[EAI-SBS Foundation] ② Fragmentation of World Order and Changes in Security Order

YouTube Link : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HR8eQVfLuaQ

Video Script

The Direction of Global Order Transformation and the Reorganization of Security Order

Professor Lee Seung-jun discussed the conceptualization of changes in the global order, and the research on how to construct a security order was the research topic for myself and our military doctor. If the global order was the most multilateral and inclusive order, its opposite is fragmentation, and various forms of blocs can exist in between. We named a bloc that is not completely exclusive and has weak internal cohesion as a 'club.' If a more exclusive and self-contained set than that is a bloc, then during the Cold War, it can be seen as a clearly bloc-based security confrontation logic. However, although the US alliance system exists now, its allies also have very close economic relations with China and other clubs, so it is a loose situation with permeability between clubs and centrifugal forces within clubs, as discussed by Professor Lee Seung-jun. Therefore, in security overall, although the alliance system has a stronger bloc logic than the economy, it is not like the Cold War.

I attempted to develop the idea that it is difficult to view the current situation as a new Cold War structure between the US and China or as two exclusive blocs. I was responsible for the overall conceptual design, and Dr. Won Boram will likely discuss the US-China strategic competition. The most important reason for such structural changes in the global security order is the overall shift in security strategy under the 'America First' policy, which began during Trump's first term. Previously, the US maintained a global, integrated deterrence system, but now, due to accumulated hegemonic fatigue, national debt from overspending, and economic crises, the US security order itself has shifted to a strategy of restraint or selective intervention, refraining from external involvement. Within this, diplomacy has become transactional, significantly strengthening economic contributions from allies.

Concurrently, the US is also creating a great power order that involves trading major spheres of influence with other great powers such as China and Russia. While the US alliance system is not entirely secure, it has not completely disintegrated either, placing us in a transitional period where the expansion and reorganization of the security order are occurring simultaneously. Furthermore, US strategy is manifesting as a combination of strategies, including traditional hegemonic superiority, restraint, and balance of power. Simultaneously, this project aims to address both the economization of security and economic security. Economic security is being materialized through various concepts such as the weaponization of mutual threats. Economization of security, traditionally, involved the US providing security in exchange for economic concessions. However, now, security is also calculated from an economic perspective, providing security benefits while extracting economic gains. Concurrently, US support for its allies' security is weakening.

Scenarios for Future Security Order and US Dilemmas

Therefore, it differs from science. Within this asymmetric security structure, US allies face a very difficult process of contributing to security itself while also responding to the transition to an economic-based security system. Looking ahead, will the security order be restored to a US-centric liberal international order, particularly a security order, if the US economy recovers to some extent after the Trump era, leading to a re-empowerment? There could be a future where the existing integrated deterrence system in the security dimension is restored. Currently, this seems highly uncertain. A second scenario is that the US further pursues the 'America First' path, prioritizing not only its own national interests but also minimizing intervention in other regions like East Asia or Europe, as seen in the recent Venezuelan situation, leading to a loosening of blocs. A third scenario is the completion of fragmentation, where major security blocs or regions such as the US, China, Russia, and the Global South establish independent orders, leading to full-scale fragmentation in security as well.

This future can be divided into several possibilities. The issue is that the weakening of this liberal security order is not necessarily advantageous for the US. This also connects to South Korea's response. At first glance, it might seem beneficial for the US to gain significant economic benefits in exchange for the security public goods it has provided and to weaken alliances. However, in the long run, it could be detrimental to the US in many ways. For example, the stability of fundamental liberal security order, such as territorial integrity, is weakening, and the security order could be significantly weakened depending on the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

Furthermore, while President Trump has amplified the narrative that allies economically exploit the US, alliances have historically provided the US with significant military advantages, access to bases, diplomatic legitimacy, and support for the US economy. If fragmentation intensifies, US security interests could also be compromised. Therefore, depending on which order is established amidst the weakening of the liberal security order, which the US has led, the concepts we have considered will manifest in certain ways. I will conclude here.

■ Jeon Jae-sung, Director of EAI; Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Lim Jae-hyun, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 0746 (ext. 209) jhim@eai.or.kr