[9th EAI Academy] ⑤ The Future of Japanese Diplomacy and Future-Oriented Korea-Japan Relations

YouTube Link : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zTemcv1VGaI

Video Script

Then we need to consider what are the drivers and factors for improvement. We can broadly divide them into three categories. The first is perception. There may be factors at the cultural level regarding how perceptions of the other party's identity or national character, or Japan as a whole, have changed. The second, which has been presented as a hypothesis, is domestic political issues. This is less about Japan and more about domestic politics, similar to how North-South issues become politicized domestically. Japan has had considerable aspects of this, so we need to consider how domestic political variables operate. Finally, and what we inevitably focus on most in our class, is that as the strategic value of the other country increases, the desire for improved relations naturally grows. As mentioned earlier.

Economically, what is the objective with Japan? It is to 'cooperate with Japan to live better.' There may also be threats like North Korea's nuclear program, necessitating cooperation with Japan. Alternatively, even without direct cooperation with Japan, there might be considerations to cooperate if the United States strongly desires trilateral security cooperation among the US, Japan, and South Korea. This is a matter related to strategic value. The desire for improved relations can vary depending on where Japan is positioned in your mental map, that is, how high its strategic value is. Today, we will begin by exploring this aspect. Therefore, there are a few questions below it.

Japan's Two Ascents and Golden Ages

We are already over 30 minutes in, so let's move on. Japan's golden age, 'Peak Japan,' has passed. Simply put, Japan has experienced two ascents since entering the modern world. The first ascent occurred during the Meiji Restoration in 1868, when Japan embarked on modernization. At that time, the term 'modernization' did not exist; Japan's slogan was 'Westernization.'

'We must become like the West. That is the path to preserving Japan's independence and prosperity.' With this idea, similar to Korea's 'Gaehwa' (Enlightenment) in the 19th century, Japan clearly pursued Westernization. Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War and, ten years later, Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, marking the first time a non-Western nation defeated a Western power. As Ahn Jung-geun sang at the time.

Through the Russo-Japanese War, Japan entered the ranks of the so-called great powers, akin to the G7. Japan did not stop there; it made several ambitious attempts to become the regional hegemon, eventually clashing with the United States. The US sought to protect its sphere of influence, and Japan sought to overcome it, leading to war and Japan's eventual defeat in 1945. If this was the first cycle, the second cycle began after 1945 with the national grand strategy of a Japanese politician named Shigeru Yoshida, the 'Yoshida Doctrine.' At that time, Japan adopted a pacifist constitution drafted by the US occupation forces commander, Douglas MacArthur. The Japanese constitution was not created by Japan but was provided by the US. Japan still operates under the constitution written by the US. It has never been amended. It is said that only Finland and Japan have not amended their constitutions since 1945. Article 9 of the constitution stipulates, 'The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.' This means renouncing the right to wage war. Do you understand what this means? Japan cannot use force to settle international disputes. If all countries were like this, there would be no war.

Instead, when can Japan wage war? Only when it is attacked. Being attacked is not settling an international dispute but an exercise of self-defense. Therefore, Japan calls its military the 'Self-Defense Forces.' Because this constitutional structure is still in place, Japan cannot use force to settle international disputes; otherwise, it would be unconstitutional. In Korea, unconstitutionality can lead to presidential impeachment through the Constitutional Court, but in Japan, it could involve complex procedures such as the dissolution of the Diet and the election of a new prime minister. While there are issues of application, that is the pacifist constitution, and under such a constitution, the US-Japan alliance ensures that US forces protect Japan, and Japan does not use force.

Consequently, Japan does not need to spend a lot of money on its military. The Yoshida line, the Yoshida Doctrine, was to invest all energy into economic growth. Following that path, Japan became the world's second-largest economy. At a very rapid pace. Japan entered the ranks of great powers by winning the Russo-Japanese War about 35 years after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. After Japan's resurgence began in 1945, when did it become the world's second-largest economy?

During the Cold War, after the United States, which country was it? It would have been West Germany. Japan caught up to West Germany in 1968, meaning it became the world's second-largest economy in just 23 years. In 1968, my aunt married a Zainichi Korean and visited her sister's home in Japan. I don't remember much, but I recall it felt like a new world. Japan had become such an advanced country by then, and the period from the late 1960s to the early 1990s was Japan's golden age.

Afterward, Japan experienced its 'lost decade, two decades, three decades.' The reason Japan's golden age was possible was due to the 'liberal international order.' This was the post-war order of American hegemony and a 'rules-based international order.' The rules and norms included respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Trump administration is currently undermining this, as are the principles of freedom and openness based on market logic. China is undermining negotiations and compromises based on democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes, and many countries, including the US and Russia, are undermining multilateralism. Economic growth strategies were possible within such an international order. The same applies to our country. The liberal international order or the rules-based international order was a gift to newly independent nations or nations seeking to recover after defeat since 1945. Such an international order was established, and strategies could be formulated and faithfully implemented within that order. If it were a world of the strong preying on the weak, there would be no rules, and the rules set by great powers today could be changed tomorrow. Then, on what basis could strategies be formulated?

Structural Crisis Factors in Japan

Precisely. Thus, such an order was formed, and an environment was created where nations could continuously grow. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and later China were successful countries that could most effectively utilize that environment. That is why there was a golden age, but it began to crumble in the 21st century. First, Japan entered a long-term recession, leading to a relative decline in national power. This reveals issues with its own capabilities. As stated here, regardless of external factors, numerous factors are at play, such as low birthrate and aging population, rigid labor markets, declining productivity, uncertainty in the policy environment, delays in transitioning from manufacturing to services, and forced direct investment due to US pressure.

This is not an unreasonable situation. Later, there is a story about Tokyo and Shanghai, and that is one aspect. The second is China's challenge. China's challenge is illustrated by this chart. Has this chart been used elsewhere? Is this the first time we are seeing it in our class? This shows GDP share. Japan (red) peaked in 2000 and began to decline. The US (top) also began to decline from 2000. After the Pax Americana era following 1945, the US's relative share began to decrease from its peak around 2000, and its allies, Japan and Germany, helped compensate for this decline.

The American world continued until it declined, and yellow represents China. In 2000, China's GDP was one-tenth of Japan's. Exactly ten years later, in 2010, Japan's and China's GDPs were equal. Exactly ten years later, in 2020, Japan's GDP was one-third of China's. In other words, China, which was one-tenth in 20 years, grew rapidly. Twenty years is not a generation, so how profound must the psychological shock have been from such a rapid change?

The material shock was undoubtedly significant, but China's challenge was very real and delivered a strong emotional and psychological blow. Until then, China was a 'paper tiger.' After Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, China was a country that could not catch up to Japan. China described its period as a '100-year hell,' and after that period passed, this event occurred after 110 years. So, how will we confront China's challenge now? The third is the relative decline of the United States and the rise of American protectionism.

Relative Decline of the US and Changes in the International Order

Perhaps the US-South Korea alliance was discussed last time. For Japan, it is the US-Japan alliance. Can we trust American commitments, given the relative decline of the US? American commitments are double-edged. Alliances carry two risks: entanglement and abandonment. The risk of entanglement means that if US power relatively declines, Japan could be forced to participate in American wars, even if it does not want to. This is similar to participating in the Iraq War in the Middle East or supporting Afghanistan. Now, due to China's challenge, a situation could arise where Japan is forced to intervene militarily to a degree it does not desire.

And the risk of abandonment is that the US might abandon Japan. For example, in disputed territories like the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese), if China occupies these islands, Japan can do nothing without US assistance. Japan does not have a force like the Marines. They are building something similar, but it is not effective. What can be done with just the navy? Therefore, Japan also faces the risk of abandonment. This presents another challenge, leading to a significant dilemma regarding the US. Finally, the liberal international order, the background we understood earlier, is shaking. This means the environment that allowed Japan to surge as the world's second-largest economy after 1945 is collapsing, posing a structurally significant threat to Japan. The same applies to our country. While issues arising from the US relationship, such as Trump's tariffs or the possibility of reducing USFK presence, pose significant threats to South Korea, structurally, there are aspects similar to the problems Japan faces.

Countries that are not great powers like ours must live in a world without rules and norms, which is very difficult. Great powers can create their own rules, but other countries must live by them. When China seeks to divide spheres of influence within its own sphere and the US within its own, other countries fall into very difficult situations. These issues emerge as Japan's core challenges. Therefore, Shinzo Abe emerged to address them.

What should be done if a situation arises where Japan is forced to intervene militarily to an extent it does not desire due to China's challenge? Furthermore, the issue of US abandonment implies the risk that Japan could be abandoned. For instance, if China occupies the Senkaku Islands, which are disputed territories with China, Japan can do nothing if the US does not help. Japan does not have a force comparable to the Marines, and although it has created similar organizations, they are insufficient.

What can be achieved with just the navy? Thus, Japan faces the risk of US abandonment, presenting a challenge that creates a significant dilemma for the US. Finally, the shaking of the liberal international order signifies the collapse of the environment that allowed Japan to grow into the world's second-largest economy after 1945, posing a structurally significant threat to Japan. This is equally true for South Korea. While issues arising from the US relationship, such as Trump's tariffs or the potential reduction of USFK, pose significant threats to South Korea, structurally, there are aspects similar to the problems Japan faces.

If the liberal international rules collapse, countries like South Korea, which are not great powers, will have to live in a world without norms, leading to very difficult situations. Great powers can create rules and apply them within their spheres of influence, but if China seeks to divide things in its own way and Japan in its own way, other countries can fall into very difficult situations. These issues emerge as Japan's core challenges, and Shinzo Abe emerged to address them.

Let's move on. This discussion is about the crisis situation Japan is currently facing, namely, the enormous shift in the balance of power. This is related to the rise of China and the relative decline of the US, as well as Japan's defensive posture. Furthermore, the crisis of the liberal international order is currently manifesting due to the aforementioned issues. This was mentioned by Japanese Prime Minister Kishida two years ago, who declared that the liberal international order had collapsed.

The international community has entered an era where intense competition, cooperation, and division among nations are complexly intertwined. So, what should Japan do? As the US declines, it no longer has the capacity to exercise global leadership alone. This is something that is difficult for the President of South Korea to say directly to the US. As Japanese Prime Minister stated in a speech at Johns Hopkins University, joint leadership between the US and Japan is necessary to contain and manage the expanding influence of China. Japan, of course, must build global partnerships as a secondary partner.

Japan's Global Partnership Strategy

In other words, it must pursue global leadership as a partner. Japan must fill the gaps left by the US, while the US continues to exercise leadership as a global player. Furthermore, it must evolve beyond the existing unilateral alliance relationship into a horizontal alliance that strengthens Japan's role. To this end, Japan has declared an increase in defense spending from 1% to 2% of GDP and, judging that the US-Japan alliance alone is insufficient, has expressed its intention to actively embrace India and ASEAN. This means Japan will compensate for areas where the US is lacking. Finally, it intends to strengthen economic engagement and economic security efforts toward China.

The US defines China as a clear threat and strategic competitor, but Japan officially refers to it as a 'challenge.' This nuance is important. While Japan does not explicitly take actions to blockade or contain China militarily, it views China's expanding influence as potentially severely undermining Japan's national interests. South Korea faces a similar situation, and it is worth paying attention to the wording regarding China that will be announced next week. These discussions are already underway between the US and Japan. This was the situation before the Trump 2.0 era.

In this context, what will be South Korea's strategic position? It appears there is little room for South Korea to play a significant role in Japan's fourth strategy, namely, strengthening the US-Japan alliance. While it would be desirable for South Korea to actively cooperate in strengthening the alliance with the US and pursuing military cooperation to contain and manage China's influence, this is a very difficult choice for South Korea.

Therefore, South Korea's utility decreases. If it is determined that South Korea cannot participate due to the China issue, Japan will focus on strengthening its own defense capabilities, and the role of the South Korean defense industry will not be significantly considered. The fourth strategy, strengthening alliances, could become difficult if South Korea-Japan relations deteriorate. South Korea-Japan relations are shaped not only by strategic aspects but also by historical issues, and these complex factors come into play. In this situation, as we move to the next stage, the two keywords of anxiety and distrust become important.

Alliance Standards in the Trump Era and Japan's Challenges

This refers to the anxiety and distrust that Japan feels towards Trump's America. Distrust is particularly strong, meaning the US is transforming into a country that is difficult to trust. The US-Japan global partnership has already been shattered. Despite the US having no intention of exercising global leadership anymore, Japan continues to propose cooperation. The theme of last year's US-Japan summit was 'Global Partnership,' referring to a partnership for global governance. However, this content disappeared from the summit between Prime Minister Ishiba and Trump in February.

This reflects Japan's anxiety and distrust toward Trump's America. The distrust is particularly strong, signifying that the U.S. is transforming into a country that is difficult to trust. The U.S.-Japan global partnership has already shattered. Despite the U.S.'s lack of willingness to assume global leadership any longer, Japan continues to propose cooperation. The theme of last year's U.S.-Japan summit was 'global partnership,' which signified a partnership for global governance. However, this was absent from the summit between Prime Minister Ishiba and Trump last February.

Prime Minister Ishiba was the second leader to meet with Trump after the Israeli leader, and the joint statement issued after the summit was reduced to defense cooperation, economic issues, etc. This shows that Trump has no intention of maintaining the existing international order. Therefore, through this summit, Japan confirmed that the notion of allies sharing a value-based international order and a rules-based international order has disappeared.

Japan sets two new criteria for alliances: First, how much benefit does it bring to American workers and businesses? Second, how much can it mitigate the security risks posed to the US? This means that when an ally faces security risks, the US does not want to bear the burden. This implies that allies must bear more of the risks they create themselves. For example, if 3.5% of GDP is spent on military expenditures, this would result in a significant reduction of alliance risks.

In case of emergency, the ally would possess more assets. Currently, Japan's defense spending is about 1% of GDP. South Korea spends 2.4%. Although Japan has declared an increase in defense spending, the level the US demands from Japan is 3.5% of GDP.

Europe is asked for 5%, and South Korea may also spend up to the high 3% range. Therefore, the new alliance criteria are that the US bears less burden, and allies provide benefits to American workers and businesses. According to these criteria, alliances will be divided into A-class, B-class, and C-class. A Japanese policymaker would naturally pursue an A-class alliance.

This requires complex calculations. While these new alliance criteria may seem excessive, the relationship between Japan and the US is characterized by asymmetrical interdependence. This can be called 'overdependence.' In a relationship where one party is excessively dependent on the other, the dependent party inevitably finds itself in a subordinate position. Japan is currently in such a position, and so is South Korea.

South Korea is in a typical state of overdependence, both militarily and economically. Therefore, it is difficult to reject these criteria. The balance of negotiation power is broken, making it difficult to refuse the heavy demands of the US. Ultimately, this situation is likely to continue. We will discuss for about 7 more minutes and then conclude.

Japan's Plan A and Plan B

The question is whether to enter into an A-class alliance or remain a B-class alliance. From Japan's perspective, the US must continue to exercise global leadership as a hegemon, and Japan will assist in this endeavor. Even if the US cannot fully uphold the liberal international order, it will be asked to protect the important parts.

If Japan actively assists, this corresponds to Plan A. To achieve this, Japan must become an 'indispensable' nation to the US. If Trump does not accept this, a Plan B must be prepared. Will we accept all of Trump's demands and simply wait for the outcome, or will we reduce our dependence on the US, become self-reliant, seek a way forward through alliances with other countries besides the US, reorganize the order, and ultimately wait for the US to return? This is Plan B. A typical Plan B is self-strengthening and self-reliance, but this is realistically difficult. Plan B here does not mean severing ties with the US, but rather adjusting the current excessive and asymmetrical interdependence to an appropriate level. This adjustment will need to be made over the long term, both economically and in terms of security. However, questions arise about whether such discussions are even feasible.

This requires great determination and leadership. Not only must domestic persuasion be undertaken, but cooperative systems must also be built with countries in similar situations. Do you recall the 'coalition of the willing' during the Bush administration? At that time, when a UN resolution could not be passed, the coalition of like-minded countries participated in the Iraq War.

The US claimed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, but the UN opposed it. The US insisted that Saddam Hussein's regime must be overthrown. Eventually, it was revealed that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, through the 'coalition of the willing,' various countries, including South Korea and Japan, deployed forces to Iraq.

Leadership and willingness similar to this 'coalition of the willing' from 2002 to 2004 are needed. Plan A and Plan B also offer significant implications for South Korea. President Yoon Suk-yeol recently described South Korea-Japan relations as 'nations sharing a common yard,' emphasizing cooperation.

Scope for South Korea-Japan Cooperation and Restoration of the Rules-Based Order

I do not know how many houses in Seoul have yards, but 'sharing a common yard' implies sharing a yard in an apartment complex or a row of houses. This can be interpreted as a metaphor for cooperation among nations with common interests. From this perspective, when looking at South Korea-Japan relations...

In a way, the necessity for cooperation out of shared hardship is greatly increasing. Whether this can actually be realized remains to be seen. As I mentioned, how can South Korea and Japan possibly help the US restore its hegemony? One might think that just imagining it is enough. Asking the US to return to its past self from the time of the US-South Korea alliance is merely a hope. However, in any case, for such a Plan A, there are considerable areas where South Korea and Japan must cooperate, and Plan A and Plan B are not contradictory.

They are not mutually exclusive and can be pursued simultaneously. Therefore, joint efforts to minimize and manage damage risks, and efforts to achieve appropriate interdependence, are necessary. In that regard, the scope for cooperation between South Korea and Japan is considerably widening. I believe it is entirely possible. Looking at it more broadly, if the rules-based international order collapses, South Korea will face immense difficulties. Japan will also face difficulties. Look at the meeting between Trump and Putin in Alaska. If you were a Ukrainian citizen, you would see events reminiscent of the imperial era, where territories are demarcated, and demands are made on individual countries about whether to agree to certain terms, with no respect for existing international law or norms. It is simply being pieced together as it is. Therefore, efforts to restore such an international order are truly necessary, and I believe this is a task that will structurally protect the national interests of both South Korea and Japan in the long term. However, this, too, is a matter of leadership. In the short term, one might think, 'What order are we talking about? Since when have we been rule-makers?' Therefore, immediate gains, such as how to slightly lower tariffs or reduce investment, are important in the short term.

Since these are not contradictory and can be done simultaneously, efforts to mitigate and manage damage risk, and efforts to achieve appropriate interdependence are necessary. In this regard, the scope for cooperation between South Korea and Japan is widening considerably. I believe this is entirely possible. Viewed from a broader perspective, if the rules-based international order collapses, South Korea will face significant hardship. Japan will also face hardship. Observe the meeting between Trump and Putin in Alaska. If you were a Ukrainian citizen, you would see that in matters reminiscent of the imperialist era, where territories are demarcated and individual countries are asked whether they will agree to 'you take this, I take that,' there is no respect for existing international law, rules, and norms.

Two-Track Diplomacy and Management of Historical Issues

However, while doing that, such joint efforts are very important. I will mention just two more things. The reason this 'two-track diplomacy' did not work was that once historical issues began to cause friction, it led to a vortex of distrust. If the other party does not apologize or take appropriate measures regarding historical issues, trust is not extended. Cooperation becomes impossible. The other party is viewed with suspicion. Cooperation fails.

You know what that means. That is what has happened. However, according to recent public opinion polls, why are perceptions improving and trust being restored when historical issues have not progressed at all? What is the reason? These things are happening now. That's right. The current government also holds this position. To give one example, do you remember the vote showdown at UNESCO a month ago regarding the Hashima Island's inscription? You probably know about the Hashima Island issue. UNESCO designated several major Japanese coal mines from the Meiji era as industrial heritage sites, and Japan intended to inscribe them as UNESCO World Heritage sites. However, the South Korean government and civic groups stated, 'Forced labor was involved at Hashima Island. This must be specified.' Since Japan did not specify this, disputes continued, and South Korea repeatedly raised objections at UNESCO.

Japan argued, 'Why bring this back to UNESCO? We should handle it between South Korea and Japan. Let's not put it on the UNESCO agenda.' South Korea insisted, 'Let's put it on the agenda.' We requested a resolution this time and lost the vote. In the past, this would have caused an uproar. And it would have disrupted various cooperative projects. Therefore, they might have avoided raising the issue. Because it would burden security or economic cooperation, they might have thought, 'Let's just drop the UNESCO issue. Let's move on. The opposition party will make a fuss in the National Assembly, but let's just take the hit and move on.' However, this time, they proceeded. UNESCO proceeded as UNESCO, and cooperation proceeded as cooperation.

Of course, Trump had some influence at the time, regarding tariffs. So, because all domestic media coverage was focused on that, it was somewhat helpful, but in any case, that is what two-track diplomacy is about. Historical issues should be resolved as historical issues, functional issues should be handled as they are, and the approach of moving forward together should continue. And the foundation for that is likely sufficiently laid. Finally, I will discuss this a bit more during the Q&A session later and conclude here. Does anyone need a question sheet? Shall we take a break for about 7 minutes after you have a look?

Let's reconvene at 50 minutes and 55 seconds. Yes. Sorry. What was I talking about? >> Sorry, sorry. C

We will reconvene at 50 minutes and 55 seconds. Yes. Sorry. What was I talking about? >> Sorry, sorry. C

■ Son Yeol_ Director of the East Asia Institute, Professor at Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies.