[EAI-API-KEI Joint Press Conference] Announcement of the 1st ROK-US-Japan Public Mutual Perception Survey and the 12th ROK-Japan Public Mutual Perception Survey

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=duMrFKmBnxo

Video Script

Good morning. We will now begin the joint press conference announcing the analysis results of the 12th Korea-Japan Public Mutual Perception Survey and the 1st Korea-US-Japan Public Mutual Perception Survey. I am Oh In-hwan, Secretary-General and Senior Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute. This joint press conference will consist of presentations by representatives from each institution in Korea, Japan, and the US, in that order, followed by a Q&A session. Simultaneous interpretation between Korean and Japanese will be provided. Those attending via video conference can select Korean or Japanese through the interpretation function on the Zoom screen.

First, representing Korea, Director Son Yeol, who has served as President of the East Asia Institute and Professor at Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies and Underwood International College, will come forward to present. Please give him a warm round of applause. >> Oh, the screen isn't showing Japan or the US right now, I see. Yes. I am Son Yeol, who was just introduced. Our East Asia Institute has been conducting the Korea-Japan Public Mutual Perception Survey since 2013. However, the survey was not conducted last year due to circumstances, and we have resumed it this year. This year, our Japanese partner for the opinion poll, the Asia Pacific Initiative, an excellent think tank, has agreed to conduct the joint survey. Additionally, KI (Korea Economic Institute) in the US proposed a joint survey, leading to what is effectively the first comprehensive joint public opinion survey involving Korea, the US, and Japan in history. I am very pleased and honored to

Changes in Korean Perceptions of the US and Japan

think about this, and I would like to extend special thanks to Director Jinbo Ken of API in Japan, Director Scott Snyder of KI, and Senior Research Fellow James Kim. I will now briefly present the survey results from the Korean perspective over approximately 15 minutes, focusing on four main points, which are already detailed in the press release. I will spend about 4 minutes on each of these four takeaways. First, the trust or evaluation of the US by the Korean and Japanese public has significantly declined. While further analysis is needed, from EAI's perspective, the primary reasons appear to be strong dislike of President Trump and, second, the trade and security policies pursued by the administration over the past six months since the current government took office, which have faced considerable

opposition. This is true for both Korea and Japan, and that is the first point. Looking at the perception of the respective countries, the table might be a bit complex, but overall, it shows how the Korean, Japanese, and American publics view Japan, the respective country. In Korea, both for Japan and the US, the blue color indicates 'good,' but the proportion is not very high. This means that relations are seen as not easy. Japan's perception was slightly better, with a slight increase in the blue color, and the US viewed the relationship relatively positively.

This seems to be the overall impression. Consequently, in Korea's case, the perception of the US is presented next, and it records the lowest score in terms of 'trust in the US.' Compared to last year, there was a significant drop of about 7%, and over the past three years, which corresponds to the term of the current Korean government, distrust has increased by 16%.

This indicates a considerably high level of distrust. Second is trust in Japan. This survey did not include an item on trust in Japan. However, we conduct the East Asia Perception Survey annually, and the data from early June shows that, in contrast to the US, trust in Japan hit a low in 2020 (2.3%, almost zero), but has since risen to 40%. The proportion of those who do not trust Japan has also fallen from 90% to 50%. This shows that the US and Japan are exhibiting significantly opposite trends. Of course, trust in the US is much higher than trust in Japan, as you can see. However, this is the trend observed. And why are these phenomena occurring? Particularly regarding the US, as I mentioned earlier, the impression of President Donald Trump is very low at 12%. This 12% is much lower than that for President Xi Jinping, and we do not conduct surveys on Kim Jong Un. This indicates a very strong dislike of President Trump. The situation is similar for Japan. Here, you can see 11.9% and 9%. This table will reappear later. Regarding the evaluation of Prime Minister Ishiba, the current approval rating is 32.5%, which is the highest approval rating among Japanese prime ministers we have surveyed historically.

Perceptions and Policy Evaluations of US and Japanese Leaders

and this is the highest approval rating recorded. Conversely, the approval rating of the Korean President by the Japanese public, Lee Jae-myung, is very low at 9.6%. I will discuss this part later. Therefore, one factor contributing to the overall decline in trust in the US can be attributed to the perception of US leaders. Second, over the past six months, Korean public opinion has shown considerable negative reactions to trade and security policies. Regarding Trump's tariffs, which we call 'tariff bombs,' 80% of the Korean public opposes them, and 75% of the Japanese public opposes them. As Dr. James Kim will explain later, even in the US, 45% oppose and 43% support, indicating that all three countries oppose these US tariff policies, with Korea showing the strongest opposition.

Regarding the US restrictions on trade and investment with China, about 58% in Korea oppose the US restricting Korea's economic relations with China, with the ratio being 58 to 33. In Japan, similarly, 50% oppose and 26% support the US restricting trade and investment with China. When asked whether to support a global economic order based on free trade, 72% of the Korean public supports it. 63% of the Japanese public also supports it, and even 56% of the US public supports it. Only 6.2% oppose the global economic order based on free trade. Other surveys show that Republican supporters have a considerable proportion supporting protectionism or American mercantilism, but this was not the case in this survey. Therefore, these factors, along with the tariff negotiations concluded on July 30th, show that negative opinions significantly outweigh positive ones. Overall, one could say that the Trump administration's economic coercion, or strong measures, are facing a kind of backlash or opposition from public opinion. We believe this is linked to the increase in distrust towards the US. Next is security policy. Regarding the increase in defense spending,

the Korean government and President Lee Jae-myung have announced an increase in defense spending. Japan is also planning to increase its defense spending. Overall, in Korea, 51% oppose a significant increase, while 42% support it, indicating a slight majority against it. In Japan, it is 49% against and 33% in favor. The opposition in Japan seems slightly stronger, given the lower approval rate for the increase. Looking at the US below, while those who believe it should be increased are in the majority, it is not an overwhelming majority.

is slightly higher. Fundamentally, a significant portion of the US public, about 40%, is unsure about this. This is understandable. Regarding the cost-sharing for US Forces Korea, there is also considerable opposition overall. However, compared to trade issues, the opposition regarding defense cost-sharing or troop presence is considerably milder and less pronounced. Therefore, from Korea's perspective, public criticism towards the US regarding security policy is relatively subdued. Behind this, both Korea and Japan exhibit considerable vigilance towards the challenge posed by China, the 'China Challenge.' Particularly in this survey, we found that public opinion towards China is rising significantly within Korean society. Even compared to Japan, public opinion regarding economic containment of China is slightly higher.

This can be seen as a reflection of the growing concerns and distrust towards China in Korean society. If time permits, I will proceed quickly. Regarding the role of the ROK-US alliance, we modified this question for the first time this year. Previously, the question offered two options: 'The ROK-US alliance should be limited to responding to North Korea's military threat,' and 'It should contribute to regional and global peace and stability.' We have now more clearly added to the second option: 'Respond to China's challenge.' This is the reality. Despite this, a considerable number of respondents chose option B. Thus, it is 49% for B and 33% for A, 'should be limited to North Korea's military threat.' This is a point worthy of significant attention. Second, the role of US Forces Korea. Regarding strategic flexibility, which is widely discussed, we have clearly included the wording 'countering China' in the defense of Korea.

