[9th EAI Academy] ③ China's Global Strategy and the Future of the Korean Peninsula

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g3CbZxANJC0

Video Script

Welcome. I am Lee Dong-ryul. Today, we will talk about China. Most of you are in your 20s, 30s, right? Yes. You can use this keyboard for screen transitions. China, which you dislike. However, you responded that it is important. This is from a public opinion poll. Paradoxically, it can be said to be a very important task from the perspective of South Korean diplomacy. It is easy to get along with good countries.

This is because we are in a situation where we have to get along with a country that is important but disliked. Therefore, I intend to focus on understanding China's intentions. I will mainly talk about China's world strategy. If possible, I will interpret and explain it in my own way, as I have been studying China for a long time. That way is to interpret through the voices of the Chinese people, what they say.

There have been many other ways of interpretation. Through IR theory or other relationships, or through inference, but I think we have neglected the attempt to interpret and understand by bringing in the voices of the Chinese people. It is our responsibility, but China also constantly presents stereotypical narratives, so we have tended to overlook or ignore them, thinking there is no need to listen anymore. However, in my opinion, the content of today's class is to revive these narratives and ponder and understand together what China is actually saying, the intentions, strategies, and inner thoughts contained in those words.

This is a very big question. Does China have the will and capability to create a new international order? As the strategic competition with the United States intensifies, the world order is becoming uncertain, unstable, and shaken. What exactly is China thinking as it engages in strategic competition with the United States? Does it have the will or capability to create a new world order as a great power that can surpass or replace the United States as a global leader? We will try to see this through the wording China uses. And then, in order, I will discuss what it means for the Korean Peninsula and Korea-China relations.

Decadal Changes in China's World Strategy

I have organized the changes in China's world strategy from the 1970s, when China began to emerge on the international stage, to the present. There is a certain pattern. It changes almost every decade. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping emerged and pursued reform and opening-up policies, leading to remarkable development and expansion of national power. As national power expanded, foreign policy strategies have also changed sequentially. China has been gradually expanding its participation in the existing international order, centered around the United States and Western countries, increasing its voice within it, and is now evolving to a point where it raises suspicions that it may be trying to modify that order to create a new China-led order. This is a chronological summary of that content.

After joining the UN in 1972, China consistently expressed a resistant stance, opposing hegemony, until its emergence in global affairs. Although China joined the UN in 1971, it remained a resistant state to the existing international system and order in the early to mid-1970s.

Then, in the 1980s, with the start of reform and opening-up in 1978, China declared its commitment to economic growth and prioritized external cooperation. From then on, China began to selectively participate in international organizations and institutions that were suitable and aligned with its economic modernization goals. It applied for membership in the IMF, World Bank, ADB, and GATT, the predecessor to the WTO.

During this period, its foreign policy strategy was proclaimed as 'independent and autonomous diplomacy.' This is quite ironic. While China emphasized external openness and cooperation more than ever before, it paradoxically described its diplomacy as independent and autonomous. This was because it feared and guarded against potential vulnerabilities in its domestic system that could arise from external openness. Therefore, despite advocating for independent and autonomous diplomacy, it actively pursued external openness and cooperation. Then, in the 1990s, another change began to occur.

Throughout the 1980s, as China selectively participated, many countries in the international community began to criticize China as a 'freeloader.' It was criticized for selectively participating only in international organizations that were beneficial and helpful to it, while evading the responsibilities and obligations associated with participation. Amidst such criticism, China's attitude began to change in the 1990s. It started participating not only selectively but also in international organizations related to human rights and security, which it had previously avoided, for the sake of system stability and preservation.

Representative examples include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and covenants related to social and human rights. Consequently, in 1997, China began to use the phrase 'responsible great power.' This was the first time China referred to itself as a great power, emphasizing that it would be a responsible one. In other words, it was an expression of becoming a nation that fulfills its responsibilities, not a freeloader.

However, the international community began to focus on the 'great power' aspect rather than 'responsibility,' and discussions emerged that China was finally revealing its true intentions. In the process, China gained an unexpected opportunity: the 1997 Asian financial crisis. This crisis, often referred to as the IMF crisis in Korea, paradoxically contributed significantly to China's image as a responsible nation.

At that time, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji made a wise decision. Although China faced criticism that its excessive export-oriented policies and exchange rate policies were partly responsible for the financial crisis, China actively responded and made gestures of effort to overcome the Asian financial crisis. In contrast, the United States, through the IMF, imposed harsh structural adjustments on Asian countries, leading to a decline in its image, while China's image improved. At that opportune moment, the rhetoric of 'responsibility' that China had been using began to gain credibility.

Then, in the 2000s, China adopted an attitude of seeking a leading role within international organizations and institutions, moving beyond mere participation. Examples include the Forum for Central Asian Cooperation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It created the first international organization named after a Chinese city, led by China. Previously, China had been a country that maximized its benefits by joining the international system and institutions created by the United States, fulfilling minimal obligations and responsibilities. Now, it has evolved to the point of creating China-led international organizations named after Chinese cities.

The most symbolic event is its accession to the WTO in 2001. How do you remember 2001? The biggest issue in 2001 was the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It was a shocking event for the United States, which became bogged down in the war on terror for a decade. How does China remember 2001? China considers it the year of globalization and the starting point of its leap forward. This is because it finally achieved accession to the WTO in 2001. China had applied for membership in GATT, the predecessor to the WTO, but was unable to achieve it due to US opposition, finally joining in 2001. Indeed, after joining in 2001, China achieved high growth rates exceeding double digits, as if a giant dragon had grown wings.

It can be argued that China's substantive and full-fledged rise as a great power began after its accession to the WTO in 2001. Although the reform and opening-up policy started in 1978, it laid the foundation, and the policy faced internal debates about its continuation after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, which led to a systemic crisis. However, overcoming this, Deng Xiaoping continued to pursue the reform and opening-up policy, culminating in WTO accession.

Subsequently, in the early 2000s, China successively introduced discourses related to its development, such as 'Peaceful Rise' (和平崛起), 'Peaceful Development' (和平發展), and 'Harmonious World' (和諧世界). Initially, it was 'Peaceful Rise.' The term '崛起' (jueqi) was difficult to interpret, and the media at the time simply translated it as 'rise.' It's 'jueqi,' not 'gulbi.'

