[North Korea and the World] US Shifting Perceptions of the ROK-US Alliance Amidst the ROK-US Trade Negotiations

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2EFvvYjwIKQ

Video Script

US-South Korea Tariff Negotiations Concluded and Security Agenda

The ROK-US alliance is transforming. A ROK-US alliance that may emerge, vastly different from the one that has evolved since the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953 and the subsequent evolution into the Combined Forces Command system in 1978. Thank you to everyone watching Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. Today, we must once again discuss the United States. Or rather, the ROK-US relationship. It begins with tariffs. Rather than focusing on tariffs and trade, I will primarily discuss the remaining ROK-US consultations on security following the tariff negotiations, ahead of the upcoming ROK-US summit, and how we should prepare for them. On April 1st, an event that garnered significant attention and anxiety, President Trump spoke of mutual tariffs, but in reality, they were unilateral tariffs. While mutual tariffs involve imposing duties on a reciprocal basis between two parties, the US unilaterally imposed tariffs on South Korea and other countries, so calling them that would be inaccurate.

On July 29th, South Korea and the United States concluded what President Trump termed a 'full and comprehensive trade agreement.' This was widely reported in the media and garnered considerable public interest. I followed it closely as well. A crucial aspect was the 15% tariff rate on specific items, with a 15% tariff on automobiles and approximately 50% on steel and aluminum. South Korea's $200 billion investment in the US, though the nature of this investment is still subject to differing interpretations between South Korea and the US, and the milestone of $150 billion in cooperation in the shipbuilding sector, are also considered significant factors by many analysts.

Furthermore, an agreement was reached for the purchase of $100 billion worth of LNG. This constituted the initial agreement. Subsequently, President Trump indicated a ROK-US summit would occur within two weeks, and it is highly probable that the summit will take place this month. However, the repercussions are still considerable. As briefly mentioned, differing opinions between South Korea and the US regarding the utilization of the $200 billion have surfaced since the agreement. Additionally, there are divergent views from the US regarding the agricultural and livestock market, as we have not successfully opened it, with differing statements concerning the rice and beef markets. Prior to the tariff agreement, many anticipated discussions on security matters between South Korea and the US, but the absence of such discussions leaves a degree of uncertainty. If the July 29th agreement was indeed the first phase, then the period remaining until the summit likely marks the commencement of the second phase of consultations and negotiations.

Therefore, it is crucial for us to meticulously analyze and track the outcomes and characteristics of the ROK-US consultations to date, as well as the missing security agenda items, for future consultations and negotiations. Even if the ROK-US summit concludes successfully, it is highly probable that the US will continue to exert pressure by linking tariffs and security for the remainder of President Trump's term, which is over three years. Today, I will focus my analysis on these aspects.

Characteristics of the Trump Administration's Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Firstly, many have observed that this negotiation was exceptionally unconventional. I will refrain from further criticism of Trump. Not because I no longer feel the need to criticize, but because the current situation is so grave that instead of spending time on criticism, we must focus on how to respond to Trump's actions and minimize damage from our perspective. This applies not only to South Korea but to other countries as well. Even Europe, known for its pride, has adopted a posture of accommodating Trump, with the NATO Secretary General referring to him as 'Daddy.' Therefore, I will refrain from criticism. It is undeniable that this occurred in a highly unconventional manner. This is what we commonly refer to as presidential-centric or White House-centric decision-making. Simply put, it means Trump does as he pleases. US foreign policy traditionally operates through the State Department in a highly systematic manner.

While some presidents may exert more control, it is rare to find a US president who disregards established diplomatic norms, regulations, and systematic foreign policy decision-making processes to the extent that Trump does. It is possible this is unprecedented. A prime example occurred on February 28th, which many will recall: President Zelensky of Ukraine was invited to the White House, only for Trump to tell him, 'You have no cards,' and effectively dismiss him. This incident goes beyond mere absurdity. Ukraine has been fighting against Russia's illegal invasion to defend its liberal democracy, with the cooperation of NATO countries and South Korea. Trump's actions effectively negate and render futile all these efforts, making it a symbolically significant event that caused considerable shock. In international relations academia, this is referred to as a 'personalized international system.' This means that Trump does not prioritize any particular confrontational structure or values.

Even countries that share liberal democratic values and are Western allies can be criticized and treated unfavorably if they do not align with US interests. This was clearly demonstrated in the ROK-US negotiations. I will offer criticism only once. Trump's concept of 'mutual tariffs' is truly unacceptable. This is because South Korea and the United States have a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). An FTA is a treaty ratified by the legislatures and parliaments of both the US and South Korea. It is a treaty guaranteed by core international law between nations.

Yet, the FTA, whose objective is to reduce tariffs to zero, is effectively ignored. Most tariffs between us are already zero. Therefore, imposing a 15% tariff on South Korea under the guise of 'mutual tariffs' is simply unacceptable. My criticism ends here. It is clear that Trump demonstrated his arbitrary decision-making throughout this process, disregarding established norms, principles, and even the treaty-like nature of the FTA. As seen in the negotiations with Japan, he was observed altering numbers by crossing them out with a pen while sitting at his desk with Japanese officials. This was a display of his achievements and power to both the US domestic audience and the world.

The Trump Administration's Approach of Linking Security and Economy

This overall situation can be seen as an act that undermines the liberal international order or the rules-based international order that the US has led since 1945. The crucial point is that this pattern of Trump's behavior could be repeated in future ROK-US security negotiations. Therefore, we must be adequately prepared. Linking security and economy, as I have repeatedly stated, is not just my assertion; Trump himself has demonstrated this pattern on multiple occasions, and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin has consistently echoed similar sentiments. His statement on March 6th was particularly clear: 'Tariffs are an economic tool linked to foreign policy and security strategy.'

He made another statement recently: 'Tariffs are a political tool.' Therefore, beyond simply reshaping the economic order to their advantage, the US intends to pursue security interests and exert security pressure through tariffs, and these actions are clearly evident. Among the countries that concluded tariff negotiations with the US are key US allies. We must consider these countries as benchmarks for our future negotiations, making comparisons with them very important. Particularly, comparisons with Japan, a key partner in the Indo-Pacific region, are also crucial. First, let's briefly examine how key US allies, beyond economic issues related to tariffs, have aligned their security interests. A prime example is the United Kingdom. The UK requires little explanation; it is a country fully aligned with the US in all aspects. It is a kind of

The UK still views the US as a junior partner to some extent. While Trump's rhetoric is harsh, the US-UK relationship is not what it once was, yet the UK remains a very special country for the US, alongside Israel. Therefore, security interests did not pose an obstacle to the tariff negotiations. In Europe, there were significant conflicts, particularly among NATO countries. Even during Trump's presidency, as I mentioned on this broadcast, severe conflicts arose. However, at the NATO summit in June, there was an agreement to increase defense spending by 5%, a significantly higher level than current spending. Few NATO countries even meet the 2% target, yet they agreed to a defense spending increase of 5%, far exceeding 2%. From Trump's perspective, this was an agreement that allowed him to declare a significant political victory, thus security issues did not become a particular problem in the tariff negotiations.

It is unlikely that European NATO countries will have extensive security discussions going forward. As for Japan, after Trump's election, in December of the previous year, Japan officially announced its intention to increase defense spending to 2% of its GDP by fiscal year 2027. Furthermore, in February of this year, Prime Minister Abe met with President Trump. Security matters were discussed during this summit. Specifically, Japan pledged to co-lead peace and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, a region prioritized by the US, enhance the capabilities of its Self-Defense Forces, and purchase US-made weapons. It is important to examine Japan closely, as the concept of the 'Indo-Pacific' region, which we frequently use, was first officially proposed by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The Indo-Pacific strategy essentially aims to counter China. Japan initially proposed this concept, and the Trump administration adopted it and continues to use it.

Furthermore, during the Trump administration, the concept of the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP), a strategic concept developed by Japan for the Indo-Pacific region, was re-adopted. This signifies that the US's alignment with Japan's concept of countering China in the Indo-Pacific indicates a high degree of congruence between the US and Japan. Therefore, while Japan may still face some conflicts and uncertainties with the US regarding economic order and tariffs, security issues are unlikely to cause significant friction. However, one remaining demand for Japan is to increase defense spending, with potential pressure to raise it from the current 2% to around 5%. Another country emerging as a key US ally in the Indo-Pacific region is

the Philippines. Under President Marcos Jr., the Philippines has significantly strengthened its ties with the US. Currently, mobile anti-ship missiles possessed by the US Marine Corps are being deployed in the Philippines, and the Philippines is participating in US-led joint exercises, particularly in the South China Sea. This is ultimately aimed at countering China, with the Philippines actively cooperating in this endeavor. This implies that despite facing high tariffs, the Philippines does not appear to have conflicting security interests with the US. The reason for this lengthy explanation is that South Korea is the only country among those that have concluded tariff negotiations with the US that has not yet concretized security cooperation with the US. While we have had the Kaesong incident and the new government has been in office for a short period, there has been limited time for in-depth discussions. However, I believe that the possibility of security issues being addressed during the preparation period for the summit and at the summit itself is very high.

Transformation of the ROK-US Alliance and 'Alliance Modernization'

It has already begun to some extent. So, what is the current state of the ROK-US alliance? Specific policies regarding the ROK-US alliance and its future direction have not yet been established since the new administration took office. In contrast, the US, as I have repeatedly discussed on this broadcast, has focused almost exclusively on this issue in the first half of the year: the ROK-US alliance is transforming. I reiterate, transformation means more than mere adjustment; it is a fundamental 'transformation.' It implies that the ROK-US alliance, which began with the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953 and evolved into the Combined Forces Command system in 1978, is undergoing a fundamental change, leading to a vastly different alliance. We are now actively using the term 'alliance modernization' to describe this. For instance, at the ROK-US Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Washington D.C. on July 31st, the modernization of the ROK-US alliance was officially discussed and acknowledged by both sides.

So, what exactly is alliance modernization? A clear definition has not yet been established. However, there is one individual who is central to driving these efforts: Elbridge Colby, whom I have mentioned on this broadcast multiple times, serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development. On July 31st, Colby posted his views on X (formerly Twitter) in a concise manner. However, it contains the core elements of alliance modernization and transformation. This is not new information; it confirms what I have detailed in previous videos. First, he states that South Korea should strengthen its leadership in responding more proactively to the North Korean threat and, to this end, increase its defense budget. This is a very clear statement. These expressions, in other words, indicate that the US is no longer the primary actor in the North Korean issue but is shifting to a policy direction of ROK leadership with US support.

What does this signify? It necessitates numerous follow-up actions, or rather, concurrent actions. First and foremost is the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON). For the alliance to move towards ROK leadership and US support, the current system is the Combined Forces Command (CFC). Currently, a four-star US general commands the CFC, with a four-star ROK general serving as deputy commander. With the transfer of wartime OPCON and the envisioned 'Future Combined Forces Command,' a ROK four-star general would lead wartime operations. Regarding the transfer of wartime OPCON, Colby discussed this in his Senate confirmation hearing in March and in his 2021 book, 'Strategy of Denial,' emphasizing the need for South Korea to transition to wartime OPCON. Through this, the US aims to reduce costs. According to the current operational plan, signed last year, Operation Plan 2022, large-scale reinforcements from the US, including a significant number of US ground troops, are anticipated in the event of a large-scale conventional war on the Korean Peninsula, and current joint exercises are aligned with this. Alliance modernization implies that this will no longer be the case. That is, a large-scale US reinforcement force would not be deployed, as has not happened for over 20 years. In all processes, South Korea would take the leading role in responding to North Korean conventional attacks, with the US providing support. This would necessitate a change in OPCON and a complete rewriting of operational plans, leading to a fundamentally new situation.

Regarding the 'Future Combined Forces Command,' I will provide a more detailed explanation later. The Future CFC, as agreed upon by South Korea and the US, involves a ROK four-star general as commander and a US four-star general as deputy commander. However, there is a 'Pershing Doctrine' in the US, originating from General Pershing's era, which prohibits US forces from being placed under the command of foreign military personnel. Therefore, a US four-star general cannot serve as deputy commander under a ROK four-star general. The organizational structure of the Future CFC does not depict a clear chain of command below the commander. Thus,

this concept is quite ambiguous and uncertain, and it needs to be clarified. If this is the case, to ensure ROK leadership and US support, the current CFC system would likely need to be replaced by a parallel structure, similar to the one currently in place between the US and Japan. Furthermore, as Colby mentioned, an increase in defense spending is necessary. I believe the US has already been requesting an increase in South Korea's defense budget.

This concept is quite ambiguous and uncertain. This also needs to be clarified. If that is the case, to ensure Korean leadership and US support, it is highly likely that the current Combined Forces Command structure would need to be changed to a parallel system, similar to what the US and Japan currently operate. Another point, as Colby mentioned, is the necessity of increasing defense spending. I believe it is reasonable to assume that the US has already been requesting increased defense spending from South Korea.

At the Shangri-La Dialogue in late May, which I covered on my broadcast, Secretary of Defense Peter discussed US allies in the Indo-Pacific region, including South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, urging them to allocate 5% of their GDP to defense spending. Even European NATO allies are spending 5% to prepare for the singular threat of Russia. While South Korea was not explicitly mentioned, a criticism was raised that US allies in the Indo-Pacific region, facing both North Korean and Chinese threats, are neglecting defense spending. Upon verification with the US Department of Defense by some South Korean media outlets, it was confirmed that there was indeed a request for 5% defense spending.

China Containment and Discussion on the Role of US Forces Korea

Second, as mentioned in the context of 'alliance modernization,' the term 'regional security preparedness' is explicitly used. This phrase can be interpreted as a directive for us to counter China. Certainly, Colby is a prominent hawk on China in Washington, and in the interim National Defense Strategy guidance released in late March, China is identified as the most serious threat, using the term 'pacing threat' to describe its aggressive stance. The issue is that this stance is not limited to Colby but is also being adopted by General Paul LaCamera, Commander of US Forces Korea and UNC. General LaCamera has publicly stated on more than two occasions that the role of US Forces Korea is not confined to repelling North Korea. These are highly unconventional remarks and are significant in that the Commander of US Forces Korea is taking a different stance than before. His predecessor, General Robert Abrams, when asked a similar question regarding the role of USFK in countering China, denied any such role, stating it was limited to preparing for the North Korean threat. General LaCamera's remarks mark the first time the Commander of USFK has hinted at a role beyond North Korea, suggesting that such discussions may continue.

These discussions have already commenced and appear to be ongoing through various channels, including the aforementioned defense ministerial meeting and dialogues involving the US State Department, Department of Defense, and South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense. Discussions are reportedly taking place at the director-general level and may extend to the upcoming summit. The most critical aspect is that the US will continuously seek confirmation of the South Korean government's position. This is already happening, and the likelihood is very high. However, there is a divergence between President Trump's views and the current positions of the US Department of Defense and State Department.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper hold very negative views of China and consider it a threat. Pompeo, in particular, is a well-known hardliner against China and an anti-communist. However, President Trump's stance differs. President Trump has not clearly stated his intention to use military force to defend Taiwan in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait.

Conversely, President Biden has repeatedly mentioned a commitment to defend Taiwan, drawing strong condemnation from China. Within the US, discussions are more active than is known in South Korea regarding whether the value of defending Taiwan warrants a full-scale war with China. These discussions are being seriously raised not only by hardliners like Mike Pompeo but also by pro-Trump strategists within the Republican Party. President Trump is at the center of these discussions, and he consistently states that if China attacks Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait, he will resolve it through tariffs.

President Trump's Security-Related Demands

Instead, he is demanding that Taiwan spend ten times its current defense budget and take responsibility for its own defense. Therefore, there is a difference between the mainstream strategic and defense department positions in the US, which view China as a threat and consider the conflict in Taiwan significant, and President Trump's views. What is important for us, then, is to understand President Trump's position during the preparation process for the ROK-US summit. As explained at length, regardless of the preparations made by the State Department or the Defense Department, the final decision rests with President Trump. Just as he decided on the tariff issue, even if all departments such as Commerce, Treasury, and the USTR prepare, the ultimate decision-maker is President Trump. Therefore, it is crucial to understand what President Trump will demand from South Korea in the security domain at the ROK-US summit. President Trump has three key points in mind regarding security.

First, South Korea is not bearing its fair share of defense costs and is contributing a very small amount. He has publicly criticized South Korea as a 'money machine.' Second, South Korea should bear the costs of combined exercises and the deployment of strategic assets. President Trump holds a very negative view of combined exercises and the deployment of strategic assets, deeming them provocative and expensive war games. Third, as recorded in the memoirs of former high-ranking officials in the Trump administration, such as former Secretary of Defense Esper and former Secretary of State Pompeo, he desires the withdrawal of US Forces Korea. These three points are the core security-related agendas concerning South Korea in President Trump's mind, and they represent a structured line of thought.

Preparation for Security Challenges and Future Outlook

All of this logically connects to the argument that if South Korea does not bear its proper costs and responsibilities, the US will not maintain its troop presence. Therefore, this issue is likely to be on President Trump's mind and could arise during the preparations for or the summit itself. We need to be prepared for this. It is a very difficult issue because increasing the cost-sharing for defense is already a matter that was agreed upon in the 12th ROK-US Special Measures Agreement (SMA) last year, has been ratified by the National Assembly, and is scheduled to take effect from next year. This agreement would need to be nullified. Similar to the issue of tariffs, while the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was ratified by both the South Korean and US legislatures, the SMA was only ratified by the South Korean National Assembly. It is questionable whether President Trump will respect this, and even if new negotiations were to occur, there is a serious concern about whether public opinion within South Korea could accept it.

However, we must consider that President Trump may disregard such procedures. If he were to demand costs for combined training and strategic asset deployments, the amount would be astronomical. We still need to deliberate on our response to this. If these demands are not met adequately, and South Korea's level of cooperation in containing China falls short of US expectations, the possibility of fundamental changes to the US Forces Korea cannot be ruled out. I believe the tariff negotiations have been largely concluded successfully. However, the remaining security-related challenges could arise during the ROK-US summit in the short term, and if this issue is not resolved thereafter, discomfort in ROK-US security relations is likely to persist throughout President Trump's term. I will conclude here for today. Thank you.

Park Won-gon, Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute, Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

Managed and Edited by: Lim Jae-hyun, EAI Research Fellow
Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhim@eai.or.kr

Managed and Edited by: Lim Jae-hyun, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhim@eai.or.kr