ROK-US Alliance and Perceptions of the China Threat

This has been included, and 58% agree with the transition to countering China. Overall, we can see that the Korean public's perception is moving towards agreement with security responses towards China. Regarding trilateral security and military cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan, the reason given is that nearly 80% of the Korean public agrees with this cooperation. 74% believe that cooperation among the three countries is necessary for North Korea's denuclearization and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Second, 'the need to counter China's rise' was also the highest response since we started asking this question in 2018, at 64.3%. This is higher than in Japan. Therefore, we can see that the threat from China is significantly widespread in Korean society. In fact, 73% of Koreans perceive this threat, compared to 68% in Japan and 58% in the US. Thus, Korea shows the highest response to the threat from China. The possibility of military conflict involving Taiwan is also seen as higher by Koreans. Taiwan itself does not initiate military conflict, does it?

This indicates that the perception of the threat from China is quite high in Korean society. In fact, 73% of Koreans perceive this threat, compared to 68% in Japan and 58% in the US. Thus, Korea shows the highest response to the threat from China. The possibility of military conflict involving Taiwan is also seen as higher by Koreans. Taiwan itself does not initiate military conflict, does it? We have modified this question for the first time this year. Previously, the question offered two options: 'The ROK-US alliance should be limited to responding to North Korea's military threat,' and 'It should contribute to regional and global peace and stability.' We have now more clearly added to the second option: 'Respond to China's challenge.' This is the reality. Despite this, a considerable number of respondents chose option B. Thus, it is 49% for B and 33% for A, 'should be limited to North Korea's military threat.' This is a point worthy of significant attention. Second, the role of US Forces Korea. Regarding strategic flexibility, which is widely discussed, we have clearly included the wording 'countering China' in the defense of Korea.

This has been included, and 58% agree with the transition to countering China. Overall, we can see that the Korean public's perception is moving towards agreement with security responses towards China. Regarding trilateral security and military cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan, the reason given is that nearly 80% of the Korean public agrees with this cooperation. 74% believe that cooperation among the three countries is necessary for North Korea's denuclearization and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Second, 'the need to counter China's rise' was also the highest response since we started asking this question in 2018, at 64.3%. This is higher than in Japan. Therefore, we can see that the threat from China is significantly widespread in Korean society. In fact, 73% of Koreans perceive this threat, compared to 68% in Japan and 58% in the US. Thus, Korea shows the highest response to the threat from China. The possibility of military conflict involving Taiwan is also seen as higher by Koreans. Taiwan itself does not initiate military conflict, does it?

This has been included, and 58% agree with the transition to countering China. Overall, we can see that the Korean public's perception is moving towards agreement with security responses towards China. Regarding trilateral security and military cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan, the reason given is that nearly 80% of the Korean public agrees with this cooperation. 74% believe that cooperation among the three countries is necessary for North Korea's denuclearization and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Second, 'the need to counter China's rise' was also the highest response since we started asking this question in 2018, at 64.3%. This is higher than in Japan. Therefore, we can see that the threat from China is significantly widespread in Korean society. In fact, 73% of Koreans perceive this threat, compared to 68% in Japan and 58% in the US. Thus, Korea shows the highest response to the threat from China. The possibility of military conflict involving Taiwan is also seen as higher by Koreans. Taiwan itself does not initiate military conflict, does it?

This is higher than in Japan. Therefore, we can see that the threat from China is significantly widespread in Korean society. In fact, 73% of Koreans perceive this threat, compared to 68% in Japan and 58% in the US. Thus, Korea shows the highest response to the threat from China. The possibility of military conflict involving Taiwan is also seen as higher by Koreans. Taiwan itself does not initiate military conflict, does it? Regarding the role of the ROK-US alliance, we modified this question for the first time this year. Previously, the question offered two options: 'The ROK-US alliance should be limited to responding to North Korea's military threat,' and 'It should contribute to regional and global peace and stability.' We have now more clearly added to the second option: 'Respond to China's challenge.' This is the reality. Despite this, a considerable number of respondents chose option B. Thus, it is 49% for B and 33% for A, 'should be limited to North Korea's military threat.' This is a point worthy of significant attention. Second, the role of US Forces Korea. Regarding strategic flexibility, which is widely discussed, we have clearly included the wording 'countering China' in the defense of Korea.

Support for Improving Korea-Japan Relations and the Gap in Mutual Perceptions

This indicates a significant concern and distrust towards China. Third is the Korea-Japan relationship. This time, we can compare it with the Japanese data, which is very helpful. Overall, public support for improving Korea-Japan relations appears to be steady and firm. The table will be shown later. Second, the reason for this is that strategic perceptions are largely shared. Perceptions between Korea and Japan include shared perceptions of China's challenge and North Korea's threat. Furthermore, with the advent of the Trump era, both Korea and Japan are experiencing similar situations regarding Trump's security commitments or economic offensives, which can be described as 'sharing the same boat.' This is reflected in the fact that both countries now evaluate each other's strategic value slightly higher, leading to a more positive view of the other and a desire for improved relations. Second, at the private level, this is bottom-up, with increased mutual favorability through tourism, consumption of popular culture, and food culture. This has been widely reported in the media. Despite these factors, the impression of Korea in Japan has declined unusually compared to other indicators in this survey. Although the impression has declined, the Japanese public still views the relationship as improving. Nevertheless, the decline in the impression of Korea, in my personal judgment, may be due to lingering doubts about the Lee Jae-myung administration. The statements made by then-leader Lee Jae-myung during his time as opposition leader, and the traditional stance of the Democratic Party on Japan policy, may have remained in the Japanese public's impression, thus negatively affecting their perception of Korea.

This is because, as in the US, the impression of a leader significantly influences the impression of the country. In the past, the image of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe played a crucial role in the very negative image of Japan held by Koreans. Since the positive impression of Prime Minister Abe was close to zero, this had a considerable impact. Therefore, this is one factor. Second, perhaps due to the constitutional revision and impeachment debates since the end of last year, and the extreme political confrontation within Korea, the political situation within Korea, particularly concerning Korean democracy, may have led to the perception that Korean democracy is regressing. In this regard, the advanced national identity, democracy, shared by Japan and Korea, may be seen as significantly regressing in Korea. This is my hypothesis. I expect the Japanese side to provide a more authoritative interpretation of this aspect. As time is limited, I will proceed quickly with the impressions. You can see them as they are. A golden cross has occurred this year. That is, positive impressions have surpassed negative impressions, with a score of 52 to 37, compared to last year's 42 to 41, where negative impressions were slightly higher. This has completely reversed. In Japan, a golden cross occurred in the previous year (2023), with positive impressions exceeding negative ones, but there has been a significant change this year, as I just mentioned. Regarding the impression of leaders, I mentioned that the Japanese evaluation of President Lee Jae-myung is quite harsh, at only about 9%.

