[North Korea and the World] NATO Summit Reaffirms Trump's Perceptions and Strategy

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BNsHKvwGWtQ

Video Script

NATO Summit and the Strategic Implications for the United States

The strategic utility of the United States is likely to be significantly weakened. Excluding this, it is questionable whether the U.S. can effectively contain China. Despite much more powerful and effective methods available, President Trump states he will not pursue them. Welcome to Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. Thank you for watching. Today, continuing from last time, I will discuss the NATO summit, rather than the U.S. This is also a topic that has recently captured my interest and has been continuously covered on this channel, regarding its implications for U.S. global strategy.

I will speak in that context today as well. On June 25th and 26th, a NATO summit was held in The Hague, Netherlands. To be precise, it was the fourth such meeting held this year, under the name NATO Summit Plus IP4. Here, IP stands for the four Indo-Pacific countries: South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Since three of these countries were unable to attend this time, the NATO Plus IP4 essentially did not materialize.

In any case, I will discuss the content addressed at the NATO summit, including this, and particularly the various actions taken by U.S. President Trump at the summit and their strategic implications. This NATO summit garnered considerable attention. Domestically, there was much debate regarding President Lee Jae-myung's attendance. As I have repeatedly stated, I have no intention of discussing this from a domestic political perspective. I will interpret and analyze the significance of this meeting in the context of global strategy and changes in the world order.

Key Content of the NATO Joint Declaration and Trump's Stance

First, ironically, a joint declaration was issued. There were considerable doubts as to whether a joint declaration from the 32 NATO countries would be possible at this NATO meeting. As you can well imagine, it was a very difficult issue whether President Trump's objectives would align with those of the NATO countries, especially concerning what President Trump demanded of the NATO countries. However, as you know, a joint declaration was issued.

This is quite meager compared to the joint statement from the NATO summit in Washington in 2024. Only five items were produced, whereas the Washington summit last year had a remarkable 38 items. The difference in volume is incomparable. However, the important thing is that it was produced nonetheless. I believe this indicates that the U.S. variable played a significant role at this NATO summit. Last year, under the Biden administration, cooperation between the U.S. and NATO allies proceeded very smoothly.

I don't think it's necessary to go over all the core content, but I will mention a few significant points. The first is that, ironically, the collective defense system that NATO countries were concerned about, namely the collective defense commitment under Article 5 of the NATO Charter, was reaffirmed. Article 5 states that an attack against one NATO member country by an external force shall be considered an attack against all member countries, and they will jointly defend themselves. This is the core content of Article 5, which is the essence of collective defense.

Although this is a core element that is naturally reaffirmed at every meeting, concerns arose this time because President Trump did not make a clear statement on it. President Trump eventually expressed his support for Article 5 at this meeting, but when asked this question on the plane to The Hague, he avoided a definitive answer, stating that there were various interpretations of the collective defense treaty obligations. Furthermore, during the Trump administration, President Trump used Montenegro as an example, questioning whether the U.S. needed to intervene if Montenegro were attacked, and whether this could lead to World War III, effectively negating the collective defense system itself. This is just one example, and he made many similar remarks later. Therefore, there were doubts as to whether the U.S. would sign the joint declaration at this NATO summit.

However, in conclusion, it did sign. I will explain why later. Second, a commitment to support Ukraine was ultimately made. There were concerns about whether this would be properly addressed, but it was only mentioned in very general terms. I will quote the joint declaration verbatim: "We reaffirm our unwavering commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty and security, and recognize that Ukraine's security contributes to our own security." I believe it is fortunate that such a principle was articulated. As you know, President Trump is pressuring Ukraine as he seeks to end the Russia-Ukraine war. While this clause was included, it is very weak compared to last year's Washington Declaration. Last year's Washington Declaration included six very specific items regarding security assistance to Ukraine and commitments for medium- to long-term security support.

