[North Korea and the World] The Aborted Summit and the Underlying Messages Exchanged Between North Korea and the U.S.

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X1Vc8YFOVzQ

Video Script

President Trump's Proposal to Meet Kim Jong Un and North Korea's Response

The possibility of dialogue between the United States and North Korea began to emerge, and this was evident once again. It is judged that both the United States and North Korea will engage in dialogue in the future. Thank you for watching Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. Today's topic is the failed meeting between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un during his recent visit. We will focus on analyzing the reasons for the eventual failure of the meeting and the possibility of future North Korea-US or inter-Korean summits. Frankly, I was initially skeptical about the possibility of President Trump meeting North Korea's Kim Jong Un, as he had expressed this intention since his inauguration and during his previous presidential campaign. However, during his visit to South Korea on October 29th and 30th, President Trump made a series of quite specific and unusually forward-looking statements. While these were not official statements, but rather responses to reporters' questions on the plane, they contained remarks that could be interpreted with significance. Even before his recent visit, he consistently expressed his desire to meet North Korea's Kim Jong Un. For example, he stated that he would meet if Kim Jong Un contacted him, and many will recall the surprise meeting possibility in June 2019, leading to hopes that it might happen this time. Among President Trump's remarks, several were particularly noteworthy. One was when reporters asked him on the plane from Malaysia to Australia about North Korea's claim that it must be recognized as a nuclear power for dialogue with the US. In response to whether he was open to that, President Trump replied, "I think they are a nuclear power." While this was not an official recognition of North Korea as a nuclear power, it was a statement that seemed to open up possibilities compared to previous stances.

He also mentioned that the visit could be extended and that he could go anywhere. Similar questions arose on the Air Force One flight from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to Tokyo, Japan, during this visit, where he stated, "I can even extend the visit. I can show that much sincerity to meet Kim Jong Un. I can go anywhere. Since I am in South Korea, which is close to North Korea, I can meet Chairman Kim Jong Un immediately if a meeting is arranged." He continued to make statements that opened up possibilities. Finally, he also made remarks about lifting sanctions. He used the phrase, "Well, we have sanctions that's pretty big to start off with." When asked if sanctions could be lifted, he responded, "We have sanctions, and lifting sanctions is a very big deal, and we can talk about it." As I will discuss later, the issue of sanctions is extremely important from North Korea's perspective. In essence, he said many things that Chairman Kim Jong Un would have wanted to hear. Of course, these were his personal thoughts expressed in response to questions, rather than official statements.

As you are well aware, North Korea responded by firing missiles over two days: a short-range ballistic missile on October 22nd and an anti-ship strategic cruise missile on October 28th. The latter is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. The short-range ballistic missile, presumed to be a KN-23, is also capable of carrying a low-yield nuclear warhead. Despite President Trump's invitation to meet, North Korea's Kim Jong Un responded in a characteristically North Korean manner. This is a familiar pattern for researchers observing North Korea: when something is unsatisfactory, they respond with missile launches or provocations.

North Korea's Diplomatic Messaging and Off-the-Record Exchanges

Furthermore, North Korea sent its Foreign Minister on a visit to Russia and Belarus at a crucial time. The departure was on October 26th, and the stay was until the 28th. If a surprise meeting between Trump and Kim Jong Un were to occur, and if one person had to be present from each side, it would logically be the Secretary of State from the US and the Foreign Minister from North Korea. If a surprise meeting had taken place, the possibility of any decisions or agreements being reached would have been extremely low. However, the meeting could have served as a starting point for future dialogue between the US and North Korea. In that context, it would have been appropriate for the Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State, who would lead the practical-level discussions, to be present. Sending the Foreign Minister outside the Korean Peninsula could be interpreted as Kim Jong Un's intention not to engage in dialogue. Let me attempt a general interpretation. First, there was a fierce exchange of off-the-record messages. The fact that Trump made such statements publicly suggests that there was little to no behind-the-scenes contact between the US and North Korea. If there had been, there would have been no need for official or public statements.

Background of North Korea's Refusal to Meet and Negotiation Strategy

Although North Korea did not provide a direct answer, its actions conveyed a message. This can be interpreted as a fierce off-the-record exchange. It also signifies a struggle for initiative and agenda-setting in the negotiations. As mentioned in previous videos, there is a possibility that a negotiation has begun between the US and North Korea, and this was evident once again. I believed there was no chance North Korea would agree to meet, but as mentioned earlier, Trump's active engagement raised the possibility from a scale of 1 to 10 to about a 2. There were two reasons for this. First, to put it crudely, Kim Jong Un might have been concerned about Trump's potential backlash. One of Trump's characteristics is unpredictability. Despite showing considerable sincerity and repeatedly inviting Chairman Kim Jong Un, and saying things Kim Jong Un wanted to hear, his absence could lead to Trump feeling disappointed, his prestige diminished, and his influence undermined. Could he suddenly revert to the 'fire and fury' rhetoric of 2017, threatening to destroy North Korea with maximum pressure? From Kim Jong Un's perspective, this was a plausible concern. Second, for Kim Jong Un, meeting Trump in any format, even without a significant agreement, would have been an event. Moreover, it could have served to showcase his achievements as a political accomplishment. Kim Jong Un has met with Putin and Xi Jinping this year. Meeting Trump as well would have positioned him as a global leader who has met with the leaders of major world powers—the US, China, and Russia—thereby enhancing his international standing. Additionally, in such meetings, North Korea often employs the 'white flag' narrative: claiming that an adversary like South Korea or the US has surrendered and begged for dialogue, and their leader magnanimously agreed to meet. This narrative can be used for internal propaganda. This year marks the final year of the 8th Party Congress. North Korea's economy is in dire straits. The 9th Party Congress is scheduled for next year, and with little time left this year, Kim Jong Un needs to maximize the display of his achievements. Therefore, I thought there was a possibility he might agree to meet for such reasons, but again, he refused. So, why did he not meet? The reason I stated from the beginning that the possibility of a meeting was slim is that in Kim Jong Un's policy address at the Supreme People's Assembly on September 21st, he spoke in detail about inter-Korean and US policy for about 40 minutes. The core message was twofold. He indicated a willingness to meet Trump. He specifically used the phrase: "I still personally have good memories of the current US President, Trump."

He absolutely does not have good memories. In 2018 and 2019, from Kim Jong Un's perspective, he felt betrayed by Trump and fell into Trump's trap, a common assessment among North Korea researchers. There can be no good feelings. Nevertheless, making such a statement indicated a willingness or intention to meet. However, it was not just about meeting; he clearly presented at least two conditions. First, he stated that he would not engage in denuclearization negotiations as before, whether it be denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula or the Korean Peninsula in general. Instead, he proposed nuclear arms reduction talks, suggesting a new approach. A similar statement was made in Kim Yo Jong's statement on July 29th: "Bring a new way of thinking." The precise wording was: "If the US abandons its existing obsessions, we can have dialogue for genuine peaceful coexistence based on acknowledging that reality." Such statements indicate a shift from denuclearization negotiations to nuclear arms reduction talks. Second, North Korea has consistently demanded for a long time the withdrawal of the US policy of hostility toward North Korea. The representative examples of this hostile policy are the suspension of joint military exercises and the deployment of strategic assets. He called for the cessation of these exercises. The prerequisite for dialogue is for the US to show sincerity first. Crucially, he proposed a bottom-up approach to dialogue, rather than the top-down approach of the past. This was because Trump's remarks about nuclear arms reduction talks were intended to be formalized and declared, not just casual remarks. Therefore, the conditions were not met this time. This is based on Kim Jong Un's official statements. However, Kim Jong Un's true intention was likely not to meet. This is because, as mentioned earlier, in the surprise meeting in June 2019, Kim Jong Un likely felt he was severely outmaneuvered by Trump. His first statement to Trump at that meeting was to question why joint exercises and strategic asset deployments were happening when they had been promised to be suspended. The ROK-US joint military exercise was already scheduled for August of that year. When he raised this issue, Trump responded, "We are not conducting such joint exercises."