This is because, as in the US, the impression of a leader significantly influences the impression of the country. In the past, the image of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe played a crucial role in the very negative image of Japan held by Koreans. Since the positive impression of Prime Minister Abe was close to zero, this had a considerable impact. Therefore, this is one factor. Second, perhaps due to the constitutional revision and impeachment debates since the end of last year, and the extreme political confrontation within Korea, the political situation within Korea, particularly concerning Korean democracy, may have led to the perception that Korean democracy is regressing. In this regard, the advanced national identity, democracy, shared by Japan and Korea, may be seen as significantly regressing in Korea. This is my hypothesis. I expect the Japanese side to provide a more authoritative interpretation of this aspect. As time is limited, I will proceed quickly with the impressions. You can see them as they are. A golden cross has occurred this year. That is, positive impressions have surpassed negative impressions, with a score of 52 to 37, compared to last year's 42 to 41, where negative impressions were slightly higher. This has completely reversed. In Japan, a golden cross occurred in the previous year (2023), with positive impressions exceeding negative ones, but there has been a significant change this year, as I just mentioned. Regarding the impression of leaders, I mentioned that the Japanese evaluation of President Lee Jae-myung is quite harsh, at only about 9%.

This has completely reversed. In Japan, a golden cross occurred in the previous year (2023), with positive impressions exceeding negative ones, but there has been a significant change this year, as I just mentioned. Regarding the impression of leaders, I mentioned that the Japanese evaluation of President Lee Jae-myung is quite harsh, at only about 9%. This is the end of the Korean presentation. I have exceeded the time slightly. Thank you. Yes, I will now take over the moderation. Next, Director Jinbo Ken will present his evaluation of the results from the Japanese perspective. Mr. Kim Bok-hyun, yes, I am Kim Bok-hyun, representing the Asia Pacific Initiative. I will proceed in Japanese. I would appreciate it if those attending the meeting could listen attentively. I am deeply honored to have been able to participate as the Japanese partner in this public opinion survey of Japan, Korea, and the US. Thank you very much. As has already been introduced, the international community is currently facing great uncertainty due to regime changes in Europe and the US.

Political Polarization in Korea and Foreign Policy

This phenomenon is also significantly reflected in foreign policy, particularly in policies towards Japan, where this polarization is evident. In the past, there was so-called 'South-South conflict' in North Korea policy, but now there are considerable differences in opinions between conservatives and progressives in Japan policy, and this is also partially evident in US policy. The difference in opinions between the two camps on these major policies ranges from a small 20% to a large 30%. This indicates that the political polarization in Korean society is leading to polarization in foreign policy, that is, polarization in public perception of foreign policy. President Lee Jae-myung's current pragmatic diplomacy or execution diplomacy stance is quite close to the conservative camp's stance. Therefore, there is a considerable gap with the foreign policy views of the progressive camp, which is often considered the President's political base. I believe that how the current administration will persuade the progressive camp on major policy stances domestically will be a significant political challenge. Although there is much more content to follow, I will mention just one point: the impression of Japan has been similar across generations. However, it began to widen in 2023. In 2023, the difference between progressives and conservatives was 12%, in 2024 it is 20%, and in 2025 it is 30%, showing a widening trend. I will conclude the Korean presentation here. I have taken a little more time. Thank you. Yes, next, I will moderate. Next, Director Jinbo Ken will present his evaluation of the results from the Japanese perspective. Mr. Kim Bok-hyun, yes, I am Kim Bok-hyun, representing the Asia Pacific Initiative. I will proceed in Japanese. I would appreciate it if those attending the meeting could listen attentively. I am deeply honored to have been able to participate as the Japanese partner in this public opinion survey of Japan, Korea, and the US. Thank you very much. As has already been introduced, the international community is currently facing great uncertainty due to regime changes in Europe and the US.

The difference in opinions between the two camps on these major policies ranges from a small 20% to a large 30%. This indicates that the political polarization in Korean society is leading to polarization in foreign policy, that is, polarization in public perception of foreign policy. President Lee Jae-myung's current pragmatic diplomacy or execution diplomacy stance is quite close to the conservative camp's stance. Therefore, there is a considerable gap with the foreign policy views of the progressive camp, which is often considered the President's political base. I believe that how the current administration will persuade the progressive camp on major policy stances domestically will be a significant political challenge. Although there is much more content to follow, I will mention just one point: the impression of Japan has been similar across generations. However, it began to widen in 2023. In 2023, the difference between progressives and conservatives was 12%, in 2024 it is 20%, and in 2025 it is 30%, showing a widening trend. I will conclude the Korean presentation here. I have exceeded the time slightly. Thank you. Yes, next, I will moderate. Next, Director Jinbo Ken will present his evaluation of the results from the Japanese perspective. Mr. Kim Bok-hyun, yes, I am Kim Bok-hyun, representing the Asia Pacific Initiative. I will proceed in Japanese. I would appreciate it if those attending the meeting could listen attentively. I am deeply honored to have been able to participate as the Japanese partner in this public opinion survey of Japan, Korea, and the US. Thank you very much. As has already been introduced, the international community is currently facing great uncertainty due to regime changes in Europe and the US.

In 2023, the difference between progressives and conservatives was 12%, in 2024 it is 20%, and in 2025 it is 30%, showing a widening trend. I will conclude the Korean presentation here. I have exceeded the time slightly. Thank you. Yes, next, I will moderate. Next, Director Jinbo Ken will present his evaluation of the results from the Japanese perspective. Mr. Kim Bok-hyun, yes, I am Kim Bok-hyun, representing the Asia Pacific Initiative. I will proceed in Japanese. I would appreciate it if those attending the meeting could listen attentively. I am deeply honored to have been able to participate as the Japanese partner in this public opinion survey of Japan, Korea, and the US. Thank you very much. As has already been introduced, the international community is currently facing great uncertainty due to regime changes in Europe and the US.

Japanese Perceptions of the US and Korea

Asia is also facing escalating geopolitical tensions. In this context, it is highly significant that Japan and Korea are comparing their respective public perceptions at the same time to formulate policies and dialogues. Furthermore, this year marks the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and Korea, and it is also an important year for Japan looking towards the future. Therefore, its significance is immense. I would now like to briefly introduce the slides. First, I will briefly explain the background of this survey. As Mr. Abe also mentioned, there are figures emerging in Japan that necessitate a discussion on perceptions of the US. While the US shares the perception that Japan and Korea are very important allies, there is a growing distrust of the current Trump administration, and a considerable number of respondents indicated that future US-Japan relations are likely to worsen. This is a characteristic of perceptions of the US. Regarding Korea, while there have been various issues in Japan-Korea relations leading to unfavorable images, Korea's soft power content has also positively contributed to improving its image. Additionally, the proportion of respondents who consider Japan-Korea relations important exceeded half of those with a negative image.

The proportion of respondents who consider Japan-Korea relations important exceeded half of those with a negative image. Regarding security, many view Taiwan as a realistic threat. However, the division of public opinion within Japan regarding how Japan or the US-Japan alliance should engage with this issue is a very interesting characteristic. Finally, a question that may be of interest to the Korean media: Should Japan pursue nuclear armament independently? I am aware that a significant number of respondents, both among supporters of conservative and progressive Korean administrations, believe that Japan should possess nuclear weapons. What about Japan then? Overall, 63% of the Japanese public opposes Japan's own nuclear armament. At the same time, there are concerning figures regarding the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella.

