North Korea and the World: The Future of North Korea-Russia Relations Amidst Armistice Prospects

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cm0fUVIqsmk

Video Script

Diplomatic rhetoric may be maintained, but actual support for North Korea could decrease from the time of the war. It will be very difficult to recover in a short period. Thank you for watching "North Korea and the World" with Park Won-gon. Today, I would like to talk about the trends following the Russia-Ukraine war. Today's filming date is November 26, 2025. By the time you watch this, there is a possibility of some changes, so I would appreciate it if you could keep that in mind. Rather than discussing current affairs, I intend to analyze how the Russia-Ukraine war has affected North Korea's relations, forecast future developments, and discuss the relationship between Russia and North Korea.

It was a key campaign promise of President Trump. Throughout the last presidential election, he repeatedly stated that if he became president, he would end the Russia-Ukraine war in a day, within 24 hours. However, eight months later, the end of the Russia-Ukraine war has still not been achieved. Recently, President Trump presented a 28-point peace plan, a ceasefire and end-of-war proposal. While there is significant backlash in Europe, the core of this plan is essentially territorial freeze, immediate ceasefire implementation, suspension of Ukraine's NATO membership, and a conditional peace plan offering partial sanctions relief to Russia. Six major points are being discussed. First, cessation of hostilities. Second, territorial issues. Third, security guarantees. Fourth, troop reduction and demilitarization. Fifth, economic reconstruction. Sixth, humanitarian measures. It is known to consist of a total of 28 articles.

It was widely assessed that parts of it were essentially accepted as Russia's proposal. Many also called it a scenario for a de facto Russian victory. Negotiations between Ukraine and the United States regarding these 28 peace articles are reportedly underway, and it is known that 19 new peace articles have been developed so far. It is said that several provisions that could benefit Russia have been adjusted. Given this development, I believe the possibility of an end to the war or a ceasefire is increasing. What I truly want to discuss is what benefits North Korea has gained from its cooperation with Russia.

The Russia-Ukraine War and North Korea's Interests

Second, what will the relationship between Russia and North Korea be like after the war ends? Third, has North Korea truly gained only benefits from Russia? Was it an equal exchange? Finally, I will discuss the limitations of Russia-North Korea cooperation. First, I will explain the benefits North Korea has gained from the Russia-Ukraine war. The first is the accumulation of practical combat experience for North Korea's weapon systems. Since the war began, not only artillery shells but also short-range ballistic missiles such as the KN23 and KN24, which North Korea began developing in May 2019, have been used on the Russia-Ukraine battlefields.

Initially, there were significant differences in the margin of error, meaning accuracy. They would fall more than 2 km away from the intended target, or fail to launch properly, but it is known that these technical limitations have been overcome, and accuracy has improved over time. Although there are some Chinese civilian statistics, a comprehensive assessment suggests that the accuracy has definitely improved compared to before. This can be seen as accumulating practical testing and operational experience for weapon systems. Furthermore, although the battlefield environment is clearly different from the Korean Peninsula, North Korea has gained actual combat experience in drone warfare. Drones can also be utilized in our general battlefield environments, and it is clear that North Korea has acquired practical experience in this area. Second, it has secured strategic diplomatic assets.

Diplomatically, North Korea is indeed isolated. However, Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a state officially recognized as a nuclear power after the Korean War, has eased this isolation through close engagement with the isolated North Korea. North Korea appears to be employing a strategy of building a strategic alliance with Russia to leverage its relations with the US and China. Its seating arrangement with President Putin, with President Xi Jinping in the center, at the Chinese Victory Day parade on September 3rd this year clearly demonstrated North Korea's emergence from diplomatic isolation. Furthermore, the appearance of Prime Minister Li Qiang and President Putin together at the 80th-anniversary military parade of the Workers' Party of Korea on October 10th symbolically conveyed that North Korea is no longer alone.

Third, it has attempted to neutralize sanctions through Russia. Unlike China, Russia, as a party to the UN sanctions against North Korea, has openly disregarded sanctions that were passed with its consent. The most notable example is the dissolution of the Panel of Experts (POE) due to Russia's exercise of its veto power. This was quite astonishing, and it was undoubtedly a difficult situation, leaving many people bewildered by the extent of such actions. This panel was established in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1874 in 2009, a resolution to which Russia also agreed. It consisted of eight independent experts tasked with monitoring the implementation of sanctions related to North Korea's nuclear and missile development. Coincidentally, on March 28, 2024, Russia vetoed a resolution to extend the Security Council panel, leading to its dissolution. Just the week before, I had a meeting with the South Korean and Chinese members of this panel in a closed session. It was a panel that had achieved considerable results and was meaningful for maintaining sanctions, yet Russia dissolved it by exercising its veto. From North Korea's perspective, this has somewhat alleviated the burden of sanctions. These are the benefits North Korea has obtained through its cooperation with Russia during the Russia-Ukraine war.

Prospects for Russia-North Korea Relations After the War

From now on, I will cautiously predict the future relationship between Russia and North Korea, whether the war ends in a ceasefire or a full peace. Firstly, I believe economic cooperation could expand to some extent. Once the war ends, there is a possibility that Western sanctions against Russia, particularly those imposed by the United States, will be eased or partially lifted. If this happens, the scope of economic cooperation between Russia and North Korea might broaden somewhat. Although Russia has shown a tendency to completely disregard North Korean sanctions, its own sanctions have limited economic cooperation. Furthermore, as Russia engages in post-war reconstruction, it is likely to utilize North Korean labor, providing North Korea with opportunities to expand its economy.

Nevertheless, due to North Korea's status under sanctions, such cooperation is unlikely to flourish and may remain largely limited and informal. The structure of exchanging artillery shells and missiles for food and energy during the war is likely to weaken, with a greater possibility of exchanging non-military resources such as coal, agricultural products, and seafood. Some suggest the possibility of resuming certain low-level cooperation projects, but since these would involve not only North Korea and Russia but also China and potentially South Korea, any resumption of such projects by North Korea and Russia is likely to remain symbolic. Diplomatic cooperation is expected to decrease in practical terms, with an emphasis on symbolic gestures. While the specific form of the war's conclusion will undoubtedly make a difference, overall, if the war ends, Russia will likely adjust its diplomatic relations with the US and Western Europe. Its diplomatic relations may improve compared to wartime, and in such a situation, Russia might maintain diplomatic rhetoric supportive of North Korea, but actual support could decrease from wartime levels, as the need for support diminishes without active conflict.

Furthermore, it cannot be entirely ruled out that Russia may reduce its active accommodation of North Korea, considering international burdens. Regarding the military sector, I believe the transfer of sensitive advanced military technology will remain restricted. Russia has no precedent of providing sensitive military technology in the past, and it is unlikely to do so for various other reasons. However, cooperation in low-risk areas, such as military operational training, could continue. For example, in the reconnaissance satellite project, with which Russia is reportedly cooperating, North Korea launched one last year. Although Kim Jong Un had ordered the launch of three last year, they were unable to proceed after the first launch. While Russia is reportedly providing technical cooperation, it is highly unlikely that they would transfer advanced reconnaissance satellite technology to North Korea. However, through such cooperation, it is possible that North Korean personnel could be dispatched to Russian military satellite centers or receive training on operational methods. Additionally, Russia might provide technologies related to radar, electronic warfare jamming, and drone operation data.

I believe that Russia's North Korea policy could also be influenced by the evolving relationship between China and Russia following the Russia-Ukraine war. Fundamentally, China has publicly maintained a negative stance on the Russia-Ukraine war, consistently stating its position as a non-party and non-interventionist. It has also limited unilateral support for North Korea. The strained relationship between North Korea and China is also believed to have been influenced by the Russia-Ukraine war. However, after the war ends, Russia, which did not need to be overly concerned about China during the conflict, may be more inclined to cooperate with China's desired stability and management of the Korean Peninsula. This suggests that we need to consider the possibility that Russia may adopt a more reserved stance regarding the extent of its support for North Korea compared to before.

Next, from an internal political perspective, North Korea will declare victory regardless of how the war ends. It will promote this as a victory for the anti-US and anti-Western bloc, propagating that the self-reliant sphere of influence, which North Korea frequently discusses, has definitively triumphed over the US-led hegemonic sphere. It will seek to elevate its status as a strategic state that directly contributed to Russia's victory. Naturally, with the 8th Party Congress concluding and the 9th Party Congress approaching, if a ceasefire is achieved within this year, it is highly probable that this will be heavily promoted as their greatest achievement. There is also a possibility of generating a narrative of hope that increased Russian support will follow this war victory.

I will now discuss the influence on the Russia-North Korea relationship. This relationship's influence can be complex. Given President Trump's ongoing mediation in the end-of-war process, it is possible that US-Russia relations will recover once the war concludes. Furthermore, the likelihood of Russia providing North Korea with sensitive technologies capable of striking the US mainland is considered even lower. Changes in Russia's North Korea policy cannot be ruled out depending on future relations. While Trump continues to speak favorably of Kim Jong Un and expresses a willingness to meet, circumstances can change. If Kim Jong Un repeatedly refuses meetings, conducts a seventh nuclear test, or escalates threats with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), there is a possibility that Trump could revert to the "maximum pressure" campaign against North Korea seen in 2017. If this happens, Russia's position would become complicated. It is questionable whether Russia could unconditionally side with North Korea if the US exerts pressure, and Russia might face dilemmas. Moreover, considering Trump's recent actions, his engagement with leaders of adversarial and rival nations such as Xi Jinping of China and Vladimir Putin of Russia, in steering global affairs, can sometimes resemble the power dynamics of the 19th and 20th centuries, where great powers dictated the world order through collusion. If Russia ends the Ukraine war with US consent, it might adopt a more compliant attitude towards US requests, potentially leading to a cessation of unconditional Russian support for North Korea, depending on its relationship with the US. We need to consider this possibility.

Asymmetry and Limitations of Russia-North Korea Cooperation

Those interested may have seen the report published in September of this year. This report is an overall assessment of the gains and losses for North Korea and Russia in the Russia-Ukraine war. The title of the report published by the German Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung itself is 'An Unequal Partnership,' which is quite suggestive. The military aid provided by North Korea to Russia in 2023 is estimated at approximately 13.6 trillion Korean won in market value. This includes 122mm shells, 152mm shells, mortar shells, multiple rocket launcher (MLRS) rounds, the aforementioned KN23 and KN24 short-range ballistic missiles, and the cost of deploying approximately 15,000 troops. However, the compensation received from Russia is reportedly only about one-tenth of this amount, approximately 1.65 trillion Korean won. While this is a significant sum for North Korea, it is only about one-tenth of what was provided. This primarily includes over 1 million barrels of oil, a small number of anti-aircraft weapon systems, and approximately $200 million annually for troop deployment, along with up to 700,000 tons of rice. It is assessed that Russia has not provided North Korea with the advanced military technology it desires. If this report is accurate, it suggests a highly asymmetrical support relationship, meaning an unequal exchange has occurred.

Of course, there are other assessments. According to a report published by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) in April 2025, the economic benefits North Korea has gained from the Russia-Ukraine war are estimated at 28.7 trillion Korean won. This is approximately double the amount cited in the aforementioned Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung report. This discrepancy arises from differences in the estimation of arms and military material exports and technology transfers. While the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung calculated only the compensation actually provided by Russia to North Korea, the KIDA included potential economic benefits. Therefore, the estimate is significantly higher. While it is difficult to make a precise judgment, it appears relatively certain that what North Korea has received is not as substantial as commonly perceived.

I will now discuss the limitations of Russia-North Korea cooperation. Firstly, there are the sanctions against North Korea. As briefly mentioned earlier, Russia has exerted considerable influence in neutralizing these sanctions. While the dissolution of the Panel of Experts was mentioned, the sanctions against North Korea remain in effect. The continued effectiveness of these sanctions can be inferred from trade volumes alone. In 2016 and 2017, there were five resolutions comprehensively sanctioning the North Korean economy. Therefore, to assess the validity of these sanctions, one must compare the period before 2016-2017 with the recent period of 2023-2024. The intervening years of 2021 and 2022 were exceptional due to North Korea closing its borders for three years because of COVID-19. To conclude, trade volumes have not reached the levels of 2014-2016 and remain at about 10-20% of those figures. While North Korea's total annual trade volume between 2014 and 2016 was between $6 billion and $7.6 billion, the situation from 2022 to the present in 2024 shows it remains at about 10-20% of that level. This implies that even with increased trade and support from Russia, Russia's share accounts for only about 2%. China accounts for over 96-97% of the total trade, and Russia's trade volume is inherently limited. In other words, the sanctions are still functioning.