Yes. Thank you for the laugh. I thought no one would laugh. 'Jueqi' means 'to stand tall,' indicating a rapid ascent. What was China trying to convey with this term? China wanted to emphasize 'peaceful' (和平) in its rise. It wanted to convey that its rise was peaceful. However, the international community began to fear China because of the word 'jueqi,' meaning 'rise.' Thus, even the term 'Peaceful Rise' was met with suspicion, and it was abandoned after only a year due to the controversy. It then immediately shifted to the term 'Peaceful Development.' From this point on, as seen in the 'responsible great power' theory of the 1990s and the 'peaceful development' and 'peaceful rise' of the 2000s, it became difficult for China to deny its development. The issue was that as China developed rapidly and unexpectedly, its rise attracted global attention, and it faced challenges such as US containment and the 'China threat' theory.

Therefore, China began to use wording that conveyed that while it was developing, it was not threatening. It stated that it would fulfill its responsibilities to the international community and rise peacefully. In succession, the United States, facing the 2008 financial crisis originating from the US, in addition to the 9/11 attacks in 2001, began to show signs of decline faster than expected. In contrast, China, after joining the WTO in 2001, hosted the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and the Shanghai Expo in 2010, effectively showcasing its emergence to the world.

Diversified Diplomatic Discourse in the Xi Jinping Era

Following this trajectory, the current Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, came to power in 2012. It seemed as if Xi Jinping took power at the climax of China's rise. During the Xi Jinping era, unlike previous periods, an unprecedentedly large number of diverse diplomatic discourses have been produced from 2012 to the present.

Following this trajectory, the current Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, came to power in 2012. It seemed as if Xi Jinping took power at the climax of China's rise. During the Xi Jinping era, from 2012 to the present, an unprecedentedly large number of diverse diplomatic discourses have been produced.

Spearheaded by this China-specific major power diplomacy, concepts such as a new type of international relations, a community of shared future for mankind, and reform of the global governance system, including GDGS, began to be introduced. Simultaneously, China advocated for the reform of existing international systems and organizations, and even began to create new alternative mechanisms that could compete with existing international systems and institutions. These include the AIIB and NDB. The AIIB, led by China, was established despite the existence of the ADB and has achieved significant success. The NDB was established as a development bank for Latin America, and China began to create such international organizations by leveraging its accumulated capital. This pattern bears a strong resemblance to the post-World War II era when the United States established the World Bank and IMF to foster European recovery, ushering in the 'Pax Americana' era.

Consequently, there was significant debate in the international community regarding the implications of these Chinese initiatives, and concerns and perceptions of threat regarding China's rise began to spread. However, amidst this situation, the term 'New Normal' emerged. What does this term signify? While 'New Normal' sounds positive, like a new standard, it is actually an economic term.

In other words, it signifies the end of the era of high-speed growth that China enjoyed from 1978 to the 2010s. The era of high-speed growth has ended, and an era of medium-to-low-speed growth has arrived, and this is explained as the new normal. We must accept this. In essence, the era of high-speed growth that China once enjoyed is over. Although the Xi Jinping era appeared highly expansive and outward-looking, the domestic political and economic situation in China was actually becoming increasingly difficult.

Perhaps because of this, Xi Jinping began a long-term rule, contrary to the expectations of the international community and the Chinese people. He amended the constitution to remove the term limit for the state president, breaking the unwritten agreement of two terms, or a 10-year tenure, observed by leaders before President Hu Jintao. He has already been in power for 13 years, and it is uncertain how much longer he will remain. This has caused significant controversy.

In the process, the Xi Jinping administration encountered two unexpected and significant obstacles. The first was the emergence of Trump. To make matters worse, the COVID-19 pandemic spread during Trump's term, subjecting China to containment and pressure from Trump, and leading to a severe deterioration of its image in the international community due to the pandemic. This material illustrates the changes in the flow of China's diplomatic discourse during the Xi Jinping era, particularly after the second term. It summarizes the speeches delivered by the Chinese Foreign Minister at the end of each year, outlining the direction and goals of diplomacy for the following year. Several patterns and characteristics are evident. The first priority consistently emphasized is China's domestic development.

In 2020, 2021, and 2022, in addition to development, emphasis was placed on creating an environment conducive to the Party Congress. In particular, the 20th Party Congress was a period of political transition and transformation, as Xi Jinping sought to begin his third term beyond two terms, attempting very new initiatives. This demonstrates that Chinese diplomacy consistently prioritizes domestic development or domestic system stability as its primary goal. Concurrently, content related to national interests and core interests is always included. The third aspect is international openness and multilateral cooperation.

Despite being a major power, China uniquely focuses on economic growth based on external cooperation. This reality also makes it inherently more vulnerable to tariff pressures, such as those from Trump. This is the trend observed. In 2023, the most recent high-level diplomatic meeting, the 'Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference,' was held. This conference takes place every five years, and a significant change occurred at this meeting. What are your thoughts?

China originally had its own diplomatic framework. Chinese foreign affairs targets are broadly categorized into major power diplomacy, peripheral diplomacy, developing country diplomacy, and multilateral diplomacy, with each expressed in Chinese with its own importance and role. While these expressions indicate that 'all are important,' their nuances differ slightly. If there is anyone proficient in Chinese, could you explain their meanings? Ultimately, among major power, peripheral, developing country, and multilateral diplomacy, which is considered the most important?

Based on that content, 'major power' (大国) is expressed as 'key' (关键), 'peripheral' (周边) as 'top priority' (首要), 'developing countries' (发展中国家) as 'foundation' (基础), and 'multilateral diplomacy' (多边外交) as 'important stage' (重要舞台). Key, top priority, foundation, important stage. Does this mean 'key' is the most important? Isn't 'top priority' also very important? At first glance, major power and peripheral diplomacy seem very important to China.

Traditionally, China has placed great importance on diplomacy with developing countries, as it claimed to be a developing country and a leader of developing countries. However, in practice, it has prioritized peripheral diplomacy. Compared to other major powers like the United States or the Soviet Union, the most significant difference for China is its highly complex periphery. How many countries do you think share a border with China?

There are 16 countries. Including those with maritime borders, it's about 20 countries. That's a lot. It shares borders with 16 countries. Starting with North Korea, it borders Russia, Mongolia, Central Asian countries, and Southeast Asian countries like Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Among these 16 countries, how many can be considered highly trusting and closely aligned with China, similar to the US alliance system?

Does no country immediately come to mind? North Korea is often mentioned, along with Laos and Cambodia. In fact, the country China has the most trusting and close relationship with is Pakistan. It has a very complex relationship with North Korea, Laos, and Cambodia. Excluding countries China can trust, it has either been at war with, had conflicts with, or has very sensitive relationships with the remaining countries. China recognizes from its long historical experience that stabilizing its border regions is crucial for its regime stability. Stability in the periphery is essential for regime stability, which in turn allows for the expansion of China's diplomacy.

Evolution of China's Diplomatic Framework: Global Initiatives

Therefore, in line with this understanding, Xi Jinping prioritized peripheral diplomacy at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference in 2014. This was likely due to the judgment that regime stability was paramount. Then, at the start of his second term in 2018, he began to emphasize 'major power diplomacy.' This was likely because, by the second term, leaders typically move beyond operating with previous administration officials and begin to implement their own policies. Thus, in 2018, major power diplomacy was pursued. At the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference held in 2023, two years ago, it moved beyond the previously mentioned frameworks of major power, peripheral, developing country, and multilateral diplomacy.

It evolved into a more expansive concept called 'Global Initiatives.' China began to present a vision to the world. The core content of the Global Initiatives can be summarized into two points, in my view. One is multipolarity, and the other is economic globalization. These are the focal points. But what do they mean? Looking back, China needed to create an international environment that would allow it to continue its modernization and economic growth under the 'New Normal,' a new economic situation characterized by medium-to-low-speed growth.

China argued that economic globalization is important because growth through external openness and cooperation remains crucial for China. However, the actual environment was rapidly shifting towards protectionism globally, symbolized by the emergence of the Trump administration, and competition between major powers intensified. China judged this environment to be highly unsuitable and unfavorable for economic growth through external cooperation and made these arguments to improve it. If we look only at the content, 'Global Initiatives,' 'multipolarity,' and 'economic globalization,' especially 'multipolarity,' seem to express China's desire to create a new order beyond the US-led unipolar system. However, upon closer examination, it is interpreted not as containing such grand dreams, but rather as an effort to create an environment conducive to building Chinese-style modernization.

Earlier this year, the 'Central Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference' was held. This was the first such conference in 12 years since the 'Peripheral Diplomacy Work Symposium' held at the beginning of the Xi Jinping administration in 2013. It raises the question, 'Is it peripheral diplomacy again?' However, this differs slightly from the 'Peripheral Diplomacy Work Symposium' of 2013. The word 'Central' has been added. Examining what was discussed, it addressed responses to de-risking initiatives pursued by the US, such as strengthening supply chains and industrial chains. It also included strengthening strategic mutual trust with neighboring countries to solidify the network of peripheral nations. This can be interpreted as a response to the containment and pressure tactics employed by the Trump and Biden administrations, leveraging their alliances against China. The goal is to manage various conflict factors, such as disputes, contradictions, territorial issues, civilian exchanges, climate change, and infectious diseases with neighboring countries, to stabilize the periphery and turn neighboring countries into allies. Finally, the inclusion of 'strengthening the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee' in the 'Diplomatic Work Conference' appears related to the preceding word 'Central.' This indicates that the central government places great importance on control and stability not only in peripheral regions but also within China's domestic regions.

In reality, if you examine it closely, China is a very peculiar country. It is highly unusual for a country of China's size to maintain a centralized, unitary Communist Party one-party system for over 70 years. At this scale, it would be common to adopt a federal system like the United States, or like the Soviet Union, which later fragmented, or to divide into multiple countries like Europe. However, China is unique in that the Communist Party's one-party rule has integrated and led the entire country as a single entity. This presents a significant challenge and task for China.

Simultaneously, it carries the risk of a complex border situation. The reason for emphasizing this is that although China has achieved remarkable development in terms of national strength, appearing to be emerging as a new leader surpassing the United States, there are underlying structural vulnerabilities. These are the complex peripheral relationships and the maintenance of a one-party system under the Communist Party. However, China cannot abandon these.

Preserving these is inevitably a core task for Chinese leaders, especially Xi Jinping. Without this, becoming a global leader or creating a new world order is unimaginable. This must be a prerequisite, and it is evident here that this prerequisite represents an immense challenge and task for China. What Xi Jinping calls 'major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics' is interpreted by the international community and researchers as 'China's great power diplomacy.'

Yes. Preserving these is inevitably a core task for Chinese leaders, especially Xi Jinping. Without this, becoming a global leader or creating a new world order is unimaginable. This must be a prerequisite, and it is evident here that this prerequisite represents an immense challenge and task for China. What Xi Jinping calls 'major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics' is interpreted by the international community and researchers as 'China's great power diplomacy.'

Community of Shared Future for Mankind and New Type of International Relations

China has never referred to itself as a 'strong power.' To my recollection, it has used the term 'great power.' It is true that China is a great power, meaning large in size, and it has indeed become strong. However, it does not refer to itself as a 'strong power.' Such expressions are interpreted as indicating that China has begun to earnestly consider itself a strong power. The two main pillars that China is building are the 'Community of Shared Future for Mankind' and the 'New Type of International Relations.'

Regarding the 'Community of Shared Future for Mankind,' China has used the expression 'within you, there is me, and within me, there is you.' This is a phrase often used in romantic relationships, signifying a sense of community. What China aims to convey through this is that its growth and rise will not be a challenge or threat to neighboring countries, but rather an opportunity. In other words, as China grows, neighboring countries can also grow together.

China advocates for shared growth through cooperation. This implies a request for assistance rather than fear, apprehension, or obstruction of China's growth. If this is provided, neighboring countries can also grow. What is the reason for using such an expression? When meeting with Chinese scholars, I have sometimes pointed out that this expression is somewhat peculiar. When hearing the phrase 'community of shared future' (命运共同体, mingyun gongtongti), which is translated as 'minggong' in Chinese, how would it sound if China said to our country, 'You and I are a community of shared destiny'?

It would likely trigger fear and apprehension. Therefore, initially, the English expression 'common destiny' was used directly. This was negatively received by Western societies. The Chinese expression is similar. Japan, during its past occupation of Asia, used a similar phrase, 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,' which carries negative connotations. Thus, the English expression was changed.

'Share the future of mankind' implies sharing future development, and the wording itself can be conveyed. However, the Chinese expression 'community of shared future for mankind' is still conveyed to Asian countries. This is different from the imposed universality under the name of existing American-style universalism. China's proposal is to create an environment where diverse development paths and methods, such as Chinese, American, and Korean styles, can coexist and prosper. The core point is that China still wants to grow further.

The 'New Type of International Relations' is similar. 'New type' means a new international relationship. So, what was the 'old type'? The old type generally refers to the power politics among great powers in realist international politics, meaning relationships of competition, confrontation, and conflict. China claims that its rise will not lead to competition and conflict among great powers, and that it can create a new form of international relations. In other words, it asserts that it will not fall into the Thucydides Trap.

According to the Thucydides Trap theory, when a rising new power challenges an existing hegemonic power, conflict and friction can occur, leading to war. It's like how there cannot be two leaders in an alley. However, China argues that two powers can coexist. It wants to coexist peacefully with the United States without being feared or contained by China's rise. It wants to coexist and prosper peacefully.

The sole precondition is the protection of China's core interests. If only these are protected, China can coexist and prosper peacefully with the United States. This is the core content of the New Type of International Relations. Concrete methods proposed include the Belt and Road Initiative and the reform of the global governance system. International political scientists interpret this as an attempt by China to modify or dismantle the existing international order and create a new China-led order.

Interpreting China's expressions literally, it is an argument to correct the problems of the existing governance system. It is not about dismantling or creating something new, but about improving the existing system's shortcomings. The existing international order was created under US leadership, and China's interests or voice were not reflected. China now argues that as its role and voice have grown within this system, it must be modified to reflect this. However, from the US perspective, this can be seen as an attempt to disrupt the existing order.

The United States fears China's rapid rise. The Thucydides Trap theory posits that regardless of the challenger's intentions, when a new nation emerges, the existing hegemonic power preemptively initiates conflict to suppress the challenger. Since the reform and opening-up policy in 1978, China's national strength has increased, and its participation and cooperation in the existing international system have expanded. South Korea has moved from selective participation to comprehensive participation, and is now even creating new institutions like the AIIB. China has evolved and changed in accordance with its expanding national power.

China First and Chinese Modernization

China may go further and create a new world order and institutions, as the United States fears. China's diplomatic discourse and vision have evolved from independent, autonomous, responsible great power to peaceful rise, and now to Chinese-style great power diplomacy. There are characteristics that differ from the Xi Jinping era compared to previous periods. What has remained consistent from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping is the pursuit of 'enriching the country and strengthening the military' (富国强兵). This is in the same vein as 'China First.' It raises the question of whether a nation that prioritizes its own national interests has the right to be a global leader.

Like Trump's 'America First,' China has consistently advocated for 'China First.' This has not significantly changed during the Xi Jinping era. Does a nation that prioritizes its own national interests have the right to be a global leader? Trump's logic of 'let's just take care of ourselves' is an expression of a diplomatic strategy aimed at creating an international environment conducive to China's high-speed growth through its open-door policy. It is a plea not to contain China's rise, but rather to help it.

China's major power diplomacy also does not deviate significantly from this line of thought. What has changed is the apparent abundance of visions and discourses. The explanatory materials are extensive enough to form a booklet. This can be interpreted as having much to say and grand visions. However, upon examining the content, there is no significant change from the 'China First' trend. The theory of a community of shared future for mankind, new international relations, GSI, GDI, GCI, etc., are similar.

Another point is that 'independent, autonomous, and responsible' rise, and the concept of 'peaceful rise,' contain strategies for maximizing China's national interests. As China rose, it faced criticism of being a 'freeloader' and began to talk about being a responsible great power. After rapid growth and trade dominance post-2001, which generated suspicion, it proclaimed itself a peace-loving nation that would rise peacefully. This is a self-centered and private narrative.

However, during the Xi Jinping era, China presents its role and blueprint for the international community as a global leader. It offers a vision of 'the direction the international community should take.' The New Type of International Relations and the Community of Shared Future for Mankind are prime examples. Furthermore, China speaks about the future, stating that there will be no conflict or clashes during the power transition process, even as it rises. This is an approach on a different level from the past. Therefore, more attention is paid to the diplomatic discourse of the Xi Jinping era.

However, upon closer examination of the content, it does not deviate significantly from the existing 'enrich the country and strengthen the military.' During the Xi Jinping era, the expression 'Chinese characteristics' is particularly emphasized. The most significant feature of China's great power diplomacy is its 'Chineseness.' Can this gain traction as a standard for a new world order?

What are your thoughts on the expression 'Chinese characteristics'? Is it friendly? Do you think Chinese characteristics are worthy of being a model? Would people in Vietnam, Japan, or Korea find it more relatable? If it were American characteristics, there would be a tendency to consider it a model. We have unknowingly adopted many American characteristics, and even in terms of appearance or cosmetic surgery trends, we often follow American styles. But what exactly are Chinese characteristics?

Confucianism is included, but it is very complex. In the Xi Jinping era, efforts are being made to restore Chinese traditions by invoking Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Confucius, but there is a strong adherence to Confucianism. In any case, do you believe that what is presented as 'Chinese characteristics' can become a global standard, as America did? Frankly, I am not favorably inclined towards Chinese characteristics. But why would one argue for it?

That's right. Unknowingly, even if we don't want to admit it, at some point we have adopted many American characteristics. The same applies to appearance and cosmetic surgery trends. Asking for larger eyes or a higher nose bridge is an American characteristic. But what are Chinese characteristics? Confucianism is included, but it is very complex. In the Xi Jinping era, efforts are being made to restore Chinese traditions by invoking Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Confucius, but there is a strong adherence to Confucianism.

In any case, do you believe that what is presented as 'Chinese characteristics' can become a global standard, as America did? Frankly, I am not favorably inclined towards Chinese characteristics. But why would one argue for it?

Exactly. Therefore, I personally interpret it as a lack of will. To persuade and gain understanding from countries worldwide, one must present something that has universality, is universally valid, and can serve as a standard. Of course, highlighting the distinction from the United States is an important point, but secondly, one must present universal values that many people around the world can empathize with. However, approaching it with 'Chinese characteristics' clearly defines the target audience. It will be very effective for the 1.4 billion Chinese people. The assertion by President Xi Jinping that he would realize the 'Chinese Dream' is likely in this context.

When asked about the content of the 'Chinese Dream,' he replied, 'the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.' China has consistently emphasized independence, self-reliance, peace, and prosperity, asserting that its rise poses no threat. Therefore, President Xi Jinping's sudden assertion of 'the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation' was highly unusual. In my view, China is very hesitant to officially use the term 'nationalism.' While it may be used academically, it is rarely employed in general discourse.

The reason is that China is a multi-ethnic country. When one says 'nationalism,' it can become ambiguous which nation is being referred to. Of course, President Xi Jinping mentions the 'Chinese nation,' but the 'Chinese nation' is a concept we call an 'imagined community.' The 'Chinese nation' has not existed as a tangible entity. It is a term used to encompass the 56 ethnic groups residing within China's current territory. However, objectively, it appears to be Han-centric, with the other 55 ethnic minorities merely being minorities. If China were to openly advocate for 'Han-centrism,' it could pose a problem for China, which emphasizes integration as a multi-ethnic state. Therefore, China explains that 'nationalism' and the 'Chinese nation' are not the same concept.

China does not directly mention 'nationalism.' Furthermore, 'nationalism' could be linked to the exclusivism that China avoids in its rise. Since the reform and opening up in 1978, China has consistently prioritized external openness. President Xi Jinping's call for 'the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation' and his efforts to restore Chinese traditions are, in fact, nationalistic in nature. We can call this nationalism.

However, China is reluctant to acknowledge it as nationalism. The reason President Xi Jinping began to directly address the sensitive topic of 'nationalism' appears to be a lack of grounds to legitimize the Communist Party's rule amidst the economic crisis known as the 'new normal.' To achieve internal unity and cohesion, he likely felt compelled to advocate for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, a glorious past era, a renaissance.

This can be interpreted as an assertion: 'If you follow me, unite around the Communist Party, and accept my long-term rule, I will bring about rejuvenation again.' However, in reality, although China recorded double-digit growth after the reform and opening up in 1978, its growth rate has halved, struggling to maintain even 5%. Even 5% is higher than the global average, but for China, a halving of the growth rate could lead to serious problems such as a doubling of unemployment.

This is a crisis situation. In such a crisis, it has become very difficult to boost growth rates again. The Communist Party regime must be maintained amidst spreading protectionism and intense US scrutiny. In this context, I believe this is an argument targeted at the domestic base. Paradoxically, this puts China in a dilemma, inevitably provoking greater vigilance and concern from the international community. China's global strategy is to present a grander vision under worsened conditions than the existing 'enrich the country and strengthen the military' theory; it is an internal vision put forth by President Xi Jinping to maintain power. Furthermore, the statement 'we are not trying to catch up with or surpass the United States' is implicitly contained within it in international relations. However, as mentioned earlier, this carries very important preconditions.

The Taiwan Issue and China's Core Interests

The core is 'sovereignty, security, and development.' This is a very comprehensive concept. The biggest issue China faces now is the Taiwan issue. There are concerns that China might invade Taiwan and analyses suggesting rising instability in Taiwan. There are also analyses that China's power is growing and that President Xi Jinping is staking his legacy on the reunification of Taiwan. While many Taiwan war scenarios are emerging, Taiwan could become an Achilles' heel for China.

The Taiwan issue has not suddenly emerged, but it has become extremely important recently. The United States and China fiercely debated the Taiwan issue during the normalization of relations negotiations, and an agreement was reached based on this. Therefore, they were already aware of the existence of the Taiwan issue. It has been an issue for nearly 50 years since Kissinger's visit to China in 1972. However, why is it suddenly being discussed at this juncture as an issue directly linked to our security? The Taiwan issue has been the most effective card the United States could use to check or pressure China.

I do not believe China has ever initiated the Taiwan issue. It is when the United States pressures or utilizes it that China determines the intensity of its response. After President Trump's election, the tacit framework of maintaining the status quo on the Taiwan issue, which had been in place, began to break down. Then-President-elect Trump called the President of Taiwan. This was the first such event in U.S.-China relations since 1972.

From then on, the Taiwan issue began to worsen. From President Xi Jinping's perspective, the greatest fear and concern regarding the Taiwan issue is Taiwan's independence. It is difficult for Taiwan to become independent on its own. I am concerned that the United States is instigating and provoking Taiwan's independence.

Do the Taiwanese people want independence? Public opinion polls show that the Taiwanese people do not want independence either, because it is too dangerous. So, how do the Taiwanese people perceive their identity? Do they consider themselves Chinese, Taiwanese, or do they have a dual identity of being both Taiwanese and Chinese politically? We might think, what's the difference since they are of the same bloodline and speak the same language, but for the Taiwanese people, this is a very important issue.

The majority of Taiwanese people consider themselves Taiwanese, not Chinese. This implies a strong desire for independence. However, they believe it is realistically impossible. So, what is the alternative? It is maintaining the status quo. The Taiwanese people want to maintain the status quo. The United States is suddenly focusing on the Taiwan issue, but the United States also does not want Taiwan's independence.

China wants reunification. What are the ways to achieve reunification? It is to change their identity. We can consider a scenario where their identity is changed through persuasion. Or, there could be a way to merge peacefully through convergence of systems.

The easiest method is 'One Country, Two Systems.' After considerable deliberation, China proposed the 'One Country, Two Systems' framework. 'One Country, Two Systems' is a system that allows Taiwan to maintain its current status if it recognizes only sovereignty as part of China. However, given what has happened in Hong Kong, it is difficult to trust this.

Observing the two Umbrella Movements and severe protests in Hong Kong, Taiwanese people ironically believe that the reason President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) could continue for a second term was due to the Hong Kong issue. There were predictions that President Tsai Ing-wen's approval ratings would fall, but the Hong Kong situation occurred just before that. It felt almost like a conspiracy theory. This led the Taiwanese people to believe they had to support the DPP.

The reason for President Tsai Ing-wen's low approval ratings was that she did not want to proceed in a confrontational direction. The Taiwanese people do not want to live in danger. They do not want unification with China, but they also do not want to choose dangerous independence. 'One Country, Two Systems' is no longer considered realistically viable due to the failure of the Hong Kong model. The only remaining option is war.

War could happen at any time. However, if policy decisions are made based on a rational cost-benefit analysis, President Xi Jinping's attempt to unify Taiwan through war would be considered insane. From China's perspective, the best outcome is to prevent Taiwan's independence. Issues such as Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet, not just Taiwan, are potential Achilles' heels for China, a rising great power, due to its incomplete modern state system.

These issues demonstrate the constraints, or dilemmas, of Xi Jinping's 'major power diplomacy.' China is still pursuing the goal of 'building a strong country through Chinese-style modernization.' To achieve this, economic recovery is paramount, and an integrated system is needed to drive it. Furthermore, international relations must be stabilized, and complex surrounding environments resolved to build low-cost relationships. Core interests must be protected, and China cannot declare abandonment of Taiwan. If President Xi Jinping were to tolerate Taiwan developing a sovereign state-to-state relationship with the United States, he would be considered a traitor.

Past Chinese leaders have consistently maintained the policy of 'not renouncing the use of force if Taiwan pursues independence' as a core tenet. While the non-use of force is often discussed, the prerequisite is 'non-independence.' Taiwan also does not desire independence, as it is considered realistically impossible. The United States also likely does not wish to provoke China by explicitly supporting Taiwan's independence and escalating to the point of war.

We need to understand this situation more accurately to determine the appropriate course of action for South Korea. It is not an issue where a position should be hastily decided. As it is a complex equation with unpredictable third-party movements, there is no need to reveal our stance prematurely. It is realistically important to observe the situation closely and seek appropriate countermeasures according to the circumstances.

If the 'three principles of Touki' (Note: 'Touki Sanjeong' requires verification in the original text) are violated, it will ultimately lead to war with the United States, which would contradict Xi Jinping's goal of building a modern strong country. The surrounding environment must be stable to protect core interests and control nationalism. Nationalism is a double-edged sword. Especially for a multi-ethnic country like China, emphasizing nationalism could ignite nationalism among the Uyghurs, Tibetans, and ethnic Koreans.

Conversely, China must always consider the possibility that nationalism, intended for unification, could provoke division. Most importantly, the legitimacy and stability of the Communist Party's rule are becoming increasingly fragile. Founded in 1921, the Communist Party has achieved remarkable growth for over 70 years, but the myth of high-speed growth can no longer be sustained. Thanks to the myth of high-speed growth, the Chinese people have accepted the one-party system of the Communist Party, but if it fails to improve their lives in the future, the maintenance of the system itself could become precarious.

Responding to Technological Control and Focusing on Economic Growth

The highest priority is placed on securing the stability and normalcy of the Communist Party's rule, rather than formulating a new international order. The focus is on how to achieve high-quality development in the so-called New Normal era. In reality, China is contemplating ways to overcome U.S. technological sanctions and access future growth sectors. This is a response to technological sanctions that began a decade ago.

During the technological sanctions initiated by the Trump administration, then-Premier Wen Jiabao of China stated at a public forum that China should dedicate itself to technological development over the next ten years. He urged a posture akin to a blacksmith forging a sharp sword. I questioned whether advanced technology could be developed in such a manner.

However, they succeeded. They developed deep learning technology, and Huawei has revived. In the electric vehicle sector, they are leading the world. Earlier this year, Xi Jinping held a meeting with private entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs of various ages, from 35 to 81, attended. Ren Zhengfei of Huawei and Jack Ma of Alibaba were among them. Jack Ma's appearance was noteworthy, interpreted as a message to re-highlight him, who had fallen out of favor with Xi Jinping. Most of the attending companies were in advanced technology sectors. This demonstrated the intention to nurture them.

Indeed, China is investing heavily in the AI industry, resulting in the development of deep learning technology and the revival of Huawei. This is not a coincidence but the fruition of ten years of effort. China's budget increases are notable not only in defense spending but also in research and development.

China cannot help but focus on economic growth until its 100th anniversary in 2049, rather than becoming a global leader. Therefore, it would be rational to build stable, low-cost diplomatic relationships. However, the environment for maintaining such stable relationships is not favorable. Ultimately, the relationship with the United States is crucial.

The message China has sent to the United States is one of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, cooperation, and common prosperity. The core of these principles is mutual respect, which means respecting China's core interests. If these are respected, it implies that the U.S. and China can coexist peacefully, cooperate, and achieve a win-win outcome. The remaining principles serve to elaborate on these core principles.

The message is to cooperate without infringing upon core interests. Of course, this could be rhetorical. Recently, four red lines were presented: the Taiwan issue, China's one-party system, China's human rights issues, and technological sanctions. If these issues are not interfered with, it means not hindering China's growth.

However, the United States, fearing China's pursuit, has elevated its vigilance to the highest level. While a second Trump administration is expected to pressure and contain China more forcefully than the first, it has not yet been overtly revealed. Trump's staff are foreshadowing controls and pressure on China in the military and security domains, but Trump himself lacks consistency.

Trade issues are expected to be negotiated first, and then attention will turn to China. China, having experienced Trump's first term, believes it is better prepared to counter the U.S. offensive than during the first term. Nevertheless, the U.S.-China relationship remains a U.S.-led dynamic, with China in a reactive position. China wishes to avoid direct conflict with the United States and will aim to delay until 2049 as much as possible.

To achieve this, diplomatic strategies will be intensely focused. Particularly in the military and security sectors, China lags significantly behind the United States. Therefore, any use of force against Taiwan would likely be limited to escalating tensions, with the possibility of actual military action being remote.

Changes in China's Stance on Korean Peninsula Denuclearization

There is a significant change in China's approach to inter-Korean relations. China has begun to deviate from its traditional stance of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, peace and stability, and resolution through dialogue. At some point, they stopped even mentioning these points.

What I have observed is from 2022 onwards. Although the Korean Peninsula issue is not a core agenda item in U.S.-China summits, it has always been mentioned. As both countries agreed on the framework of denuclearization, it was included in joint communiqués or mentioned in press briefings. However, at some point, the Korean Peninsula issue began to be omitted from official statements after summits on the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website. U.S. press briefings indicate that the U.S. mentioned the issue, but China omits it.

Since 2024, there have been frequent discussions about war concerning the Korean Peninsula. In a speech, Foreign Minister Wang Yi included the Korean Peninsula among four global hotspots that China must responsibly manage. Mentioning the Korean Peninsula at the same level as the wars in Ukraine, Palestine, and Israel was highly unusual. This suggests that China perceives the instability on the Korean Peninsula as very significant.

In summit talks with China, it was stated that the responsibility for the escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula lies with the threatening actions of the United States and its allies. This is a typical North Korean assertion. While China has previously mentioned the responsibility of relevant parties, including the United States, attributing responsibility to allies, specifically South Korea, is unprecedented.

Regarding the nuclear issue, while not mentioning denuclearization, attributing the responsibility for tensions on the Korean Peninsula to South Korea seems excessive. In a recent phone call between the leaders of South Korea and China, Xi Jinping emphasized multilateralism, the defense of free trade, cooperation on supply chain stability, and respect for core interests (Taiwan issue).

The Korean Peninsula issue was not mentioned. There is also no mention of the Korean Peninsula issue on the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. However, the South Korean Presidential Office's materials state that China was requested to play a role in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website briefly mentions that President Lee Jae-myung spoke about the importance of improving sentiment between the peoples of the two countries. China is evading the issue of Korean Peninsula denuclearization.

Perception of South Korea-China Relations and Diplomatic Dilemmas

According to public opinion survey data collected by the East Asia Institute for 13 consecutive years, South Koreans' impressions of China remain negative. However, with the advent of a new government, expectations for an improvement in South Korea-China relations are high. This public sentiment indicates that we must consider the complexity and various variables of the diplomacy we face. The public believes that South Korea-China relations are poor and need improvement, and expects the new government to lead this improvement.

I believe the economic relationship with China is important. But what about relations with other countries? The South Korea-U.S. relationship is the most important. The South Korea-U.S. relationship accounts for 90%, and while the South Korea-China relationship is also important, it is only half as significant as the South Korea-U.S. relationship. This situation clearly illustrates the perception of China. When asked why China is disliked, the most significant reason in the 2022 survey was economic retaliation, i.e., the shock of the THAAD incident, although this proportion is decreasing. The second highest reason is 38%, which is due to China not respecting South Korea. Do you agree with this? One of the reasons for disliking China is economic coercion, and the second is a lack of respect for South Korea.

There are no recent survey results. However, in two surveys conducted before 2010, the reasons cited by Chinese people for disliking South Korea were, in the first and second positions, that South Koreans do not respect China. This is a very sensitive issue in South Korea-China relations. Do you respect Chinese people? No, you don't. Why don't you respect them? I studied and pursued my postgraduate studies in China during a time when China was very poor and struggling.

So, when I look at China now, frankly speaking, it reminds me of a nouveau riche neighbor who suddenly became wealthy and drives luxury cars, like winning the lottery. The uniqueness of China's rise is that countries that typically rise to great power status are simultaneously advanced nations.

However, China is a great power but does not seem to be an advanced nation. Can a non-advanced nation become a hegemon? Most of you likely encountered China after it had reached a certain level of development, so your perspective on China may differ. Why don't you respect them? Is it because they don't respect us, so we don't respect them? If you ask whether not respecting Chinese people is the biggest reason for disliking China, South Koreans are reluctant to acknowledge China's rise.

It's similar to what I think. A nouveau riche is just a nouveau riche. Despite growing to a national strength comparable to the United States, there is an underlying perspective of looking down on China. However, this was not the most significant factor. The most shocking result this year was that the response citing dislike due to the Chinese national character and behavior exceeded 58%. The second reason was the one-party system of the Communist Party, which is a structural issue that cannot be changed.

I believe this is very serious because it is a reason for disliking an unchangeable counterpart. It is an important country and an inseparable one, yet it is disliked due to structural reasons. I often ask students in classes why this is the case. In society, there are many people you dislike, but you still have to get along with them to earn a salary. South Korea's diplomacy faces such a situation. How should we coexist with a country we dislike yet have an inseparable relationship with?

Fortunately, there is a hopeful aspect: a sense of crisis has emerged regarding this serious issue, and public opinion is shifting. There seems to be a consensus that this issue is important and that a passive approach of waiting for it to resolve over time is not appropriate. Furthermore, young people have recently begun visiting Shanghai under the visa-free policy. Students who visited have started saying, 'Professor, this China is different from what I imagined.'

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the conflict in South Korea-China relations, particularly since the THAAD incident in 2010 up to the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's anti-China policies, visits to China have decreased. Wouldn't visiting and interacting with China more frequently lead to gradual improvement? Wouldn't one start thinking, 'The China I knew is not the only China'? I believe China's visa-free policy is effective, and in response, if South Korea also implements a visa-free policy for group tourism starting in the second half of the year, exchanges between the two countries will be revitalized. If exchanges among the younger generation increase, there is room for improvement in the feeling of dislike. Blindly disliking is dangerous.

In Japan's case, favorable views have risen to almost the same level as those towards the United States. The most important reason is the increase in visits to Japan. The older generation thought it would be difficult for sentiments towards Japan to change favorably, but they actually did. Another point to note is that North Korea is perceived as the primary military threat, with China gradually rising.

The message China has conveyed to the United States is mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, cooperation, and common prosperity. The core of this is mutual respect, meaning respect for China's core interests. If these are respected, it implies that peaceful coexistence and cooperation with the United States can lead to a win-win outcome. The remaining principles are explanations of these core principles.

Cultural exchanges are not active, and the Korean Wave is not significantly popular in China. Excluding these, there is nothing left. One of the reasons for the current deterioration of relations is that the economic cooperation between South Korea and China has rapidly shifted from a complementary relationship to a competitive one. As China's industries have advanced, we are no longer a country exporting intermediate goods; instead, we have become more dependent on China for critical minerals. In all sectors such as semiconductors, automobiles, and electric vehicles, critical minerals are sourced from China at rates of 80-90%. Dependence on China is increasing, and imports are rising. The economic cooperation structure that we have enjoyed for the past 20 years is undergoing a complete transformation. While many aspects are shifting towards economic competition, regarding the perception of military threat, it is somewhat...

This is an unexpected answer. Consequently, the necessity of strengthening ROK-US military cooperation appears to be increasing. Another interesting point is China's significant role in responding to North Korea's military provocations. China's influence also exceeds 80% in denuclearization. However, on the other hand, the 33-year history of ROK-China relations has developed with economic cooperation as the driving force, and South Korea has begun to have excessive expectations of China. This was the expectation that China would help and cooperate from the South Korean perspective on the North Korean issue. However, the result was not only a lack of achievement but also the advancement of North Korea's nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it was peculiar that it was still considered influential and important. When asked what is most important in foreign diplomacy, policy coordination for denuclearization has decreased.

Instead, economic exchange has rapidly increased. While this may seem like a contradictory response, perceptions of China's influence and role differ markedly between conservative and progressive camps. The conservative camp hopes that China will step in to control and contain North Korea further, and thus sees China as having influence and a role. However, China has no intention of doing so.

We have confirmed this through 33 years of history. Despite repeated confirmations, each new government harbors some hope. This expectation reached its peak during the Park Geun-hye administration. Great expectations lead to great disappointments. In 2015, South Korea even participated in the Victory Day parade, considered the best relationship at the time. While there is attention on whether President Lee Jae-myung will attend the 80th Victory Day anniversary event this September, he will not attend due to the painful memory of the 70th anniversary. Why did a conservative government leader attend at that time?

At that time, President Park Geun-hye promoted the idea of a 'unification jackpot.' She may have thought that the North Korean regime could collapse. However, the only reason North Korea has not collapsed and has endured is because China opened the back door. It seems they believed that if China also locked the back door, North Korea would collapse, and South Korea could achieve the unification jackpot. They likely expected that since the relationship with President Xi Jinping was good, things would go smoothly if discussed properly. However, we need to recognize that China historically perceives North Korea as a buffer state due to geopolitical considerations, a variable that can never change.

South Korea's Strategic Choices Amidst US-China Conflict

This is similar to the illusion that improving relations with China could weaken or abolish the ROK-US alliance. The ROK-China relationship has historically seen four major conflict cases. The Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyeong shelling incidents were triggered by North Korean provocations but did not end with the North Korean issue, escalating into a US-China matter. There is a lingering possibility of this happening again, as Korea has experienced being caught in turmoil and ROK-China relations deteriorating. Public opinion, according to survey results, is rational regarding the question of which side to choose in the US-China conflict. The highest response is 'neutral.' Of course, if forced to choose between the US and China, it would overwhelmingly be the US, but neutrality remains high when the neutral option is available.

This is a matter of betting. When Vice President Biden visited South Korea in 2013, he had a deep conversation with President Park Geun-hye, and Vice President Biden advised her to 'bet on the right horse.' Although the South Korean government denied this at the time, the controversy escalated ten years later when Chinese Ambassador Xing Haiming stated, 'You should not bet on China losing.' Subsequently, Ambassador Xing could not play any role in South Korea, and ROK-China relations further deteriorated. This indicates that the US and China are increasingly and overtly exerting pressure, as reflected in the public opinion survey questions.

This also occurred in 2016. Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a statement around the time of the THAAD deployment, which is referred to as the 'Huangjangbu sword.' THAAD is akin to the fake nephew Emperor Xiang Yu of the late Qin Dynasty used to hold a banquet and perform sword dances to kill Liu Bang. To put it bluntly, it means South Korea should not wield the US's sword on its behalf. For China, THAAD signifies exactly that: South Korea is pointing the US's sword at them. This issue may arise again in the future, not just with THAAD. China's message is not about the weapon itself but about South Korea's stance. They want to confirm whether South Korea will actively participate in pressuring and containing China in line with US desires.

From China's perspective, the maximum expectation for the Korean Peninsula is for South Korea to be on its side, and the minimum is for it not to take the lead. That is, not to take the lead in US-led pressure to contain China. However, the moment of truth is fast approaching. Trade negotiations have concluded, but now, when security issues arise during ROK-US summit talks, and the US explicitly asks, 'Won't you take the lead in containing China? Otherwise, we will withdraw US Forces Korea' or 'We will change the role of US Forces Korea,' South Korea must consider how to preemptively position itself. In the current dynamic, with the US holding the sword, it is very difficult to ignore US demands.

We are in a structural situation that is more difficult for China to understand than during the THAAD deployment. There are no communication channels. China wants to hear South Korea's voice. Our official position is that US Forces Korea are important and are for deterring North Korean threats, not aimed at China. However, are our actual actions consistent with this? To what extent will we participate, especially regarding the Taiwan issue? What is public opinion on this?

There is a growing consensus that tensions and conflicts in the Taiwan Strait are becoming increasingly important. However, if a military conflict occurs, to what extent should we intervene? Many believe that intervention should be limited to humanitarian aid, not military support or involvement. There is even a significant opinion that we should not be involved at all. Furthermore, while we cannot control the status of US Forces Korea, opinions suggest that they should remain in a supporting role and not participate in such conflicts.

It is argued that they should focus on their original role of deterring North Korean threats. Given public opinion, even if we do not directly participate in a Taiwan Strait crisis, it is questionable whether we can act according to public demands if the role of US Forces Korea changes. The reason for discussing the Taiwan issue at length is that the likelihood of tensions escalating to this extent and the threat of war becoming imminent is considered low. Therefore, there is no need to preemptively present our actions by assuming an overly tense situation. If a conflict truly occurs in the Taiwan Strait and tensions rise significantly, our extensive experience in overseas operations will play a crucial role in terms of regional stability.

However, the probability of it reaching that level is very slim. There is no need to consider this scenario and constantly seek responses that escalate tensions. It would be beneficial to remember that the US-China relationship has consistently repeated a process of de-escalation to an appropriate level whenever tensions rise due to the Taiwan issue over the past 70 years. Thank you for your hard work. Thank you.

Lee Dong-ryul, Director of the EAI Center for Chinese Studies and Professor of Chinese Studies at Dongduk Women's University.