Consequently, Trump and Kim Jong Un engaged in what was effectively a summit for over 50 minutes. Since Trump stated that joint exercises and strategic asset deployments would not occur, they likely discussed other matters. However, joint exercises and strategic asset deployments did take place. Therefore, Kim Jong Un could not help but feel deceived by Trump. This led to the breakdown of the working-level talks in Stockholm, Sweden, at the end of October, and the declaration of a 'frontal breakthrough' strategy at the 7th Plenary Meeting in December, effectively halting dialogue with the US—a sequence of events that unfolded over the course of that year. Kim Jong Un clearly retained those memories and experiences, so he had no intention of a surprise meeting from the outset. Considering his past experiences, the possibility of such a surprise meeting was indeed very slim. So, what about the future? I believe both the US and North Korea have the motivation and willingness to meet in the future. Trump's willingness is somewhat ambiguous. I believe Trump has a strong desire for recognition. While it is an uncomfortable truth for us, the issue of North Korean denuclearization is a core security agenda for us. However, from Trump's perspective, he wants to enhance his legacy by being the one who resolved the North Korean denuclearization issue, which has persisted for over 30 years, and the inter-Korean issue, which has lasted over 70 years, positioning himself as a peacemaker. As is well known, he has claimed to have resolved all wars in recent months and believes he deserves the Nobel Peace Prize. Given this desire for recognition, his continued interest in the North Korean issue, as evidenced by his recent actions, suggests a clear possibility that he will seek to draw North Korea back into negotiations.

Recognition of North Korea as a Nuclear State and Demand for Sanctions Relief

North Korea also has reasons to engage. As mentioned earlier, Kim Jong Un's expression of willingness to meet in his September 21st speech at the Supreme People's Assembly indicates that North Korea clearly feels the need for a decisive negotiation. Will North Korea truly be recognized globally as a nuclear-armed state, as it desires? I believe this is impossible. Even Russia, which maintains close relations with North Korea, cannot officially recognize it as a nuclear-armed state. Doing so would undermine the non-proliferation regime established in 1968, which recognizes only five nuclear-weapon states: the US, UK, France, China, and the former Soviet Union (now Russia). Their nuclear monopoly would collapse. The moment this nuclear monopoly collapses, South Korea might seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and potentially Japan and Taiwan as well. From Russia's perspective, Ukraine might also pursue nuclear armament. The nuclear monopoly they hold is an immense privilege, and they are unlikely to relinquish it. Kim Jong Un of North Korea is well aware of this. So, how will they overcome this? Ultimately, it comes down to sanctions relief. This is the India and Pakistan model. India and Pakistan, despite not signing the NPT, conducted illegal nuclear tests and acquired nuclear weapons, leading to sanctions. However, after the 9/11 attacks, through war and improved relations with India, sanctions were gradually lifted, and they have now effectively emerged as nuclear-armed states. North Korea is likely considering a similar path. Therefore, there is a possibility that they will meet with Trump to demand sanctions relief. This is the first reason. The second reason is that North Korea genuinely needs sanctions relief.

Some argue that North Korea can circumvent sanctions through cooperation with Russia and because China does not emphasize sanctions strongly. I disagree with this view. There is clear evidence that sanctions are working. Comprehensive UN sanctions against North Korea were passed in 2016 and 2017. Around the same time, the US passed a series of very strong sanctions under the Sanctions Modernization Act as unilateral sanctions. If sanctions were ineffective, North Korea's foreign trade levels prior to 2016 would be comparable to current levels.

It could serve to showcase achievements as a political accomplishment. Kim Jong Un has met with Putin and Xi Jinping this year. Meeting Trump as well would have positioned him as a global leader who has met with the leaders of major world powers—the US, China, and Russia—thereby enhancing his international standing. Additionally, in such meetings, North Korea often employs the 'white flag' narrative: claiming that an adversary like South Korea or the US has surrendered and begged for dialogue, and their leader magnanimously agreed to meet. This narrative can be used for internal propaganda. This year marks the final year of the 8th Party Congress. North Korea's economy is in dire straits. The 9th Party Congress is scheduled for next year, and with little time left this year, Kim Jong Un needs to maximize the display of his achievements.

Therefore, I thought there was a possibility he might agree to meet for such reasons, but again, he refused. So, why did he not meet? The reason I stated from the beginning that the possibility of a meeting was slim is that in Kim Jong Un's policy address at the Supreme People's Assembly on September 21st, he spoke in detail about inter-Korean and US policy for about 40 minutes. The core message was twofold. He indicated a willingness to meet Trump. He specifically used the phrase: "I still personally have good memories of the current US President, Trump."

He absolutely does not have good memories. In 2018 and 2019, from Kim Jong Un's perspective, he felt betrayed by Trump and fell into Trump's trap, a common assessment among North Korea researchers. There can be no good feelings. Nevertheless, making such a statement indicated a willingness or intention to meet. However, it was not just about meeting; he clearly presented at least two conditions. First, he stated that he would not engage in denuclearization negotiations as before, whether it be denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula or the Korean Peninsula in general. Instead, he proposed nuclear arms reduction talks, suggesting a new approach.

A similar statement was made in Kim Yo Jong's statement on July 29th: "Bring a new way of thinking." The precise wording was: "If the US abandons its existing obsessions, we can have dialogue for genuine peaceful coexistence based on acknowledging that reality." Such statements indicate a shift from denuclearization negotiations to nuclear arms reduction talks. Second, North Korea has consistently demanded for a long time the withdrawal of the US policy of hostility toward North Korea. The representative examples of this hostile policy are the suspension of joint military exercises and the deployment of strategic assets.

He called for the cessation of these exercises. The prerequisite for dialogue is for the US to show sincerity first. Crucially, he proposed a bottom-up approach to dialogue, rather than the top-down approach of the past. This was because Trump's remarks about nuclear arms reduction talks were intended to be formalized and declared, not just casual remarks. Therefore, the conditions were not met this time. This is based on Kim Jong Un's official statements. However, Kim Jong Un's true intention was likely not to meet. This is because, as mentioned earlier, in the surprise meeting in June 2019, Kim Jong Un likely felt he was severely outmaneuvered by Trump. His first statement to Trump at that meeting was to question why joint exercises and strategic asset deployments were happening when they had been promised to be suspended. The ROK-US joint military exercise was already scheduled for August of that year. When he raised this issue, Trump responded, "We are not conducting such joint exercises."

Consequently, Trump and Kim Jong Un engaged in what was effectively a summit for over 50 minutes. Since Trump stated that joint exercises and strategic asset deployments would not occur, they likely discussed other matters. However, joint exercises and strategic asset deployments did take place. Therefore, Kim Jong Un could not help but feel deceived by Trump. This led to the breakdown of the working-level talks in Stockholm, Sweden, at the end of October, and the declaration of a 'frontal breakthrough' strategy at the 7th Plenary Meeting in December, effectively halting dialogue with the US—a sequence of events that unfolded over the course of that year.

Future Prospects for North Korea-US Relations and Negotiation Motives

Kim Jong Un clearly retained those memories and experiences, so he had no intention of a surprise meeting from the outset. Considering his past experiences, the possibility of such a surprise meeting was indeed very slim. So, what about the future? I believe both the US and North Korea have the motivation and willingness to meet in the future. Trump's willingness is somewhat ambiguous. I believe Trump has a strong desire for recognition. While it is an uncomfortable truth for us, the issue of North Korean denuclearization is a core security agenda for us. However, from Trump's perspective, he wants to enhance his legacy by being the one who resolved the North Korean denuclearization issue, which has persisted for over 30 years, and the inter-Korean issue, which has lasted over 70 years, positioning himself as a peacemaker. As is well known, he has claimed to have resolved all wars in recent months and believes he deserves the Nobel Peace Prize. Given this desire for recognition, his continued interest in the North Korean issue, as evidenced by his recent actions, suggests a clear possibility that he will seek to draw North Korea back into negotiations.

North Korea also has reasons to engage. As mentioned earlier, Kim Jong Un's expression of willingness to meet in his September 21st speech at the Supreme People's Assembly indicates that North Korea clearly feels the need for a decisive negotiation. Will North Korea truly be recognized globally as a nuclear-armed state, as it desires? I believe this is impossible. Even Russia, which maintains close relations with North Korea, cannot officially recognize it as a nuclear-armed state.

Doing so would undermine the non-proliferation regime established in 1968, which recognizes only five nuclear-weapon states: the US, UK, France, China, and the former Soviet Union (now Russia). Their nuclear monopoly would collapse. The moment this nuclear monopoly collapses, South Korea might seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and potentially Japan and Taiwan as well. From Russia's perspective, Ukraine might also pursue nuclear armament. The nuclear monopoly they hold is an immense privilege, and they are unlikely to relinquish it. Kim Jong Un of North Korea is well aware of this. So, how will they overcome this?

Ultimately, it comes down to sanctions relief. This is the India and Pakistan model. India and Pakistan, despite not signing the NPT, conducted illegal nuclear tests and acquired nuclear weapons, leading to sanctions. However, after the 9/11 attacks, through war and improved relations with India, sanctions were gradually lifted, and they have now effectively emerged as nuclear-armed states. North Korea is likely considering a similar path. Therefore, there is a possibility that they will meet with Trump to demand sanctions relief. This is the first reason. The second reason is that North Korea genuinely needs sanctions relief.

Effectiveness of Sanctions Against North Korea and North Korea's Economic Hardship

Some argue that North Korea can circumvent sanctions through cooperation with Russia and because China does not emphasize sanctions strongly. I disagree with this view. There is clear evidence that sanctions are working. Comprehensive UN sanctions against North Korea were passed in 2016 and 2017. Around the same time, the US passed a series of very strong sanctions under the Sanctions Modernization Act as unilateral sanctions. If sanctions were ineffective, North Korea's foreign trade levels prior to 2016 would be comparable to current levels.

It cannot be said that sanctions are ineffective. I will provide estimated figures, although they are not exact. From 2014 to 2016, North Korea's total annual trade volume was in the range of $6 billion to $7.6 billion. As of 2024, it is less than $3 billion. This means that the trade volume has decreased by approximately one-tenth. It remains only about 20-30% of the previous level. Even with Russia significantly ignoring sanctions and assisting North Korea, the trade volume is at this level, indicating that sanctions are still functioning and remain effective. Chairman Kim Jong Un of North Korea clearly intends to develop and advance the economy. Whether he seeks regime stability or improvement in the lives of North Korean citizens, his commitment to economic development is genuine.

Under the current sanctions, North Korea cannot attract the market and investment it desires. North Korea does not wish to establish economic relations with Europe or the United States, including South Korea. For more substantial economic cooperation with China or cooperation with the Global South, these sanctions must be lifted. Therefore, there is a clear possibility that the two countries will meet again in the future. Another piece of evidence that North Korea is concerned about sanctions is that the word 'sanctions' appears five times in Kim Jong Un's policy address on September 21st. They claim to be unconcerned by sanctions and that sanctions cannot affect them, but if sanctions were not causing hardship or problems, there would be no need to make such statements.

I believe this indicates that North Korea is experiencing significant hardship due to sanctions. Most recently, on November 6th, according to a statement by North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Eun-chol, who is in charge of US affairs, in early November, the US further strengthened UN sanctions and imposed unilateral sanctions against North Korea. North Korea immediately responded. In the past, whenever the US or the UN took action regarding sanctions, North Korea has consistently issued counterarguments or condemnations. This is also evidence that sanctions are working.

Conclusion: Possibility of North Korea-US Summit and Prospects for Denuclearization Talks

To conclude, this time it almost became an event, and there was much speculation, but ultimately, the leaders of the United States and North Korea did not meet. So, when will they meet? While it is difficult to say precisely due to various variables, I believe there is a possibility that the US and North Korea will meet sometime next year. However, I have considerable doubts about whether substantive negotiations on North Korean denuclearization or the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will take place. Today, we have attempted to analyze the possibility of a summit between the US and North Korea, which was the central focus. Thank you for watching.

■ Author: Park Won-gon _ Director of the North Korea Research Center, East Asia Institute. Professor of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Management and Editing: Lim Jae-hyun _ EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhlim@eai.or.kr