Economic cooperation with Russia also remains inherently limited. The statistics indicate that in 2014, Russia's share of North Korea's foreign trade was only about 1.2-2%. Despite being North Korea's second-largest trading partner after China, this was the extent of its share. North Korea relies on China for over 90% of its trade. Although there has been a sharp increase since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, as of 2023, Russia's share of North Korea's total trade is still only 1.5%. Overall, the economic cooperation that Russia can provide to North Korea is bound to be limited.

In terms of economic development, the economies of Russia and North Korea lack complementarity. North Korea needs markets and capital, neither of which Russia can provide. Regarding exports, both Russia and North Korea primarily export natural resources, meaning Russia cannot meet North Korea's demand. For instance, despite North Korea's emphasis on tourism, only 880 Russian tourists visited North Korea last year. Considering these factors, the Russia-North Korea relationship appears to offer little economic benefit.

Regarding the transfer of military technology, a closed-door briefing to the National Assembly's Government Committee on September 11th of this year indicated that South Korean intelligence agencies assessed North Korea as being dissatisfied with the insufficient reciprocal benefits received from Russia for its troop deployment and arms support during the inter-Korean summit. One reason North Korea may feel it has not received adequate benefits is the lack of advanced military technology transfer. While some domestic media outlets have suggested the possibility of transferring some core technologies for nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), caution is advised. If SSBN technology were transferred, it would provide North Korea with the capability to strike the United States, potentially provoking a strong backlash from the US. Furthermore, Russia has historically provided very little sensitive military technology transfer since the Soviet era, making it unlikely to provide such technology to North Korea even after the war.

From China's perspective, it is clearly undesirable for such technology transfer to occur. As North Korea's capability to strike the US mainland improves with Russian assistance, it would legitimize the missile defense (MD) systems and nuclear capability enhancement efforts pursued by the Trump administration, leading South Korea and Japan to also establish robust defense systems. While these defense systems are ostensibly aimed at countering North Korean threats, their ultimate target could be China, making it unlikely that China would consent to such transfers.

Implications for Russia-South Korea Relations and the International Order

Finally, I will discuss the future of Russia-South Korea relations after the war. Russia is making overtures to South Korea in various ways. Once the war ends, it will be very difficult for Russia to find partners in Europe. Therefore, there is a possibility that South Korea could become a partner in the development of Siberia through Putin's "New Eastern Policy." However, a cautious approach is necessary. Some argue that South Korea could gain economic benefits through economic relations with Russia and exert influence over North Korea via Russia. However, the manner in which the war concludes is crucial. If Russia achieves a decisive victory and Ukraine effectively loses, South Korea must exercise caution in its cooperation with Russia and coordinate the timing, scope, and extent of such engagement with like-minded liberal democratic nations.

While Russia may not pose a direct threat to South Korea to the same extent as European nations, it is necessary to maintain a certain level of alignment with them. Clearly, Russia's war in Ukraine is an imperialist war of aggression against Ukraine. The term "imperialist" is used because it involves the forceful seizure of territory from the sovereign nation of Ukraine. Furthermore, the fact that Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has engaged in such an act undermines the very foundation of the international order established since 1945. Therefore, if the war concludes in such a manner, we must approach the restoration of relations with Russia with extreme caution, prioritizing our economic interests. More importantly, in a situation where we face nuclear threats, it is imperative to reflect fundamental international norms, principles, and peace objectives more broadly in our policies.

Today, I have presented my analysis on the Russia-Ukraine war, for which discussions of its conclusion are intensifying, and its connection with North Korea. While I hope for a swift end to the Russia-Ukraine war to prevent further casualties, the manner in which it concludes also carries significant implications for the future international order. Therefore, I also hope that it does not end in a way that rewards imperialist aggression. Thank you for watching today.

Park Won-gon, Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute and Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

Lim Jae-hyun, EAI Research Fellow
Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhlim@eai.or.kr