do that, we want this,' with almost no consideration of the consequences of such actions. Therefore, calling it a 'strategy' is strange in itself; it's closer to a manifesto or a wish list. In that sense, it also lacks consistency. As you read it, within a single paragraph, the administration might say one thing in one sentence and then say something completely different in the very next sentence. It's a very confusing and tangled document. Nevertheless, we can glean a few important points. This document focuses heavily on the Western Hemisphere and Latin America. If there is one conclusion to be drawn from this document, it is that this administration views dominating the Western Hemisphere as its 'number one task' and will allocate more resources there. This inevitably means fewer resources will be allocated to other regions.

I find it very strange, even 19th-century in its worldview, to spend so much time on Latin and South America, but one thing that is clearly identifiable in this murky document is that Latin America is priority number one. The world should pay attention to this. Another point is a bit stranger: the obsession with the Middle East, and particularly the Persian Gulf region. The document is somewhat self-contradictory on this point.

The document correctly states that Persian Gulf oil is far less important to the U.S. than it was 50 years ago, that the U.S. has achieved 'energy independence,' and has become a major energy producer. It even calls it 'American energy dominance.' It's a very boastful document. They say, 'The Persian Gulf is less important than before. We are an energy superpower.'

At the same time, American security commitments to the Persian Gulf are increasing. If one were to assess American threats, dangers, opportunities, and resources from a realist perspective, the Persian Gulf would probably be a place to disengage from. However, I would rank the Persian Gulf as the second priority in this National Security Strategy. It's strange, but perhaps not so strange when you consider that the United States is currently governed by a kind of 'cult of personality.'

One might not see this as a national security strategy. It includes elements of what benefits the 'ruling family' and makes them wealthy, and that family wants to do a lot of business in the Persian Gulf region. This might better explain the current U.S. approach to Persian Gulf security than a coherent explanation of America's core interests. Again, I think this is a very muddled document. It's a document that is not sensitive to the concept of 'strategy,' but we can infer a few things.

The emphasis on the Western Hemisphere, the continued interest in the Middle East, and, strangely, the desire to conclude the war in Ukraine, possibly on terms favorable to Russia. This is a dramatic reversal of U.S. policy and far from what we traditionally considered to be in America's best interests. I see these as the three main takeaways from this document that are difficult for outsiders to analyze precisely.

Q2: Causes of Trump's Monroe Doctrine Foreign Policy

Jeon Jae-seong: That is a very insightful critique. Regarding the Western Hemisphere, from the perspective of an outsider in Asia, it was striking to see the mention of the 'Monroe Doctrine' from around 1823. Trump revived this with the term 'Trump's revised Monroe Doctrine,' which, while a political declaration, I believe underestimates the sovereignty of Latin American countries. In the 21st century, this is somewhat anachronistic and is a dangerous endeavor, directly contrary to the liberal international order, as it could lead to encouraging other great powers to form their own spheres of influence. What are the origins of this mindset within the United States?

Kirshner: I think your last point is the most important. The U.S. seems to believe it should be able to dominate adjacent regions for reasons it deems appropriate, and that in 'America's hemisphere,' outsiders should not be allowed to do so. If the U.S. asserts this, as you said, it signals to other regional powers that they too should be allowed to dominate their adjacent regions without interference from others. This could set a very dangerous and unstable precedent. But as I said, this document is not the product of such deliberation.

A strategy is about 'What will be the reaction if I do this? What will be the global consequences?' If the U.S. says, 'This is how the world works. Great powers dominate their adjacent regions without question and do as they please,' then other military powers will learn the so-called 'lessons of the tyrant.' This is a very dangerous and irresponsible notion.

Regarding the 'Trump version' you asked about, they've brought in a 19th-century concept, but there's actually no concrete definition. No one can explain in a single sentence what 'Trump's version of the Monroe Doctrine' is. All we know is that the current president really likes to put his name on things.

Perhaps the authors of this document tried to please the president by attaching his name to some concept. What it means in actual practice is not specified, and beyond asserting dominance, I can't understand it either. However, if we look at the inherent contradiction regarding South America, there's a kind of anxiety underlying it. First, there's the desire for dominance: 'This is our territory, so we dominate it. Because we are tough guys, and tough guys do that.' But underlying that is the anxiety that China has become a very important economic actor in many South American countries. Many South American countries rely heavily on exports to China. It's a very important part of their economy.

If the U.S. wants to decouple the South American economy from its so-called 'dependence' on the Chinese market, what would it actually need to do? It would probably need to restructure trade relations and increase trade with South American countries. However, looking at the overall trajectory of this administration, they are by no means a pro-import government. They view imports as weakening the U.S.

Therefore, it's politically difficult to understand how the U.S., while hostile to closer economic ties with South American countries, can induce them to sever economic ties with China. There is absolutely no consistency.

There are only declarations like, 'We will do whatever we deem appropriate, even if it looks like a war crime.' Regarding things like shooting survivors from ships seized off the South American coast, it's like, 'We don't care what others think.' This is a very dangerous precedent that we should pay attention to. Again, I see chaos here, not realism. They are banging on desks, asserting dominance, and boasting, but I don't see any well-established policies or plans.

Q3: Views on China Policy as Revealed in the U.S. National Security Strategy Document

Jeon Jae-seong: I see. You mentioned the China factor in the Western Hemisphere; I am also curious about the U.S. policy toward China as reflected in the document. One is the attempt to reduce China's influence in the Southern Hemisphere, i.e., the Western Hemisphere and Latin America. This is because China is currently the number one trading partner for many Latin American countries, and its political influence is also expanding. This leads to China policy related to the Indo-Pacific strategy. The U.S. speaks of 'regional dominance' in the Western Hemisphere, but in the Pacific, it speaks of protecting the 'balance of power.' In other words, China can be a big country, but it should not dominate the region. This logic is the opposite of the Trump version of sphere-of-influence claims, which could be confusing for China. Is there a deal between great powers to recognize each other's spheres of influence, or will China's influence in the Pacific not be recognized? What are your thoughts on the overall China policy as reflected in the document?

Kirshner: I think the most important point about this document is that it has very little to say about the substance of U.S.-China relations. It does emphasize, in general terms, the growing potential threat from China. Every U.S. administration in the 21st century has understood and been wary of China's rise as a powerful military state and geopolitical competitor.

This doesn't mean going to war, but responding to the changing geopolitical landscape in East Asia with political and defensive strategies has been one of the core tasks of U.S. policy. What's interesting is that this issue, which most realists would consider a high-priority task, is relegated to the back burner in this administration's worldview. Regional actors should be aware of this. The U.S. has declared it will allocate more resources to the Western Hemisphere and stated that the Middle East remains important. To me, this implies that U.S. political engagement in East Asia has become a low priority, which could have very significant consequences.

Q4: Prospects for U.S.-China Relations

Jeon Jae-seong: That's right. Looking at the economic security aspect of the document, President Trump seems to emphasize economic relations with China and seek leverage in negotiations through his visit to China in April next year. Militarily, it appears to be a strategy of maintaining the status quo while maximizing economic gains. However, the U.S. has weaknesses in securing key minerals such as rare earths. Also, President Trump needs to boost the U.S. economy before the midterm elections.

So, this document feels more like it's for next year's elections than a long-term strategy. In Asia, we are receiving confusing signals about whether U.S.-China relations are improving or deteriorating.

Kirshner: It's natural for it to be confusing. This administration is, to an unprecedented degree in modern American history, a highly personalized government driven by the president's whims. In the past, there have been strong, charismatic presidents who drove policy, but the current president is more capricious than any of them.

He also trusts his instincts more than any president and changes his mind frequently. It's hard to see this as deep strategic thinking. I have criticized President Nixon my entire life and do not respect him as a person or as a president, but Nixon was a deep strategic thinker.

He skillfully grasped global geopolitics, understood what he was trying to achieve, and took logical steps to do so. While I disagreed with his policies, as a thinker, he was intelligent, ambitious, and understood the workings of the world. None of these descriptors can be applied to President Trump. Yet, at the same time, he has immense confidence in his abilities and can change his stance on basic foreign policy questions in an instant. If foreign countries have to deal with this, I would be worried too. I see many diplomats adopting an 'appeasement' strategy.

They meet the president, say nice things, and the president enjoys it and feels good for a while. I don't know how long that effect lasts, but many diplomats are using this strategy now, and it seems to be effective for the time being. However, I'm not sure how it helps in understanding America's global strategic posture.