Defense Spending Target of 5% and the Case of Spain

Prior to that, the fact of Russia's illegal invasion was explicitly mentioned. Last year, Russia was mentioned as many as 43 or 44 times, criticizing its invasion of Ukraine, but this time it was barely mentioned, only to the extent I described. Nevertheless, the fact that it was mentioned at all can be seen as significant in acknowledging the need for security assistance to Ukraine. Third, I believe President Trump signed the joint declaration because what he and the U.S. wanted was ultimately accepted. Although many media outlets have already reported on this, it is the demand that European NATO allies spend 5% of their gross domestic product (GDP) annually on defense spending. President Trump has consistently pressured NATO allies to meet the 5% defense spending target since his presidential campaign. This content is included in the current joint declaration. Of course, if you look closely,

there are clauses that allow for some interpretation. First, it is not that 5% of GDP must be spent entirely on defense; rather, a minimum of 3.5% must be directly allocated to defense spending. For example, South Korea currently spends about 2.3% on defense, which is entirely allocated to defense. Therefore, European countries are to spend 3.5% on military expenditures and the remaining 1.5% on indirect costs such as major infrastructure, cyber networks, and strengthening the defense industry to reach the 5% target. Another point is this clause. In setting the target for when this will be implemented, member states submitted annual plans for achieving the target, and a review of whether these are being properly implemented will be conducted in 2029.

The year 2029 seems somewhat arbitrary. I wonder why 2029. While I cannot definitively say, 2029 is also the year President Trump's term ends. Perhaps this was taken into consideration. In any case, from President Trump's perspective, since what he had been advocating for was included in the joint declaration, he declared it a political victory. He called the outcome "a monumental victory for the United States" and stated, "NATO countries truly love their countries." He reiterated that the U.S. came here to protect these countries, and naturally, NATO countries must pay the costs. There is something noteworthy here.

President Trump held a rather lengthy press conference. I watched it all, and Spain was repeatedly mentioned. When he asked reporters to ask questions, he first asked, "What country are you from?" Two Spanish reporters asked questions, and on both occasions, he explicitly targeted Spain. This is because Spain is one of the countries among the 32 NATO member states with the lowest defense spending as a percentage of GDP, at only 1.24%. Spain has consistently expressed its position that it should be exempted from meeting the 5% target, meaning

that they cannot comply with it. There may be various reasons, but looking at the map of Europe, Spain is located in the south. Being in the south, it is not directly facing threats from Russia or other immediate dangers. While this is cited as a reason, it could also apply to Portugal, Greece, and other southern countries. In any case, Spain took such a stance, and President Trump, finding it highly displeasing, immediately targeted them.

Two Spanish reporters asked other questions. When asked if they were from Spain, they replied yes, and then he criticized Spain, saying, "Spain is terrible, and their actions are terrible." He strongly stated in a live broadcast during the press conference that "Spain is the only country that has not paid, and I don't know what the problem is. We will impose double the trade tariffs on Spain." "We are in trade negotiations with Spain, and we will make Spain pay double. I'm serious."

The Role of Secretary General Stoltenberg and Trump's Diplomacy

It is a terrible situation. He used all of President Trump's characteristic strong expressions to criticize Spain repeatedly. While it is a burdensome statement, I doubt whether the U.S. can actually retaliate against Spain. This is because the U.S. negotiates with Europe as a whole, not with Spain as an individual bilateral partner, making it difficult to single out Spain. Nevertheless, given President Trump's personality, even if his expressions are harsh, he is a person who follows through, so it will undoubtedly be firmly imprinted in his mind. This means that all future relations with Spain could become very uncomfortable. Throughout this entire process, President Trump expressed considerable satisfaction, and in his press conference, he spoke more positively about NATO than before. The primary credit for achieving these results goes to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.

I cannot help but feel personally that the Secretary General made tremendous efforts. He coordinated the differing opinions among member states and, in the end, managed to achieve the 5% target. This is the role of the Secretary General. Furthermore, in his interactions with President Trump, he says things that are pleasing to President Trump. While I have no intention of criticizing, it is evident that all world leaders, including Secretary General Stoltenberg, are trying to appease President Trump. A prime example is President Yoon Suk-yeol's behavior towards President Trump in 2024, which you may recall. Moreover, Western leaders are all doing the same.

