[North Korea and the World] Indo-Pacific Allies' 'Responsibilities and Costs' Demanded by U.S. Secretary of Defense

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OVeIHrIpNP0

Video Script

Reaffirmation of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and Defense Strategy

That is, if a situation arises where we cooperate with China for economic gain, it will be considered a factor that directly affects U.S. security, so do not do it. What does this mean? It means the U.S. will equate economy and security. Thank you to everyone watching "Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World." Today, I must once again discuss the U.S.'s global strategy, particularly its defense strategy, which I have been covering for nearly two months. Very important information continues to emerge from the U.S., and these issues have a direct impact on South Korea, as well as on the North Korean issue I am discussing. Therefore, I believe I have no choice but to continue discussing this. What I want to analyze and share with you today is the Shangri-La Dialogue held on the last day of May. As some of you may know, the Shangri-La Dialogue is a dialogue initiated in 2002 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a renowned British institution, and held at the Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore since 2002. It primarily addresses key security and defense issues in the Asia-Pacific region and involves defense ministers. It began in 2002, so it has been over 20 years. The important point is that the U.S. Secretary of Defense attended, but unfortunately, due to political circumstances, the South Korean minister could not attend. Furthermore, South Korea was excluded when the U.S. Secretary of Defense visited the Indo-Pacific region in March.

I believe it was influenced by the political situation. Secretary Hagerty gave a rather lengthy speech, the content of which is very important. Therefore, I intend to focus on its content today. First, it reaffirmed the U.S.'s foreign policy stance. As you all know well, diplomacy focused on pursuing national interests is at the core of Trump's "America First" policy. He reiterated this point. While it's not new information for us, specific details have emerged. For example, the U.S. clearly stated that it is not interested in a moralistic or preachy foreign policy as it was in the past. It is particularly uninterested in the political policies or systems of other countries and will not play a role in pressuring them.

Interpreted personally, this means the U.S. has very clearly stated that it no longer intends to respect the values that it has continuously upheld and strengthened since 1945, such as the liberal international order, or an order based on norms, the rule of law based on liberal democracy, freedom of action, respect for sovereignty, the alteration of the status quo by force, and human rights. This is similar to the content of President Trump's speech in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Secretary Hagerty once again stated that the U.S. will no longer respect liberal democratic values, moral values, ethical values, the democratic peace theory that world peace comes with the spread of democracy, or the ideologies that form the basis of the Democratic Party since Woodrow Wilson.

Redefining U.S. National Identity and Strategic Objectives

Second, it clarified the U.S.'s national identity. This is a geopolitical identity. The U.S. clearly stated that it is an Indo-Pacific nation. The exact phrasing is: The United States is an Indo-Pacific nation. It states that the U.S. has been in this region since its founding and will continue to be a nation with interests in the Indo-Pacific region. This also has its own significance. While the U.S. has had an identity as an Indo-Pacific nation, its relationship with Europe has been much closer.

Increase in U.S. Defense Budget and Strengthening of Military Power

The U.S. participated in World War I and II and led the creation of the Atlantic alliance, NATO, which can be seen as a reason for its focus on Europe. Now, it intends to focus on the Indo-Pacific region. Ultimately, this is about containing China, and while the Trump administration has spoken much less about Europe, it is judged that this has been reaffirmed. Second, strategic objectives were discussed, which I analyzed in detail in my previous video. The strategy of denial, as advocated by Elbridge Colby, currently serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, has been reaffirmed. It is highly likely that Colby was involved in the drafting of Secretary Hagerty's speech, as the strategic objectives he has consistently discussed are reflected in the speech. What is reaffirmed and emphasized here is that in the Indo-Pacific region,

the most important thing is to deter attacks, that is, to deny the opponent's attack. This is the strategy of denial. It is also the title of Elbridge Colby's book. It has been reaffirmed that the reason the U.S. is in this region is not alone, but with allies and partner countries, to ultimately execute a strategy of denial against China. Third, the U.S. defense budget. As widely reported in the press, the Trump administration's defense budget has exceeded $1 trillion for the first time. The "trillion-dollar country" has finally surpassed $1 trillion, an increase of 13% compared to last year. Secretary Hagerty has reaffirmed this. He stated that a significant portion will be used for force development, specifically mentioning cutting-edge forces such as the 6th-generation fighter jets F-22 and F-35. Of course, there is debate about the necessity of 6th-generation fighter jets. There is discussion about whether expensive 6th-generation fighter jets are needed, or if unmanned combat aircraft or drones are more effective. Considering Ukraine's recent successful use of drones to attack Russian

bombers, the debate about what is important in the future battlefield environment is likely to continue. This is the story that the U.S. has allocated a defense budget increased by 13% compared to before for force enhancement, including stealth fighters, P-8 submarines, destroyers, hypersonic weapons, and drones. Additionally, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) was mentioned. This is a system the U.S. is building for missile defense, protecting the U.S. homeland from external nuclear missile attacks. While North Korea is included, the primary purpose is to contain China. President Trump stated that it would be built in a very short period, and substantial funds were invested. The GMD itself is also linked to the North Korean nuclear issue. If the GMD is built within a short period to the extent President Trump claims, the utility of North Korean nuclear weapons will be significantly

reduced. It means that North Korea's existing intercontinental ballistic missiles or weapon systems capable of attacking the U.S. homeland cannot penetrate it. Personally, I have considerable doubts about whether North Korea possesses the capability to strike the U.S. homeland, given that it has not even conducted proper tests of its existing weapon systems. In any case, if such a missile defense system is built more perfectly, North Korea will not be able to possess the capability to strike the U.S. homeland. This will reduce the utility of North Korean nuclear weapons.

Potential Impact on North Korean Denuclearization Negotiations

Second, there is a possibility that it could have a negative impact on North Korean denuclearization negotiations. As President Trump continues to emphasize "America First," if the U.S. homeland can be safely defended against external attacks, particularly North Korean nuclear attacks, the U.S. might pay less attention to North Korean nuclear weapons. After all, the homeland is safe. Of course, South Korea is within the practical range of North Korean nuclear threats, and I believe North Korea has operational capabilities. In that sense, it is an existential threat to us, and the level of threat increases, but from the U.S. perspective, the threat to its homeland is reduced, which could lessen the U.S.'s motivation to engage in denuclearization negotiations with North Korea.

Emphasis on Burden-Sharing by Allies

Next, it emphasized the sharing of costs and responsibilities by allies. As I have mentioned several times, the core of the U.S.'s strategy for alliance transformation is for allies and partners to share costs and responsibilities. Many people will remember Richard Nixon's Nixon Doctrine in the 1970s. "The security of Asia is the responsibility of Asians," meaning each country should take responsibility for its own security. This was announced in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and is considered to be on a similar level. At that time, one of Nixon's top priorities was the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. Some withdrawals were carried out, and discussions about further withdrawals continued until they were halted during the Ford administration, and then attempted again by President Carter as a campaign promise, but were ultimately stopped. In any case, entrusting costs and responsibilities to allies implies that the U.S. intends to reduce its potential for intervention in the region to defend its allies. Therefore, the possibility of reducing or adjusting the presence of U.S. troops in Korea, as discussed in some quarters, is also considered

U.S. Strategy to Counter China

to be plausible. Secretary Hagerty's speech clearly reaffirms this: "We are encouraging our European allies to take greater responsibility for their own security, which they have long borne." He adds, "An alliance cannot be ironclad if it appears one-sided, either in reality or perception," meaning that from the U.S. perspective, it has been unilaterally protecting its allies, and this can no longer continue. The core of Secretary Hagerty's speech is China. He spoke in great detail about China, and first, he elaborated on China's aggressive actions. I don't think I need to go into all the details here; a few key points are that China clearly aims to become the hegemonic power in Asia. Therefore, it is rapidly increasing its military power and demonstrating its willingness to use it. Naturally, China fundamentally seeks to alter the status quo in the region. This ultimately leads to the issue of Taiwan.

He states that President Xi Jinping has ordered the military to possess the capability to invade Taiwan by 2027. The same point is reiterated in Elbridge Colby's Senate testimony. The year 2027 is emphasized, and it is believed that Secretary Hagerty has reaffirmed that the U.S. Department of Defense is focusing on this. Expanding our thoughts here, this is a topic discussed by specialists, policy research groups, and academia. First, the question is whether China will truly have the possibility of attacking Taiwan. Second, if China does attack Taiwan, will the U.S. militarily intervene? Both questions remain. The first question is also highly debated. It is often said that the situation where China would use military force would be when Taiwan declares independence.

However, if that is the case, it is possible that the U.S. might prevent Taiwan from declaring independence. Therefore, the question of whether China can militarily invade Taiwan remains. In any case, I believe the second question is more important. That is, if a military conflict does occur, will the U.S. step in to militarily protect Taiwan? This has been a highly debated issue since the Trump administration, but Secretary Hagerty clearly articulates the Trump administration's policy on this matter to date.

He states that the Trump administration has no intention of going to war with China. However, not wanting war does not mean yielding to China. It means creating a very strong deterrence system, a strategy of denial, to prevent China from using military force in Taiwan or the Indo-Pacific region altogether. This strategy of denial is not being created by the U.S. alone but will be built by sharing responsibilities and costs with allies and partners. This is what Trump constantly refers to as "peace through strength" – deterring war by demonstrating strength rather than using it. This is believed to be the official and public stance of the Trump administration's policy toward Taiwan to date. However, the problem is, what will the U.S. do if this deterrence fails, meaning if Taiwan is attacked? Will it truly intervene?

Regarding this, the previous Biden administration, through President Biden's statements on several occasions implying a commitment to defense, essentially indicated an intention to intervene, and most major U.S. strategists agree that intervention is necessary. However, the issue here is Trump. Trump has never stated an intention to intervene. Instead, when such questions arise, he has spoken about imposing 200% tariffs on China to contain it or that Taiwan must increase its defense burden-sharing. He has never promised military force like Biden. Therefore, this aspect requires future observation. However, Secretary Hagerty had this to say about it:

"If deterrence fails, the Department of Defense will do what it does best: fight and win." Naturally, from the Department of Defense's perspective, this is a reasonable statement. As I analyzed earlier, the interim U.S. defense strategy guidance released in late March clearly designated China as a "pacing" competitive threat and mentioned the possibility of a war over Taiwan as the most likely scenario. The U.S. strategy and policies are being formulated accordingly. There are reports that the final version will be released in August, and it is likely to proceed in that direction.

Interconnection of Economy and Security and the Role of Allies

Naturally, from the Department of Defense's perspective, this is understandable. Another point regarding China that has been most widely covered in the South Korean media is "Anmi-Gyeong-jung" (Security with the U.S., Economy with China). Secretary Hagerty's approach to this is very direct. He states that the U.S. is aware that its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region are tempted to simultaneously pursue economic cooperation with China and security cooperation with the U.S. However, he points out that economic dependence on China not only deepens malign influence but also complicates U.S. defense decision-making space during times of heightened tension. I believe this is sufficient for you to understand. In other words, one cannot have both security and economy. If a situation arises where one cooperates with China for economic gain, it can directly impact U.S. security, so it is advised not to do so.

What this means is, as explained in a previous video, the U.S. will equate economy and security. Former Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin, who chairs the Economic Security Committee, stated this very clearly, and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has also clarified this point. Economy and security are interconnected. Simply put, if allies do not participate in containing and deterring China, the U.S. will reduce its defense commitments to those allies and impose high tariffs. Conversely,

if allies actively participate with the U.S. against China, they will share defense burden-sharing responsibilities and adjust tariffs accordingly. This is what Secretary Yellen and former Secretary Mnuchin have said. Of course, President Trump says something different, but this is their thinking. Therefore, it must be reaffirmed that "Anmi-Gyeong-jung" is not acceptable. Next, he emphasizes the role of allies in countering China. Secretary Hagerty also states this directly. We request it, and furthermore, we strongly demand it.

if allies actively participate with the U.S. against China, they will share defense burden-sharing responsibilities and adjust tariffs accordingly. This is the argument of Secretary Yellen and former Secretary Mnuchin. Of course, President Trump says something different, but this is their thinking. Therefore, it must be reaffirmed that "Anmi-Gyeong-jung" (安美輕中) is not acceptable. Next, he emphasizes the role of allies in countering China. Secretary Hagerty also states this directly. We request it, and furthermore, we strongly demand it.