Q5: Advice for East Asian Countries' Foreign Policy

Jeon Jae-seong: You mentioned Nixon; when he proclaimed the 'Guam Doctrine' in 1969, there were significant concerns in South Korea. It stated that 'the security of Asia must be the responsibility of Asians themselves.' Similarly, President Trump's thinking is causing great concern for South Korea. South Korea faces the threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons and the rise of China. As a final question, what advice would you give to East Asian allies in a situation of uncertain future security? Can South Korea continue to rely on U.S. commitments in East Asia, including the decisive 'extended nuclear deterrence'?

Kirshner: I am cautious about giving advice, but I can offer an analysis. The U.S. and South Korea have a very close and deep security relationship. It would never be a small matter for the U.S. to alter this relationship. However, conversely, if I were a policymaker in an East Asian country with a warm relationship with the U.S., I would certainly re-evaluate my confidence in the U.S.'s long-term commitment to this relationship.

Will the U.S. be there at a critical moment? As an analyst, I am not saying that the U.S. will outright abandon its traditional allies. However, traditional allies must seriously consider that possibility more than ever before. We have discussed that Trump thinks very transactionally.

But alliances are not transactions. Alliances are about shared values, partnerships, and long-term relationships. It's not about calculating how much I gain from here every day. Rather, it's a vision of 'Will the world be a better place for us and our partners when this security system is maintained?' The grand vision of creating an environment that serves the interests of both the U.S. and its partners seems far from the current administration's thinking.

I am not a predictor, so I will not say that the U.S. will abandon specific alliances. However, the U.S. is acting like a 'less reliable ally' than in the past.

This is not just a problem for South Korea. It's the same in Europe. If I were a European leader, I would not have as much confidence in the question 'Will my American friends help me when I'm in trouble?' as I have had for the past 75 years. Every country must make its own assessment. And these assessments will carry more weight at the political level than at the military level. Most countries are not at war in peacetime, but they always have to decide where to direct their political stance.

Therefore, we will see countries around the world engaging in a kind of 'hedging' or reorientation of their political stances. To borrow an American expression, they will have to consider changing their actions in preparation for the possibility that the U.S. might suddenly 'pack up its marbles and go home.' Options that were not on the table before are now on the table.

Q6: Possibility of a Return to Pre-Trump U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump's Term

Jeon Jae-seong: One last question. Theoretically, looking back at the unipolar system of the past 30 years, even a powerful country like the U.S. has limits to unilaterally leading the liberal international order. This is because the demand for international public goods, such as security regimes and the role of the ultimate guarantor of an open international economy, has become too great. The U.S. has borne too much burden over the past 30 years. Although President Trump is transactional, the costs should have been shared through more 'deals' between the U.S. and its allies much earlier, but this did not happen.

Therefore, within South Korea, there is a sentiment of adjusting our role and taking on more responsibility while dealing with President Trump. We understand that if we want to maintain the liberal international order, we must step forward. Our hope is that after President Trump leaves office, the U.S. will find relief upon confirming that its allies are sharing roles and helping. Then, can U.S. policy return to greater engagement in global issues?

Kirshner: I think that's a healthy phenomenon. For the past 50 years, every U.S. president has wanted allies to take on a greater role in defense spending and defense. Successive administrations have expressed dissatisfaction with allies over this issue for decades. President Trump can claim that he has instilled 'fear of God' in many allies, leading them to increase defense spending more than any previous president, and I am willing to give him credit for that. However, the more fundamental question you asked, whether cooperation between the U.S. and its traditional allies will be strengthened in the future, is a separate issue.

It is an open question, and it is also a domestic political issue in the United States. Eventually, there will be a post-Trump administration era. The question is whether the Trump administration will leave an indelible mark on how the United States imagines its role in the world, or whether it will be just a passing phase.

From the perspective of someone in the United States, it is difficult to imagine that there will be no lasting consequences from his policies even after Trump himself leaves the stage. I see the world becoming more dangerous and less stable due to America's new attitude. Unfortunately, as an observer, when the United States withdraws from the world stage and adopts a very transactional, extortionate, and bullying attitude towards the entire world, other countries will also react and behave accordingly. My gut feeling is that this will negatively impact the nature of international politics and the possibility of resolving issues through international cooperation.

Jeon Jae-seong: Thank you. I learned a great deal from your time. Thank you for your excellent insights and wisdom.

Kirshner: It was a pleasure to talk with you. ■

■ Jonathan Kirshner, Professor at Boston College, USA.

Managed and Edited by: Lee Sang-jun, EAI Research Fellow
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