This time, Secretary General Stoltenberg said the following regarding the frequent discussions about Israel and Iran: When President Trump said that Israel and Iran were like "two children fighting on a playground," Secretary General Stoltenberg responded, "Sometimes a father has to say strong words to stop them." Some of you may understand what this means. The reason Israel and Iran reached a ceasefire after the U.S. bombing of Iran was, in fact, a method of ceasefire between countries lacking mutual trust. It is a process where one country first ceases attacks, and then the other country follows suit. While it may be unfamiliar to some, this is how it works. In any case, the important point is that Israel attacked again immediately after the ceasefire. He unleashed very harsh words in front of reporters about this. This was reported by domestic and international media. In Korean, it translates to "They don't know what they are doing." I have omitted the truly harsh language.

In English, it was "they don't know what they are doing," which included the F-word. Despite President Trump's harsh rhetoric, there were many interpretations of him using such language in front of the entire world, but he used it intentionally, and it was effective. After he said that, Israel did not take any further action. This is precisely what Secretary General Stoltenberg was referring to. "Strong words are needed to stop fighting children." Should we call this a remarkable level of flattery, or even sycophancy?

The Future of NATO Plus IP4 and China Containment Strategy

In any case, he provided a very favorable interpretation, and President Trump, feeling very good about his words, humbly said that Secretary General Stoltenberg liked him and even called him "my father." It is a bitter but true story. This is how one deals with President Trump. With this understanding, the immediate priority is that the crisis at NATO has been averted. What I want to convey today is this: the area that interests me is very important from South Korea's perspective, as we are directly involved. The question is whether NATO Plus IP4, which I mentioned at the beginning, will continue to develop in the future. Let me provide some background. This was the fourth year it was held, but IP actually did not participate properly this time. However, for the past three years, meetings of the heads of state of NATO Plus the four Indo-Pacific countries have been held. Who initiated this?

In any case, he provided a very favorable interpretation, and President Trump, feeling very good about his words, humbly said that Secretary General Stoltenberg liked him and even called him "my father." It is a bitter but true story. This is how one deals with President Trump. With this understanding, the immediate priority is that the crisis at NATO has been averted. What I want to convey today is this: the area that interests me is very important from South Korea's perspective, as we are directly involved. The question is whether NATO Plus IP4, which I mentioned at the beginning, will continue to develop in the future. Let me provide some background. This was the fourth year it was held, but IP actually did not participate properly this time. However, for the past three years, meetings of the heads of state of NATO Plus the four Indo-Pacific countries have been held. Who initiated this?

The United States led this initiative, and President Biden started it. President Biden strategically structured this as a consultative body with the following intention: NATO Plus and IP4 are strongly aimed at containing China, including allies in the Indo-Pacific region. Biden's strategy can be understood as follows: to federate NATO's Atlantic alliance with the core U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific region. The term 'federate' was used in English. This was a term used by Ex, who was the Deputy Secretary of Defense at the time. Simply put, it means to enhance value cooperation with the Atlantic NATO alliance and the core U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific region—South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand—to contain North Korea.

Logically, if this succeeds, containing China would be highly effective. This is because 32 NATO countries, essentially the world's advanced nations, would be involved in containing China. They are militarily useful countries, and among them, the UK and France are nuclear powers. The participation of such countries would place significant pressure on China and enhance U.S. deterrence. Therefore, when the NATO IP4 was formed, the U.S. used the term 'integrated deterrence' to enhance deterrence. Will Trump maintain this? The conclusion is that it is highly questionable. While NATO will hold another meeting next year, it remains uncertain whether the IP4 will participate, and we need to observe further. I will provide a few reasons. First, the IP4 did not properly convene this time. Second, in the joint statement of the NATO summit this time, there were no harsh remarks from U.S. President Trump or any U.S. president regarding China. Not only harsh remarks but also no warnings towards China. This is a significant difference from the 2024 Washington Declaration. The Washington Declaration also included content regarding North Korea. It points out North Korea's problems, stating that it has fueled Russia's war of aggression by providing military support to Iran and Russia. Paragraph 26 mentions that China is acting as an accomplice in the Ukraine war through its unlimited partnership with Russia. Paragraph 27 is the most crucial, explicitly stating that China poses a systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security. This aligns with Biden's core objective of connecting NATO and IP4 to contain China. And

Paragraph 30 reaffirms that NATO will strengthen cooperation with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. However, all of this content was omitted from the NATO summit in The Hague this time. Therefore, regarding whether this will continue, I reiterate that my stance is reserved. Let me interpret this. In videos I have previously produced, I have analyzed the defense strategy of the Trump administration. President Trump does not seem inclined to federate the Atlantic alliance with the Indo-Pacific alliances. Rather, the demand for NATO to spend 5% of its GDP on defense implies that Europe should take responsibility for its own defense. More directly, it means that Europe should increase its defense spending to address the threat from Russia. In return, the U.S. will remain a NATO ally and provide extended deterrence, particularly against nuclear threats. However, Europe must handle the rest. It can also be interpreted as meaning that NATO does not necessarily need to be involved in the Indo-Pacific region. If this analysis is correct, the demand for increased responsibility from Indo-Pacific allies becomes more likely. Instead of sharing responsibilities with countries, if the U.S. focuses on the Indo-Pacific region, it will likely demand greater roles, responsibilities, and costs for China containment from relevant countries such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, New Zealand, and India.

Increased Responsibility for Indo-Pacific Allies and U.S. Strategic Shift

This is already becoming evident. The demand for 5% of GDP in defense spending has been made to countries in the Indo-Pacific region, including South Korea. As I analyzed earlier, U.S. Secretary of Defense Peter S. Palmer explicitly stated this at the Shangri-La Dialogue in late May. Following that, before and after the NATO summit, official announcements from the White House and the Department of Defense stated that Asian allies and Indo-Pacific allies should follow Europe's example and spend 5% of their GDP on defense. This implies that the Indo-Pacific region will also face increased burdens. However, from a broader strategic perspective of the United States, its utility is significantly weakened. We had a closed-door meeting on this issue a few weeks ago, and I had the opportunity to speak with someone who played a significant role in the Biden administration, and they said the same thing.

There is an increased likelihood of demands for expanded roles and responsibilities, and even costs. This is already becoming evident. The United States demanded that countries in the Indo-Pacific region, including South Korea, spend 5% of their GDP on defense, as clearly stated by U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin at the Shangri-La Dialogue in late May, as I analyzed previously. Following that, before and after the NATO summit, official statements were made by the White House and the Department of Defense urging Asian allies and allies in the Indo-Pacific region to follow Europe's example and spend 5% of their GDP on defense. This inevitably places a burden on the Indo-Pacific region as well. However, from a broader strategic perspective for the United States, its utility is significantly weakened. I had a discussion about this issue during a private meeting a few weeks ago with an individual who played a significant role in the Biden administration, and they expressed the same sentiment.

Weakened U.S. Strategic Utility and South Korea's Response Challenges

Excluding the Atlantic NATO allies, it is questionable whether the U.S. can effectively contain China. This is interpreted as a loss of a very important strategic asset, and I largely agree. Despite having much more powerful and effective methods available, President Trump states he will not pursue them. Therefore, the future direction for the Indo-Pacific region is becoming clearer, and this is consistent with my previous analysis. Ultimately, it involves increasing the responsibilities and costs of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, thereby reducing the U.S.'s burden for threats to individual countries (like North Korea for South Korea), allowing the U.S. to focus more on the threat from China while also requiring allies to contribute to this effort. This is the strategic direction of the U.S. that has been reaffirmed through this NATO summit. There are many concerns and worries from various perspectives. It feels like standing before a great storm. Especially from South Korea's standpoint, there is the tangible threat from North Korea due to its geopolitical location,

and we must also maintain good relations with China. I believe this environment is becoming increasingly distant. We must be fully alert and make swift, accurate, and wise decisions on how to respond. Thank you for watching.

■ Park Won-gon: Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute (EAI). Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Editor and Manager: Park Han-soo, EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr

■ Editor and Manager: Park Han-soo, EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr