[EAI-KIEP Conference] 60 Years of ROK-Japan Normalization and Future-Oriented Development: Opening Ceremony and Session 1

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FiNJewVADc8

Video Script

Good morning. I am the Director of the East Asia Institute's Center for Economic Policy. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Chairman Joo Ho-young of the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians' Union, President Son Yeol of the East Asia Institute, and all the experts on Korea-Japan relations and the audience who have joined us today. Today, we gather to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan and to chart a course for the next 60 years. Since the signing of the Basic Treaty between Korea and Japan in 1965, both countries have normalized relations and maintained close ties in various fields, including politics, economy, society, and culture.

The Importance of Korea-Japan Cooperation in a Global Transition

While there have been periods when relations between the two countries cooled due to past issues or differences in historical perception, there is a growing consensus that relations should be developed with a more future-oriented approach. The global economy is currently like a large container ship navigating through rough seas. The free trade system, which was as valuable as gold for decades, is gradually losing momentum due to the spread of liberalization and conflicts in isolated regions, leading to changes in international trade, weakening growth engines, and financial market instability. Amidst this, geopolitical uncertainties have increased, highlighting the importance of economic security globally. In particular, over the past few years, trade, diplomatic, and supply chain cooperation among countries sharing democratic values, i.e., democratic bloc countries, has been emphasized.

However, the Trump administration, which took office early this year, has pursued foreign policies biased towards interests rather than values, under the banner of "America First." In such circumstances, strengthening solidarity among countries facing similar situations, or countries with similar positions, is considered even more important than cooperation among existing democratic bloc countries. It is necessary to make a unified voice regarding the coexistence of free trade and multilateralism, and the spread of self-centered industrial policies, through the firm cooperation of countries harmed by protectionist measures such as increased tariffs and export controls by the United States. From this perspective, close cooperation between Korea and Japan, which face similar situations in terms of industrial and export structure, demographic structure, and geopolitical conditions, is considered extremely important now more than ever. Furthermore, both Korea and Japan face common socio-economic challenges such as low birth rates and aging populations, and balanced regional development. Therefore, policy communication and experience sharing between the two countries can play a crucial role in responding to these challenges.

Today, experts from Korea and Japan have gathered to address these various contemporary challenges. I urge you to engage in vigorous discussions to solidify future-oriented Korea-Japan relations in all fields, including diplomacy and security, economy, technology, humanities, and social sciences. In particular, I hope that during the discussions, efforts will be made to derive long-term visions and tasks that will enable the older generation in both countries to fulfill their responsibilities and opportunities for the future generation. With the sincere hope that today's valuable meeting will serve as an important stepping stone for building mid- to long-term trust and mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries, I conclude my opening remarks. Thank you. Yes. Good morning, everyone. I am Joo Ho-young, a member of the National Assembly and Chairman of the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians' Union.

I understand that today's international conference is a forum to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan, to reflect on the past, and to explore avenues for future cooperation. Sixty years is recognized as 'Hwangap' in Korea and 'Kanno' in Japan, signifying the end of one cycle and the beginning of a new era. I extend my deep gratitude to the East Asia Institute and the East Asia Institute for Economic Policy for jointly hosting this meaningful international conference, and to all the experts on Korea-Japan relations who have joined us today despite their busy schedules.

The Basic Treaty between Korea and Japan, signed in 1965, marked the beginning of reconciliation and cooperation beyond the long history of the past. The two countries have achieved comprehensive development in politics, economy, culture, and people-to-people exchanges. However, we must not stop here. We are currently at a major inflection point in the world order, facing the US-China strategic competition, the triangle of North Korea-China-Russia, the climate crisis, and the spread of digital transformation and AI. These complex challenges are reasons why both Korea and Japan must reflect on the past while jointly designing a new century of peace and prosperity. Our countries, Korea and Japan, are geographically closest neighbors and partners who share the values of liberal democracy and human rights. On the basis of these shared values, we must further strengthen practical, future-oriented cooperation in various fields such as economy, security, technology, energy, and culture. In particular, we must pool our wisdom to broaden intergenerational exchanges and mutual understanding so that the youth of both countries can jointly shape the future. To this end, governments, parliaments, schools, and civil society must join hands and take bold and comprehensive action.

approaches to create new cooperation models. However, the lingering historical issues have repeatedly led to a vicious cycle, undoing all previous efforts and progress. We must recognize once again that without forming a consensus within Korea on this issue, we will face this vicious cycle every time a problem arises, and we must continue to strive to bridge this gap. Fortunately, since the inauguration of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, the Secretary-General of the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians' Union, Mr. Nagashima, visited a few days ago and held discussions with our parliamentarians and met with the National Security Advisor. Just a moment ago, the leaders of the two countries held a summit in Canada and seem to have reached positive and desirable agreements on the future development of Korea-Japan relations. The Korea-Japan Parliamentarians' Union will also align with this trend, continue to enrich exchanges between the parliaments of the two countries, and make greater efforts at the parliamentary level to enable policy alignment. I hope this conference will serve as a starting point for reflecting on the past 60 years of Korea-Japan relations and designing another new 60 years together.

I hope that the various insights and proposals presented today will serve as a valuable stepping stone in overcoming the common challenges faced by both countries. The discussion results will be summarized and shared with all members of the Korean National Assembly and the Korea-Japan Summit. Congratulations. Hello. I am Kim Young, who was introduced earlier. I will give a keynote presentation on a few points. I would like to share some points that I have felt during the approximately nine months of joint research conducted by the East Asia Institute and the East Asia Institute for Economic Policy.

