[North Korea and the World] Pursuing Denuclearization Through a Freeze Rather Than a Halt, and ROK-US Cooperation is Necessary

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kcBZDJymznE

Video Script

Korea is exposed to a much stronger nuclear threat from North Korea. It is very important to coordinate North Korea policy, unification policy, and above all, denuclearization policy between South Korea and the United States to have the same stance. Thank you to everyone watching Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. Today, we will address the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons and inter-Korean relations, which are central to South Korea's security. Through speeches at the UN General Assembly held every September, President Lee Jae-myung, President Trump, and Chairman Xi Jinping have all delivered speeches. And on September 22, North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un detailed his policies toward South Korea and the United States at the Supreme People's Assembly. I believe that the US and Chinese leaders will meet at a summit to be held in late October or early November, and by then, the Korean Peninsula is highly likely to experience fluctuations in various situations. Among these, today, I would like to focus on the North Korea policy, denuclearization policy, and inter-Korean relations being pursued by the Lee Jae-myung administration, and North Korea's stance on these issues.

Key Contents of the Lee Jae-myung Administration's North Korea Policy

So far, neither our government's policy nor the US administration's policy has officially stated its position on North Korea policy, denuclearization policy, or unification policy. On August 25, various details were introduced regarding the conversation between President Lee Jae-myung and President Trump during their summit. These were mainly contents that President Lee Jae-myung conveyed to President Trump regarding North Korea's denuclearization issue. Now, let's analyze this part in detail. It is said that President Lee Jae-myung emphasized three points. The first is weapons that North Korea can use to strike the US mainland.

This is called an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). The assessment conveyed to President Trump was that the development of ICBMs is almost complete. What this means is that from the US perspective, its mainland is highly likely to be threatened, and since North Korea can soon complete that capability, the US should quickly negotiate with North Korea. The second point is that North Korea can produce 15 to 20 nuclear bombs annually and can transfer these bombs externally, a statement made to Trump. This is the part that the US considers most sensitive. If nuclear materials fall into the hands of US adversaries, especially terrorist organizations, it poses a significant threat, so they try to prevent it thoroughly. Ultimately, if left unchecked, North Korea can continue to produce nuclear materials and build bombs, so it can be interpreted that he told Trump that this must be stopped. The third point, combining these two, is that it is important to halt North Korea's ICBM and nuclear production capabilities.

He stated that this alone would provide significant security benefits. He urged Trump to negotiate with North Korea quickly, as only President Trump has the capacity and will to resolve this issue. I have some concerns. Of course, I believe he well-organized and explained the reasons for negotiating with President Trump. However, from South Korea's perspective, two elements that challenge our security are missing. South Korea is exposed to a much stronger nuclear threat from North Korea.

However, there was no mention of this aspect. Another point is that since South Korea does not possess nuclear weapons, its nuclear deterrence relies entirely on the extended deterrence provided by the United States. Therefore, it would have been natural to discuss the US commitment to defending South Korea and the extended deterrence with President Trump, but that discussion was also absent. I am quite concerned about this aspect. What is the actual level of North Korea's capability to strike the mainland? While there is debate among experts, it is clear that North Korea cannot easily acquire the capability to strike the US mainland. On January 27, after Trump's election, he issued an executive order for 'Iron Dome for America,' later nicknamed 'Golden Dome,' which aims to significantly strengthen the missile defense system capable of defending the US mainland.

How will it be strengthened? It essentially involves building a next-generation missile defense and interception system to counter threats from ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, advanced cruise missiles, and new types of missiles. It aims to build a much stronger defense system, including pre-emptive detection and destruction of all incoming missiles, extending to space. Here, I believe a very strong deterrent can be exerted, especially against North Korea, because the US is not dealing with North Korea but China. As China is highly advancing its nuclear capabilities and its nuclear strategy doctrine is changing, and China itself states its intention to possess nuclear capabilities equivalent to those of the US,

the US is significantly expanding its capabilities to defend its mainland. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, it is clear that the US will have a much stronger capability to reliably defend against North Korea's nuclear threat, the extent of which in terms of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) capable of striking the mainland is still unconfirmed. I believe that not engaging in dialogue and negotiations demonstrates the existence of alternative capabilities to counter the military threats posed by North Korea. Even in such a situation, the Trump administration is strengthening its capabilities. On the other hand, I am very concerned about the situation in South Korea.

In May 2019, which I consider a critical point, North Korea began developing the KN-23 missile, also known as the Iskander missile. With a range of approximately 690 km, it can cover the entire Korean Peninsula and is capable of carrying low-yield nuclear or tactical nuclear warheads. This missile has been significantly used on the Russia-Ukraine battlefield. According to international intelligence, the missile's accuracy was initially very low, deviating by nearly 2 km from the intended target, but later showed a considerable level of accuracy. A report from the US Congressional Research Service in May 2025 concluded that North Korea has sufficiently tested and deployed the KN-23 missile on the Russia-Ukraine battlefield and is capable of attacking South Korea.

Conceptual Ambiguity of Phased Denuclearization Theory

To summarize, while the threat to the mainland still remains questionable, the threat to South Korea is an existing, present danger. Regardless of whether President Trump meets with Kim Jong-un or engages in dialogue, the most important aspect in all these processes is South Korea's security, and unfortunately, such discussions did not occur. I have many concerns about this. Furthermore, there must be objectives for negotiations and parties to negotiate with; simply attaching significance to the act of meeting itself is not a way to lead our security in a better direction. Second, the government is discussing a three-stage theory of denuclearization. However, these concepts are constantly changing. Initially, it was freeze, reduction, and dismantlement. The term 'freeze' was used. In a recent interview with the Times, the concept changed. It shifted to cessation, disarmament, and complete denuclearization. And the expression used in the recent UN speech reverted to cessation, reduction, and dismantlement.

What is important here is my concern that the concept of what was called 'freeze' and what is now called 'cessation' is very different. I say this because National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac stated that the term 'cessation' is a more accurate expression. What is important is how this will be verified in the future. When we talk about denuclearization in the international community, the generally used concept is 'freeze.' Freeze is not just a formal term; if a country developing or possessing nuclear capabilities agrees to freeze its nuclear and missile capabilities, it must designate specific regions, facilities, and weapon systems. Verification must follow. Verification by a credible third party is necessary. However, the concept of 'cessation' is ambiguous.

This is because these are not the officially used terms for denuclearization. For example, if North Korea simply declares a halt to its ICBM and nuclear material production on a certain day, that would suffice. If it's just a declaration, how can we confirm whether North Korea is actually doing it or not? President Lee Jae-myung stated in an interview with the Times, 'Even a cessation alone has sufficient meaning, so we can provide corresponding measures.' That is what concerns me the most.

If it is truly frozen, facilities are designated, and verification is conducted, then providing corresponding measures is naturally appropriate. However, if measures are provided based solely on a North Korean declaration without any verification, it is a serious problem, and if it proceeds in that direction, it will inevitably lead to the de facto recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. The UN Institute for Disarmament Research also officially uses the terms 'freeze' and 'verification.' The word 'stop' does not appear. The Geneva Accord of 1994 also uses the term 'freeze.' I believe that precise terms and concepts must follow, as these are matters of significant security concern for us.

The Order of the END Initiative and the Importance of Denuclearization

I believe so. Lastly, I would like to add one more point. This is the so-called END initiative. E stands for Exchange, N for Normalization, and D for Denuclearization. I believe our government did well by including D in the overall framework. Why is it good? Because denuclearization is included. Denuclearization must be included in some form. The current general sentiment in the US is that complete denuclearization of North Korea is impossible and unrealistic. Therefore, the prevailing opinion is to avoid even mentioning denuclearization. From South Korea's perspective, we must continue to emphasize the term denuclearization and make it clear that it must be our final goal. If it is abandoned, North Korea will effectively become a nuclear-armed state, and only military options, not diplomatic or negotiation-based methods, will remain.

In that regard, I believe the inclusion of the term denuclearization is very well done. However, the order of END, or the details, reveal some issues. Looking at D, it is Exchange, Normalization, and then Denuclearization. We can only assume there is an order. Because normalization of relations occurs through exchange. Regarding this, Director Lee Seong-hak stated in a briefing to reporters that this is a principle emphasized in the Singapore Joint Statement between North Korea and the US in 2018, among others. The three agreements from Singapore in 2018 are key: First, improvement of North Korea-US relations. Second, the Korean Peninsula peace process, ultimately improving inter-Korean relations. Third, denuclearization.

Of course, the US claims there is no order here. However, the Singapore agreement is written as 1, 2, 3, 4. North Korea, through its official statement in December 2018, stated that its denuclearization is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and as preconditions, it cited the improvement of US relations and the Korean Peninsula peace process in that order. That is North Korea's position. Therefore, I do not find the government's argument that these three elements are not a process with mutual priorities or sequence to be very persuasive. Denuclearization is placed last. While I do not argue that we must denuclearize first and then engage in dialogue, my point is that there should be no priority relationship between them. This aspect also concerns me from the perspective of inter-Korean relations. I believe the English term used for N, normalization of relations, after E, is problematic.

In diplomacy, the term 'normalization' is used when two countries that have not established diplomatic relations officially do so. Currently, South Korea and North Korea do not have normal diplomatic relations, nor do they recognize each other as normal states. The 1991 Basic Agreement between South and North Korea states the following about inter-Korean relations: 'The South and the North acknowledge that their relations are not those between states but a special relationship provisionally formed in the process of pursuing unification.' Article 3 of the Constitution clearly states, 'The territory of the Republic of Korea shall be the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands.'

Therefore, we cannot view North Korea as an independent, single state. A more critical issue is that in December 2023, at the 8th session of the 9th Plenary Meeting, North Korea's Kim Jong-un spoke of the 'theory of two adversarial states.' This theory of two states does not refer to two coexisting states but rather 'two adversarial states' where South Korea is the ultimate enemy, and that position was reconfirmed in his speech at the Supreme People's Assembly on September 22. I will quote Kim Jong-un directly: 'We will have no reason to sit down with South Korea, nor will we do anything together. We will not deal with them in any way.'

'Reality has shown that the ambition of South Korea, which has overthrown our military and government under the guise of democracy or conservatism, has never been easy.' This is their line. No matter how much North Korea adheres to a sole leadership system, a supreme leader system, or a one-person rule system, its line cannot be easily abandoned unless it changes. Another concern is that the statements by Director Wi Sung-lac and Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young contradict each other. Director Wi Sung-lac stated that it is not acknowledging the adversarial two states theory mentioned by North Korea, whereas Minister Chung Dong-young said, 'South and North are de facto two states. They are two states in terms of international law.' Therefore, different interpretations and voices are emerging within the government. In this situation, it is reasonable to suspect that North Korea is not being recognized.

North Korea's Proposal for Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations and the South Korean Government's Tasks

The phased denuclearization theory mentioned earlier is also clearly rejected by North Korea. North Korea has consistently stated that the so-called three-stage denuclearization theory of cessation, reduction, and dismantlement is unacceptable because it amounts to their disarmament. Regarding the United States, Kim Jong-un's speech on September 22 stated, 'I still personally have good memories of the current US President, Trump.' A similar statement was made in Kim Yo-jong's statement on July 29. 'I do not wish to deny the fact that the personal relationship between our head of state and the current US President is not bad.' This implies a willingness to meet. However, it is not just about meeting; in Kim Yo-jong's words, they are asked to 'think anew,' and Kim Jong-un spoke at length, but the core message is not denuclearization but a nuclear disarmament negotiation.

To summarize and conclude, the first thing the South Korean government must do is to quickly formalize its North Korea policy, unification policy, and denuclearization policy. The government must take the lead in clearly articulating these concepts and, when necessary, create explanatory materials stating, 'This is our position.' More importantly, it must consult with the United States first. Despite South Korea facing a tangible nuclear threat, we are not the primary party in denuclearization negotiations, are we? It is the United States. And as mentioned, Kim Jong-un will meet with Trump. Instead of stating our policy position, we must negotiate with the US, ensuring that the ultimate goal of denuclearization is complete denuclearization, and we must align with the US. The US has also not yet officially stated its position on North Korea policy or denuclearization policy.

President Trump has not commented on this, but the official US stance is the complete denuclearization of North Korea. Recently, there was a South Korea-US foreign ministers' meeting, and according to the South Korean side's announcement, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the priority. It is judged that achieving this first will prevent South Korea from being excluded from future US-North Korea negotiations and ensure that South Korea's position is reflected. North Korea is already attempting to thoroughly exclude South Korea through 'Korea Passing,' and the Trump administration is also showing a similar attitude. In such times, it is crucial to align positions on North Korea policy, unification policy, and above all, denuclearization policy through thorough cooperation between South Korea and the United States. I sincerely ask that you keep this in mind and implement it. Thank you.

Park Won-gon (Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute, Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University)

Lim Jae-hyun (EAI Researcher)