[EAI-KIEP Conference] 60 Years of ROK-Japan Normalization and Future-Oriented Development Directions: Session 2

YouTube Link : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LIJwOMu3Mxc

Video Script

Past Historical Issues and Future-Oriented Cooperation in Korea-Japan Relations

Overall, I will first present my general impressions and overview, and then offer discussion comments in the form of questions for each of the four presentations. My initial thought was that it was meaningful to have explored various cooperative agendas for pragmatic diplomacy for mature Korea-Japan relations and to have been able to confirm them in detail. However, historical issues are absent, and while I believe this was intentional, I have some doubts about the possibility of future-oriented cooperation without these historical issues, which warrants consideration.

Constantly bringing up past issues while talking about the future can be perceived as 'latte talk,' which can be uncomfortable and awkward for young people. When adults talk about the past, they likely want to convey that the present is not an 'accelerator.' I believe such remarks stem from a desire to bridge the gap between the past and the present. Therefore, I hope you will understand this as an effort to fill in the gaps in the present time leading to the future, given that the future is not an accelerator. While discussing the past might have been a disruptive act in the past, it is now possible to discuss it independently of past issues.

We must move in that direction. Nevertheless, there will be aspects that are bumpy or do not run smoothly, and in those areas, historical issues and past grievances must be considered together to ensure smooth progress, like adding broth rather than just cold water. Moreover, this is not merely a unique issue between Korea and Japan but is becoming an effort with universal significance in world and civilization history. Issues in Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran, particularly the unfinished tasks of decolonization, have emerged at the forefront of global and geopolitical politics in an era where past issues have not been properly resolved. In a sense, comparatively,

From a comparative historical perspective, it is crucial to properly situate and evaluate the efforts made by Korea and Japan to resolve past issues, and then, moving forward, to establish a global model case. This will be important not only for the future-oriented development of Korea-Japan relations but also for playing a significant role in world history. Specifically, there are ongoing issues such as forced mobilization and the comfort women issue. Various solutions have been proposed for these issues, and it is important to create strategic and meticulous plans. Ultimately, this must go hand in hand with efforts to overcome the 1965 framework, moving from a colonial to a post-colonial path.

I believe the promotion of the four current cooperation agendas will aid in overcoming the 1965 framework. There is no predetermined order. To elaborate on the issue raised by Mr. Lee Jeong-hwan, you explained it as five factors determining Korea-Japan relations in 2050, but perhaps it could also be viewed as five factors that can bring about changes, with how to manage Korea-Japan relations as the subject. That is to say,

Diplomatic Security and Advanced Technology Cooperation

We also need to consider the possibility that how Korea-Japan relations are managed could alter US-China relations. Regarding the global post-colonial challenges, while events are unfolding in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, there are also signs in East Asia. Although the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan issues are involved, the decolonization process in East Asia ultimately involves North Korea-Japan relations. Therefore, how to manage North Korea-Japan relations is crucial, and as Mr. Lee Jeong-hwan accurately explained, the North Korea-Japan relations agenda is a very broad topic. Thus, deeper consideration is needed. Regarding diplomatic and security cooperation, in a nutshell, security cooperation is important, and it is very important to continuously enhance what Korea and Japan can do,

but I believe finding balance or an optimal point is also important. If cooperation between Korea and Japan becomes prominent without balancing surrounding factors, it could become a destabilizing element in the region. Therefore, extreme caution is necessary in security and military cooperation, and it is crucial to manage it at a level that does not hinder North Korea-Japan relations or efforts for peace on the Korean Peninsula. I have raised this as a question.

Economic Cooperation and Free Trade System

Regarding advanced technology cooperation, I wonder if the cooperation between Korea and Japan is on an equal footing. Many people will likely think so. If it is not equal cooperation, meaning a relationship where neither party desperately needs the other, then it could become a weapon against the other party, intertwined with economic security. Should we not consider this aspect as well? Since advanced technology cooperation could be distorted due to economic security risks, we must strive to prevent this. Regarding economic cooperation, the issues of a Korea-Japan FTA and CPTPP, which you yourself have contemplated, are relevant.

CPTPP has also been stalled due to historical issues, so efforts to resolve past issues together must be undertaken. Regarding a Korea-Japan FTA, I also wonder if it would solely act as an opportunity for Korea. It might be an unconventional idea, but what about Korea considering joining BRICS? When focusing solely on a Korea-Japan FTA or Korea-US-Japan relations, I believe there might be markets or opportunities lost by exerting great effort to maintain the free trade system. Therefore, efforts to find an optimal point and balance are needed here as well.

Humanities, Social Sciences, and Cultural Exchange

In terms of humanities and social sciences cooperation, we observe the phenomenon of the Korean Wave and a global flow of culture. If this flow goes awry, it could become a rip current, like waves flowing outward from the land. When these flows collide, they could lead to a Korean Wave, potentially resulting in conflict rather than cooperation. While familiarity and enjoyment of culture increase, there seems to be a concurrent sense of doubt among the same generation that historical issues have not yet been properly resolved. Another survey indicates that over 80% of young Koreans feel that Japan's attitude has not shown sufficient apology and express dissatisfaction. If these issues are not resolved, and if they ignite, this significant gap could still exist.

We need to be cautious in that regard. Finally, I would like to mention the three strategies proposed by Hwang Jun-heon in today's keynote presentation, namely 'resolving ties,' which was a response to Russia's southward policy in that historical context. In other words, it emerged from the question of how to construct opposition.

On the other hand, there is an aspect that emerged from the question of how to realize this in East Asia based on the so-called modern civilization theory and social Darwinism. However, we are still entangled in that, and past issues are deeply entrenched. Therefore, creating a new horizon of understanding in literature, history, and philosophy that can overcome this modern civilization theory between Korea and Japan, and how to leverage the long-standing tradition of the Chinese character cultural sphere, will be a crucial process for humanities and social sciences cooperation. I conclude my comments here. Thank you. The discussion on the humanities and social sciences section was particularly engaging, given that Professor Mori specializes in media studies.

Historical Issues as a Decolonization Process and the East Asian Context

Thank you. It seems we are short on time. I have two main points. First, past issues are still ongoing and will inevitably continue to be discussed in the future. This is not to say we should ignore them, but rather that we need to view these issues in a new context. That is, instead of seeing them as unique past or historical issues between Korea and Japan, we should view them as solutions to historical problems within the process of overcoming decolonization in a global context. Discussing them in more generalized or universal terms will be more persuasive to future generations.

Second, there is an East Asian context, and it has been formed through a humanistic foundation, making it easily understood, especially by future generations. Therefore, it seems you have raised the question of whether there are new ways for the young generations of Korea and Japan to meet and resolve issues within the space and time of East Asia. Next is Professor Mori. You have traveled a long distance, and we do not have enough time. Please take 12 minutes.

Korea-Japan Joint Cultural Tolerance Linkage Project and Mutual Perception

Yes, I am Mori, a full professor at Seinan Gakuin University. I will now present my comments. I learned this morning that Dr. Choi Eun-mi's presentation is the result of joint research by four individuals. While preparing my comments, I felt as if separate research had been conducted, but today I understand why there were four presentations. Therefore, it is difficult for me to provide a general comment on Dr. Choi Eun-mi's presentation, and I will offer comments on each of the four parts individually.

My first comment is on population change and regional decline. As I am not an expert in this area, I will mention some points of curiosity and reservations. Regarding regional decline, you cite the research of Mr. Masuda Hiroya. His book 'Regional Decline' is well-known. To my knowledge, he was involved in the reform of regional governance in the first and second Abe cabinets. That is the subject.

in Japan. Therefore, I suspect that the overall intention is reflected in this data as well. There are many counterarguments to Mr. Masuda Hiroya's research within Japan. To my knowledge, scholars such as Odagiri Samoto and Okada have counterarguments regarding population, and I apologize, regional decline. Therefore, I believe these aspects should be recognized. Next, the Korea-Japan Joint Cultural Tolerance Linkage Project is an attractive project, even from my perspective.

However, I am aware that it is growing. There are many inbound tourists these days. While this is beneficial for the Japanese economy, it also exacerbates the problem of overtourism. Should we not consider these aspects as well? Next, regarding the promotion of mutual perception exchange between future generations of Korea and Japan, as you mentioned, the perception of Korea among Japanese Gen Z is very positive. I am also teaching students now, and they have very positive feelings towards Korea, its culture, and so on. However, I believe it might be problematic to base future Korea-Japan relations solely on this perception.

In my opinion, Japanese Gen Z students' positive perception is a mixture of admiration for idol stars, their fashion sense, and Korea's advanced material culture, which is at the forefront of capitalism. Therefore, their interest in Korea's modern or contemporary history is not very high. Furthermore, the scope of 'Koreans' as perceived by Gen Z is very narrow, and they are likely to fail to recognize the reality that there are many Koreans who fall outside this framework.

I was somewhat surprised by your earlier statement about the historical perceptions of recent Korean youth. You mentioned that recent Korean youth tend to view historical issues, or past problems, as someone else's problem. While you suggested that multilateralization can offer an objective perspective, I have some reservations. Multilateralization may offer an objective viewpoint, but it could also suppress the very interest in the issue.

Media and Cultural Content Cooperation

I believe it is important to consider these issues as one's own problem rather than multilateralizing them. Japanese youth tend to perceive past issues differently, which has resulted in a lack of reflection on past issues. I am somewhat concerned about this aspect and would like to emphasize the importance of education. Next is the issue of media cooperation. The idea of a Korea-Japan Media Monitoring Committee is excellent.

However, problems can arise if the media does not self-regulate and make efforts. For example, if media outlets or industry organizations do not establish a principle of not accepting funding from specific corporations, issues related to journalism may arise. Furthermore, we need to discuss not only the improvement of reporting by legacy media but also the influence of social media between Korea and Japan. This is also connected to the issue of Western-centrism.

For cultural content cooperation, before discussing specific content, the definition and purpose of Korea-Japan cultural cooperation must be clarified. For example, cultural cooperation focused on commemoration, cultural cooperation focused on checks and balances, and cultural cooperation as a civil society movement can have different objectives, directions, and processes. Sometimes, there are overlapping areas.

I believe this philosophical foundation is important. While I consider content cooperation in areas such as music, games, and dramas to be universal, I believe that cultural fields related to historical issues should also be discussed between Korea and Japan. Here, I would like to make two proposals. The first is the issue of 'cultural properties located abroad' in Korea. This is related to the issue of returning cultural properties mentioned in the 1960 Basic Treaty between Korea and Japan.

At that time, the treaty was concluded under the logic of inter-governmental agreements. That is, it was concluded as cooperation, separate from the summit issue. I believe that legal and institutional arrangements for the return of cultural properties can be made between Korea and Japan in the future. My second proposal concerns collective memory. While it may be difficult for contemporary and modern history between Korea and Japan, we could make efforts to discover and jointly register memories that can be mutually understood in the medieval or ancient periods, for example, with UNESCO.

The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty is an example of this. I have made four proposals, and my remarks end here. Thank you. Professor Mori, who specializes in media studies, focused his discussion on the humanities and social sciences section, and it was a very interesting discussion. He made four proposals regarding cultural cooperation, which I believe are valuable suggestions that the government should heed. In the process of implementation, it would be beneficial to actively pursue projects that discover and disseminate positive memories rather than dealing with negative ones. Dr. Choi Eun-mi, if time permits, it would be beneficial to provide additional comments on the historical views of the MG generation. Further explanation would be needed on whether the historical views of the Japanese MG generation can be generalized, and what precautions should be taken when introducing the historical views of the Korean MG generation to Japan. Next, Professor Abe, please.

In particular, you made four suggestions regarding cultural cooperation, which I believe are valuable proposals that the government should heed. In the implementation process, rather than dwelling on negative memories, it would be beneficial to actively pursue projects that uncover and disseminate positive memories. Dr. Choi Eun-mi, if you have the time, I would appreciate it if you could provide additional comments on the historical perspectives of the MG generation. Further explanation would be helpful regarding whether the historical perspectives of Japan's MG generation can be generalized, and what precautions should be taken when introducing the historical perspectives of Korea's MG generation to Japan. Next, we turn to Mr. Abe.

US-China Strategic Competition and Strengthening the Free Trade System

Yes, Abe. I will primarily comment on Dr. Kim Ki-bak's report. The various scenarios pointed out in Professor Lee Jeong-ho's presentation can also exist in the industrial sector, and I believe these scenarios have the potential to unfold globally. Japan also needs to respond from its own perspective.

First, we must consider US containment security, and there are areas where we need to secure a presence and cooperate in the Americas. However, there is also a trend of the US prioritizing security or alliances, so we must consider how to contain without the US. Conversely, there is China.

The main concern is how to secure a presence without the US. Furthermore, as a country that has grown through the free trade system, how to maintain and strengthen the free trade system in the future is also a matter that requires deep consideration. Korea is likely in a similar position regarding this aspect.

Therefore, I believe there is room for cooperation between Korea and Japan in terms of cooperation with the US, US security, and maintaining the free trade system. Regarding the policy direction of the Lee Jae-myung administration, there are many unclear aspects, and I would like to discuss them further. Among the various tasks presented by Dr. Kim Ki-bak, cooperation between Japan and Korea is important for maintaining and strengthening the free trade system, and joining CPTPP would be a good option. CPTPP is important for strengthening supply chains, but it will also contribute to strengthening the free trade system.

Korea's accession to CPTPP would be very beneficial. While there may be politically sensitive issues, I believe Japan is also fundamentally in favor. Beyond CPTPP, efforts are needed to build a new order by cooperating with various countries such as Canada and Australia, which oppose US protectionism and seek to maintain the free trade system. Korea and Japan should participate in these efforts, and Korea needs to think more deeply about how to build supply chains as a bloc.

Regarding the strengthening of supply chains between Japan and Korea, Dr. Kim Ki-bak has pointed out many aspects, and I believe it is important to apply and strengthen the framework of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPF). Since IPF is a US-centric framework, we need to consider how to maintain it if the US withdraws. This, like the free trade system, requires leadership from Korea and Japan, and the two countries need to take the lead and cooperate with other nations.

Industrial Cooperation and Energy Sector

I agree that Korea needs to make significant progress in industrial areas, including hydrogen. There is significant potential for cooperation between Korea and Japan in the industrial sector, with the advantages of large investment scales and risk sharing through joint investments. Cooperation is important in areas where each country can leverage its strengths and compensate for its weaknesses. Furthermore, cooperation is possible with countries having similar stances on regulations, international norms, and certification systems. I believe the hydrogen sector offers many such opportunities for cooperation.

Japan and Korea have extensive experience in the energy sector. Japanese general trading companies are showing interest, and this can be combined with Korea's strengths. Significant interest and investment are also being made in the hydrogen sector. In particular, the trend is moving towards green hydrogen, with Europe focusing on this area. Korea and Japan must respond jointly to areas where they are falling behind. Furthermore, the experience of Japan and Korea can be helpful in presenting realistic alternatives to Europe's ideal approach.

Regarding ammonia, Europe views it as a method for rapid fuel transition, but Japan and Korea are taking a more realistic approach. Europe is also changing its direction recently, and cooperation between Japan and Korea is necessary to adapt to these changes. This indicates common ground between Japan and Korea, with ample room for progress.

Finally, in terms of industrial competitiveness, future industries are important, but the role of private companies is also crucial. Currently, Japanese companies' interest in Korea is focused on semiconductor-related materials, machinery, and the internet sector. Investment by Japanese companies in Korea is increasing, and there is room for government-level support for private sector efforts. This will lead to considerations for both Korea and Japan.

You have primarily commented on the economic aspects, and economic security without the US, and a liberal order without the US, are becoming realities. In this situation, the major question is whether Korea and Japan, as the core, and furthermore, in cooperation with like-minded countries, can restore or build an order without the US. While there is much discussion on the necessity, the crucial issue is whether it is actually feasible and how Korea and Japan can specifically cooperate to achieve this. You mentioned CPTPP, which is very important, and there is a consensus on its long-term effects.

However, considering Korea's political cycle of approximately three years, which includes a five-year presidential term, a six-month transition committee, and a final lame-duck period, it is necessary to carefully calculate not only the long-term effects but also the short-term effects. Only then can the current administration take action. You have pointed this out well. Finally, Professor Ito, please take about 10 minutes.

US Weakening and Strengthening Security Cooperation

Hello. This is Ito. Thank you for joining us today. Among the points made by Professor Lee Jeong-ho, the session titled 'Determinants of Korea-Japan Security in 2050' was the one I, as an audience member, listened to with the most interest. I believe we need to seriously discuss how much the US will weaken.

In the past week alone, Japan's naval power has been severely weakened due to land reforms. There was a sense of crisis that even a slight weakening would be disastrous, and Japan is taking this matter this seriously. At the same time, China's pressure in the West Sea region is intensifying. Tensions are escalating between 124 and 25 degrees longitude, and we are under pressure from both poles. It is necessary to recognize the severity of this situation at sea. Furthermore, to compensate for this naval power, our country's armored ships, etc...

The power of the US Seventh Fleet is also weakening. Frankly, not only the US manufacturing industry but also its shipbuilding industry have collapsed significantly, making it impossible to build new ships. This is a more serious issue to consider. While this is being discussed, particularly in Korea, not only Korea but also Japan and Australia are exploring strategic possibilities on how they can assist the US shipbuilding industry. Furthermore, the Israeli war situation continues, and countries without military power are inevitably subject to attacks on their fortified cities.

Even Israel, which launched a preemptive strike, was attacked by missiles, demonstrating that missile defense is not 100% successful. While the outcome of this situation is uncertain, Korea has been building a three-axis system through the Moon Jae-in administration and the current government over the past decade. It is necessary to discuss whether maintaining this course is appropriate. Missiles resulting from Iran's attack cannot be defended by any country at present. I believe it would be beneficial for the Korean government to participate in the US missile defense system development mechanism. Furthermore, beyond the independent Korean-style three-axis system, there may be differing opinions on developing Korean-style nuclear weapons, similar to Japan's nuclear weapons development.

A comprehensive dialogue is necessary. I believe the time has come for Korea to state that if Japan pursues independent nuclear weapons development, it will pose a problem for Korean security. As both poles weaken, we need to strategically discuss how each can strengthen and train its capabilities. Finally, I believe the issue of strengthening cooperation between the US-Korea alliance and the Korea-Japan alliance, emphasized in the Camp David Declaration of August 2024, is important. Even a progressive administration must address these issues due to the circumstances, so it is unavoidable.

Furthermore, issues such as the Alaska LNG project, Ariel, and UN issues, pointed out by Professor Nam Gi-jeong during the discussion, require a deeper political awareness and discussions that consider the background and context, rather than superficial ones. You have spoken about short-term issues in the security field, and in a situation where military threats at sea are increasing...

You have pointed out that joint Korea-Japan responses must be significantly strengthened compared to the present, and that missile defense is also an area that needs new consideration. Furthermore, concrete discussions on US-China relations and the US-Korea linkage are also necessary. We are almost out of time, so if anyone in the audience has any questions or comments, please feel free to speak.

Economic Policy and Political Fluctuations in Korea-Japan Relations

Thank you for the excellent presentations and discussions today. I am honored, and I am grateful to have been invited here as the president of the Korea-Japan Economics Association for the past year and this year. What I notice while teaching students is that economics students are overly influenced by policy. For example, during the previous Moon Jae-in administration, it was difficult to bring up the topic of Japanese companies in economics classes. A few students would express discomfort or comment, 'Stop praising Japan.' The situation has changed considerably now. While there are many supportive students in classes outside of the Democratic Party administration, there are still concerns.

From the Japanese perspective, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration likely had a considerably favorable relationship, but they may be cautiously considering what will happen under the Lee Jae-myung administration. If you could provide your opinions on how the Japanese side views the future under the current administration, I would be grateful.

I am curious whether there is potential for joint cooperation between Japan and Korea on the large-scale Alaska LNG project and Korea's Arctic route development, as pointed out by Dr. Abel, Mr. Kwon, and Dr. Kim. Also, I have heard that Japan is planning to significantly enhance its defense capabilities in response to the US request for increased defense cost-sharing.

I am curious about how Japan plans to enhance its defense capabilities in the future and how it intends to foster its defense industry for this purpose. While South Korea's defense industry is well-developed, I would like to hear about Japan's plans for nurturing its defense industry and the public's stance on this matter.

Prospects for Future South Korea-Japan Relations and Q&A

Due to time constraints, Dr. Choi Mi will handle this personally. Professor Mori will respond to Japan's reaction to President Lee Jae-myung, Professor Abel will address the Alaska LNG issue, and Professor Ito will respond to the defense budget increase. Professor Nam Ki-jeong, do you have any questions? I do, but I will ask later. Professors Mori, Abel, and Ito will provide brief answers. Among the students present, there is a view that relations between South Korea and Japan will deteriorate if Lee Jae-myung becomes president. The influence of the media seems significant. However, there are aspects I am not particularly concerned about.

The basis for this is that when South Korea-Japan relations worsened in 2019, while political and diplomatic spheres experienced negative sentiment, students' feelings towards popular culture did not change significantly. Politics and diplomacy were brief, but exchanges in popular culture were vibrant. This indicates that the influence of politics and diplomacy on culture is limited, and even if popular culture improves, it is difficult for politics and diplomacy to improve suddenly. Dr. Jae-eun Mi's mention of 2023 seems to be a key point.

Regarding energy development in Alaska, there appears to be considerable caution about economic feasibility, and thus, there are almost no moves in Japan to pursue it. However, considerations are being given to aspects such as ship efficiency related to polar routes, but there does not seem to be a strong will to directly pursue energy development yet.

The Kangbon government was scheduled to make related announcements, but it is reportedly taking time. Major corporations find it difficult to secure funding elsewhere due to low profit margins, and concerns exist regarding merchants of death and Shinho Show. A survey conducted a year ago indicated that about 10% of the public opposed it, but regarding the GF second firearms project, 50% expressed a strong desire to proceed.

As I stated in the discussion, due to global instability such as cooperation with China and the isolation of the Korean Peninsula, I believe the public's interest is deepening. Given the extremely limited time, it seems we could not engage in a thorough discussion. There will be many more opportunities to discuss this topic in the future. This year marked the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan. While many events were anticipated at the beginning of the year, the extent to which South Korea's political changes would have such a significant impact was unforeseen. Surprisingly, there were very few events related to the 60th anniversary.

I am grateful to Director Lee Si-woo for his steadfast support and for organizing this event. I believe today's event will undoubtedly be mentioned when discussing the 60th anniversary of South Korea-Japan diplomatic relations normalization in 2025. I extend my gratitude to everyone who has supported and assisted in making this event possible, and we hereby conclude this session.

I am grateful to Director Lee Si-woo for his steadfast support and for organizing this event. I believe today's event will undoubtedly be mentioned when discussing the 60th anniversary of South Korea-Japan diplomatic relations normalization in 2025. I extend my gratitude to everyone who has supported and assisted in making this event possible, and we hereby conclude this session.

Nam Ki-jeong, Director of the Seoul National University Institute of Japanese Studies.

Mori Tomomi, Professor at the Faculty of International Studies, Setsunan University.

Abe Makoto, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO).

Ito Kotaro, Senior Research Fellow at Canon Institute for Global Studies.

Managed and Edited by: Song Chaerin, Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute (EAI).

Inquiries: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 211) | crsong@eai.or.kr