Meaning and Tasks of Future-Oriented Korea-Japan Relations

If we are to identify keywords, the term "future-oriented Korea-Japan relations" is frequently used. The meaning of "future" in this context, and the fact that "future-oriented" inevitably leads us to discuss future generations. Therefore, the issues concerning future generations in Korea-Japan relations become the core. Lastly, I have used the word "resolution" here, and I have considered the path towards resolution. The phrase "future-oriented Korea-Japan relations" is being used a lot. The current president uses it frequently, as does the Japanese Prime Minister. This is because the Korea-Japan relationship has been marred by conflicts over past issues, and the reality is that both countries are so preoccupied with historical issues that they cannot genuinely pursue mutual cooperation and development. In this context, when we talk about being future-oriented, it means moving beyond the past. Therefore, in a sense, the Korea-Japan relationship and being future-oriented are contextually linked. Historical issues

have been ongoing for 60 years and continue to create current issues. As the honorable member mentioned, despite the agreement between the two governments ten years ago, the measures to commemorate and restore the honor of the comfort women victims are still insufficient. Furthermore, although a third-party payment proposal was put forth as a solution to the forced labor issue, Japan's response has not been sufficient to meet Korea's expectations, and its implementation is facing increasing difficulties. This is the current situation.

The controversy surrounding the inscription of Sado Island's gold mine on the UNESCO World Heritage list was also quite heated last year and remains a periodically recurring issue. Nevertheless, since the Yoon Suk-yeol administration proposed the third-party payment plan in 2023, relations between the two countries have significantly improved, and exchanges at both government and private levels have expanded tremendously. Furthermore, security cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan was established through the Camp David Accords. Very recently, on June 4th and 5th, the East Asia Institute conducted a public opinion survey on East Asia, which was very interesting. Almost all indicators related to Japan relations showed positive results, with a significant overall improvement.

Specifically, regarding the foreign policy priorities of the new government, 50% of respondents indicated that future-oriented cooperation in areas such as economy, technology, security, and environment should be pursued, while 32% prioritized resolving historical issues. This significant difference of 50% versus 32% is noteworthy. When we asked the same question before the last presidential election, future cooperation was favored by 35% and resolving historical issues by 40%. Thus, while historical issues were prioritized then, the perception has now completely reversed.

I believe that this significant change over the past three years is due to two main factors. First, as Director Lee pointed out, both Korea and Japan feel the risks emanating from the US-China relationship and China. While security risks such as nuclear weapons and missiles are always present, the more structural problem is the China risk. The Korean economy, within the context of globalization, worries about China's supply chains and relies on exports to China, to the extent that it has become excessively dependent, with exports to China reaching up to 28%. This is an overdependence.

This has created a structurally vulnerable situation in terms of strategic security. In fact, we have experienced economic retaliation from China, such as the THAAD retaliation, which has significantly worsened public opinion and increased the perception of China as a threat in Korea, leading to a similar level of dislike for China as for North Korea. As an escape route from this dependence on China, as correctly pointed out by the KIEP, we have significantly expanded exports to the United States. However, the result of this expansion in exports to the US was facing tariffs from Trump. We must accept this as a consequence of increasing dependence on the US to partially alleviate dependence on China. Furthermore, since the advent of the Biden administration, we have also been exposed to the risks of overdependence in terms of security. This is a structural problem where our security is entirely dependent on the ROK-US alliance. The US, in its hegemonic decline, is selectively reducing its global engagement and increasing the burden on its allies, potentially leading to a relaxation of deterrence. Consequently, Korea and Japan must increase their military spending and pay more for the stationing of troops. Thus, participating in China containment and cooperation becomes a strategic vulnerability of the stationed forces. We have to do more. I believe we have reached a point of such a dilemma. Therefore, the public's fear of dependence or overdependence on China, the uncertainty of alliances due to the decline of US hegemony, and the fatigue from the deepening strategic competition between the US and China are all pressures from the overall international structure that have become structural factors driving Korea-Japan cooperation.

The results of this are clearly reflected in the public opinion survey. So, I would like to point that out. Second, this can be described as a force from below. This is the fact that public favorability towards Japan in Korean society has been steadily and, recently, very rapidly increasing. I have provided a table, and according to that table, in 2020, the favorability towards Japan was 12.3%. That 12.3% in 2020 was a result of the Korea-Japan conflict in 2019.

The results are well-reflected in this public opinion poll. Therefore, I would like to point out one thing. Second, this is what I will call a bottom-up force. It is that the favorability towards Japan in Korean society is steadily increasing, and recently, it is increasing at a very rapid pace. I have presented a table, and if you look at it, the favorability towards Japan in 2020 was 12.3%. That 12.3% in 2020 was a result of the Korea-Japan conflict in 2019.

This was concluded in a public opinion poll in June 2020. So, it was at a very low level, but it has increased to 63.3% five years later. It has increased fivefold in five years. Favorability towards Japan is now at a record high. This aspect, which Dr. Choi Mi-young will explain in detail, is the surge in tourism, especially among young people in both countries. Young people are not just visiting once; they are repeat visitors. Through tourism, they directly experience Japan, form perceptions of Japan, and we can intuitively understand this. Moreover, these generations are the largest consumers of Japanese popular culture. Therefore, the young generations in their 20s and 30s are forming their own views of Japan based on direct experiences, different from the frames or narratives of the older generation. These views of Japan are forming a positive perception of Japan, which is reflected in public opinion, and this favorability, driven by those in their 20s and 30s, is now spreading to all generations. Therefore, given this trend, it is hard not to feel that we are entering a new dimension in our relationship, at least at the private level. And in line with this overall trend at the private level, the current government is also pursuing future-oriented growth and functional cooperation. Therefore, I would like to conclude my keynote presentation by highlighting two points within this overall trend. One is the meaning of future-oriented, as I mentioned this afternoon. It is not future-oriented simply because it deals with issues other than history.

We have used it that way so far, but the concept of "future" in "future-oriented" should refer to the challenges that future generations will face, as extensively discussed in the joint research by our TF and EAI. Therefore, we must engage in cooperative efforts between Korea and Japan that move towards that future. In other words, we should define the future as the period up to 2050, looking ahead at least 10 years and up to 2050, and consider the period when the current young generations become the mainstream and older generations in both societies. We must identify the core challenges that these future generations will face and begin the process of resolving them with the older generation, together with the future generation, starting now. That is the meaning of "future-oriented." Second, in that regard, what concept can be used? For future-oriented cooperation, I have tentatively used the term "resolution."

As you know, the term "resolution" comes from the "Joseon Chaeryak" (Korean Strategy) written by Huang Jun-yuan, a Chinese official in Japan, which Kim Hong-jip of Joseon received in 1880 when he visited Japan. At that time, Huang Jun-yuan's Joseon Chaeryak advised a strategy of "Banga," meaning to maintain friendly relations with China, align with Japan, and connect with the US to defend against or check Russia.

Since then, the term "resolution" has not been used in our society. "Solidarity" is possible. Aligning with Japan in specific areas is possible, but "resolving" together with Japan implies compromise or joint action on almost all issues, which represents a very high level of Korea-Japan cooperation. And for that cooperation, it is a concept that requires emotional and cultural connection.

Therefore, it is not easy for the current older generation. However, as I mentioned earlier, the future generation, or the younger generation, in both Korea and Japan, are forming their identities by centering on each other's cultures and confirming and expanding their identities through tourism. Therefore, when looking to the future, do we not need to start working now for the resolution of the future generation? And many of the important items for those tasks will be presented in today's two sessions, especially in the first session. To elaborate, if "future-oriented" means cooperation to solve the problems and challenges faced by future generations, then I believe the older generation must resolve historical issues. In other words, a future-oriented relationship does not mean putting history aside and moving towards cooperation.

rather, it means that we must also resolve historical issues in that context for the sake of the future. Therefore, what I have said so far is my personal opinion based on our research findings. I hope that what I have presented as my keynote address will be of some reference to today's discussions. Thank you very much. This is Lee Jeong-hwan. For those who have participated in our joint research, you will know that the content of my presentation is not solely my own work. There are three main topics. I will present a comprehensive summary of the research conducted by three individuals. Please understand it in that context.

Korea-Japan Foreign and Security Cooperation in the Era of US-China Competition

The area of defense cooperation was primarily handled by Professor Jeon Jae-sung of Seoul National University's Department of Political Science and International Relations. I dealt with Korea-Japan cooperation in the defense sector. Energy cooperation in the era of climate crisis was handled by Professor Lee Moon-jung of Sungkyunkwan University. I will first explain the background for the emergence of these three topics related to foreign and security affairs. In a way, the common challenges that Korea and Japan face in preparing for the future are related to the transformation of the world order, and there is regional cooperation that both countries are considering. Ultimately, this relates to two dimensions of foreign and security affairs: the global dimension and the regional dimension. How will we respond to these by 2050, i.e., in 25 years? The first topic concerns how Korea and Japan can engage in diplomatic cooperation, specifically foreign and security cooperation, in response to the changing world order centered on US-China competition. In the regional aspect, the issue is North Korea.

Regarding North Korea, assuming the next 25 years, the second theme focuses on how to cooperate in engaging with North Korea, rather than the point of deterrence that has been the focus in recent years. Joint response to climate crisis in the era of climate change as a future task will be closely linked with the environmental aspects of hydrogen, which will be presented later. However, the focus has been on how to seek policy responses and foreign and security cooperation in the areas of climate change and energy as future tasks.

The defense cooperation section deals with the content of joint cooperation between Korea and Japan in the era of US-China competition. I am not entirely confident as I did not write this part, but Professor Jeon Jae-sung summarized it by considering the potential risks and changes over the next 25 years. As you all know, the most important aspect is the strategic competition between the United States and China. What scenarios can we predict for 25 years from now, considering the interconnected changes in other areas?

There are scenarios of power politics and scenarios of inevitable conflict. In the current situation where confrontation and coexistence are happening simultaneously, we are meeting and clashing. Within such conflicts, there could be a situation similar to the US-Soviet confrontation during the Cold War, or the possibility of countries like Korea and Japan forming a different kind of order within great power competition, or a relationship of great power separation where the competition between great powers is not intense, or the continuation of the liberal international order. Among these scenarios, while the "inevitable conflict" refers to the first one, the second, third, and fourth scenarios could potentially combine. In such cases, as in the second scenario, which we can predict a lot, the active camp-based cooperation between Korea and Japan in foreign and security affairs in recent years is something you will recall. Such aspects could continue. Ultimately, just as Korea and Japan were incorporated into the camp order during the US-Soviet confrontation, if the camp order of US-China competition intensifies, the cooperation in the defense sector between Korea and Japan is likely to take on a camp-based cooperative nature. If there are other aspects of cooperation between the US and China, and in the third and fourth scenarios where both countries can bring about changes in the regional order through cooperation of a different nature, not just within a US or China camp, then the cooperation in the defense sector between Korea and Japan will be somewhat different from camp-based cooperation. This is the key point in this section.

However, this is my personal feeling, but for now, the part primarily described by Professor Jeon Jae-sung focuses on how Korea and Japan will cooperate within the US-led camp order. You can read it. However, one point here is that in terms of specific responses, the fourth part, in addition to the camp-based defense cooperation described by Professor Jeon Jae-sung, suggests that there is a need to expand the space for strategic cooperation between Korea and Japan beyond the US and to explore such content further. This seems to be linked to cooperation for North Korean reform and opening up. In other words,

Regarding North Korea, there has been a conflict within Korea and a prolonged lack of alignment between the regimes of Korea and Japan on whether to primarily pursue deterrence or engagement. However, from a longer-term perspective, if Korea and Japan can jointly participate in North Korea's growth and development, this could lead to cooperation that differs in nature from US-China competition. In this regard, we have developed discussions on the need for joint institutional frameworks for North Korea's reform and opening up, which are somewhat functional. Capital will be needed for North Korea's reform and opening up, and there is currently no established framework for financing it. In the future, there may be competition among countries in the region, but it is possible for Japan and Korea to jointly

reflect these aspects. The concept of a development bank was envisioned as a multilateral development bank (MDB). The idea of a small-scale Northeast Asia Development Bank, playing a role similar to the World Bank at a regional level, emerged in Korea and Japan in the 1990s and 2000s. While the name may not be the same, these ideas could be explored as a way for Korea and Japan to jointly engage with North Korea. This can be seen as one way to explore cooperation between Korea and Japan outside the context of US-China competition.

However, you will all understand that these ideas lack realism from the perspective of 2025. But from a long-term vision perspective, we need to build a vision where North Korea is not a source of conflict, competition, or confrontation between Korea and Japan, but rather an object of joint cooperation. For the past decade, North Korea has been a prominent source of conflict between Korea and Japan, much like historical issues. Therefore, it is necessary to shift our thinking framework to reverse this situation. Energy cooperation between Korea and Japan in the era of climate crisis seems to be organically linked with economic cooperation, which will be presented next. It is a common challenge.

Ultimately, there is climate change, and the energy issue in the context of the climate crisis for Korea and Japan is identical due to the similarities in their economic structures, industrial structures, and energy procurement structures. Therefore, the challenge is the same, and the proposal is to cooperate in renewable energy and nuclear energy as energy sources while reducing carbon emissions. It's already been 10 minutes.

Yes. Both Korea and Japan have a common goal of carbon neutrality by 2050. If there is a common goal, we can align our plans accordingly. However, we must be mindful of the differences in energy policy governance between Korea and Japan. Korea's energy policy is clearly politicized, while Japan, with no change in its nuclear power policy, naturally has policy continuity, and the nature of the energy market itself is different.

Therefore, although policy alignment may not be easy due to different policy governance, there is a commonality in content, and cooperation can be pursued accordingly. Regarding specific items, Professor Lee Moon-jung proposed joint procurement and stockpiling of natural gas (LNG) as a form of cooperation. Another proposal is to align standards and systems for reducing carbon emissions. Finally, although it may be a sensitive issue, if nuclear energy, in addition to renewable energy, is indispensable for Korea and Japan, then cooperation in nuclear energy between the two countries should also be considered.

In fact, you may feel that the three topics I presented are on very different levels. Perhaps now

Economic Cooperation: Economic Security, FTA, Hydrogen Sector

Korea and Japan must both consider future cooperation, and please understand that these three researchers worked on separate parts. That is all. Thank you. Our economic section is the same as Professor Lee Jeong-hwan's presentation earlier. It is part of the joint research conducted by KIEP. There are three parts: economic security, FTA, and climate crisis. The economic security part was written by Dr. Jeong Sung-chun, the second part was originally written by Dr. Ohs, and the third part was written by myself. It is difficult to reflect the opinions of all authors consistently in a future vision of cooperation, so I have only taken the titles. I would like to state that any suggestions I make are entirely my personal opinion. Before I discuss these three parts, I would like to make two or three preliminary remarks. Our title is "Economic Cooperation." In fact, the very term "economic cooperation" between Korea and Japan is highly suggestive. Since the 1965 treaty, Korea's economy has grown with economic aid, and after the 1997 financial crisis, economic cooperation between Korea and Japan has been formed and developed through continuous unilateral support from Japan and the US. Therefore, the term "economic cooperation" is often equated with unilateral economic aid. However, while the term "cooperation" is used, the content is not. As the world has changed, we now use the term "economic cooperation" in a relationship of equals. So, I would like to draw your attention to this point. Second, while cooperation is discussed in many areas, it is very difficult to discuss without considering the actors of cooperation. I believe the actors of cooperation can be divided into the private sector and the government sector.

Korea and Japan must both consider the aspects of future cooperation. I would appreciate it if you would consider and understand that these were separate contributions by three researchers. Thank you. Thank you. Our economics section is the same as the presentation made by Professor Lee Jung-hwan earlier. This is a joint JK study. There are three parts: economic security, FK, and the third is climate crisis. Actually, the economic security section was written by Dr. Jeong Sung-chun, the second part was originally written by Dr. Osh, and the third part was written by myself. It is difficult to write this consistently, reflecting the opinions of all authors regarding the future vision and cooperation direction, so I have only brought the titles. I want to state that any suggestions or proposals I make are entirely my personal opinion. And before I discuss these three parts, I would like to make two or three points. Our title is economic cooperation.

So, what role does the private sector play in cooperation, and what can the governments of Korea and Japan do from the perspective of viewing Korea and Japan as a single economic community, economic bloc, or economic unit, particularly in areas where market failures may occur? Third, when we talk about economic cooperation, there are sectors, and here we have the World Bank, and there are parts that are missing. Among these, perhaps the most important area for the new government is AI, isn't it? Ultimately, it is about future industries. AI, quantum, and space are expected to emerge as new cooperation issues between Korea and Japan, but I could not cover them due to time constraints. Therefore, after stating these three preconditions, I will briefly explain. Economic Security Part. As you all know, economic security is, in my perception, understood through three pillars.

It is easier to understand if viewed as three pillars. In the context of US-China conflict and confrontation, the first is economic statecraft, which refers to economic means. This includes export controls. The second is the supply chain part. These are issues arising from the decoupling from China, and this is perhaps the only area where multilateral capabilities and bilateral cooperation between Korea and Japan can be considered. The third is advanced science and technology, and the development of national strategic technologies. In these three pillars, economic security competition and cooperation occur. In terms of cooperation, there is room for cooperation in the supply chain, which is the second pillar, so we are discussing that area.

It is easier to understand if viewed as three pillars. In the context of US-China conflict and confrontation, the first is economic statecraft, which refers to economic means. This includes export controls. The second is the supply chain part. These are issues arising from the decoupling from China, and this is perhaps the only area where multilateral capabilities and bilateral cooperation between Korea and Japan can be considered. The third is advanced science and technology, and the development of national strategic technologies. In these three pillars, economic security competition and cooperation occur. In terms of cooperation, there is room for cooperation in the supply chain, which is the second pillar, so we are discussing that area.

It is easier to understand if viewed as three pillars. In the context of US-China conflict and confrontation, the first is economic statecraft, which refers to economic means. This includes export controls. The second is the supply chain part. These are issues arising from the decoupling from China, and this is perhaps the only area where multilateral capabilities and bilateral cooperation between Korea and Japan can be considered. The third is advanced science and technology, and the development of national strategic technologies. In these three pillars, economic security competition and cooperation occur. In terms of cooperation, there is room for cooperation in the supply chain, which is the second pillar, so we are discussing that area.

Regarding cooperation, we can consider US-led cooperation. However, its concrete form is not yet visible. The Biden administration's supply chain cooperation frameworks were the IPF and MSP, but they are reportedly dysfunctional. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration's achievement in IPF supply chain cooperation cannot be ignored, as Korea served as the chair for one year. Korea and Japan's governments must continuously consider alternatives to IPF, considering issues with China and the context of a Korea-US-Japan economic alliance. In particular, while Korea has shown relatively high interest in IPF, the Japanese government has not.

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry are also emphasizing IPF supply chain cooperation, so this framework must be maintained even under a Trump administration. Furthermore, bilateral cooperation can be divided into two parts: the energy sector and mineral resources. In the energy sector, LNG is an important issue, and Japan is in a more urgent situation than Korea.

Japan has a high dependence on LNG due to earthquakes, and the issue of joint LNG procurement between Korea and Japan is an area where trust can be built. KOGAS and JERA are already cooperating. In the energy sector, LNG development is being considered as a bargaining chip in tariff negotiations, and although Korea and Japan will participate individually, there have been discussions about potential future cooperation. The second area is critical minerals.

Since Korea and Japan benefit from multilateral cooperation such as the US-led MSP, they must either inherit this cooperation framework or seek alternatives. Second is bilateral cooperation. Due to China's unexpected export ban, incidents like Japan's monopoly incident in 2010 and Korea's urea solution crisis have occurred. As long as there is US-China conflict, this is a variable that must be considered in Korea-Japan cooperation. Cooperation is needed in the mineral resources sector, and although the government has changed, an agreement is expected to be signed between the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. This should continue.

Specific details will be omitted, and I will move on to the second theme, FTA. I debated whether to include this part in the presentation. The biggest issue currently is the discussion of Korea's accession to the CPTPP. This reached the stage just before application for accession after a public hearing at the end of the Moon Jae-in administration in 2022, but it was halted by the Yoon Suk-yeol administration.

Ironically, a meeting related to the CPTPP was held at the Trade and Commerce Ministers' Meeting in Jeju Island last May. During this meeting, a significant statement was made about jointly responding to the Trump administration's tariff policies in cooperation with the CPTPP, EU, and ASEAN within the year. Furthermore, last year, the CPTPP Japan website mentioned that the CPTPP agreement would be revised to jointly respond to China's strengthening economic threat in the latter half of this year. I understand this meeting will be held in September or October.

It is significant that the CPTPP is moving beyond simply liberalizing trade and investment to encompass supply chains and responding to the Trump administration. Therefore, I believe it is time for the current government to seriously consider Korea's accession to the CPTPP. While there may be a price to pay, the benefits are substantial, making it meaningful as a Korea-Japan cooperation measure. The reason the Yoon Suk-yeol administration has not pursued CPTPP accession is likely due to concerns about the National Assembly, particularly the Democratic Party.

There was a public sentiment that if Korea joins the CPTPP, the situation will worsen, especially given the difficulties already faced regarding the forced labor issue. Mindful of this, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration has avoided the topic of CPTPP accession. However, the current government should overcome this frame and reconsider it.

Finally, regarding CPTPP accession, the business community appears to be actively in favor. The third topic is hydrogen. As there are only about 3 minutes left, I will speak briefly. Hydrogen can be a relatively free area of cooperation between Korea and Japan in terms of political relations, especially in addressing climate change. Since the inauguration of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, there has been significant cooperation in the hydrogen sector.

Under the name of joint entry into third countries, many MOUs have been signed between Korean energy companies and Japanese trading companies to procure hydrogen from abroad. I thought that full-scale cooperation in the hydrogen sector was underway. However, from a long-term perspective, the direction seems somewhat off. To achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, Korea and Japan have an obligation to fulfill international commitments. There is room for cooperation between Korea and Japan in the hydrogen sector. Currently, corporate cooperation is almost entirely at the level of gray hydrogen, which has high carbon emissions.

Currently, over 95% of the hydrogen distributed globally is gray hydrogen. There will be almost no hydrogen that meets the 2050 carbon neutrality goal. Therefore, Korea-Japan hydrogen cooperation needs a change in direction away from gray hydrogen. Currently, both Korea and Japan primarily rely on blue hydrogen based on LNG, but green hydrogen based on renewable energy is not competitive domestically. Therefore, technological development must come first, and second, joint development in third countries is the only way forward.

From a long-term perspective, it is beneficial for Korea and Japan to cooperate. Specifically, project-related aspects and technological cooperation below are important. AI technology cooperation, which Professor Baek Sun will present, will be a meaningful joint R&D for climate change response. Finally, there is the area of norms. By 2030 or 2050, a global hydrogen market will be formed, and if the current trend continues, China will dominate the market. In that process, they will confront China and argue about what constitutes green hydrogen.

Technological Cooperation: AI and Humanoid Robots

Korea and Japan must prepare for this area, but unfortunately, both countries are lagging far behind. Therefore, I emphasize the need for Korea and Japan to unite in this regard. I conclude my presentation. I was in charge of the technology section. The technology section is a crucial asset for economic growth and security, and it also requires support from the humanities and social sciences.

Korea-Japan technological cooperation is very important. The background is similar to what I mentioned earlier. Both Korea and Japan are experiencing issues such as aging populations and industrial challenges. Personally, the most important industrial issue is US-China competition. The US maintains technological superiority and checks China, but as a reaction, China is growing rapidly. As a result, only the US and China are advancing, and other countries are completely left behind in science and technology. No country can catch up.

Korea and Japan possess important technologies and ecosystems, but individually, they are in a situation where they cannot keep up. Furthermore, even if one of the two countries cooperates with the US, it is highly likely to become subordinate. Therefore, for the sake of securing a certain degree of open technological sovereignty, Korea-Japan technological cooperation is very important.

In recent years, Japan's industrial policy has shown that if left to market forces without government intervention, its share in semiconductors could virtually disappear. This is similarly observed in most technology sectors. Without strong government investment or momentum, Korea faces the same situation, and it might even be more severe. This year marks the 10th anniversary of China's 'Made in China 2025'; while its evaluation is mixed, it has grown to threaten manufacturing not only in Korea but globally across most sectors. The humanoid robot sector, like the hydrogen sector, is also experiencing this trend.

These are technologies that are bound to be absent in Korea or Japan. The approach to exploring and engaging with cooperation agendas involves examining national visions and the role of science and technology. Japan has announced Society 5.0, and Korea has announced Science and Technology Innovation 2045. Overall, they are compatible. We have drawn inspiration and learned from various Japanese documents. What both countries desire goes beyond merely acquiring specific technologies; it is about benefiting society and humanity. The focus on sustainable development and value creation through science and technology indicates a high degree of compatibility in fundamental overarching concepts.

If we were to cooperate, we could examine science and technology-related projects being undertaken at the Prime Minister's Office or the Presidential Office, and relevant ministries. Japan's Moonshot Project is well-designed. Korea also has similar projects, but they are fragmented across different ministries. Among the numerous joint R&D initiatives, I mention this one because it is problem-solving oriented. It is not technology-centric but rather a mission-oriented project aimed at solving societal problems or national development needs. Such projects are already well-designed in both Japan and Korea.

Looking at projects pursued in Japan in recent years and Korea's Alchemist Project, the core item that runs through them is humanoid robots. Humanoid robots are the solution and means to address and strengthen issues of aging, low birth rates, and industrial competitiveness, particularly in manufacturing, that both Korea and Japan are facing. It involves creating new agents, and at this important juncture with the recent appointment of a Chief AI Officer, these can be applied to society to solve problems and create value.

The reasons why Korea and Japan should cooperate in the field of humanoid robots are the same as those mentioned earlier.

Currently, Korean manufacturing is generally the strongest, excluding China, while Japan is the strongest in the materials, parts, and equipment sector. However, the emergence of humanoid robots could completely change this landscape. If we are slow to respond, we will face a situation similar to being slow to respond to AI. Since AI is already integrated into humanoid robots, there is a very high probability that Japan's industrial robot market, currently a global leader, will disappear. This is because the industrial humanoid robot market will be completely transformed.

If our response to the adoption of these robots is slow, we could face a situation similar to the Roborock incident. From robot vacuum cleaners used in homes to all home appliances, competitive products produced using this technology could encroach upon our market share, and it is highly probable that competitors will emerge. Therefore, I want to emphasize the need for rapid change in this area. Specific agendas are included in our report, and I have organized my thoughts based on feedback requesting suggestions on what the government should do and what academia should do. This is my personal opinion. I believe cooperation agendas exist in two aspects: technology and market. Professor Kim emphasized the importance of R&D, but I want to state that R&D is not everything. Usually, R&D is important, and because it is the easiest to manage, funds are often invested only in that area,

and the project is concluded. However, in the case of Korea-Japan cooperation, while R&D can be utilized for international joint research, elemental or platform technologies, and data construction, practical outcomes can only be achieved if policies that stimulate market demand are fundamentally in place. Of course, there are critical areas and aspects requiring institutional adjustments, but fields where humanoid robots can be applied include disaster response, public administration, and healthcare. These are areas that both countries can jointly explore and are already pursuing individually. Various policies that should play a role in connecting technology and supply, which can be seen as ecosystem policies, could involve cooperation in fund creation, personnel exchange, learning support, and technology planning for future exploration. Of particular importance is human resources

exchange. As Director Son Jae mentioned, the current bottom-up atmosphere is very positive. It is a good situation where Korean university students are employed by Japanese robot companies, or skilled Japanese engineers come to Korea to start businesses. While this could be seen as a brain drain, considering the situation of Korean companies, it is difficult for the employment environment to improve drastically within five years. Therefore, it is important for our graduates to gain career experience abroad and grow into skilled engineers. The situation in Japan may also change within five years. When viewed as the same region, active personnel mobility, continuous growth, and the process of movement can enrich the ecosystem. Regarding funds, much has been discussed earlier,

so I will conclude by discussing future technology exploration. Japan has accumulated extensive experience in technology planning, almost to the point of learning from Japanese documents. Roadmaps for the robotics sector up to 2050 have already been developed, but it would be beneficial to stably operate a joint future technology exploration body based on these roadmaps to determine what to do, how to solve problems, and in which areas to implement them. For each sector, public demand will primarily come from the government, while research institutes, universities, and companies can participate in the technology sector. The private sector and government research institutes can work together in the ecosystem sector. In conclusion, while we are focusing solely on AI, it is AI that must ultimately bring about change, and what we must ultimately pursue is the value it creates, rather than the cost invested.

What and how can it change, that is, creating value, is very important. Competitiveness may decline with AI alone, and the same applies to the robotics sector, but there are opinions that we should become a country that quickly adopts and effectively uses foreign technologies, while others advocate for complete national technological sovereignty. However, approaching it solely in this manner is difficult. Fundamentally, highly reliable alternative robots are the best option. We should aim for inclusive robots, and this cannot be achieved by Korea or Japan alone.

Humanities and Social Sciences Cooperation: Demographic Change and Future Generations

If Korea and Japan cooperate, it will be relatively advantageous. Instead of one country dominating hegemony like the US or China, I thought it would be good to pursue humanoid robot cooperation as a potential alternative to some extent. This concludes my presentation. Thank you. Yes, hello. I am Choi Eunmi, a researcher at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, focusing on exchange rate relations and Japanese politics and diplomacy. I will be giving the fourth presentation. The field I will present on is the working group on future visions for Korea-Japan humanities and social sciences cooperation. As the last presenter, I always face time constraints, and as you can see, our working group has four members. This means we have to explain each area in two minutes, and I am unsure if it will be possible, but I will try. Our humanities and social sciences working group is divided into four sub-groups: first, demographic change; second, mutual perception of future generations; third, cooperation in the media sector; and finally, cultural cooperation.

I wrote the section on the mutual perception and exchange cooperation agenda for future generations, which is the second sub-group. The other three areas were written by other doctors, and although I will present them on their behalf, I will focus on the most important points as I understand them and on aspects that I believe should be emphasized, inferring what the other authors wanted to convey. The first topic is demographic change.

I am well aware that the issue of low birth rates and aging populations, which always arises in discussions on Korea-Japan relations, requires joint efforts from both countries. Therefore, when I first encountered this task, I had one central question: why should two countries that are both struggling with these issues come together to address them? However, after reading Dr. Lee's paper, I found it convincing. The point that caught my attention was this: typically, discussions on low birth rates and aging populations focus on specific aspects, which dictates the direction of the paper. Should the focus be on low birth rates, declining birth rates, or aging? However, Dr. Lee focused on 'demographic change.' This is a point I can strongly empathize with.

What this means is that papers focusing on low birth rates primarily address the issue of not having children, and policy directions also follow suit. In the case of declining birth rates, the focus is on women not having children, leading to discussions on how to encourage more births and how to facilitate marriage. I have significant reservations about these aspects and have commented that they reflect a highly male-centric perspective. However, this paper shifts the focus from those issues to the fact that both countries are experiencing population decline. Therefore, it first discusses 'demographic change,' stating that in 2025, Japan's population is approximately 120 million, and Korea's is approximately 50 million.

Looking at the projected figures for 2050, the main theme of this report, Japan is expected to have about 104.68 million people, and Korea about 42 million. This is where the problem arises. The second graph shows the old-age dependency ratio, which is the ratio of people aged 65 and over that the working-age population must support. This ratio is increasing, meaning the burden on the younger generation will grow. During the recent presidential election, I had the opportunity to discuss with young people in their 20s about Korean politics, and surprisingly, many students talked about the pension issue. Even though I am in my 40s and do not deeply contemplate pensions, I was surprised that students in their 20s were concerned about it, realizing their concerns differed from mine. Perhaps because they are the generation directly experiencing population decline,

they have more concerns about the future. The next slide is about regional decline. I believe you have seen this content before. Moving on, in the face of these demographic changes, this paper explores three areas for mutual cooperation between Korea and Japan: low birth rates, aging populations, and regional decline. Of course, changing the population structure is very difficult, so the focus seems to be on how to address these issues. From that perspective, the working-age population is decreasing, leading to a labor shortage.

So, when there is a labor shortage, what kind of cooperation can be achieved? The increase in robot and AI utilization, which was presented earlier, is likely a continuation of this discussion. Second, as the elderly population increases, social welfare costs rise, and the fiscal burden grows. This is where the discussion about the pension system comes in, as I understand it. Third is the issue of regional decline due to the concentration of the young population in large cities. To address this problem, solutions such as encouraging the influx of foreign labor into rural areas have been proposed, along with specific policy suggestions. I recently spoke with someone deeply involved in related issues in Japan, and when I asked if there was much exchange regarding low birth rates and aging populations, they said there was not much. Discussions should occur in demographic societies, but only scholars like us at Korea-Japan forums share this sense of urgency. However, we only share the sense of urgency,

and there are limitations to engaging in detailed discussions. As low birth rates and aging populations are not my specialty, when I hear these discussions, I can offer comments, but when asked 'What should be done?', I can only say, 'I hope demographers can resolve this.' Therefore, I agree that joint forums or policy exchanges on this matter should be more active. Recently, I participated in a contest for local governments in Korea aimed at solving the crisis of regional decline. It was a session to present and evaluate policies that had actually been implemented and their effects. I wish there were opportunities for Korea and Japan to share these cases as examples for overcoming the crisis of regional decline. While it may be difficult at the university level, such

sharing opportunities would be beneficial. My presentation time has exceeded seven minutes. Regarding regional decline, I can share these thoughts. In this regard, I believe cooperation in technological areas or in fields where Korea and Japan excel would be beneficial. I am concerned about the lack of time for my presentation. Regarding future generations, it is a field I am very interested in, and EAI continuously provides valuable data, which is a precious resource for researchers. At the time I submitted this data, it had not yet been published, so I could not include it, but as Director Son mentioned earlier, a golden cross has occurred.

Perceptions of Japan in Korea have become more positive, and I personally use the term 'new normal' in Korea-Japan relations in my report. This implies that discussions can extend to how cooperation can proceed amidst the changed perceptions between the two countries, particularly from the perspective of the younger generations. Looking at this graph, the bold blue line represents favorability among those in their 20s, showing an absolutely high level of favorability towards Japan. More specifically, Korean men in their 20s show absolutely high favorability towards Japan. While women's favorability is also high, the level of favorability shown by men in their 20s deviates from the general pattern,

which I can point out. This level is high enough to be considered a driving force behind Korea's perception of Japan. Personal exchanges and cultural openness between the two countries have significantly influenced this shift in perception. Here, I pointed out an 'asymmetry issue.' Asymmetry goes beyond simply more people traveling from Korea to Japan; it raises the question of why, if Korean culture is so widely spread in Japan and many Japanese people like Korea, do these people not visit Korea? Why isn't inbound tourism changing? My concern was why, despite many Koreans liking Japan and visiting frequently, perceptions of Japan remain negative? This narrative held true until 2022. As of 2023, perceptions in both countries have changed, and I view this change not as temporary but as structural, referring to it as the 'new normal in Korea-Japan perceptions.' Finally, I would like to conclude by discussing students. Yesterday was the last day of the semester, and when I asked students to raise their hands if they had something to say, one student raised their hand and spoke.

He spoke about how, despite frequent exchanges between Korea and Japan and his own frequent visits to Japan, the historical issues felt very distant to him, and he didn't feel a sense of urgency about them. He wondered if he was doing something wrong by frequently visiting Japan despite this lack of concern. I thanked him for his honest reflection and offered two points. The perspective of young people today towards Japan, especially regarding historical issues, is largely characterized by a sense of detachment, a 'them-ification.' Consequently, these young people are not emotionally swayed. This detachment allows for an objective view, and it is our role as the older generation to create a platform where they can discuss these issues without prejudice,

Media and Cultural Content Cooperation

and perhaps discuss topics that are difficult for young people to address more easily. This is how I conclude this final section. Regarding media and cultural content, due to time constraints, I apologize, but I will briefly touch upon it. Concerning media, I understand that our book is being published, and the two authors who wrote about media and cultural content have largely written in a style resembling academic papers.

I understand that our book is being published, and the two authors who wrote about media and cultural content have largely written in a style resembling academic papers.

I believe there is a wealth of information to reference. For detailed information, please refer to the relevant materials. Regarding the media, as you can see, many people obtain information through the media in both Korea and Japan. Why is the media important? This connects to the previously mentioned perceptions: there are three factors that shape a country's image. The first is personal channels, such as tourism and cultural exchange. The second is relational channels, referring to the attitudes and policies that governments or administrations express towards other countries.

The third is textual channels, namely the media. How the media in Korea portrays Japan, and how Japan portrays Korea, influences people's perceptions and images. I believe you share many of the same concerns regarding the media in Korea and Japan without me needing to elaborate further. In this context, discussions on the direction of media reporting are emerging, and I believe this aspect is also very well-organized and warrants our deep consideration. Based on this content, when discussing future actions, proposals such as establishing a Korea-Japan media monitoring committee or creating a joint Korea-Japan future journalism course are commendable as they are novel suggestions.

To add just two points to this, I believe media literacy education needs to be strengthened. Lastly, when I assigned students a presentation on the media, I expected them to cover NHK, major Japanese media outlets, or the top five newspapers. However, the presentations featured Shorts and YouTubers. Therefore, we must identify what students are actually watching and what content the younger generation consumes, and engage in discussions about it. Because they are the future generation, rather than focusing on the positive aspects, I believe we, the older generation, need to broaden our perspective to understand the vision through which the future generation views the world, the content they encounter, and the primary content they consume. The cultural

content section is written in great academic detail, offering much to reference and detailed data. Among these, the aspects that caught my attention were the current status of cultural content exports from Korea to Japan and the import status. As you can see, music and games accounted for a significant proportion of exports to Japan, while publishing, games, and broadcasting were high in imports from Japan. However, in terms of the largest monetary value, it was manga, animation, and games. It is important to pay attention to this aspect, and there was also an explanation of why cultural content is important.

Cultural content serves as a medium to satisfy cultural needs. It is also closely linked to advanced technologies, enabling value creation and simultaneously promoting the image of products. Furthermore, it has a significant ripple effect on other industries, creating employment opportunities. In other words, I want to emphasize that the cultural content industry is attracting attention as a future advanced industry.

In conclusion, various ideas were discussed regarding cooperation in the cultural content industry, including new technologies and startup ventures. I particularly want to highlight the need for joint efforts to address the illegal distribution of content from both countries overseas. Current responses in terms of laws, systems, and technology are insufficient, so I hope for opportunities to share the current situation and develop policies in this area.

Finally, regarding startup ventures, only one piece of data is missing, so I will conclude by sharing the data I have. Many students come from Japan, but a problem is pointed out that the employment rate for students and people coming to Korea is very low. This is referred to as 'settlement rate.' Japan also faces a population shortage, and a survey on the employment settlement rate of international students who come to Japan and are linked to employment found it to be 44.3%.

Conversely, the employment rate for foreigners who came to Korea was only 8%. Therefore, I believe there are ample areas where we can share information on these matters. Despite speaking quickly, I have taken up a lot of time. As this was the final presentation among the four working groups, I apologize once again for the time taken and request your understanding. This concludes my presentation. Thank you. ■ Lee Seok-wook, President, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. ■ Joo Ho-young, Chairman, Korea-Japan Parliamentarians' Union. ■ Son Yeol, Director, East Asia Institute. ■ Lee Jeong-hwan, Professor, Seoul National University, Department of Political Science and International Relations. ■ Kim Gyu-pan, Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. ■ Baek Seo-in, Professor, Hanyang University, School of Global Culture and Commerce. ■ Choi Eunmi, Research Fellow, Asan Institute for Policy Studies. ■ Editor: Song Chaerin, EAI Research Fellow.

Thank you.

■ Lee Si-wook_President, Korea Development Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP).

■ Joo Ho-young_Chairman, Korea-Japan Parliamentarians' Union.

■ Sohn Yeol_Director, Institute for East Asian Studies (IEAS).

■ Lee Jung-hwan_Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Kim Gyu-pan_Senior Research Fellow, Korea Development Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP).

■ Baek Seo-in_Professor, College of Global Business Administration, Hanyang University.

■ Choi Eun-mi_Senior Fellow, Asan Institute for Policy Studies.

■ Contact and Editor: Song Chae-rin_Research Fellow, EAI.

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | crsong@eai.or.kr