Let's proceed with the slides briefly as time is running late. This survey was conducted via internet from August 19th to 22nd for three days, with responses obtained from 1037 individuals aged 18 and over. The gender and age distribution is shown on the slide. It should be noted that while the survey is considered well-balanced in terms of gender and prefecture distribution, a significant portion of the valid respondents are aged 60 and over (42%). Therefore, we can see that this age group was highly represented among the respondents. Furthermore, regarding the discussion of changes from the past mentioned by the previous speaker, as this is our first time participating, we must handle the evaluation of the results compared to the past with caution. In the past, our partner, NP, conducted in-depth interviews, but this time we used internet surveys. Although the survey methods are the same, we must approach comparisons with the past objectively and cautiously. First, let's look at the US-Japan relationship.

First, the proportion of those with a good impression of the US was 40.5%, while 34.5% had a bad impression. Reasons for a good impression included the US being an important security partner for Japan and its leadership role in the international community. Conversely, negative reasons cited included negative impressions of the US president, US protectionism, and 'America First' policies. Regarding the impression of President Trump, only 14.7% had a good impression, while a significant 70.1% had a bad impression.

Also, similar to Korea, when asked about reactions to trade policy, only 7.5% expressed approval or a positive response, while 76.5% expressed opposition. Regarding the current US-Japan relationship, 42.4% responded that it is a good relationship, while 34.9% responded that it is a bad relationship. Furthermore, the proportion of those who consider the current US-Japan relationship important is very high at 85.9%. However, only 23.6% believe that the US-Japan relationship will improve in the future, while 44.7% believe it will worsen, and 31.6% believe it will remain largely unchanged. These are the figures shown on the slide, so please refer to them. Next, let's move on to the Japan-Korea relationship. The proportion of those with a good impression of Korea is 24.8%, meaning roughly one in four people have a good impression. Unfortunately, 51% have a bad impression. Reasons for a good impression included the appeal of Korean culture and its attractiveness as a travel destination. Conversely, reasons for a bad impression included historical perception issues, territorial disputes, and anti-Japan

media reports, national character, and manners were mentioned. Regarding the increase in negative impressions of Korea this time, it is a one-off event, and further analysis is needed in the future. As mentioned earlier, there may be concerns about the current progressive administration in Korea, or a very difficult impression. Also, due to the survey methodology, as mentioned earlier, the high proportion of respondents aged 60 and over may reflect the perceptions of older generations towards Korea. Therefore, although our research team is conducting age-specific analysis, it is not yet at the publication stage, so please be mindful of this point when reporting. Another very important point is that the proportion of those who consider the current Japan-Korea relationship important is very high at 54.1%, significantly exceeding the proportion who consider it unimportant. Reasons cited for its importance include security and geographical and cultural connections. Regarding the future of Japan-Korea relations, looking at a 3-5 year span, 26.2% believe it will improve, 28.8% believe it will worsen, and 44.9% believe it will remain unchanged. In this regard, the impressions of good, bad, and unchanged appear relatively balanced, with no strong trend observed. The most frequently mentioned goals for Japan to address in the Japan-Korea relationship were the restoration of mutual trust and a future-oriented approach, followed by the North Korean nuclear issue and security cooperation. When asked about the extent to which historical issues influence Japan-Korea cooperation, many responded that even if historical issues remain, cooperation should proceed with the goal of resolution, meaning practical cooperation should be strengthened while resolving historical issues. This is a very interesting point.

Japanese Security Perceptions and the Taiwan Issue

These are the responses regarding the Japan-Korea relationship. Please refer to the data. Next, we move to the security sector. When asked which countries are important to Japan, China ranked highest, followed by North Korea, and then Russia. When asked about important countries or regions for Japan economically, China accounted for the largest proportion, followed by the EU, and then India. Next are questions regarding US Forces. Specifically, regarding Japan's burden related to US Forces and the increase in defense spending by each country, 56% of respondents in Japan answered that the burden of US Forces expenses is excessive, while about 20% responded that it is appropriate. Therefore, a majority indicated that the burden of expenses for US Forces is excessive. On the other hand, regarding Japan's defense, one in three people (33.7%) responded that it should be increased in the future, and there were also responses suggesting maintaining the current level. These results were very interesting. When asked whether the US nuclear umbrella adequately functions for Japan in the face of threats from China or North Korea, only one in three responded that it is sufficient, while nearly half responded that the US nuclear umbrella does not function adequately. This is a very important finding. Furthermore, regarding security cooperation with North Korea, 42.5% responded that intelligence sharing between Japan and the US is necessary to counter North Korea's military threat. Meanwhile, over 60% of respondents expressed opposition to possessing nuclear weapons in either Japan or Korea. Finally, regarding international relations tensions. When asked about the possibility of a military conflict between China and Taiwan within the next few years, 42.1% responded that it is possible. This is an important response. Also, regarding the risk of military tension or conflict in the Taiwan Strait, 77.1% responded that it is very important for Japan's security, economy, and national interests. Regarding the Taiwan issue, a significant proportion of respondents also indicated that the US military should take military action in conjunction with its allies. However, opinions were divided within Japan regarding Japan's role. 27.5% responded that the Self-Defense Forces should not participate in direct combat but should focus on providing weapons and supplies to the US and humanitarian aid to Taiwan. 26% responded that Japan should avoid any military involvement. I believe public opinion in Japan is divided on this point. Regarding trilateral cooperation among Japan, the US, and Korea, a very strong majority expressed agreement, with 51.7% in favor and 27.7% opposed. These figures are also very important. Finally, we asked a question about foreigners, which is a very sensitive and politically significant issue in Japan today. When asked about the increase in foreign tourists in Japan in the future, 29.4% responded in favor, while 50.7% responded in opposition.

The proportion of those who consider Japan-Korea relations important is very high at 54.1%, significantly exceeding the proportion who consider it unimportant. Reasons cited for its importance include security and geographical and cultural connections. Regarding the future of Japan-Korea relations, looking at a 3-5 year span, 26.2% believe it will improve, 28.8% believe it will worsen, and 44.9% believe it will remain unchanged. In this regard, the impressions of good, bad, and unchanged appear relatively balanced, with no strong trend observed. The most frequently mentioned goals for Japan to address in the Japan-Korea relationship were the restoration of mutual trust and a future-oriented approach, followed by the North Korean nuclear issue and security cooperation. When asked about the extent to which historical issues influence Japan-Korea cooperation, many responded that even if historical issues remain, cooperation should proceed with the goal of resolution, meaning practical cooperation should be strengthened while resolving historical issues. This is a very interesting point. These are the responses regarding the Japan-Korea relationship. Please refer to the data. Next, we move to the security sector. When asked which countries are important to Japan, China ranked highest, followed by North Korea, and then Russia. When asked about important countries or regions for Japan economically, China accounted for the largest proportion, followed by the EU, and then India. Next are questions regarding US Forces. Specifically, regarding Japan's burden related to US Forces and the increase in defense spending by each country, 56% of respondents in Japan answered that the burden of US Forces expenses is excessive, while about 20% responded that it is appropriate. Therefore, a majority indicated that the burden of expenses for US Forces is excessive. On the other hand, regarding Japan's defense, one in three people (33.7%) responded that it should be increased in the future, and there were also responses suggesting maintaining the current level. These results were very interesting. When asked whether the US nuclear umbrella adequately functions for Japan in the face of threats from China or North Korea, only one in three responded that it is sufficient, while nearly half responded that the US nuclear umbrella does not function adequately. This is a very important finding. Furthermore, regarding security cooperation with North Korea, 42.5% responded that intelligence sharing between Japan and the US is necessary to counter North Korea's military threat. Meanwhile, over 60% of respondents expressed opposition to possessing nuclear weapons in either Japan or Korea. Finally, regarding international relations tensions. When asked about the possibility of a military conflict between China and Taiwan within the next few years, 42.1% responded that it is possible. This is an important response. Also, regarding the risk of military tension or conflict in the Taiwan Strait, 77.1% responded that it is very important for Japan's security, economy, and national interests. Regarding the Taiwan issue, a significant proportion of respondents also indicated that the US military should take military action in conjunction with its allies. However, opinions were divided within Japan regarding Japan's role. 27.5% responded that the Self-Defense Forces should not participate in direct combat but should focus on providing weapons and supplies to the US and humanitarian aid to Taiwan. 26% responded that Japan should avoid any military involvement. I believe public opinion in Japan is divided on this point. Regarding trilateral cooperation among Japan, the US, and Korea, a very strong majority expressed agreement, with 51.7% in favor and 27.7% opposed. These figures are also very important. Finally, we asked a question about foreigners, which is a very sensitive and politically significant issue in Japan today. When asked about the increase in foreign tourists in Japan in the future, 29.4% responded in favor, while 50.7% responded in opposition.

Furthermore, 77.1% responded that the military tensions and risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait are very important to Japan's security, economy, and national interests. Regarding the Taiwan issue, a significant proportion of respondents indicated that the U.S. military should take military action in conjunction with its allies. Opinions were divided within Japan regarding Japan's role: 27.5% stated that the Self-Defense Forces should focus on providing weapons and material support to the U.S. and humanitarian aid to Taiwan, without direct participation in combat, while 26% believed that any Japanese military intervention should be avoided. I believe public opinion in Japan is divided on this matter. Strong support was also expressed for trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and South Korea, with 51.7% in favor and 27.7% opposed. These figures are also very significant. Finally, I asked a question regarding foreigners, which is a very sensitive and politically significant issue in Japan today. When asked about the prospect of an increase in foreign tourists in Japan, 29.4% responded in favor, while

50.7% were opposed. The reasons for supporting an increase include the potential contribution to regional and economic revitalization, whereas reasons for opposition cited overtourism and environmental degradation. Additionally, while many currently support an increase in the foreign population in Japan, 57.8% were opposed. The reason for support is the need for foreign labor, but equally cited reasons for opposition include concerns about public safety, the behavior of foreigners, and friction with Japanese culture. This concludes my presentation.

This is the content of the data. Please refer to it.

I have now presented the respective responses concerning the relationship between Japan and South Korea. I hope you will review the content of the data later. Next is the security sector. There was a question about which countries are important to Japan. My presentation materials have changed slightly, so please wait a moment. In terms of relations with Japan, China had the highest proportion, followed by North Korea, and then Russia. When asked about important countries or regions for Japan in economic terms, China accounted for the largest share, followed by the EU, and then India. Next is a question about the U.S. military. Specifically, there was also a question about the extent to which Japan should increase its burden for the U.S. military and its respective defense costs. 56% of domestic respondents in Japan

responded that the burden of U.S. military costs is excessive, while approximately 20% considered it appropriate. This can be interpreted as a response indicating a significant burden regarding the costs associated with the U.S. Forces in Japan. On the other hand, regarding Japan's defense, one in three respondents (33.7%) stated that it should be increased in the future. There were also responses indicating that the current level should be maintained. These response results are very interesting. There was also a question about whether the U.S. nuclear umbrella adequately functions for Japan in response to North Korea's military threat. Only one in three respondents answered that it functions adequately.

The fact that nearly half of the respondents indicated that the U.S. nuclear umbrella does not function adequately is a very significant finding. Furthermore, regarding security cooperation with North Korea, 42.5% responded that Japan-U.S. information sharing is necessary to counter North Korea's military threat. Meanwhile, over 60% of respondents expressed opposition to possessing nuclear weapons in either Japan or South Korea. Finally, concerning international relations tensions. When asked about the possibility of a military conflict between China and Taiwan within the next few years, 42.1% responded that they believe it is possible. This is an important

This is an important finding. Also, regarding the risk of military tension or conflict in the Taiwan Strait, 77.1% responded that it is very important for Japan's security, economy, and national interests. Regarding the Taiwan issue, a significant proportion of respondents also indicated that the US military should take military action in conjunction with its allies. However, opinions were divided within Japan regarding Japan's role. 27.5% responded that the Self-Defense Forces should not participate in direct combat but should focus on providing weapons and supplies to the US and humanitarian aid to Taiwan. 26% responded that Japan should avoid any military involvement. I believe public opinion in Japan is divided on this point. Regarding trilateral cooperation among Japan, the US, and Korea, a very strong majority expressed agreement, with 51.7% in favor and 27.7% opposed. These figures are also very important. Finally, we asked a question about foreigners, which is a very sensitive and politically significant issue in Japan today. When asked about the increase in foreign tourists in Japan in the future, 29.4% responded in favor, while 50.7% responded in opposition.

I believe public opinion in Japan is divided on this point. Regarding trilateral cooperation among Japan, the US, and Korea, a very strong majority expressed agreement, with 51.7% in favor and 27.7% opposed. These figures are also very important. Finally, we asked a question about foreigners, which is a very sensitive and politically significant issue in Japan today. When asked about the increase in foreign tourists in Japan in the future, 29.4% responded in favor, while 50.7% responded in opposition.

The reasons for favoring it are that an increase in foreign tourists will contribute to the revitalization of local regions and the economy. Reasons for opposition include overtourism and environmental degradation. Furthermore, regarding the increase in foreigners currently residing in Japan, the proportion in favor was 46.8%, while the proportion in opposition was 57.8%. The reason for favoring it is the need for foreign labor, but reasons for opposition include concerns about public safety, the manners of foreigners, and friction with Japanese culture, all cited with similar weight. This concludes the lengthy presentation. This,

Despite the inevitability of the US-Japan alliance, there is also anxiety about the current dependence on the US. Furthermore, in terms of Japan-Korea relations, the image of Korea shows concerning figures. Nevertheless, there were strong responses indicating the importance of Korea. Additionally, characteristics of this survey emerged in the approaches to Japan-Korea relations and perspectives on foreign countries. Thank you, Professor Jinbo Ken. Now, we will move on to Dr. James Kim in the US. Yes, thank you.

US Public Opinion and Perceptions of Leaders

This is James Kim from KI. I would like to express my gratitude once again to the East Asia Institute and API for participating in this project with us. Personally, this survey has been a very meaningful experience. Especially considering this year marks the second anniversary of the Camp David Summit between the US, Japan, and Korea, and that President Yoon Suk-yeol recently mentioned this during his visit to the US, KI also intended to examine the sustainability of trilateral cooperation through this survey. We are currently preparing to publish a report focusing on the US data from this survey within the next one to two weeks. Following that, we will continue to prepare additional materials and publications that include content from our Korean and Japanese partner institutions. We would appreciate your continued interest. In my presentation today, I will focus on the survey results related to US public opinion. This was our survey methodology, and we had six collaborating research institutions. If you have any questions about the methodology, I will explain them separately later. First, I would like to introduce some key findings that I found interesting in this survey.

Therefore, I have prepared analytical data. First, the data prepared concerns perceptions of countries and leaders. Given that there was a summit meeting this week, I am unsure if I should be presenting these results, but the data shows that perceptions of countries and leaders are not identical. Here, you can see that the overall impression of Korea and Japan appears generally favorable, and views on trust and importance regarding these countries are also relatively positive. However, considering that over 60% of US respondents stated they do not know Prime Minister Kishida or President Yoon Suk-yeol, it confirms that perceptions of countries and leaders are not linked. I wanted to point out that this differs from the results from Korea and Japan.

Generally, high favorability and trust appear to correlate with overall views on bilateral relations, economic cooperation, and defense cooperation. For example, among respondents with a favorable impression of Korea or Japan, bilateral relations are often evaluated positively or described as mutually complementary. Conversely, among those with unfavorable impressions, bilateral relations are predominantly evaluated negatively or seen as competitive. Despite this, the statement that Americans generally evaluate ROK-US or ROK-Japan relations positively can be interpreted as accepting a positive impression of both countries.

Defense Cost Sharing and Taiwan Contingency

Next is the issue of defense cost sharing. In our survey, Americans participating in this survey indicated that Korea and Japan are contributing an appropriate amount or paying an excessive amount for defense cost sharing, with 44% for Korea and 49% for Japan. These figures become even more interesting when examined alongside the level of trust in each country. To elaborate, among Americans who consider Korea and Japan reliable partners, 58% believe Korea and 61% believe Japan are contributing sufficiently or more than sufficiently to the stationing of US forces in their respective countries. This suggests that trust is linked to the defense costs borne by Korea and Japan.

A part of this survey that I personally found particularly interesting was the data related to the Taiwan contingency. What particularly surprised me was that only 42% of Americans believe there is a high probability of China initiating a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, which is similar to Japan, but the figure for Koreans who share this view is lower at 72%. Professor Son Yeol provided an explanation for this phenomenon, but I would like to add that in the case of the US, 49% of respondents were unsure whether China would initiate a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. This result is directly related to the current US policy towards China concerning Taiwan. From Washington's perspective, the issue of Taiwan is not about the probability or frequency of occurrence, but about the response. Regardless of how low the possibility, if a conflict situation arises in the Taiwan Strait, the core of policy is how to respond. As you can see, the survey results show that there is no clear stance on exactly how the US should respond to a Taiwan contingency. However, one thing is certain: Americans prefer diplomatic approaches and indirect support over unilateral US military intervention through the deployment of US troops. Even in the case of a joint response, American public opinion is divided on how the US, Japan, and Korea should cooperate on this issue. This indicates that the Taiwan contingency is a difficult issue, and there is no clear national consensus on this matter, as shown by the survey results.

finding. A part of this survey that I personally found particularly interesting relates to the data concerning a contingency in Taiwan. What particularly surprised me was that only 42% of Americans believe there is a high probability of China initiating a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, which is similar to Japan, but the corresponding figure for South Koreans is lower at 72%. Professor Yeol Soh explained this phenomenon, but what I would like to add is that in the case of the U.S., 49% of respondents stated they could not be certain whether China would initiate a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. These results can be interpreted as being directly related to the current U.S. policy toward China concerning Taiwan.

From Washington's perspective, the issue of Taiwan is not about the probability or frequency of occurrence, but about the response. Regardless of how low the possibility, if a conflict situation arises in the Taiwan Strait, the core of policy is how to respond. As you can see, the survey results show that there is no clear stance on exactly how the US should respond to a Taiwan contingency. However, one thing is certain: Americans prefer diplomatic approaches and indirect support over unilateral US military intervention through the deployment of US troops. Even in the case of a joint response, American public opinion is divided on how the US, Japan, and Korea should cooperate on this issue. This indicates that the Taiwan contingency is a difficult issue, and there is no clear national consensus on this matter, as shown by the survey results.

US Public Opinion on Trade, Tariffs, and Nuclear Armament

Regarding trade and tariff issues, Americans appear to generally oppose the tariffs imposed by the Trump administration on Korea and Japan. In our survey, 43% for Korea and 46% for Japan stated their opposition to the current US government's imposition of tariffs on these countries. Furthermore, regarding trade and investment relations with China, only about 29% support the US exerting influence on Japan and Korea, which is a relatively low evaluation. Finally, American opinions on independent nuclear development by Korea and Japan and the deployment of US nuclear weapons appear to be mixed. We are well aware that there is a distinction between these two approaches in Korea. Some studies conducted in Korea indicate differing views on alliances and extended deterrence between groups supporting one approach and those supporting the other. However, looking at the US survey results, we can confirm that Americans do not perceive the difference between these two approaches to nuclear weapons as keenly as Koreans do. As you can see here, the respondents gave the same answers for independent nuclear development and the deployment of US nuclear weapons. The boxes shaded darker, running diagonally from the bottom left to the top right, indicate that the people who gave the same answer are far more numerous than those who gave different answers.

However, looking at the US survey results, we can confirm that Americans do not perceive the difference between these two approaches to nuclear weapons as keenly as Koreans do. As you can see here, the respondents gave the same answers for independent nuclear development and the deployment of US nuclear weapons. The boxes shaded darker, running diagonally from the bottom left to the top right, indicate that the people who gave the same answer are far more numerous than those who gave different answers.

I am showing tables that indicate there are more of them, divided between both Korea and Japan, and the results were similar. I would like to reiterate here that Americans do not feel much difference on this issue, and I will conclude here. Yes. Yes. Thank you, Dr. James Kim. You have pointed out very valuable points. We will now move on to the Q&A session. We have two individuals ready in the United States and Japan. We will begin the Q&A session, and those in the United States and Japan are currently connected via Zoom. They can ask questions through Zoom chat. We will also take questions from those present here. Yes.

Q&A: Perceptions of US-Japan Relations and Survey Methodology

This is Lee Sang-seo from Yonhap News. In the first data set, you analyzed that both South Korea and Japan perceive their relationship with the United States as having deteriorated. For South Korea, 'good' and 'very good' are more numerous than negative perceptions, so this interpretation seems correct. However, for Japan, while it is true that 34.9% perceive the relationship as 'bad,' 42% perceive it as 'good,' which is nearly a majority. Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that Japan perceives the relationship as having improved rather than deteriorated? I have carefully noted the point you just raised. Ms. Jin Bo-hyeon will also need to respond to this, as it relates to time series analysis.

Therefore, for South Korea, the trend of perceptions of deterioration is increasingly evident. For Japan, although we do not have the data at hand, we can assess that negative perceptions are quite high considering the US-Japan relationship. It is true that negative perceptions exceed 34%, but positive perceptions overwhelmingly outweigh them. So, can this be interpreted as a perception of deterioration? I believe a more accurate expression would be that negative perceptions are increasing. You then explained that negative perceptions have increased in Japan. Yes. While the annual graph for South Korea shows the trend, we only have this year's survey for Japan, so could we know how it was last year or the year before?

Yes, yes. Could Ms. Jin Bo-hyeon please answer that? As I mentioned, this internet survey is the first of its kind, so I believe we need to be cautious about tracking past changes. The surveys conducted by NPO and EAI in the past were in-person interviews, where respondents were given time to answer and the surveys were collected. This year's survey is an internet-based survey, so the response method may differ. Therefore, I believe we should be cautious about interpreting the responses as 'concerns'.

However, what is revealed within that is that the United States is indeed very important to Japan. The importance of the country is answered as important by over 80% of Japanese respondents in this survey. Within that, 40% have a good impression, and 34% have a bad impression. Among the bad impressions mentioned are the current Trump administration's policies and this time...

So, you stated that Japan perceives the relationship as having deteriorated, which is 34.9%. However, positive perceptions are nearly 10 percentage points higher than negative perceptions. Despite this, why would it be considered a deterioration? Ah, I have revised that expression. Previously, I used the term 'decline in trust,' and I meant that the trend is deteriorating, not that negative perceptions outweigh positive ones, leading to deterioration. I am making that correction.

In the first line, you stated that the decline in trust of the Japanese public towards the United States is evident. Do you also consider this to be evident? Where exactly did you state that? We distributed a press release yesterday. Oh, really? Yes. Please correct that then. Yes. How would you like it corrected? Yes. Since the results for the Japanese side are not yet available, and Ms. Jin has also spoken, please limit the expression to South Korea only.

This led me to ask a follow-up question: you mentioned that negative perceptions of Japan's future regarding the United States were 44.7%, significantly exceeding positive perceptions. Could we know last year's figures to see if this crossover occurred then? I will provide that information. Yes. Have the points you raised been confirmed? Yes. I will convey them. Yes. Could you please ask the next question? Yes. The gentleman here.

In any case, as you just mentioned, the Japanese data cannot be compared with last year's. The East Asia Institute has been conducting surveys with the media MPO, but this year it is with API. I am curious about the reason for the change in the survey period. Well, I can explain the order of operations. Last year, we were unable to conduct the survey with MPO for several reasons. This year, we conducted it again with API. The main reason is that we have been conducting face-to-face surveys. We conducted 1,000 face-to-face interviews. However, there are risks associated with conducting face-to-face surveys, especially for questions related to foreign policy and national security. Therefore, we changed the survey method to a web-based survey.

Furthermore, regarding the transition to web surveys, the East Asia Institute has been transitioning several surveys to web-based methods since 2019 and has fully transitioned all surveys to web-based methods starting in 2023, as we assessed their reliability to be quite high. In that process, Japan has consistently preferred mail surveys, while we have fully transitioned to web surveys. Therefore, we could not continue with a combination of web and mail surveys.

However, consensus could not be reached there, so starting this year, web surveys are being conducted jointly. This is also the case in the United States. Web surveys are generalized as a scientific survey method. In issues related to diplomacy and security, site visits are rarely conducted, and the efficiency of site visits is significantly reduced, especially when there are many questions. I can provide such expert opinions.

Q&A: Trumpism and ROK-US-Japan Cooperation

There has been a noticeable backlash against Trumpism. I am curious about how this could affect the trilateral cooperation strategy between South Korea, the United States, and Japan in the long term. Additionally, there was an analysis suggesting that South Korea tends to view cooperation with Japan as important due to a sense of shared suffering, while Japan is more reserved. I am curious about your views on the reasons for this. Dr. James Kim previously explained in detail the differing perceptions between South Korea and the United States regarding independent nuclear armament, US weapons deployment, and independent nuclear armament. I would appreciate hearing more specific reasons for this.

I would like to direct my questions to Dr. James Kim and Director Jin Bo. From the US perspective, public opinion is important, but the positions of leaders are more crucial. This is a focal point among experts at think tanks in Washington. Since President Trump has not spoken negatively about this issue recently, I expect that if Japan and South Korea can lead this issue in a positive and constructive manner, there may be more productive outcomes.

I recall seeing similar research findings from the East Asia Institute. While I do not remember the exact research paper, a review of my own survey results and recent CSIS survey results suggests that distrust in US extended deterrence plays a significant role regarding independent nuclear armament. On the issue of redeploying US tactical nuclear weapons, while the importance of alliances is emphasized, concerns about extended deterrence are the primary focus.

The faction pursuing independent self-defense and the stance on independent nuclear armament are one group. On the issue of redeploying tactical nuclear weapons, it is analyzed that there is an intention to strengthen extended deterrence by emphasizing the importance of alliances. This is an interpretation specific to the political environment and background of South Korea. I am curious whether the American public also recognizes these differences, and we included this in the US public opinion survey, and the results are not surprising.

From the perspective of the American public, whether nuclear weapons are possessed is the core point. It does not matter what kind of nuclear weapon it is, where it was produced, or who controls it. It is important whether Japan possesses nuclear weapons, regardless of whether US nuclear weapons are deployed or if they pursue independent nuclear armament. The support or opposition stance remained the same regardless of the question framing.

This implies that they view these two issues as one. >> Yes. Director Jin Bo. Yes. >> First, the essence of our question was what is most important in Japan's security environment. Perceptions of the Taiwan issue were extremely high. Over 70% of people believe that Taiwan is deeply related to Japan's security and is an inseparable and critical issue for Japan. Third, regarding how to respond to Taiwan, many people believe there should be direct US intervention. That is, they believe it is desirable for the US to be directly involved, not just for Taiwan itself or US allies to respond. Finally, many people believe that trilateral cooperation among the US, Japan, and South Korea is important. These were the survey results. When considering future policy directions, opinions within Japan are still divided on the manner of Japan's military role.

Thank you. Doctor, if I may add one more point to your answer regarding the future of Trumpism and US-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation. Currently, support for trilateral cooperation among the US, Japan, and South Korea, particularly in military and security cooperation, is quite strong in both Japan and South Korea. Traditionally, the weak link in US-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation has been Japan-South Korea relations, but now both Japan and South Korea show over 50% support for trilateral cooperation, especially at the security level. South Korea shows 70% support.

What you refer to as the influence of Trumpism is a question of how concerns about a Trump-led America will unfold in Japan and South Korea. The biggest concern is the weakening of US commitments. Currently, Japan and South Korea will not move towards reducing their security dependence on the United States. Such discussions are not emerging. Therefore, they will likely move towards strengthening Japan-South Korea cooperation to engage more with the United States. I believe this was also evident in the recent summit meeting.

Therefore, if Trumpism places a significant burden on Japan and South Korea for burden-sharing in regional deterrence, meaning if Trump demands greater military contributions from Japan and South Korea, will Japan and South Korea cooperate well on security and meet the US demands, or are there still obstacles in Japan-South Korea cooperation, and specifically, will the decline in positive perceptions of South Korea from the Japanese side, as shown in this survey, become an obstacle to Japan-South Korea security cooperation? You have pointed out these variables.

Currently, I understand that both Japan and South Korea are moving towards strengthening security cooperation to better respond to Trump's assertiveness. Therefore, I do not believe Trumpism will fundamentally disrupt the framework of US-Japan-South Korea security cooperation. >> Yes. >> Please ask your question. Yes. >> Yes. Reporter Lee. Yes.

Q&A: US Trust and Age Distribution Bias

In the item regarding South Korea's trust in the United States, 'do not trust' is 30.2%. >> It is page 4. This is page 4 of the press release, and what you have is page 11. >> Is this the first time it has exceeded 30% in Deepkeil? >> Ah, excuse me. >> Yes. US trust, 2011 to 17, 2025. >> We have data from 2017 to 2025 regarding US trust, and this is the highest it has been. >> What I asked was >> So, since we started compiling the data, this is the first year it has exceeded 30%. Yes. Yes. We started compiling data in 2017. Yes.

Are there any other questions? Mr. Sawada from Mainichi Shimbun has a question via Zoom. In the diplomatic opinion poll conducted annually by the Japanese government's Cabinet Office, there is a significant generational gap. The perceptions of elderly men are clearly negative. Given that over 40% in this survey are aged 60 and above, is it possible that the data is biased? What is the reason for not controlling the age distribution of respondents?

I believe there was no significant deviation in the respondent distribution in the East Asia Institute's survey. Ms. Jin Bo-hyeon answered your previous question. In the survey conducted with Genron NPO in 2023, those aged 60 and above accounted for 39%. This year, it is 41.9%, an increase of about 3 percentage points. I am unsure if it is oversampling, but this is how the data turned out. For the 50s age group, it was 16% in 2023 and 17% this year, so it is difficult to see a significant difference. It is difficult to conclude that the data is biased. We will conduct a detailed review of this matter with API starting now. Ms. Jin Bo-hyeon, would you like to add anything? Yes, thank you. The method used in Japan this time involved a session of approximately two days and a sample size of over 1,000. It is possible that the number of respondents aged 60 and above increased within the effective response count, which can be considered a general trend in public opinion surveys. As you mentioned, the insufficient representation of opinions from those aged 20 to 40 is a structural problem. While it is possible to adjust respondents based on population ratios, this could lead to ignoring the majority opinion and potentially yield dangerous results, so the methodology is not perfect. I believe the distribution of respondents in the survey conducted this time is relatively even. Considering this, there may be biases in the results, but this also reflects a part of society. Rather, cross-tabulations of how the numbers are processed and what responses are given are important. We will continue to refine our methods to conduct more precise public opinion surveys.

Yes, we will also conduct a detailed review of the age distribution for our EAI survey from last year and this year. It appears there are no further questions from Zoom. Are there any other questions? If not, we will >> I have one additional point to make. Ah, yes. Go ahead. >> Regarding the possibility of trilateral cooperation you mentioned earlier, the reason for observing indicators of national favorability and trust is because there are political repercussions when relationships break down. If relationships are broken with these political repercussions in mind, we can see that favorability and support for that country also affect bilateral and economic relations. If the relationship itself is broken...

There will be a public reaction to that, and if that reaction occurs close to an election, the political repercussions cannot be ignored. Therefore, I believe we are in a situation where these factors cannot be ignored. From the perspective of leadership, these variables must also be considered. While there are concerns in many aspects, if Japan and South Korea, relatively speaking, have positive perceptions and attitudes towards each other, there is a possibility that trilateral cooperation will continue. This is my expectation. As Professor Son mentioned, no one knows how the variable of Trump will play out.

If President Trump suddenly decides he does not want trilateral cooperation, the situation could change. In my opinion, President Trump did not speak negatively about US-Japan cooperation during the recent US-Japan summit, so if Japan and South Korea are willing, the sustainability of trilateral cooperation will be higher. However, no one knows how the variable of Trump will play out.

Yes. >> Yes. >> Please ask your question. Yes. >> Yes. Reporter Lee. Yes. >> Regarding the item on South Korea's trust in the United States, 'do not trust' is 30.2%. >> It is page 4. This is page 4 of the press release, and what you have is page 11. >> Is this the first time it has exceeded 30% in Deepkeil? >> Ah, excuse me. >> Yes. US trust, 2011 to 17, 2025. >> We have data from 2017 to 2025 regarding US trust, and this is the highest it has been. >> What I asked was >> So, since we started compiling the data, this is the first year it has exceeded 30%. Yes. Yes. We started compiling data in 2017. Yes.

Yes. >> Yes. >> Please ask your question. Yes. >> Yes. Reporter Lee. Yes. >> In the item regarding trust in the United States, 30.2% do not trust [the U.S.]. >> It's page 4. The press release is page 4, and what you were given is page 11. >> Is this the first time it has exceeded 30% in a Deepfake poll? >> Ah, excuse me. >> Yes. Trust in the U.S. 2011 to 17, 2025. >> There is data on trust in the U.S. from 2017 to 2025, and this year's results are the highest. >> What I asked was >> So, I believe this is the first time it has exceeded 30% since data collection began. Yes. Yes. Data collection began in 2017. Yes.

>> Are there any other questions? Mr. Sawada from Mainichi Shimbun has a question via Zoom. In the diplomatic opinion poll conducted annually by the Japanese government's Cabinet Office, there is a significant generational gap. The perceptions of elderly men are clearly negative. Given that over 40% in this survey are aged 60 and above, is it possible that the data is biased? What is the reason for not controlling the age distribution of respondents?

Closing Remarks and Future Plans

As the scheduled time has exceeded by 10 minutes, we will conclude today's press conference here. It has lasted approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes. Thank you very much for coming to cover the event despite your busy schedules, especially with the ROK-Japan summit and ROK-US summit. Most importantly, we thank our two partner institutions, API and KEI, and Director Jin Bo and Dr. James Kim who attended today. As this is the first time we have conducted a trilateral ROK-US-Japan public opinion survey this year, there were many difficulties and time required for operational coordination. Nevertheless, we are fortunate and grateful to be able to announce the results today. We also thank the staff members of the three institutions for their efforts during this process.

Although I cannot mention everyone individually, I would like to express my sincere gratitude for their hard work and conclude today's press conference here. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you.

Announcement of the 1st ROK-US-Japan Public Perception Survey and the 12th ROK-Japan Public Perception Survey

The East Asia Institute (EAI), in collaboration with the Asia-Pacific Initiative (API) of Japan and the Korea Economic Institute (KEI) of the United States, conducted the 'ROK-US-Japan Public Perception Survey' targeting the public in South Korea, Japan, and the United States from August 8 to August 20, 2025. The results were announced at a joint press conference held on August 28 at 10:30 AM. The ROK-Japan Public Perception Survey, conducted annually since 2013, was temporarily suspended in 2024 due to the non-implementation of the Japanese survey but has been resumed this year. Notably, with the participation of KEI from the United States in the joint survey starting in 2025, the first-ever mutual perception survey among the three countries—South Korea, the United States, and Japan—has been realized.

On August 28, the three research institutions (EAI, API, KEI) held a joint press conference in a hybrid online and offline format. Director Son Yeol (EAI), Director Ken Jimbo (API), and Director J. James Kim (KEI) attended this press conference to present the main findings of the survey. The objective of this survey was to deeply diagnose the mutual perceptions and public opinion on key policy issues among the publics of the three countries as a foundation for the increasingly strategically important trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan, and to present trends in public opinion between South Korea and Japan and policy implications.

Detailed results of this survey can be found in the East Asia Institute's Public Opinion Briefing, with more in-depth analysis to be provided in an upcoming Issue Briefing.

Press Conference for Domestic and Foreign Media

Date: Thursday, August 28, 2025, 10:30 AM - 11:45 AM

Location: East Asia Institute Conference Hall (7-gil, Sajik-ro, Jongno-gu, Seoul)

Presenters: Son Yeol (Director, East Asia Institute), Ken Jimbo (Director, API), J. James Kim (Director, KEI Public Opinion and External Affairs)

Audience: Reporters from domestic and international broadcasting stations, newspapers, and online media, including South Korea and Japan

Language: Korean-Japanese simultaneous interpretation