Role of Allies in Countering China and Demand for Increased Defense Spending

He even went that far. He clearly states that the U.S. demands that its allies and partners fulfill their roles in defense. Naturally, this has the objective of deterring Chinese aggression. He mentions a few concepts, and these concepts are important. "Force multiplier" is a military term the U.S. uses frequently. For allies to be a force multiplier means that by utilizing the existing U.S. alliance network, it can be used much more effectively than a simple 1+1. By leveraging what allies do best and their geopolitical positions, actual combat capabilities are enhanced beyond a simple force multiplication.

He reiterates this point. This is something the U.S. has said often, and the Biden administration also emphasized it. In any case, he reaffirms it and expresses the expectation that allies and partners will play a force multiplier role. Next, the demand for defense spending. This has also been widely covered in the domestic media. He stated that NATO allies should spend 5% of their total GDP on defense. This is an enormous amount. The target was 3%, but he is talking about 5%. The issue is that this 5% is also demanded of Asian allies. I will read it verbatim: "It makes no sense for key Asian allies, who face much more significant threats from China and North Korea, to spend so little on defense," he stated quite bluntly.

The mention of North Korea is inevitably a cause for concern from our perspective. Avril Haines, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, stated in a Senate hearing that she specifically mentioned three countries: South Korea, Israel, and Poland. She said these countries are spending sufficiently on defense and contributing adequately to the alliance. All other countries were deemed insufficient. However, if he is talking about 5% and mentioning the North Korean threat, it can only be interpreted as referring to South Korea, which is naturally included. The very complex issue I discussed in my previous broadcast is whether South Korea can remain indifferent if a Taiwan Strait contingency occurs. The demand for increased defense spending by Hagerty includes this. The Taiwan Strait issue is involved. As I mentioned in a previous broadcast, the Northern and Eastern Fleets of China would move during a Taiwan Strait contingency.

The Liaoning aircraft carrier and the Northern and Eastern Fleet forces docked in Shandong Province could deploy as an aircraft carrier strike group and move down through the West Sea. U.S. Forces Korea are naturally responding to this, and the question is how South Korea will respond. I will not disclose personal experiences, but a former high-ranking official at the South Korean Ministry of National Defense kindly contacted me after seeing my writing and provided an idea, which I will share. Can South Korea really stand by and do nothing? You are likely familiar with the concept: Access Denial/Area Denial (A2AD).

Strengthening U.S. Forward Deployment Posture in the Indo-Pacific Region

This is Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD). Isn't it necessary for South Korea to also develop this capability? To elaborate, does South Korea not need to possess the capability to defend and deter China's advance through the West Sea, not just the U.S. Forces Korea? To achieve this capability, it is natural that more defense spending will be required, and the U.S. may be expecting this from South Korea. In that regard, I believe the situation is very difficult and not straightforward. Finally, Hagerty specifically mentions three things the U.S. will do in the Indo-Pacific region, which also has significant implications for South Korea. First, he states that the U.S. will strengthen its forward deployment posture. As I read through this, I felt a sense of unease and concern. Why? Because there are countries where forward deployment is strengthened, right? These are the key allies of the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region, and he mentions three countries: Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. And

he discusses the importance of India. However, South Korea is completely absent from this discussion. There is no mention of South Korea at all. He speaks very specifically, for example, regarding the Philippines, he announced the deployment of the U.S. Marine Corps' mobile anti-ship missile system. This will be deployed in the Philippines, which is at the choke point of China's advance. Deploying mobile anti-ship missiles of the U.S. Marine Corps, which are ultimately missiles capable of attacking the Chinese navy, in the Philippines. This clearly demonstrates the intention to implement the A2AD strategy I mentioned earlier. He also speaks specifically about Japan and Australia.

Japan and Australia are strengthening military cooperation and reorganizing weapon systems, which is naturally aimed at countering China. However, there is no mention of South Korea. He also mentions this: This is something I discussed in the previous broadcast, Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). The U.S. will strengthen its integrated air and missile defense system, which is linked to the very important Trump administration executive order that led to the development of the GMD. He is discussing this, and therefore, they will create a missile defense system in the Indo-Pacific region at a different level than before. He already mentions Japan and Australia here.

Support for Strengthening Allies' Self-Defense Capabilities and Rebuilding Defense Industrial Base

Japan and Australia are building partnerships for missile defense technology and data sharing. The U.S., which already possesses world-class technology, will strengthen the air and missile defense structure with them. South Korea is absent. The reasons for South Korea's absence may include political turmoil, and also the fact that South Korea has not yet clarified its position. When I mentioned Deputy Secretary of Defense Avril Haines, I made this point: the content she mentioned regarding the strategy of denial is precisely these points. South Korea is absent; only Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and India are mentioned as important. Therefore, in Deputy Secretary Haines's view, South Korea is a frontline nation for countering China, but if the U.S. draws a defensive line, South Korea is excluded from Deputy Secretary Haines's strategy of denial. This has profound implications for us, places a significant burden on us, and makes us think deeply about many things. Second, he also emphasized supporting allies and partners in strengthening their self-defense capabilities. Furthermore, in cooperation with U.S. industry,

they have launched a maritime security consortium. What this consortium does is build and maintain maritime surveillance capabilities in the region using unmanned surface vessels. As the name suggests, this is done in conjunction with key U.S. allies. Third, and finally, he states that they will rebuild the defense industrial base. There is an "Indo-Pacific Industrial Health Partnership," and I understand South Korea is currently participating, along with 14 other countries. The most important aspect here is the U.S. Navy's MRO (Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul) capabilities. This is where South Korea is mentioned for the first time. He mentions several projects, the first being the establishment of P-8 radar system maintenance capabilities and scope in Australia. Allies in the Indo-Pacific, including New Zealand and South Korea, will be able to repair aircraft within the region without sending them to the U.S. mainland. This is where South Korea is mentioned for the first time. The second project involves developing standards for small unmanned aerial systems in the Indo-Pacific region. This is also a very

important matter. Why? Because current warfare, and increasingly future warfare, will involve unmanned aerial systems, and this is changing the battlefield environment. The leading nation in this is, of course, the U.S., and they are developing standards. Ladies and gentlemen, when the term "standard" appears, be cautious. The very establishment of these standards is a competition for who secures them first as we transition to new forms. Whether or not to participate in the development of these standards is a crucial aspect in both security and economic fields. If we participate in establishing standards, South Korean industries may have their developed technologies become the standard, and in that case, the parts and components needed for our industries will inevitably be sourced from our own products. The U.S. has, in fact, led the global economy by establishing these standards. They intend to establish standards in the security domain as well. Furthermore, regarding small unmanned aerial systems, which are highly significant, and MRO (Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul), which is frequently discussed. This refers to U.S. maintenance.

Hagerty also mentions this, stating that through a regional MRO framework, they will expand maintenance contracts for U.S. Navy surface vessels. They plan to involve more companies in the future and expand maintenance capabilities throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Specifically, they will utilize the world-class maintenance capabilities possessed by U.S. allies. This will enhance the operational efficiency of the U.S. Navy. South Korea. This is where only South Korea is mentioned. Therefore, this is the last point. Let me summarize the entire speech. We talk a lot about MRO, don't we? The U.S. is naturally demanding this from South Korea, and that's all that's being said, and of course, the U.S. considers it important. However, South Korea's necessity only appears at the very end of Hagerty's lengthy speech, and it was omitted from all the preceding sections.

So, do you think the U.S. believes that South Korea should not bear responsibility and costs for the rest, but only for this part? I do not think so at all. The logical flow and what Hagerty has been saying is that allies in the Indo-Pacific region that are meant to counter China must bear responsibility and costs, and only if they can bear these costs will they be included in the rebuilding of the defense industrial base, such as standards, and the defense systems of the alliance. I believe that only after all of this is accomplished can they participate in areas like this at the end. Of course, in terms of practical choices, it is clear that the U.S. has no other partner than South Korea to enhance its naval capabilities, which have begun to lag significantly behind China. However, whether this will offset all the preceding points is something I believe we need to consider carefully.

Today, through Secretary of Defense Hagerty's Shangri-La Dialogue speech, we have analyzed the defense strategy, particularly the Indo-Pacific strategy, that the U.S. is envisioning. Thank you for watching.

■ Park Won-gon, Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute and Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Managed and Edited by Park Han-soo, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr