[9th EAI Academy] IV. Changes in the World Order Led by the United States and South Korea's Response

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cH2F7V6hz6Q

Video Script

Crisis and Fundamental Transformation of the Liberal International Order

There is much talk about great upheaval and crisis in the world order following the Trump administration. From the perspective of someone who has observed national politics for a long time, many things are changing, and we often say that we are all changing, that it is always a difficult time, and a period of rapid change and transition, and indeed it is. However, it is difficult to know how significant these changes are compared to other changes, and whether they are truly important changes. Relatively speaking. However, I believe that the changes in the international order we are experiencing today are far more significant than the commonly discussed changes. Therefore, as we study, we keenly feel that we did not anticipate this in advance. It is also a very interesting discussion to consider whether this change is comparable in magnitude to past changes. I wonder how long this change will last, whether another period of stability will come, and what will be at the end of this change.

International relations is a very broad field that covers many subjects. As it deals with the entire world population of nearly 8 billion people, it encompasses over 200 countries, as well as military, political, socio-cultural, and ideological aspects, not to mention the environment, ecology, science, and technology. Therefore, studying international relations is akin to studying almost everything. Thus, I believe it is extremely difficult to grasp the changes occurring in so many areas in a coherent human conceptual framework.

This makes the study of international relations itself difficult. Scholarship ultimately aims to accurately grasp its subject matter, and I am reminded of how challenging it is to grasp international reality. When the Soviet Union collapsed and became Russia, around 1990 or 1991, it was the Cold War before that. The Cold War, which began in 1945 or 1947 and lasted for over 40 years, saw international relations scholars who had studied nothing but the Cold War completely unable to predict how or when it would end. The sense of self-reproach they must have felt from not predicting the collapse of the Soviet Union overnight and the end of the Cold War in such a short period would have been immense, especially for established scholars.

The shock of the first Trump administration was very significant, and the Biden administration, pursuing a relatively traditional foreign policy, caused less shock. The second election of President Trump was surprising, and he was elected with overwhelming support. Since then, his foreign policy has also differed significantly from our predictions and from typical American foreign policy. As we face the world order without anticipating these developments, much analysis is needed. Therefore, the problem begins with how to describe this change in a single phrase, or what is changing. Nowadays, international scholars talk a lot about the world order or international order, and I believe the term 'international order' has been used very frequently. However, because it was relatively static, much discussion focused on changes within the order, such as shifts in power distribution or the outbreak of wars, rather than the change of the order itself. Scholars' ages might also be a factor. This unipolar system of the United States, or what we have experienced in the international order over the past 30 years, has its closest point of comparison in the end of the Cold War around 1990 or 1991. Already 30 years have passed, so one needs a perspective that compares the present with 30 years ago to predict current changes. In fact, this is a much more fundamental change. As we will discuss later, it is a change in the international order that began around 1945, spanning approximately 80 years. This year also marks the 80th anniversary of Korea's liberation. The US-led international order that emerged from the post-World War II settlement is what we often refer to as the liberal international order.

Changes in the International Order Since 1945

It is a change in that order. When President Trump pursued a very illiberal hegemony, it is a change in the 80-year order, so one must understand 80 years ago to perceive the change. However, it is sometimes called the international order, sometimes the world order, or the global order. Nowadays, it is even called the planetary order. Yet, the subjects encompassed by each term differ. The international order is an order centered on states and refers to the order among states. The world order includes actors other than states, such as international organizations, supranational actors, or subnational entities like corporations, civil society, and individuals. The world order can be understood as an order created with the recognition of the order-creating capacity of these non-state actors. This is important because the international order is an order that emerged after the establishment of the sovereign state system. We often say that the sovereign state system was established in Europe in the 17th century.

The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is often taken as a symbolic starting point. If the state-centric order is being overthrown entirely, and we are entering an era where states no longer hold any power, then non-state actors, such as the high-tech companies discussed in Dr. Bae's lecture last time, wield immense influence. There is much talk about the advent of the AGI era, and AGI will ultimately be created by corporations. To utilize such advanced artificial intelligence created by corporations for national security or economic purposes, a new relationship between corporations and states is necessary. In the past, technology was developed under state leadership and with state capital, entrusted to scientists or companies. China operates this way even now.

However, the United States does not operate this way, which is why some people are discussing techno-polarity. The most important advanced technology companies have become significant actors. This is indeed the case. In such a context, if the order includes non-state actors, then the change in order we are currently experiencing is the first such change since 1648. So, is it 200 years? No, 400 years? This is a macro-level transition that occurs once every 400 years, so we must now discuss the world order, not just the international order. If the relationship between nature and humanity is changing due to ecological or environmental crises, leading to human extinction or a fundamental redefinition of our relationship with nature, then this is what is being discussed in the current planetary order discourse. From that perspective, it could be considered a change occurring once in millions of years. As we have developed the technological capacity to destroy nature entirely, this is the first change in order we are facing. In this sense, the change in the world order or international order, which I have termed 'US-initiated,' is not solely originating from the United States.

This change in the world order or international order is not solely originating from the United States. It is an order change that has occurred through the aggregation of numerous logical developments accumulated over approximately 30 years, and we must grasp all of them. In this regard, phenomena that cannot be analyzed with 20th-century international relations theories are emerging in the 21st century. Natural sciences may have trans-historical and timeless laws because they deal with nature, but whether this is actually the case is a separate issue. International relations is a social science, and human societies are constantly changing. Theories developed based on 20th-century international phenomena have significant limitations in explaining the 21st century. We are in a situation where we need to create new theories and delve deeper into reality.

Although the introduction has been a bit long, we are entering an era where the future is highly uncertain, an era where you may live for 80 years or more, or humanity might face extinction before reaching the 22nd century. The depth of the changes in the international order we are about to face is immense. It is so profound that our mindset and policy preparedness must also be vastly different. Our president is scheduled to hold summit meetings with Japan and the United States in February. The nature of the relationship we will forge with these two countries depends on whether we can truly grasp the extent of the changes in the international order and establish new relationships with a long-term perspective. This is not an era of merely supplementing and improving past practices. Even major powers like the United States and Japan are ultimately just one nation within this structure, and all nations are seeking new paradigms within this structural change.

We must enter into individual policies with knowledge and vision regarding this world order. In this regard, academic work, policy research by think tanks, and policy-making by practitioners in the field typically involve three stages. In the United States, this is referred to as a revolving system. Even when examining the same subject of international relations, different perspectives and languages must be well integrated to produce good policies and gain a good understanding of the world. The international order you will study now and in the future is highly challenging and exciting. The discussions of 20th-century international relations scholars taught in textbooks are now almost inapplicable. It is an era that demands great creativity and sensitivity to the changes in reality.

This means we have entered an era where we can understand the content. The first topic is the international order in which we have lived, which is called the liberal international order. I will discuss the international order of the past 80 years. Of these 80 years, the first 40 were the Cold War, and the subsequent approximately 30 years have been a period of experiencing the most powerful unipolar system in history since the end of the Cold War, relatively more powerful than Rome or the early modern Spanish Empire, and we are now entering the next phase. If we consider historical inflection points, the leader of the liberal hegemonic state throughout the past 80 years was the United States. Because there were two camps, the Soviet Union separately created a communist proletarian international order. Ultimately, the Soviet Union collapsed, and under Clinton's policy of 'engagement and empowerment,' the US-led liberal international order spread to the communist bloc. It was a unique period where the entire world was integrated into a single order for 30 years. The order of the liberal camp during the Cold War and the world order of the post-Cold War era must be combined and named the international order, which is commonly called the liberal international order. It is known that this term was coined by American scholars Ikenberry and Dudney around 1997 or 1998. Professor Ikenberry has visited Korea frequently and participated in discussions this summer. This is plausible. Professor Lee Yong-yi, whom I will discuss later, was a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University and wrote a book titled 'General International Relations' in 1962. In that book, the term 'liberal world order' appears. Thus, the term 'liberal world order' has been used since the 1960s.

Characteristics and Functioning of the Liberal International Order

This has several implications. At first glance, the word 'liberal' might lead to a preconception that liberalism is inherently good and that the liberal international order is also very good. While there are aspects of truth to this, there are also aspects that are not. Nevertheless, the past 80 years are collectively referred to as the liberal international order. The characteristics of the liberal international order include agreement on fundamental ideologies, mechanisms for operating international relations based on those ideologies, and an overarching flow of order. In the past, such discussions were common, but I do not intend to elaborate on them today. Typically, orders that oppose the liberal international order are those based on balance of power or military strength.

As I mentioned earlier regarding the Peace of Westphalia, the international order established in Europe after the Thirty Years' War was one where all states were sovereign, possessed military power, and could engage in war at any time. This is fundamental to international politics. Therefore, in the Westphalian sovereign state system in which we live today, war is an inevitable constant. All states possess military power, there is no overarching government to prevent it, international law is meaningless, and war can be waged at any time. The only reason for not waging war is the lack of a high probability of winning. It is not waged out of fear of losing, but there are few other reasons to refrain from war.

Therefore, asking why war occurs within the current Westphalian system is meaningless. The more important question is why war does not occur. When we gather the various reasons for not waging war, we can broadly outline the features of the liberal international order. If we consider state sovereignty as freedom, it is derived from the liberal rights of individuals, such as the inherent right to freedom, which implies the right of all states to territorial integrity and supreme sovereignty. The UN Charter and other documents began to recognize this. Furthermore, states were encouraged to engage in open international economic relations through economic interactions not dictated by powers other than the market, and the use of force was prohibited, establishing a rules-based order where any use of force must comply with international law after World War II. These rules were not imposed by anyone but were gradually built through continuous agreement among all states after experiencing World War II. To prevent wars like World War II and the competitive protectionist trade policies and disregard for international law and organizations of the 1930s that led to them, the post-World War II order was established, which is called the liberal international order. Theoretically, it speaks of democratic peace, market peace, and institutional peace. In any case, despite being a Westphalian order, it created an order that sought to achieve international relations through rules, compromise, and multilateral institutions, rather than through the use of military force or power-based order. We, like you, live within that order, so we believe war is bad, there is international law, diplomacy must be conducted, and it is illegal for states to wage war against other countries.

Is this not working? I thought so too. However, with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022 and the relative decline of American power, whether American power has weakened is a separate issue, but strategic engagement has decreased, weakening the global deterrence system. We will discuss this later. As a result, regional rivalries, such as Israel-Palestine, North and South Korea, Taiwan, Ukraine, and India-Pakistan, are emerging in the form of wars, as if sprouting after rain. While we may wonder why they are suddenly fighting, from an international relations perspective, this is far more natural. They are bound to fight, and the question becomes what were the reasons they were not fighting.

Why were we not fighting? This leads us to ask about the past 80 years, and is this not leading to a crisis? While it is indeed heading towards a crisis, the fundamental organizing principle of international politics itself has been a state of crisis through the constant application of military force. As Hobbes argued in his 'Leviathan,' humans are in a state of nature, a war of all against all, and unable to endure it, they create the Leviathan. When asked if this is indeed the case, Hobbes stated in chapters 13 and 14 that the relations between states best exemplify the state of nature. States can be instantly killed, unlike human relationships, so they have some resilience in that regard. However, the fundamental organizing principle of the state of nature remains the same. Therefore, the liberal international order in which we have lived for the past 80 years was highly exceptional. There are several reasons for this. There was an agreement among states to avoid repeating wars, and there was the leadership of two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, whose leadership was far stronger than that of previous European powers. There were efforts to continuously improve liberal free trade, and there were international legal and institutional frameworks established during the war period. All of these combined are what we have called the liberal international order, and it was very natural.

We have taken it for granted as natural and obvious, but now the liberal international order is in a state of crisis. Therefore, American scholars, more so than what is felt in Korea, state in articles written in the past month or two that the liberal international order should now be considered virtually gone. Many also say that even if Trump were to leave, it would be difficult to return to the original liberal order. But why has this happened? Why has the liberal international order fallen into such a crisis? I have thought about this many times and written extensively on the subject, but this slide was created yesterday. So, I have reorganized it, and we can see about four main points. The liberal international order, why has the liberal order of the past 80 years collapsed, or is collapsing? There may be inherent reasons. It is bound to collapse, and it is bound to collapse due to its internal, inherent contradictions. Or, even if it does not collapse, there are aspects that can be called inherently contradictory. It can also be argued that there are contradictory conditions outside the liberal international order that are shaking this order. The first point, which is a bit difficult, is that the liberal political order, not the international political order, is often discussed within a nation. However, even in political philosophy, while the confrontation between realism and liberalism is discussed, we all live in liberal democratic states. Therefore, a liberal state has a constitution, and laws under it, so any political action we take is filtered by law, preventing illegal acts. Thus, political activity is normal, and politics is conducted through legal procedures without violence or illegal means, as we think. This is a fundamental principle of liberal political philosophy. There is a scholar named Carl Schmitt. He was a scholar from the interwar period, and you have likely heard of him.

I thought, 'Isn't this not going to happen?' and I thought so too. However, with the outbreak of the Ukraine war in 2022 and the relative reduction of U.S. power, whether U.S. national strength has weakened is a separate issue, but strategically, intervention has been reduced, weakening the global deterrence system. We will discuss that later. As a result, the rivalries that each region originally had, such as Israel-Palestine, North and South Korea, Taiwan, Ukraine, and India-Pakistan, have emerged in the form of wars like mushrooms after rain. One might wonder why they are suddenly fighting, but from an international politics perspective, this is much more natural. They are in a situation where they have no choice but to fight, and we are now in a situation where we must ask why they weren't fighting.

Why haven't we been fighting? If so, does this mean we are asking about the past 80 years, and is this heading towards a crisis? While it is indeed heading towards a crisis, the fundamental organizing principle of international politics itself is a crisis situation involving the constant use of military power, which is the essence of international politics. As Hobbes stated in his 'Leviathan,' humans are in a state of struggle of all against all in a state of nature and cannot endure it, thus creating Leviathan. When Hobbes asked if this wasn't actually the case, he stated in Chapters 13 and 14 that the relationship between states best exemplifies the state of nature. At any moment,

Unlike human-to-human relationships, states cannot be instantly killed, so in that sense, they have some resilience. However, the fundamental organizing principle of the state of nature remains the same. Therefore, the liberal international order in which we have lived for the past 80 years was a very exceptional phenomenon. There are several reasons for this. There was an agreement among nations not to repeat wars, and there was the leadership of two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Their leadership was far stronger than that of previous European powers. There were efforts to continuously improve liberal free trade, and there were also mechanisms of international law and institutions created during the war period. Combining all of these, we have called it the liberal international order, and it was very different.

Inherent Contradictions and Crisis Factors of the Liberal International Order

He collaborated with the Nazis, and although his later life was very unhappy, he left behind a vast body of work. There is also a prominent realist political philosopher and international relations scholar named Hans Morgenthau. There is a history of exchange between Morgenthau and Schmitt. It is said that Morgenthau gave Schmitt some of his ideas, which Schmitt then plagiarized, leading to a significant deterioration in their relationship. Regardless, Schmitt's primary critique of liberalism is that politics is not defined by law. Law is created before an event occurs. However, when a political event actually happens, trying to solve the problem by applying previously made laws to the current situation ultimately fails. Therefore, given the limitations of what law can do, who ultimately decides?

It is the judge who decides. The judge's decision on how to legally interpret the current situation by applying this law depends on the judge's decision. While the judge's decision is relatively rational, and personal opinions may be involved, especially in legal matters we encounter in daily life, which are quite procedural, when it comes to truly political issues, extremely sensitive political matters, the judge's decision-making can also be highly political. We often raise many issues regarding the political judgments of Supreme Court justices. The legal ruling itself is political. This is a slightly different topic, but it relates to the increasing 'judicialization of politics' and 'politicization of the judiciary.' However, on a higher level, issues like coups, changing the constitutional order itself, or legal issues surrounding the procedure for declaring war to defend the nation when war breaks out, or when Trump imposes tariffs using national security arguments, as he has been doing recently. He frames it as a national security issue, declaring a state of emergency. When attempting to override existing laws by declaring a national emergency, who is there to make that judgment? There is no one to make that judgment because it cannot be resolved by existing legal judgments. In this sense, liberal constitutions and liberal political orders can easily lead one to believe that politics flows automatically by being codified into law, but in reality, in very important matters, in what are called exceptional circumstances, the judgment is made by the highest sovereign, usually the president or prime minister.

That person inevitably makes a political decision. Therefore, although that person was elected according to the constitution, they are both an entity within the constitution and an entity outside the constitution. Thus, the idea that politics can be deferred to the liberal political order and that all human affairs will be governed by legal procedures is a profoundly naive, idealistic illusion. This is Schmitt's argument. While some scholars apply Schmitt's ideas to international politics, my view is that international politics is mostly an emergency situation, almost always an exceptional circumstance. Of course, there are routine aspects as well. Therefore, when we build an international order, and we talk about a liberal order, a rules-based order, or a norms-based order, what are the rules and norms of the international order we live in today? They are the various procedures created by international law scholars after or before World War II. Ultimately,

agreements, WTO treaty texts, etc. However, how can current problems be regulated by past, very fragile international laws, which international law scholars might dislike, but which have weak treaty density and significant legal gaps? Who fills these gaps? Ultimately, it can only be filled through political compromise among states. Therefore, what appears to be a norms-based order, the liberal international order, is in reality constantly filled by fierce compromises and deals, which is the fundamental tenet of realist political science.

In this context, when Trump engages in 'deals,' 'deals,' 'compromises,' 'compromise-centric approaches,' or 'dealism,' we often use these terms negatively. And when President Zelensky visited the White House, there was much talk about him having no cards. It was a very interesting statement, but ultimately, many scholars and people are disappointed that the current order is being transformed into a deal-centric, short-term interest-based international order. However, the liberal perspective has significantly concealed the political aspects of the liberal international order. This international order was built step by step from a grand compromise or a big deal starting in 1945. Therefore, an international order without deals and political compromise is impossible. Thus, all orders are fundamentally 'deal-based orders'.

Although the meaning is somewhat different from what Trump is doing, what is the crisis of the liberal order today? Has the problem arisen because it violates the norms-based order and attempts to make deals? I believe it is rather the opposite. Rather, the problem is that we have failed to make the truly important deals and compromises that are needed now, or we have delayed them, or we have lacked the capacity to do so. This is a separate discussion, but after World War II, figures like de Gaulle, Churchill, Acheson, Truman, Roosevelt, and even Stalin dealt with and resolved many issues, although it might seem like a collection of biographies. However, when President Trump was re-elected, there was significant criticism within the United States. Some scholars questioned his qualifications as a leader. There is a difference between a national leader who grows up in peacetime and a leader during wartime.

Whether humans become great through adversity is uncertain, but the foresight and breadth of thought of those who shaped the post-World War II era may differ from today's. Therefore, after maintaining a US-led hegemonic system for 30 years, it is now evident that something must change. The 9/11 attacks, economic crises, and China's rise have occurred, but these have not been well-harmonized, and the US-China conflict, or rather the US-China relationship, was actually very good before 2010. Although it may be before your life cycle, in the 2000s, when I visited China, I was already an established scholar, and the South Korea-China relationship was excellent. China genuinely wanted to learn from a country like South Korea that had achieved development and wished to maintain good relations. I am not saying the current situation is bad, but the US-China relationship was also very good then. If proactive efforts had been made by both countries or by three countries to ease the US-China relationship at that time,

the situation might not have become what it is today. If problems had been preempted and deals had been made to resolve them. Returning to the original point, looking back, a major problem with the liberal international order is the illusion that it would flow automatically based on norms or rules, when in fact it should have been built through constant compromise, political deals, or diplomatic activities. This illusion seems to have been a significant problem. Second, that liberal order, the liberal international order, is precisely that – an order. This order is an artificially designed order. If left to itself, to create its own order, it would not be an emergent order as in complex systems theory; it would be a balance of power order. Then, all states would possess military power and fight. They would fight, kill, annex territories, and eventually reach a point where they would stop fighting. That was 18th-century Europe. Thus, a balance of power, as discussed by international society theorists, is created, but at a tremendous cost, involving much warfare. However, the liberal order was created artificially after such fighting, by establishing the UN, GATT, and so on. But someone must lead this order.

Every act of creating this order involves transaction costs. Someone must lead and bear some of the costs. The failure of this order, which I sometimes refer to as 'order failure' in my writings, although the term is not commonly used, means a return to the balance of power. There is a scholar named Little who discusses balance of power. There are benign balances of power and highly adversarial ones. So, while a balance of power may seem to adjust automatically, it actually requires some agreement to achieve balance.

This is something we often discuss in security studies. In any case, a balance of power can only be achieved if there is a fundamental underlying agreement. Who creates this? The leadership that can prevent the failure of this order, particularly the public goods required for it. Just as someone must lend money to prevent market failure (the lender of last resort), someone must act as the ultimate guarantor of security to prevent war in the end (the lender of last resort or the ultimate security guarantor).

It might not have turned out as it is now. If we had preempted problems and made deals to solve them. Looking back now, a major problem with the liberal international order is that it should have been built through constant compromise, political deals, or diplomatic activities. However, the illusion that the liberal international order would automatically flow based on norms and rules was a significant problem. The second point is that the liberal order, as the name suggests, is an order. This order is a very artificially devised order. If we were to leave it as it is and say, 'Create order yourselves.' Unlike emergent order in complex systems theory, such an order is an order of power balance. So, if all states were to start with military power and fight, they would fight and kill each other, annex territories, and eventually reach a point where they stop fighting.

They fought so much that a few great powers and a few weak states emerged. That was 18th-century Europe. Thus, automatically, agreements arose, such as 'We can't fight anymore, it's too difficult,' especially needing to prevent the emergence of empires. So, what international society scholars call a balance of power as an institution is created at the cost of immense suffering. Many wars must be fought. However, the liberal order was created artificially after such fighting, by establishing the United Nations, GATT, and so on. But someone must lead that order.

All actions to create this order involve transaction costs. Someone must lead, and costs must be incurred. All of this leads to the failure of the order. We often talk about market failure, but I haven't seen the term 'order failure' before, although I use it in my book. The failure of the international system's order means a return to a balance of power. There is a scholar named Little. There are favorable balances of power and highly adversarial balances of power. So, while a balance of power may seem to adjust automatically, it actually requires some form of agreement to achieve balance.

This is something we often discuss in security theory. In any event, a balance of power can only be achieved if there is a foundational agreement underlying it. Who creates that? Leadership that can prevent the failure of that order, particularly the public goods necessary for it. We usually say that to prevent market failure, there needs to be someone to lend money at the end, and to prevent security failure, there needs to be someone like a guarantor of last resort who can prevent war when it breaks out. A lender of last resort or a guarantor of security, perhaps.

This role could be played by one country, several countries, or international organizations. This was the liberal international order, and for the past 80 years, the United States has played this role alone. It has borne almost the entire cost. While other countries have provided much assistance, when the US became strained, it would twist the arms of other countries, demanding more contributions and receiving them. You may have heard of the Plaza Accord of 1985. Exchange rates were adjusted, and various other measures were taken.

When the US faces economic difficulties, there are ways to create trade surpluses. This can involve imposing tariffs on the other party, as is happening now, or pressuring them to open their markets. Alternatively, they can devalue their currency to boost exports, or borrow money by having others buy their bonds. Fundamentally, with the existence of a reserve currency, the US has created a financial structure that allows it to maintain the liberal order through various means.

This has been the case for 80 years. While there have been periods of surplus and deficit, deficits have gradually accumulated. For various reasons, primarily military spending to maintain the world order or, as we discuss today, alliance burdens. From the US perspective, operating approximately 750 military bases worldwide (which may include non-military facilities) naturally incurs costs. Many American soldiers have died maintaining these bases, and significant expenses are involved. There are times when these costs are manageable and times when they are not, especially when the economy weakens. Currently, the US faces challenges such as an aging population, declining economic growth rates, and fiscal pressures from social security costs. When combined with events like the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2008 financial crisis, the nation's capacity to play a hegemonic role internationally diminishes. Therefore, while not strictly a law, there are bound to be fluctuations. The current level of US national debt has reached a critical crisis point, standing at $37 trillion. At an exchange rate of 1,000 won to the dollar, this amounts to approximately 43 quadrillion won. If we consider 1,200 or 1,300 won to the dollar, it would be around 50 quadrillion won, an unimaginable sum. Our national budget is about 600 trillion won. The interest alone on the US debt exceeds its defense budget, which is over a trillion won, making it the 'trillion-dollar nation.' This year, the annual interest payment on the US debt has surpassed its defense budget for the first time, a point often discussed in relation to the 'Fukuyama Limit,' which will be briefly mentioned later.

It is no longer sustainable. From the US perspective, the thought arises: 'I am struggling, yet I must continue to fund the liberal international order.' The reasons for this are another matter. Thus, this is an inherent contradiction in maintaining the liberal international order through the expenditure of a single nation. Continuing with the second point. Third, the liberal international order assumes that all states are free. Economically, based on the principle of comparative advantage, as articulated by Adam Smith and Ricardo, free market economies are considered beneficial for all international economies. Therefore, barriers are naturally dismantled. We maintain international institutions on a global scale, and consequently, it is difficult for the liberal international order to remain regional. The liberal international order inherently tends towards globalization.

Globalization and the Clash with the Liberal Order

Therefore, Professor Lee Yong-yi's argument, for instance, posits that globalization ended with World War I. Since a global-scale war had already occurred, the fundamental unit of what we consider international politics is now global. This means that whatever we do, our actions will have global repercussions. This is the situation we are in. We cannot go back to the 19th century. Then, after the end of the Cold War, there was a significant return to globalization, primarily driven by US-led neoliberal economic globalization, which brought this aspect to the forefront. However, globalization as a phenomenon can be considered quite widespread since World War I.

There are aspects that support this view and aspects that do not. While the layers of globalization—technological, ecological, ideological—have deepened and diversified, the starting point can be seen as after World War I. Of course, some perspectives look back to the 13th century or discuss ancient civilization exchanges. However, the problem is that compared to the reality of globalization, the global governance that supports it remains state-centric. The reality is globalized, but the superstructure is international, leading to continuous conflicts between the two. Liberalism presupposes that all states possess sovereignty and act freely, but this is a difficult issue. Liberalism and democracy are bound to clash.

Liberalism pursues the freedom of all individuals to act freely. When liberalism is taken to its extreme, immense inequality arises. In a situation of inherent inequality from birth, a liberal society cannot be maintained if left unchecked, regardless of ability, inheritance, or innate fortune. Therefore, communitarian values are needed to protect minorities and maintain equality, and democracy must fulfill this role. A healthy liberal democratic system is created by binding these conflicting relationships into a single political system through liberal democracy, which combines the liberal tendencies of liberalism with the communitarian tendencies of democracy. In other words, it progresses through continuous conflict. What about the international order, then? The liberal international order is purely liberal.

Therefore, the inequality between the United States and Sub-Saharan African countries will be far greater than the difference in individual abilities. In a liberal order, both countries have one vote each, so this structure of inequality will inevitably persist if left as is. While the liberal international order can be considered good in that all states participate equally, if left unchecked, it becomes a structure without accountability. From the perspective of major powers that have granted sovereignty and believe they have done all they can, since all states started from the same point and became equal, the resulting inequalities and oppressive structures are not considered problematic because the starting line was the same.

If this international order is not democratized, the inequalities and oppressive structures arising from the liberal international order will inevitably persist. While the liberal order has its merits, it has the advantage of maintaining formal equality, such as one state, one vote, as in World Population, where they fight amongst themselves. However, when divided into formal sovereignty and substantive de facto sovereignty, while formal sovereignty is equal, the inequality in substantive sovereignty is not addressed. This differs from liberal democracy. If a world government is established 100 or 200 years from now, people studying history might think, 'Back then, they said the US and poor African countries were equal, but in reality, there was a system of domination. Why did they accept such oppressive structures as natural?'

Eurocentrism and Postcolonial Issues

We currently view this order as highly beneficial, but in the future, it may be evaluated as more oppressive than imperial orders. Returning to the inherent contradictions of the liberal international order, namely, the problems that arise when liberalization occurs without liberal and democratic principles to operate it. Fourth, the current liberal order is a Western order. In the 19th century, liberal states colonized other countries through imperialism and then granted them sovereignty upon independence. However, most other regions were under imperial systems, not sovereign state systems.

Even looking at East Asia, the pre-modern era was characterized by imperial systems. Imperial systems, such as China's tributary system, involved inequality between the core and the periphery. Which system was more unequal and oppressive: the imperial system or the current sovereign state system? Naturally, it was the imperial system. The imperialistic violence that occurred when the liberal Westphalian system imperialized non-Western orders was immense. Through that violence, Third World countries were incorporated into the liberal international order. As the cost of colonial rule increased due to intensified independence movements, Western developed countries sought to maintain practical control mechanisms while granting formal sovereignty.

Over time, various problems arose. Countries that were incorporated into the Western order but harbored dissatisfaction may seek to return to their own orders when the Western order weakens. China is a prime example. China has grown within the liberal international order but is not considered fully assimilated into it. Although I will discuss this in more detail later, the revisionism of countries seeking to break away from the Western-centric liberal international order is entirely different from partially modifying the existing order.

It must be called something different because it seeks to overturn the order itself. The current Western liberal international order includes countries that have not been postcolonized or can be considered incomplete sovereign states, which have not yet fully achieved what the liberal order pursues. Korea is also in a similar situation. Korea was under China's influence within the traditional order, and during the Joseon Dynasty, it maintained relations with China through envoys. Immediately upon entering the modern state system, it was divided into two.

Incomplete Korean Sovereignty and Response to Order Change

Therefore, we have not become a complete sovereign state within the modern state system. Due to internal conflicts and the Cold War, we were divided, and responsibility for this can be debated through internal and external theories. The Republic of Korea has grown within the liberal international order and has become a prosperous nation, but it remains an incomplete sovereign state. The incompleteness of its sovereignty has been solidified by Japanese imperialism and the Cold War structure. These four points, I believe, are the inherent contradictions of the liberal international order over the past 80 years.

Consequently, we did not become a complete sovereign state within the modern state system. We were divided due to internal conflicts and the Cold War, and responsibility for this can be debated through internal and external factors. The Republic of Korea has grown into an excellent nation within the liberal international order, but it remains an incomplete sovereign state. The incompleteness of sovereignty has been entrenched due to Japanese imperialism and the Cold War structure. I believe these four factors represent the inherent contradictions within the liberal international order over the past 80 years.

I also believe that if we had known these factors in advance and managed them well, some aspects could have been changed. There may be limitations, and depending on the evaluation, the current liberal international order, while facing a crisis due to contradictions, could be upgraded to the next stage if navigated successfully. If that happens, Korea, as a representative divided nation that has grown within the liberal international order and benefits most from it in terms of exports and ideology, faces the question of what must be done to preserve it.

Strengthening relations with the forces defending the liberal international order within the United States and with other liberal-oriented countries in the West and around the world should be our primary foreign policy ideal. If the liberal order weakens and an era of balance of power or regional struggles ensues, liberal ideology will be a luxury. We stand at a crossroads where we must abandon ideology for survival and development and start anew. European countries are already in such a situation, as the United States has largely abandoned Europe, forcing European nations to defend themselves militarily. Finally, external factors such as the ecological and environmental crises, which have intensified over the past 30 years, have emerged. This has led to an exponential increase in the costs that a hegemonic power must bear to maintain order. This is because we must respond to issues like COVID-19, health crises, and climate change. While President Trump denies climate change, this is not an inherent contradiction of the liberal international order; it is a problem that has persisted since the Industrial Revolution. Although much time has passed, things can accelerate rapidly, so I will move on quickly.

Changes in the Role of the United States and Prospects for the Future International Order

What has been the nature of the US-led international order that the United States has maintained until now? The US played a significant role in creating the liberal international order and bore almost the entire cost of public goods. Therefore, a significant part of the key to resolving the inherent and external contradictions of the current liberal international order lies with the United States. Furthermore, it depends on how we approach the US and what new agreements we make. Before looking at this, let us briefly consider what will happen in the future. It is now 2025. President Trump's term will end in 2028, and the next president will serve until 2032. President Xi Jinping's term will end in 2027, and he may serve another five years from 2028 and another five years from 2033. Given the current trend and discussions about leadership changes, there is a possibility of another term. Around 2032, when the US presidential term ends, a post-seed era may arrive. For the South Korean president, President Lee Jae-myung's term will end, and if an election is held in 2030, a new president will emerge in 2031. What will the international order be like around that time? The next five to six years are expected to be a period of intense chaos and struggle.

The two leaders, Trump and Xi Jinping, will strive to secure their positions amidst the strategic competition between the US and China. The US may alter its trade structure and intervene in finance to revive its economy through adjustments made during President Trump's term, and will demand that allies, including those in Europe, contribute more to defense cost-sharing. Despite its difficulties, the US may state its intention to lead and take care of its allies, looking after the global liberal order by fostering good relations with Europe. Rather than outright confrontation with China, Russia, and others, it will demand that they determine their internal systems independently while cooperating in maintaining order. If the 2030s are organized in this manner, a new version of a rules-based order, if not a liberal order, may emerge.

Other countries will reluctantly pay more and compromise with the US, believing that adjustments are necessary even under US pressure. In this scenario, the US's role will be significantly reduced, with lower financial contributions and diminished contributions to alliances, leading to a weakening of its authority. Therefore, if the 2030s arrive with a shift from a US-centric liberal system to a collective hegemonic leadership like the G20 or G7, the confusion and anxiety we feel, which were inevitable due to inherent contradictions, may be resolved. Viewed in this light, understanding the nature of the current crisis logically and executing it well presents an entirely different realm of practice. If long-standing confrontations such as US-China relations or the Ukraine war are resolved and we move towards a new rules-based order, the 2030s could be a better era than the vague sense of anxiety suggests.

Crises facing all of humanity will be significantly amplified. The climate crisis will worsen, and issues of technological control and regulation, such as AI, will also confront us. For instance, the world could face destruction if criminal organizations exploit advanced artificial intelligence. A collective response is necessary for this, as are measures for cybersecurity and the risks posed by AI-based nuclear weapons. As we enter an era where common threats are felt more acutely than geopolitical confrontations, there are also factors that could promote global governance in a globalized world. Therefore, it is difficult to view the world order as solely deteriorating, as it currently feels. Even if the cost of maintaining order is high, the US's role may change. Until now, the US's role involved bearing significant costs and enjoying the benefits derived from it, such as its reserve currency status, nuclear monopoly, and the establishment and unilateral operation of the international system.

This role of the United States has reached a certain limit. It will be difficult to overcome unless the risk factor of increasing US federal debt is resolved. President Trump's current strategy is positioned to address the contradictions of the liberal order. If I were the President of the United States, I would need to resolve the financial burden of the liberal economic order that has been maintained alone, find solutions through political compromise, and establish a new framework to sustain the era of globalization. This is an immense calling of the times.

US Hegemony Reinforcement Strategy and the Role of Allies

This can be seen as a calling of the times for US presidents across the terms of Trump's first presidency, Biden's presidency, and Trump's second presidency. Whether President Trump personally recognizes this is uncertain, but the United States as a whole must recognize it. This requires introspection on the international order. The tariffs imposed by President Trump and the demands for increased defense cost-sharing from allies are significant. Looking at the ROK-US relationship alone, the US is a good ally to South Korea, but tariff pressures and demands for increased alliance burden-sharing are economic issues. In essence, it's a demand for more money. This approach, dubbed 'Show Me The Money Diplomacy,' leads to demands for spending 5% of GDP in exchange for ensuring strategic flexibility for US Forces Korea.

This is because the US wants South Korea to become stronger, and at the same time, it needs to check China as a competitor. According to Mearsheimer's discussion, a hegemonic power must prevent the emergence of regional hegemonic powers. If regional hegemons emerge in Asia or the Middle East, they will challenge the US, and the US seeks to prevent this. China is the primary candidate for this, and it needs the help of its allies to check China. While allies also feel threatened by China, they are less inclined to proactively check China as they are not engaged in a hegemonic competition.

This is a matter of presidential terms. This can be seen as a calling of the times for US presidents across the terms of Trump's first presidency, Biden's presidency, and Trump's second presidency. Whether the US recognizes this or not, and whether President Trump personally recognizes it, seems unlikely. However, the United States as a whole must recognize it, which will require considerable introspection on the international order. In that regard, the tariffs imposed by President Trump, the pressure on allies to increase financial contributions, and the demand to spend 5% of GDP are very significant. For example, in the ROK-US relationship, the US is a very good ally and friendly nation to us, but current tariff pressures and demands for alliance burden-sharing are economic issues. This means paying more money. This approach, currently referred to as 'Show Me The Money Diplomacy,' is equivalent to demanding that we spend 5% of GDP and ensure strategic flexibility for US Forces Korea. This is something that has not been discussed before.

This stems from the recognition that while the US wants us to become stronger, it also cannot become stronger itself without checking China, its competitor. One of the roles of a hegemonic power is to manage its allies well, but at the same time, it must check its competitors. According to Mearsheimer's discussion, the emergence of great powers in other regions may be acceptable. A hegemonic power is a state that controls the entire world, and if regional hegemons emerge in Asia or the Middle East, they will be brimming with power and challenge the US, thereby creating spheres of influence for the US. Therefore, the US seeks to prevent the emergence of regional hegemons, with China being the primary candidate. The US needs the help of its allies to check China, but allies do not necessarily feel the same threat from China, and since we are not engaged in a hegemonic competition, our intention to proactively check China is relatively weak.

Depending on the country, there is anxiety among neighboring nations due to China sharing land borders, but this does not necessarily translate into a military threat for all. However, there are aspects of the US's demand for us to join in checking China based on its own standards that are difficult for us to agree with. Therefore, the policies currently pursued by the US are a strategy to strengthen the economic foundation of its weakened hegemony and a strategy to check the hegemony of competing nations; these are inevitable structural demands of foreign policy where US hegemony clashes. This translates into demands for tariff increases and increased alliance burden-sharing for us.

This means paying more for alliance burden-sharing, spending 5% of GDP, which is double the current 2.6%. We are currently spending 50 trillion won, and the demand is to spend 100 trillion won, so we must consider where to spend the remaining 50 trillion won. We could increase soldiers' salaries or purchase better weapons, but doubling expenditures annually is practically difficult. The demand to spend 5% of GDP implicitly suggests the need to possess military capabilities for China, although this is not explicitly stated. Japan has decided to increase its defense spending from 1% to 2% of GDP over five years, explicitly viewing China as a military threat. Furthermore, there is a desire to utilize US Forces Korea for deterring China rather than North Korea. While troop reduction is discussed, the key issue is not the reduction itself but the US's desire for South Korea to agree to flexibly shift the primary target for strategic utilization of US Forces Korea to security threats in other regions, rather than North Korea.

A Washington Post article in early August was precisely about this. When our president visited the US, there was a task to conclude tariff negotiations without specific details, but more importantly, the US's position was to seek confirmation on how much South Korea could contribute to the US's strategy of reinforcing its hegemony and managing its competitors.

The Difference Between a Hegemon and a Great Power, and the Trump Variable

How we respond is a later issue; from the US perspective, there are two pillars to the strategy being pursued. These two pillars are issues that the US president must resolve as a calling of the times, making them the same for President Trump and President Biden. This is why there is much talk about Biden and Trump being similar; it's not simply inherited, but rather a strategy that must be pursued if the US does not abandon its hegemonic strategy and continues to seek leadership as a hegemonic power. It is possible to abandon hegemony and remain a great power, but the ways in which a hegemon and a great power gain benefits are entirely different. A hegemon manages the entire world and incurs immense costs but reaps very large long-term benefits. Trump, on the other hand, seeks to incur costs like a great power while gaining benefits like a hegemon, which may be due to ignorance.

President Trump will soon realize that this is impossible. Therefore, there are structural factors and individual variables related to Trump. Regarding Trump personally, there are various inaccurate examples. For instance, recently, there has been criticism within the US regarding the sale of Nvidia H2N, which was sold at Jackson Hole, with 15% paid as tax to the US government. Professor Bae Hyung-je points out that blocking all semiconductors could actually accelerate technological development, as companies like Huawei are producing many semiconductors. Thus, some scholars argue that maintaining mutual interdependence and dependence on us could serve as leverage.

On the other hand, President Trump tends to prioritize personal political gain over structural needs, even if the 15% profit from selling semiconductors goes to the government, as it has various effects on him personally. President Trump, in particular, tends to focus more on personal gain. Therefore, his meeting with Putin in Alaska tomorrow, Friday, is noteworthy to see what promises will be made. Additionally, the three-month suspension of tariffs with China is set to expire around November 10th, which is also a variable. President Trump claims to have ended five wars during his term and seeks to achieve the accomplishment of having concluded all wars early in his term and reached compromises with great power leaders.

Based on these achievements, he will likely seek dialogue with Chairman Kim Jong-un as well. He will aim to leverage these diplomatic achievements to contest the midterm elections and leave a legacy. The possibility of a third term through constitutional amendment is also being discussed these days; all these discussions fall under personal variables. While these are difficult for political scientists to analyze, it is important to see how structural and personal variables harmonize and progress.

Trump's Freeloader Discourse and the Increased Demand for Public Goods

Among the various discussions during the Trump administration, President Trump claimed that allies have been exploiting him, meaning that allies were 'freeloaders.' Recently, the term 'big food' has also been used frequently, and there is a debate about its validity. Trump is framing the inherent contradictions of the liberal international order as the unilateral sacrifice of the sole hegemonic power, which can be considered incorrect. Even if that were the case, the US has gained immense benefits, and in reality, many countries have contributed to US hegemony in various forms, so this should be viewed as the cost of maintaining a common order. In other words, it can be seen as a process of reorganizing the order.

If the US wishes to maintain this order, using coercive economic statecraft as it does now is acceptable. However, it can only be called a strategy when there is a vision for what it aims to achieve. President Trump proposes countermeasures for what is wrong but does not clarify what he is aiming for. Recent articles in the US, such as 'from the ashes,' point out the lack of a US idea for what to do after devastating the world with tariffs and neutralizing the WTO. Discussions proceed without a plan for what kind of security order is to be created while twisting the arms of allies. Therefore, it would be ideal if 'America First' or 'MAGA' were the next steps after resolving the contradictions of the liberal order; otherwise, any government that comes into power after Trump will eventually have to address this issue.

Trump's freeloader discourse is flawed, and secondly, the demand for public goods, such as climate change, has increased. The workload has increased significantly compared to what the US envisioned in 1945, including terrorism, cyber, and space. This is becoming a burden for the US, and while other countries sympathize with the demand for burden-sharing, they are not actively participating. South Korea and European countries are also not complying with the demand to increase GDP. European countries are facing various difficulties, including low economic growth, aging populations, and insufficient capacity for defense spending. Increasing defense capabilities would require considering conscription, but before the Ukraine war, European youth had little awareness of this. Therefore, it was impossible for Europe to increase its own defense capabilities without a massive shock. The situation is gradually changing due to Trump's pressure and Russia's actions, but the reality is that other countries are not actively following suit. There is also a reliance on the US to prevent the failure of this order. The emergence of figures like Trump can be seen as a drastic measure. If all of this is resolved successfully and the US emphasizes cooperation again, President Trump could be evaluated as a president who effectively played the role of a 'bad cop' in correcting the behavior of allies.

Trump's Vision and the Possibility of a Realistic Order Transition

However, if this order completely collapses, the situation will be far more dire. Secondly, what is the vision presented by Trump? In the early 19th century, after the Napoleonic Wars, four European powers formed the 'Concert of Europe' to check France. This was an international order based on compromise among great powers, a thoroughly great-power-centric realist order where weaker nations were jointly managed by the great powers. Currently, Trump's actions, without respect for the historical context or common ideology of allies, convey a nuance of great powers like China and Russia making exclusive deals, and the rest of the countries can be jointly managed. While this may differ from his actual intentions, the result of many of Trump's actions could lead to an order where the US descends into being just another realist great power, rather than an upgrade of the liberal order. Such a self-centered order based on transactions and collusion is very difficult to maintain.

Economically, the multilateral trade system is collapsing, and in terms of security, alliances, multilateralism, and global norms are shaking. The destruction of the nuclear non-proliferation norm is particularly serious. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) system, established in 1970, is an unequal treaty that grants nuclear weapons only to the P5. The nuclear-weapon states promised not to attack non-nuclear-weapon states, but this norm is being broken as Russia directly attacks Ukraine. For example, the US never mentioned the use of nuclear weapons even during the Vietnam War. However, Russia has explicitly mentioned the use of nuclear weapons, thus undermining the basic norms of the NPT system. The second pillar is the US providing nuclear umbrellas to its allies. It's a 'I have them, you can't, but I'll cover you with a nuclear umbrella' approach, but President Trump hints that this may not be possible if the cost is too high. If that happens, countries like South Korea and Japan will have no choice but to consider developing their own nuclear weapons to prepare for North Korea's nuclear threat or China's future threat. If about 20 countries with nuclear potential develop nuclear weapons, the probability of a conflict escalating into a nuclear war will increase compared to the current system of 5 nuclear-weapon states and 4 undeclared nuclear-weapon states, totaling 9 countries.

Even the detonation of a single small tactical nuclear weapon would have immense long-term effects on the global environment. It is difficult to control radioactivity, and even if it were possible with modern technology, it could lead to a dystopian world, as seen in movies, where one cannot walk the streets without a gas mask. Therefore, even if economic problems can be resolved, discussions leading to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the security domain could become a very serious issue.

The Essence of US-China Competition: Regional Competition and Order Competition

This is about US-China relations. While US-China relations are very complex, I will explain using the concept of 'sphere' or 'region' from one of my books. Everyone will agree that the US and China are competing. Competition does not negate the existence of the other party; it is a competition based on rules while acknowledging each other's right to exist. US-China competition itself can be positive if it is based on rules and norms. Just as two political parties in domestic politics compete with better policies without trying to destroy each other, the world can progress if the US and China compete without war and strive for better governance. To achieve this, they must be within a single framework, meaning a single set of rules and organizational principles. The current issue is what adjective to attach to US-China competition. Some view it as a hegemonic competition, while others see it as a strategic competition. Many lectures refer to it as hegemonic competition, but I believe it is not the whole story. There are various reasons, but what I want to discuss here is 'regional competition.'

China's plan is not to replace US hegemony within the Westphalian system, but to replace the entire 'sphere' of the US-established liberal international order. Regardless of whether this is good or bad, China has sufficient capability and motivation to break away from this liberal sphere. Therefore, US-China competition is not a fight over who becomes number one within the international order created by the US and the West, but a fight over what kind of order will be created in a completely changed global environment. This can be called 'order competition,' and some scholars refer to it as a 'multipolar world.' However, 'sphere' is more important than that. 'Sphere' implies historicity, and China possesses the know-how, ideology, and strategy for a pre-modern, China-centric order. Discussions are underway to re-implement this. The 'Chinese Dream' or China's vision for a future order nowadays is not about becoming a successor to the liberal order and doing better. It argues that it can present a better order by overcoming the problems of the liberal order, such as human rights, individualism, and war. It claims that its ideological foundation lies in China's vast spiritual civilization. If China wins this 'regional competition,' it will be a post-Westphalian order, not a post-American liberal order. The US does not understand what 'sphere' China envisions.

It is said that even the detonation of a single tactical nuclear weapon of 20 kilotons, on a small scale, would have enormous long-term effects on the global environment. Not only is it difficult to control radioactivity, but even if it were possible with recent technological advancements, it could lead to a dystopia seen in movies, where one cannot walk the streets without a gas mask. Therefore, even if the Trump administration resolves economic issues, if discussions on nuclear weapon proliferation occur in the security sector, it could lead to a very difficult situation.

This is about US-China relations. While US-China relations are very complex, I will explain them based on the concept of 'sphere' from my book. Everyone can agree that the US and China are competing. Competition does not negate the existence of the other party. That is, it acknowledges the other party's right to exist and proposes to compete together. If competition is based on rules, better norms may emerge through the process of competing while adhering to rules without war. Just as two political parties in domestic politics try to win votes with better policies without destroying each other, the world can improve if the US and China avoid war and strive for better governance with the help of other countries. To do so, they must be within a single framework, meaning a single set of rules and organizational principles.

The issue is what adjective to attach to the current US-China competition. Some call it hegemonic competition, while others call it strategic competition. The term hegemonic competition is often used, but I believe it is not the whole story.

There are various reasons. What I want to discuss here is regional competition. China's plan is not to become a hegemon replacing the US within the Westphalian system, but to replace the entire sphere of the US-established liberal international order. This is not a matter of good or bad, but because China has a great capacity and motivation to break away from this liberal sphere. Therefore, US-China competition is not a fight over who becomes number one within the international order created by the US and the West, but a fight over what kind of order will be created in a completely changed global environment. This can be called 'order competition' or a 'multipolar world.' This is a concept by scholar Plokart, which I consider an excellent one.

The reason 'sphere' is more important than Plokart's concept of order is that 'sphere' implies historicity. China has possessed know-how, ideology, and strategy for a China-centric order since before modernity, and discussions are underway to re-implement it. The 'Chinese Dream' or China's vision for a future order nowadays is not about creating a liberal order better than the US. It argues that it can present a better order by overcoming the problems of the liberal order, such as human rights, individualism, and war within the Westphalian system, and claims that its ideological foundation lies in China's vast spiritual civilization. Therefore, if China wins this regional competition, it will be a post-Westphalian order, not a post-American liberal order. The US does not understand what sphere China envisions.

The US lacks this experience, so when I converse with American scholars, they say that only South Korea truly understands what the liberal camp is and is best at grasping what the Chinese camp envisions. I believe no country has understood both camps as well as South Korea and played such a exemplary role. It has been the most exemplary ally of the US. In terms of the theory of democratic expansion, South Korea seems to be almost the only successful case of the US spreading democracy to other countries. Attempts in the Middle East have failed.

South Korea's Role and the US-China Competitive Landscape

Japan can also be considered a democratic country in practice, but considering its traditional cultural background, it is difficult to regard it as a full democracy. Among China's tributary states, Vietnam and Korea were the most exemplary. While Vietnam is also a great nation, Korea, to the extent of discussing the 'Sojunghwa' (Little China) ideology, is a country that has developed by experiencing the fundamental principles of both camps firsthand. Therefore, US-China competition cannot be viewed solely as a competition of interests and power. Figures like Mira Rapp-Hooper, who worked at the White House, advocate for 'zero-based diplomacy,' arguing that even after Trump, returning to the previous Democratic Party diplomacy will be difficult, and the international order must be reconsidered from its very foundation. This leads to academic debates about the liberal order, and the argument that it is time to re-evaluate the hegemonic role the US has played.

Even if Trump disappears, returning to the past Democratic Party line will be difficult, and the international order must be reconsidered from its foundation. This leads to academic debates about the liberal order, and the argument that it is time to re-evaluate the hegemonic role the US has played. Allies' opinions must be more considered, and basic roles must be re-evaluated. One cannot pursue values alone, nor can the importance of technology be overlooked. Therefore, even if the 2030s arrive, the situation will inevitably change, even under a Democratic administration after Trump.

Restructuring of Trade Systems and Security Strategies

Secondly, discussions are also underway regarding the trade system. Scholars like Michael O'Hanlon believe that the WTO system has reached its limits and argue for finding pragmatic and gradual approaches closer to free trade. This is referred to as 'pluralism,' and it is proposed that if it is difficult at the global level, we should start with coordinating trade, supply chains, and industrial policies among like-minded countries.

These proposals adopt a 'zero-based' approach. The proposals by Cohen and Nye are also meaningful, but they cannot shake off the feeling of being 20th-century in nature. Younger scholars like Stacee Goddard argue that we should move towards political compromise and adherence to the principle of non-interference, based on pragmatism, pluralism, and technocracy.

Even if Trump disappears, it will be difficult to return to the past Democratic Party line, and a creative framework must be established from a 'zero-based' perspective. Therefore, South Korea must have its own plan for these changes. Security strategy is also an important topic of discussion. The Trump administration's security strategy has already emerged and has been in place for about seven months.

Changes in US Security Strategy and the Role of Allies

The US government publishes documents related to its security strategy annually. The National Security Strategy, the Global Posture Review Report on the deployment of US forces overseas, and the National Defense Strategy are scheduled to be released starting this year. The core content has already been widely discussed: the threat from China is significant, and the defense of the US homeland is the top priority. To this end, cooperation from allies is crucial, and a comprehensive enhancement of defense capabilities across multiple domains, including cyber and space security, is necessary. The importance of new technologies like AI and the recovery of weakened military manufacturing supply chains are also emphasized. The US must selectively focus on East Asian security, making it unavoidable to minimize intervention in Europe and the Middle East.

Discussions on the redeployment of overseas forces are actively underway. Plans are being discussed to halve forces in Europe, deploy forces in the Asian region to the front lines while the US handles rear support, and deter China with advanced technology. The goal is to ensure deterrence without direct conflict with China. Multi-domain space operations are also being discussed.

This defense strategy aims for highly efficient homeland defense, including defense against hypersonic missiles and space surveillance and detection capabilities. It points out the problems with the current deployment situation, advocating for avoiding overly aggressive and front-line-focused deployments and strengthening long-term deterrence. The issue of allies free-riding is also raised, and the South China Sea, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula, including Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, should be considered as a single theater.

Japan must consider the role of its US military bases in the event of a Taiwan conflict, in addition to the East China Sea issue, and the possibility of North Korean provocations. Therefore, the US and Japan must prepare for this as a single warfighting space. From South Korea's perspective, while it wishes to avoid entanglement, if a war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait and US Forces Korea are involved, South Korea will inevitably be affected. This cannot be dismissed as not being South Korea's problem, and the possibility of supply route interdiction and indirect attacks on US Forces Korea cannot be ruled out.

Considering the alliance between North Korea and China, South Korea must consider ways to contribute to deterring such situations from occurring, even if it does not directly intervene. Recommendations concerning South Korea include the reduction of US Forces Korea and dedicated deterrence against North Korea, as well as the provision of US nuclear deterrence. This information has already been leaked through various channels, and it is an issue that is bound to arise due to the necessity of troop reduction, even if not explicitly discussed at the ROK-US summit.

Pathways of Future World Order and South Korea's Foreign Strategy

Looking at the logic and domains of international order change originating from the US in a general sense, it can be divided into economic and security fields. There can be several types of future world orders. The most ideal scenario is to establish global governance where all 8 billion people can live within a single political order. Considering the level of technological development, real-time communication is possible, and a political communication system based on this can be established. This is our dream, and it may be realized sooner than we think.

The worst-case scenario is fragmentation into multiple spheres where norms are not shared between spheres, leading to conflict and war. Therefore, it is important to maintain a single sphere and share norms and rules as much as possible. This sphere could be US-led or China-led. Furthermore, even if the liberal sphere is maintained, conflicts may persist. Such situations could lead to a pluralistic order, or after experiencing a major crisis, move towards a new order. Alternatively, the existing order could be painfully upgraded, recognizing common threats and reaching compromises to move towards a new global order.

South Korea's Short-Term Tasks and Mid-to-Long-Term Growth Prospects

Several pathways can be considered, and there is a logical basis connecting them. It is uncertain which pathway will materialize. The Chairman has asked me to present a single prediction, but it is not easy. I will proceed with just two or three more slides. Our foreign strategy roadmap is to establish strategies towards the US and Japan based on an understanding of the international order. Furthermore, we must identify what needs to be done from short-, mid-, and long-term perspectives. In the short term, the probability of becoming a great power and reaping benefits is low. The task for the next decade is to minimize damage amidst the conflict between great powers while simultaneously accumulating strength.

If these efforts are successful, South Korea, with its enhanced status and national power in the mid-to-long term, will be able to contribute to shaping the international order. Therefore, the core short-term objective is to deter factors that could critically impact South Korea's interests in this region. This includes preventing US-China military conflict, especially escalation into nuclear war, war on the Korean Peninsula, collapse of the Northeast Asian military balance, and militarization of conflicts. Simultaneously, economic and other issues must be addressed. If South Korea endures these situations well in the long term, it can grow into a significant advanced power in the 2030s, based on its accumulated technological capabilities, military strength, economic power, and the political maturity to support them.

To this end, strengthening military power and developing new technologies are urgent. Especially in this technological era, a painful process is expected to resolve the US's national debt problem. Increased imports and reduced expenditures are necessary, including reforms to social security systems and tax increases. Although these are politically difficult tasks, some argue that technological advancements like AI are the only way to restore US economic power and resolve national debt through productivity gains. The level of US productivity and the global economic system supporting it are key.

Fareed Zakaria of CNN points out that the claim, as argued by Trump, that the US is suffering from the global trade order and that its manufacturing industry has collapsed is not true. The number of manufacturing workers in the US is only about 12 million out of 350 million people, and the collapse of manufacturing is not a major problem for the US. Rather, the service and new technology sectors are important, and Trump's vision of American development is based on the 1960s and 70s when manufacturing was strong. The liberal trade system has brought many benefits to the US, and its economic growth rate has been favorable. Therefore, the discourse that the US is in decline is itself not true.

South Korea's Independent Development and Re-establishing Relations

Zakaria states that the sense of crisis created by Trump and the 'MAGA' project need to be verified, as there is much distortion of information. From South Korea's perspective, efforts to strengthen internal capabilities for independent development, along with re-establishing ROK-US and ROK-Japan relations, are necessary.

Modernizing the ROK-US Alliance and North Korea Strategy

The ROK-US relationship also requires a comprehensive readjustment of the alliance, not just in terms of security. The US uses the term 'alliance modernization,' which implies an expanded mission for the ROK-US alliance to counter China. We need a comprehensive plan for how to manage the ROK-US relationship, but we are not sufficiently prepared. The importance of North Korea strategy is also emphasized.

Changes in Inter-Korean Relations and the Two-State Theory

North Korea maintains a strategic stance that there is nothing to gain by improving the situation beyond the current state. This is because the economic and military benefits derived from China and Russia are substantial, and severing relations with South Korea would actually reduce its options. A closer examination of inter-Korean relations reveals that both states are unstable sovereign entities. If South Korea were to abandon unification and remain as two sovereign states, conflict factors between the two Koreas, such as border disputes or trade issues, would largely disappear. If unification is abandoned, there would be no military need to increase defense spending...

...which is a deeply ironic reality that if they were to completely separate, there would be little reason for the two Koreas to fight. However, there is a cost to abandoning unification, which we are unwilling to bear. Public opinion polls also indicate that peace and stability are prioritized over unification, suggesting that the South Korean public also favors a two-state approach. In essence, North Korea advocates for a hostile two-state theory, while we propose a peaceful two-state theory. If there were genuine certainty that unification had been abandoned, the two states could establish international relations without significant conflict. However, whether to proceed down this path is a matter of political choice. I do not believe it is a favorable path. The benefits that unification could bring are immense, and the invisible costs of division remain high; there is no need to abandon these for short-term reasons. Returning to the main point, North Korea's strategic environment is currently quite favorable, and thus it has no particular incentive to pursue denuclearization or improve inter-Korean relations. The primary reason for this is the change in the international relations environment.

Changes in North Korea's Strategic Environment and the Direction of North Korea Policy

The gap between the sense of crisis North Korea felt in 1991 or 1992, when it developed nuclear weapons, and the hope it might feel when the US-centric world order established after the end of the Cold War weakens and a bipolar system re-emerges, is very significant. In this regard, we must focus all our efforts on managing and deterring the military threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons as a priority for our North Korea policy. We must acknowledge that North Korea has little incentive to negotiate with us because it has alternatives in China and Russia, not just South Korea and the United States. Maintaining a relationship with North Korea within this context is crucial. If we ultimately believe in the restoration of the liberal international order, meaning the maintenance of the Multipolar System (MPT) and the continued pursuit of North Korea's goal of denuclearization as an illegal nuclear state, then we must continue to move in that direction. However, if we believe that the order has already changed and that the nuclear weapons order will effectively end, then we could discuss South Korea's nuclear armament militarily and establish a different relationship with North Korea. We have not yet reached that point.

Therefore, we must closely observe the future trajectory of inter-Korean relations amidst changes in the international order and, whenever possible, strive for unification and the improvement of inter-Korean relations. However, overly hasty North Korea policies that are not aligned with the timing can lead to the forfeiture of significant leverage. The judgment of whether concessions are truly necessary to gain certain benefits also involves a degree of political consideration.

International Political Variables and the Resetting of Inter-Korean Relations

In this regard, the current inter-Korean relations are less about a bilateral relationship and more influenced by international political variables. North Korea has already become a global actor participating in the Ukraine war. Therefore, in the context of inter-Korean relations, it is crucial to rethink them within the new international order, given that Russia is North Korea's almost sole ally, and China is its officially sole ally that is aiding Ukraine. I will conclude my remarks here. I wish you all a very productive time, and I hope you find the remaining lectures engaging and enjoyable. Thank you.

I hope you find the remaining lectures engaging and enjoyable. Thank you.

■ Jeon Jae-sung, Director of the Center for National Security Research at the East Asia Institute. Professor at Seoul National University.