EAI Grand Debate on the New Administration's Foreign Policy: Session 3: Inter-Korean Relations and North Korea Policy

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-FT1dE9aWWk

Video Script

Before we begin, while I am not an expert on inter-Korean relations or North Korea policy, based on my past experiences with related activities, such as the Committee for the Unification Preparation, there are discourses that have disappeared. It seems no one talks about the 'North Korea collapse theory' anymore, and people rarely mention 'unification' these days. This indicates that inter-Korean relations and public opinion have changed significantly. The issue of readjusting the role of the US Forces Korea, which Professor Jeon Jae-sung mentioned in the previous session, and the implementation of deterrence efforts against North Korea are expected to be important topics in this session as well. The second issue is Taiwan. The influence of the Taiwan issue on the Korean Peninsula has always been profound, making it a topic of discussion for decades. There has been much debate about how the US would play the North Korea and Taiwan cards in its negotiations with China.

However, recent American magazines have been seriously discussing the Taiwan issue. President Tsai Ing-wen belongs to the Democratic Progressive Party, but the Kuomintang holds a majority in the legislature, creating a divided government. This allows for domestic political maneuvering. Some view the situation as difficult due to President Tsai's leadership, which is more akin to a pure event manager than a leader initiating conflict. The third issue is Russia. The Russia-North Korea relationship has become crucial for mutual security, making it difficult to view them separately. Professor Park Won-gon has prepared an excellent presentation on a comprehensive North Korea strategy and the reconstruction of inter-Korean relations. He will speak for approximately 13 to 15 minutes. In essence, this session was prepared as a major debate on the new government's foreign policy.

Challenges and Perceptions of North Korea in the New Government's Foreign Policy

However, this election is in a unique situation, and specific pledges or policies from each party regarding unification, foreign policy, and security are not visible. Particularly, the issues of North Korea and unification, which are being discussed in today's session, are very important and highly divisive. Nevertheless, it is deeply concerning that these issues are not being discussed in the presidential election. The East Asia Institute (EAI) has organized this event to consolidate opinions on at least where we should be heading. Therefore, this session includes more policy-oriented content than the previous one. As a researcher, I have also conducted extensive policy research, so I hope you understand that this content is included accordingly. The starting point is to consider what North Korea is thinking. To achieve unification between the two Koreas, North Korea is our counterpart, making its thoughts extremely important. Regarding this,

North Korea perceives the pursuit of a new Cold War. While there is no guarantee that a new Cold War will necessarily occur, it is the direction North Korea desires and hopes for. Kim Jong-un himself began using the term 'new Cold War' in 2021 and reaffirmed it at the 8th Plenary Meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea last year. It signifies the clash between spheres of influence and hegemonic powers. I believe this is a very deliberate statement. If a new Cold War were to truly emerge and blocs were formed, North Korea would likely believe it could solve many of its problems. Firstly, it could solidify its de facto nuclear-armed state status. Economically, it could operate within its bloc, independent of relations with the US, South Korea, and the West. In such a scenario, sanctions would likely be resolved automatically. I believe North Korea is aiming for such an outcome. In this context, the denuclearization negotiations between the US and North Korea, which are expected to intensify, will likely begin, and North Korea is likely viewing its relationship with China within the framework of this new Cold War.

Regarding inter-Korean relations, I will not elaborate extensively, as I believe everyone is well aware. In December of the year before last and January of last year, Kim Jong-un spoke of two hostile states. In his speech on the 8th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army last February, he clearly stated that stabilizing territory and occupying the Republic of Korea by force when necessary are their national objectives. They no longer use the term 'South Korea.' Consequently, one of the points North Korea has repeatedly made in its policy towards South Korea is, and I quote directly: 'The heinous ambition of the puppets to collapse our system and regime, whether they profess democracy or wear the guise of conservatism, has been no different.' In other words,

regardless of the nature of the South Korean government, they are clearly demonstrating their intention to maintain and pursue the policy of two hostile states. They are showing many signs of this. Most recently, two North Korean residents drifted to South Korea. The South Korean government confirmed that they wished to return to North Korea. Despite repeated attempts to contact North Korea, there has been no response. Even when their own citizens arrived, there was no reply regarding their return, indicating North Korea's complete severance of relations with South Korea. This is an aspect that the new government must approach with extreme caution. What is even more concerning is the situation within South Korea. From an educational perspective, students are increasingly losing interest in unification.

The Necessity and Core Objectives of a Comprehensive North Korea Strategy

This is sufficiently confirmed by various surveys. Furthermore, I believe that discussions regarding North Korea's declaration of two hostile states are likely to resume in earnest domestically. This is the overall environment for inter-Korean relations and unification. So, what should be done? EAI undertook a similar task in 2013. Chairman Ha Young-sun and I participated in this effort, which was then termed a 'comprehensive North Korea strategy.' It is presented in your handouts. The chart was created in 2013, and although over a decade has passed, it remains relevant. This suggests that we have not progressed in the direction we had hoped. Therefore, the comprehensive North Korea strategy developed at that time is still necessary and should continue to be pursued. The most

significant policy objective, which I believe most will agree on, is to move beyond North Korea's current pursuit of 'pre-emptive nuclear capability' under the Kim Jong-un regime, towards a direction where North Korea prioritizes denuclearization, security, and economic development. South Korea should support this transition, and this should be the primary goal of our North Korea policy. To achieve this, several recommendations were made. The most immediate priority, given the current situation, is the North Korean nuclear issue. Above all, this nuclear issue consistently obstructs any resolution to North Korea-related problems. Without a solution, inter-Korean relations will remain difficult, progress will be stalled, and peace on the Korean Peninsula will be unattainable, as we have empirically experienced numerous times. Moreover, the situation is worsening, as you are all well aware. To resolve this issue first, the extended deterrence that South Korea and the US have developed, as discussed in the previous session, is crucial. I believe this extended

deterrence is of utmost importance. I have personally continued research in this area and have had numerous discussions with the Ministry of National Defense, so I am well aware of its progress. What is important is that the institutionalization of extended deterrence, which has been prepared and developed over the past year and a half since the Trump administration and with the emergence of the new South Korean government, must continue. If this effort falters, significant difficulties will arise.

The argument for South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons may re-emerge, and the idea of redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula could gain further traction. The core of this issue ultimately lies in the ROK-US alliance, which has been consistently mentioned. Both major parties are currently discussing the importance of the ROK-US alliance for the new government. Therefore, strengthening deterrence against North Korea based on such an alliance is the most necessary and urgent priority. Second, this is not necessarily sequential. Whenever I say this, people ask if I am only advocating for deterrence, which is absolutely not the case. I will elaborate further later, but I use the terms 'conservative' and 'progressive' because I do not agree with the conventional distinctions between them. I am often unsure whether I am progressive or conservative myself. Hence, I use quotation marks.

North Korea's New Cold War Conception and Policy Recommendations

In any case, conservative governments tend to emphasize deterrence, while progressive governments emphasize engagement. I believe this is the core argument of Professor Kim Byung-hyun's editorials in the JoongAng Ilbo. A solution to the North Korea issue cannot be achieved by leaning solely in one direction. Therefore, the reason we use the term 'comprehensive' is that, while the emphasis may shift depending on the situation, these elements must work together. Thus, when I mention 'first' and 'second,' it does not imply a strict order of priority. Furthermore, it is necessary to support North Korea in abandoning its 'nuclear-first' policy and choosing denuclearization, security, and economic development, as mentioned earlier. There are various ways to provide this support. As I mentioned earlier, is the new Cold War envisioned by North Korea viable? I do not believe so.

Therefore, it is necessary to convey the accurate reality to North Korea, which dreams of a new Cold War. In this regard, strengthening cooperation with China and Russia is also crucial. This should be done to induce North Korea to change its course. Moreover, the negotiations between the US and North Korea are ultimately very important, and they must yield substantive results, not just symbolic ones. One of the most critical aspects here is that the US and South Korea must agree on and pursue the ultimate goal of North Korean denuclearization. If the goal of North Korean denuclearization disappears, then denuclearization through dialogue, diplomacy, agreement, and compromise will vanish, leaving only military means. Therefore, regardless of realism, it is necessary to demonstrate this as a clear objective.

Current Inter-Korean Relations and Linkage with International Affairs

In the ongoing process, as I mentioned earlier, how will North Korea engage in dialogue with South Korea? Regardless of which government emerges, it is highly probable that attempts will be made to engage in dialogue with North Korea again. However, this must be approached with extreme caution. Given North Korea's explicit declaration of two hostile states, persistently advocating for unilateral dialogue could provoke a backlash from North Korea. Instead, it is necessary to address immediate inter-Korean issues that involve serious matters. Issues that require immediate resolution

For instance, issues such as loudspeaker broadcasts and trash balloons can be resolved through consultation and agreement. It is necessary to approach these issues first. Furthermore, as has been discussed, the North Korean issue is linked to major global agendas. This is an undeniable reality. North Korea's participation in the Russia-Ukraine war is a prime example of 'linkage politics,' and the US-China relationship is also inevitably linked to the North Korean issue. These aspects must also be considered. The statement from the previous session that generative AI will bring about significant geopolitical changes is evident, although its direction and specifics are still unclear. However, this must be a key consideration for future North Korea and unification policies. Another point is North Korea's hostile stance towards South Korea, that is, its declaration of two hostile states, effectively abandoning unification. What should our response be? From our perspective, we must continue to pursue the goal of unification and uphold our constitutional values. However, this should not be an artificial unification but a natural outcome of strengthened trust-building measures. In the concluding part, what should be done? This is EAI's fundamental stance: let's create a 'Korean Peninsula Unification 2050 Initiative.' Existing unification plans have been too short-term and focused on immediate issues, but unification is not that simple. Therefore, we must move beyond existing frameworks and envision 2050, expanding the scope not only to security and economy but also to environment, culture, information, and knowledge, in line with the 'Dabo Model' that Chairman Ha Young-sun consistently advocates.

Korean Peninsula Unification 2050 Initiative and Co-evolution Strategy

We need to draw a picture. Ultimately, we need a mid-to-long-term vision. This needs to be developed into a more concrete form. Through this, we must create a strategy that avoids mutual destruction between the two Koreas, which is the core of a comprehensive North Korea policy, and not only avoids stagnation but achieves co-evolution. This is my position and the position of EAI. Thank you. First, you emphasized that North Korea is pursuing a new Cold War, which is true. However, since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, there has been much discussion about a 'new Cold War plus a multipolar world.' When discussing the new Cold War, the focus is on US-China relations, while the multipolar world discussion seems to evaluate Russia's rise. Particularly, when Putin stated during the Russia-Ukraine war that the unipolar world has ended and we have entered a multipolar world, North Korea, with a slight time lag, has shown signs of accepting the multipolar world discourse. And in that process,

Simultaneous Consideration of Perceptions of the New Cold War and a Multipolar World

What is very interesting is that Russia has also played a role in recognizing North Korea as a de facto nuclear-armed state. To elaborate, in March 2023, Putin was asked in an interview with a Russian media outlet: 'What about mobilizing the millions of strong troops in a neighboring country to benefit Russia in the current Russia-Ukraine war?' Putin responded by saying, 'They already possess their own nuclear weapons, and Russia can win the Russia-Ukraine war without the help of the North Korean military.' This indicates that discussions regarding troop deployment were indeed occurring within Russia. What is emphasized here is that North Korea has been recognized as a nuclear-armed state, which has been the case since the Hanoi summit in April 2019 with no agreement.

North Korea's Policy Towards South Korea and South Korea's Response Measures

North Korea's South Korea Policy and South Korea's Response Measures

Russia had previously defined North Korea as a de facto nuclear-armed state and denuclearization as nuclear disarmament. Therefore, the perception of a 'new Cold War plus a multipolar world' should also be considered. Second, regarding the 'two states theory,' which you are all well aware of, I personally view it as a negative acknowledgment of the Republic of Korea. There are two issues: first, how should we respond? I would like to ask Professor Do Woo about this. First, we can ignore it, not making it an agenda item. Second, we can continue to maintain the special relationship theory and engage in dialogue. Third, we can accept the two-state theory and discuss it ourselves. I am curious about Professor Kim Hyun-wook's opinion. Another point is that North Korea has posed three questions, stemming from the two-state theory, specifically, the theory of two hostile states or two states in a state of war. The first question is

Institutionalization of Extended Deterrence and Implications of an Arms Race

How to resolve the hostility? The second question is how to interpret and resolve the state of war. The third question is what is South Korea's North Korea policy, if not a policy of unification through absorption? Personally, I am contemplating how to envision inter-Korean relations as a non-subjugation relationship, considering concepts like 'new republicanism.' I believe the third question is also very important for us. Finally, regarding the comprehensive strategy, you mention deterrence, engagement, and trust. North Korea has not abandoned its framework of strengthening revolutionary capabilities with a 'nuclear-first' approach. However, when the Yoon Suk-yeol administration discussed unification, its logical structure, albeit humorously, shared the same structure as North Korea's 'capability enhancement.' We have discussed among ourselves who wrote this. First, regarding deterrence, the completion of the institutionalization of extended deterrence

is emphasized, but its objective is unclear to me. Are we aiming for a balance of deterrence? If so, an arms race will inevitably occur. North Korea is accelerating the development of tactical nuclear weapons to enhance its deterrence, and most importantly, it is striving to improve its counterattack capabilities, i.e., second-strike capabilities. For example, the Hwasong-18 missile launched in October 2024 uses solid fuel and is reportedly capable of carrying multiple warheads, although this needs further verification. This could neutralize missile defense systems. Regarding deterrence, the renowned Thomas Schelling discussed two types of balance of terror, emphasizing a balance where both sides can annihilate each other. He also stated that if mutual deterrence is possible, stability of the balance is more important than the balance itself. Stability, in this paradoxical sense, means acknowledging the opponent's counterattack capability.

In that context, the completion of institutionalizing extended deterrence, as you mentioned, raises the question of what state of the Korean Peninsula is sought through this. If deterrence, balance, and stability of the balance are secured, dialogue and negotiation, as seen between the US and the Soviet Union, would ensue. Another point of contention is the need for North Korea-US negotiations to bear fruit. There seem to be about four variables: How will the Russia-Ukraine war conclude?

Variables in North Korea-US Negotiations and the Importance of a Peace Treaty

Second, as is often discussed, does Trump truly desire to receive the Nobel Peace Prize? Third, what North Korea policy will South Korea's new government adopt? And fourth, how will North Korea react to these proposals? Regarding the last point, the breakdown of the North Korea-US summits in 2018 and 2019 was a profoundly serious event for Kim Jong-un, undermining the foundation of his domestic political legitimacy. Without going into detail, if North Korea-US dialogue opens, North Korea will find it extremely difficult to participate unless it gains something concrete. This 'something concrete' could be, for example, the status of a nuclear-armed state, which is currently being discussed. More importantly for both Trump and North Korea is the issue of concluding a peace treaty. For Trump to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, he would likely need to claim the official end of the Korean War. South Korea's dilemma is whether to recognize this path.

The Russia-Ukraine War and North Korea's Parallel Development Policy

This path. Next is the choice between denuclearization and a peace regime. Broadly interpreted, the Russia-Ukraine war has provided North Korea with an opportunity for a sustainable parallel development policy. Although controversial, what I sometimes jokingly refer to as 'NK defense industry' has contributed to the maintenance and development of the North Korean economy. We talk about the Korean defense industry; I believe the same applies to them, though I am unsure how much of this will trickle down to the general populace.

Restoration of Military Agreements and the Need for Mutual Restraint

Even if North Korea halts its nuclear advancement, the NK defense industry is likely to remain operational. The simultaneous pursuit of deterrence and engagement is unlikely to be highly feasible. A de facto peace is practically impossible in the foreseeable future. Personally, the first task for the current government should be whether it can unilaterally restore military agreements. Earlier, regarding leaflets and balloons, Madam Bong Sun's remarks were likely central. I was curious about how foreign policy has been conducted under the current government. When the impeachment motion was passed, the Minister of Unification stated in the National Assembly that the distribution of anti-North Korea leaflets would be suspended. I was curious about the reasons for this shift. On the other hand, North Korea did not react to the drones that flew into the headquarters of the Workers' Party of Korea Central Committee. I wonder why this situation occurred. From a republican perspective, there are concerns about the overall societal dynamics where mutual restraint might have operated. I have a lot to say about generative AI, but that would be a separate discussion topic. However, recent research suggests that in terms of security, AI paradoxically offers an opportunity for relatively weaker states to adjust the power imbalance.

Unification Vision and the Conception of a Future Republic Committee

Vision for Unification and the Concept of a Future Republic Committee

These trends are also evident in US-China relations. Finally, regarding unification, it is reminiscent of the situation in 1973 when South Korea announced the June 23 Declaration, and North Korea responded with the proposal for a Korean Federation. The roles seem reversed. Professor Park is not entirely in agreement with the path to unification through peaceful coexistence, but if it exists, it seems to be the only viable path. Therefore, personally, while you mentioned creating a 'zone,' I will make one final remark. I believe the priority should be on how to structure the domestic political process for creating a mid-to-long-term vision. Perhaps, provocatively, we should establish something like a Korean Peninsula Future Republic Committee, embodying the characteristics of a citizens' assembly as discussed by republicans, and develop a process for its formation. This is my thought.

Challenges of Comprehensive North Korea Policy and Geopolitical Linkage

I co-authored an article on North Korea policy with Chairman Ha Young-sun. Three years have passed, and Professor Park Won has written an article. The section written by Chairman Ha is significantly better than mine, so I am grateful for the opportunity. I particularly hope that policymakers will pay close attention to the diagram in the presentation, as it would be beneficial if candidates could understand this concept of comprehensiveness. I hope it is widely read. To the best of my recollection, Professor Ha Young-sun presented a similar diagram during the unification preparation phase and tested the president's understanding. From my observation,

the president did not grasp the concept, thinking, 'Why is he talking about such things?' However, the concept was well explained in our presentation. But the burden and challenges faced by Professor Park now are significantly greater than when I presented three years ago. This is because, regardless of which government takes office, the existing paradigms may not apply. If a conservative government takes office, it will likely emphasize extended deterrence, especially given public sentiment. If it continues to emphasize extended deterrence, Trump will likely ask, 'How much will you pay?' This is a period of rapidly increasing costs for extended deterrence. Therefore, the public may question whether to continue bearing these costs, or if a progressive government takes office and perceives this as unfair, it could lead to escalation. This is a complex issue.

If, then, a progressive government proposes, as they have in the past, a peace regime, dialogue, and various military measures, as Professor Park mentioned earlier, there might be no response. They might think, 'Why do these hostile states keep provoking us?' Thus, both traditional approaches are currently blocked. Therefore, we need to think more deeply. We have the cards of conservative and progressive approaches to North Korea policy, but playing these cards now could complicate the issue or lead to no reaction, creating difficulties for domestic policy. We need to consider whether to continue playing these cards. Therefore, the concept presented in this diagram, in line with geopolitical changes and the emergence of the Trump administration, seems to be a geopolitically linked, Trump-tailored North Korea policy. Thus, you seem to be experimenting with a much more difficult burden.

In that regard, I truly sympathize. We, as a society, need to think more deeply about these issues. However, can we simply push this problem aside and forget about it? Currently, I feel a sense of crisis because I am concerned about the opportunity cost of ignoring the North Korean issue. This is because, first, North Korea is like a small fault line in an earthquake; it is highly mobile. If this fault line moves, it could potentially cause China and Russia to move as well. During a recent conversation with an American, this person emphasized that South Korea should actively participate in containing China and, in return, forget about the North Korean issue. This was about four or five years ago.

Opportunity Costs of Neglecting the North Korean Issue and Geopolitical Implications

I argued that while North Korea may seem small, it is a much more dangerous issue. If the situation shifts unfavorably, China and Russia could be drawn in. The person I spoke with emphasized that South Korea should actively participate in containing China and, in return, forget about the North Korean issue. This was about four or five years ago. I argued that North Korea, though seemingly small, is a far more dangerous issue because if the situation shifts unfavorably, China and Russia could be drawn in. The statement that North Korea's participation in the war effort is a prime example of 'linkage politics' is undeniable. Therefore, I believe the opportunity cost of pushing this issue aside is growing. Not to mention the advancement of nuclear capabilities. The next government will likely have to prove itself in this regard. If the next government decides not to solve this problem, thinking it will be difficult to solve, the problem will only grow in cost. So, what is the answer? Who will provide the answer? We need to think about it. Yesterday, perhaps?

I presented my own answer in a column. Ultimately, the force that keeps the deterrence quadrant (quadrant 3) in place seems to be geopolitical. While there is deterrence originating from North Korea and the forces working behind it, the ROK-Russia-North Korea alignment is what currently confines North Korea to quadrant 3. The same applies to the North Korea-China relationship. Therefore, our policy should be to resolve this ROK-Russia-North Korea alignment and North Korea-China relationship to some extent, as otherwise, we cannot move from quadrant 3 to quadrant 1. We must do this. There is no need for further policy discussion. We must naturally move from the deterrence quadrant (quadrant 3) to the trust quadrant (quadrant 1). The question is how. The answer to the 'how' question will ultimately be found in geopolitics.

Resolving the ROK-Russia Intimacy and Seeking Geopolitical Solutions

Looking at it that way, if the North Korea policy in Session 3 is not integrated with the answers from Sessions 1 and 2, the 'how' will be unfavorable. Therefore, we need to further consider how to integrate the answers from Sessions 1 and 2 with the answer from Session 3. It is not clearly visible to me. After reading it, I felt that way. Therefore, I am looking forward to seeing if specific solutions can be provided to integrate the answers from Sessions 1 and 2 with the answer from Session 3. You can do this, right? Second, the Trump issue. At this point, if we propose any plan, will Trump be interested?

Especially since he counts costs, we need to consider strategies for how to present issues like this. In the previous session, when discussing the statue issue, some suggested separating the statue security issue from trade, handling the statue solely as a trade matter and responding to security separately. Others suggested bundling it as a package to compensate for our weaknesses and assist the US with its needs. Such approaches exist. We need to consider these issues as well. A few days ago, I attended a closed-door meeting, and the perspectives of the strategists for both presidential candidates were quite different. We need to reconcile these differences. My current feeling is that there is insufficient coordination between the foreign policy and security sectors and the economic sectors. They seem to be looking at different things.

They have different perspectives. My personal feeling is that there might be competition among the strategists. Those focused on economics want to prioritize economic issues, while those focused on security want to prioritize security issues. However, I wonder if the Republic of Korea is in a position to think so leisurely. Regardless of the party in power, security, foreign policy, economic trade, and North Korea issues must be addressed in an integrated manner. This is my final point. When I studied economics, my friends and I used to ask each other if we had solved the problem. But after taking introductory or advanced economics courses and taking exams, the question everyone asked was, 'How much did you write?' I don't think this is the time to focus on how much you write. It's time to solve problems. I believe we need to learn economics thoroughly. However, in economics, I am not well-versed, but I find politics and diplomacy excellent for understanding and conceptualizing this vast world. However, economists possess a problem-solving instinct, a kind of bloodhound-like ability to solve problems. Therefore, extensive dialogue is necessary. It is the point where conceptualization meets solutions, and that point is not yet visible, which is a concern. Therefore, I request that this institute further consider this matter.

Since we are particularly counting costs, I believe we need to strategize on how to present solutions to these issues. Looking at the previous session, when discussing the statue issue, some suggested separating the statue's security issue, handling it solely through trade, and addressing security separately. Alternatively, one could propose bundling it as a package to leverage our weaknesses and assist the U.S. in areas where it needs help. Such approaches exist. I believe we need to consider these aspects. A few days ago, I attended a closed-door meeting where the perspectives of the key advisors to both presidential candidates were quite different. We need to reconcile these differences. My current feeling is that there isn't sufficient coordination between the foreign policy/security sector and the economic sector. They seem to perceive things differently.

The Necessity of a Problem-Solving Oriented Economic Approach

With different viewpoints. Perhaps, in my personal opinion, there's competition among the advisors, isn't there? Those in economics want to focus on economic matters, while those in security want to advance security agendas. However, my feeling is whether the South Korean public is in a position to contemplate such matters so casually. Regardless of which party takes office, I believe security, diplomacy, economic trade, and North Korean issues must be addressed in an integrated manner. This is my final remark. When studying economics, there's a question I used to ask my friends.

The Urgency of Establishing Bipartisan Foreign and Security Strategies

The Urgency of Establishing Bipartisan Foreign Policy and Security Strategy

In preparing for this discussion, we have made numerous attempts online and offline, studied extensively, and organized this event. As Professor Park mentioned, it is regrettable that it has not received as much attention as we had hoped. However, on the other hand, it is also fortunate that we have begun. We are in a very unstable and crisis-ridden situation, and if political disputes over foreign and security issues escalate, our country could be shaken indefinitely. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, until a national interest-based bipartisan foreign and security strategy is established, my personal hope is that debates on foreign and security issues during the election process will be restrained. The inter-Korean issue we are discussing, as well as US-China relations and trade issues, are all confrontational. The existing domestic divisions and confrontational situations expanding into foreign and security issues could pose a significant challenge for the newly launched government. Therefore, while regrettable, it is also fortunate.

International Cooperation and Re-evaluation of China's Role

I feel that way. Regarding Professor Kim Byung-hyun's remarks, I was actually planning to say something similar and found them very resonant: our diplomacy with the US, China, and Japan, and our North Korea policy are not separate. Just as foreign affairs and foreign trade are connected, diplomatic relations with each country are closely linked. However, because our approach is reactive and responsive, our strategies inevitably manifest in conflicting and unharmonious ways. How can we devise a method to place everything on one table and strategize together? We have often discussed this when we meet, but I believe it is a time when those who actually implement policy desperately need to make such efforts. Regarding the inter-Korean issue, Professor Park Won mentioned the importance of gaining international cooperation, and I fully agree. In relation to this, my

specialty is China. Looking back, our diplomacy with China for the past 33 years has been almost entirely focused on the North Korean nuclear issue and North Korea itself, to the point where it is no exaggeration to say so. As you all know well, the results have not been desirable. Therefore, Professor Park Hong also suggested that perhaps it is time to reconsider and abandon the notion of China's role. I, too, especially concerning denuclearization and unification, have seen every government invariably bring up China's role, but the outcome has either been to blame China or to discuss excluding China altogether. I believe we need to re-evaluate whether we have set China's role incorrectly based on our own expectations. I still believe China's role exists nonetheless.

Sino-Korean Relations and Measures to Manage Korean Peninsula Instability

Regarding how to leverage China's role, we may need to consider a direction different from the denuclearized unification we hope for. Looking back, North Korea's provocations have triggered competition on the Korean Peninsula, and in the process, South Korea-China relations have deteriorated. Both the Cheonan incident in 2010 and the THAAD deployment in 2016 were initiated by North Korean provocations. While we discuss these as North Korean issues, China and the United States perceive them as Sino-US issues. As a result, South Korea-China relations have reached their worst point. I believe the current situation is not free from that risk. Therefore, while we should discuss grand strategy, inter-Korean relations improvement, and unification, in the current situation, it would be more appropriate to first explore a pessimistic and passive role of how to manage North Korea's provocations and instability on the Korean Peninsula in relation to China.

Strategy for Managing North Korean Provocations and Korean Peninsula Instability

Personally, I believe this should be prioritized. Currently, North Korea is very closely aligned with Russia, and both sides claim that Russia-China relations are at their highest point in history. While US-China relations show signs of gradual recovery, South Korea-China relations remain at their worst since the 2016 THAAD incident with no significant change. In this context, we need to examine what means or mechanisms we possess to play a role and lead in the desired direction when North Korean provocations, Korean Peninsula instability, or North Korea-US dialogues occur.

Difficulty in Restoring South Korea-China Relations and China's Role

Restoring South Korea-China relations appears to be very difficult. The two pillars that have guided South Korea-China relations for the past 33 years were economic cooperation and a consensus on the North Korean nuclear issue, but both are losing momentum. Bilateral relations are worsening, and recovery is difficult without motivation or momentum. Nevertheless, China remains a major variable concerning our security, and there is a significant possibility that it could become a disruptor or spoiler, even if not in the positive role we desire. Therefore, it is time to consider this aspect. While we do not know if North Korea-US dialogue will occur, considering that China has held five North Korea-China summit meetings in one year, a feat not achieved in six years, immediately after North Korea-US dialogue began, it seems there are unique circumstances in which China plays a role in the Korean Peninsula issue.

Leveraging China's Role Amidst US-China Conflict

The fundamental goal of the Korean Peninsula policy is to maintain the status quo through stabilization. However, if the North Korean regime becomes unstable due to US pressure on China, or if the status quo on the Korean Peninsula changes through North Korea-US dialogue excluding China, China has always sought to play its own role. Through this, we may find answers on how to leverage China. Furthermore, if a Trump administration takes office, internal consensus must be prepared in advance regarding the extent to which we will participate in countering China as demanded by the US.

US Containment of China and Strategic Communication

It is highly likely that we will face a situation where complying with US demands is unavoidable. In such a case, we need to reflect on the 2010 THAAD experience to determine how to define our relationship with China. From China's perspective, the concern is not South Korea's choice but the extent to which the US will expand its activities to contain China. The focus is on whether this will extend beyond South Korea to other countries surrounding China, thereby creating a US encirclement strategy that burdens China. Therefore, even if fully persuading China is difficult, strategic communication to prevent unavoidable situations like THAAD from being unnecessarily amplified is possible.

The Need for a Cautious and Sophisticated Approach to North Korea Policy

Even if we inevitably participate in containment from our perspective, if the implications are pre-arranged through communication with China, we can prevent the issue from escalating excessively. The world order pursued by Trump and North Korea's 'two hostile states' theory are very different from the past, requiring a cautious and sophisticated approach. While election campaigns require slogans and clear policy directions, if both parties had presented specific foreign and security policies, their scope of action after inauguration might have been limited. It could be seen as fortunate, but it is concerning whether this is truly fortunate. Whether this is genuine or a lack of thought, it is important to mitigate immediate problems. I will proceed by reversing the order of the points presented.

Shift in US Alliance Towards Extended Deterrence and Economic Security

Professor Kim Byung-hyun's core point is extended deterrence, which I believe is also connected to Professor Koo's deterrence of North Korea. I don't think there are no answers to this, and I will share my personal opinion. It is clear that the US is shifting its alliances, and the Trump administration lacks strategists to execute this. I am focusing on two individuals: Steve Mnuchin (economic security) and Elbridge Colby (defense). Connecting their actions, a broad judgment is needed, at least in the direction of economic security, which speaks with logic. Professor Park Won-gon of the East Asia Institute's video 'North Korea and the World' explains this in detail, so it would be beneficial to refer to it. I believe extended deterrence should be approached in this manner.

Strengthening Korean Peninsula Defense Responsibilities and Wartime Operational Control

Regarding defense cost-sharing, it will undoubtedly be demanded. Rather, to use a North Korean expression, we should proactively assert that we bear the primary responsibility for the defense of the Korean Peninsula. If so, we should take the lead in the transition of wartime operational control and in addressing North Korea's conventional forces. This will also bring changes to the Combined Forces Command structure in the future. In fact, I believe this will enable negotiations with the United States. In exchange for reducing the US burden of defending the Korean Peninsula, we will assume that responsibility.

Adjustment of USFK Role and Non-Public Negotiations

However, the role of the US Forces Korea is likely to shift towards containing China, whether we prevent it or not. This will likely be the case even with a Democratic Party administration. In that case, instead of rejecting it, we should negotiate with the US. Let's discuss the scenario where the defense of the Korean Peninsula is our responsibility, and the role of USFK ultimately shifts to Taiwan Strait containment; then, let's have a discussion. There is absolutely no reason to discuss this publicly; let's discuss it privately, including point 1, regarding what picture you have, what you demand of USFK, the ROK-US alliance, and South Korea, and similarly for Japan. It is more necessary to draw a line, doing what we can and refusing what we cannot.

Ensuring Nuclear Deterrence and North Korea's Sustainable Parallel Development Path

This would, in turn, enhance the importance of extended deterrence. Regarding the associated costs, if we move towards bearing the primary responsibility for the defense of the Korean Peninsula, the most crucial point is to strongly emphasize that North Korea and the US must continue to guarantee deterrence against South Korea, especially concerning nuclear weapons, even if other matters are disregarded. I believe this is not entirely impossible. While it is difficult to answer Professor Koo's ten questions within a minute, if I were to state the most critical objective, I have a different view on whether North Korea has pursued a sustainable parallel development path since the Russia-Ukraine war.

North Korea's Choice of Russia and Potential Strategic Miscalculation

I believe North Korea's choice of Russia is a significant strategic miscalculation. Considering Russia's position in the international order after the Russia-Ukraine war, it is questionable whether North Korea can resolve all its issues with Russia. The difficulties are likely to be greater. North Korea's choice alienates European countries, and what North Korea's economy needs is not economic cooperation with Russia. While possible as a short-term remedy, it is difficult beyond that. The advanced military technology North Korea desires will not come from Russia. Depending on how the Russia-Ukraine war and US strategy unfold concerning China, if it moves in the direction of engaging Russia, as some suggest, North Korea could lose a pillar of the new Cold War order. I also view a multipolar system as likely. Kim Jong Un has already spoken of the advent of a multipolar system in the past tense, and that discourse structure is similar to Russia and China. They are deliberately constructing it. However, North Korea's choice of Russia itself is one of Kim Jong Un's major strategic miscalculations.

South Korea's Russia Policy and European Countries' Stance

Since the issue of Russia was raised, I have heard many European ambassadors express disappointment with South Korea's stance on Russia. Even after the war in Ukraine ends, Russia will remain a crucial issue for Europe, and how it is handled will determine NATO's future. South Korea, while advocating for liberal democracy and security, seems to prioritize Russia's economic interests while disregarding norms. Of course, improving relations with Russia is important to decouple from North Korea, but there must be a certain level of principle. Otherwise, we risk being disdained by our friends later.

Learning Foreign Policy and Security and What Not to Do

With a little time remaining, I would like to ask the three discussants. Over decades, there have been many learning experiences. Looking back at Trump's first term, potential presidential candidates, the Moon Jae-in administration, and Kim Jong Un, what should we do, what should we not do, and what learning is important? Please share your thoughts in one minute each. Professor Koo's scope was very broad, but the choice of Russia by North Korea can be pinpointed as a strategic miscalculation, which occurred around January 2022.

North Korea's Forced Choice and Cooperation with Japan

As North Korea, which had been closed due to COVID, began to engage externally, it approached both China and Russia. China's reaction was lukewarm, while Russia's was active. Shortly thereafter, the war broke out. When the resolution condemning Russia was drafted, five countries sided with Russia: Russia, Belarus, Eritrea, Syria, and North Korea. This is a significant event in North Korea's diplomatic history. Friends like China, Iran, and Cuba abstained. I would like to state that it was essentially a forced choice, and in the midst of this, a window of opportunity opened. What we should not do is repeat the past. What we should do, as was emphasized greatly in the first and second sessions, is that cooperation and solidarity with Japan are most crucial at this juncture. Given the high cost-effectiveness, if we do not broaden the scope and depth of cooperation with Japan, we will not be able to face a world order where we speak with our own voice.

Comprehensive Approach and Deriving National Consensus

We should not overcommit to any single issue. Alliance, North Korean denuclearization – the current administration seems to be pursuing these as its brand, but these are all interconnected issues. We need a comprehensive view, as a problem in one area affects others. The current administration aims to conclude its agenda, but we must approach it by considering the tasks for the next administration. I hope we can focus on deriving national consensus.

The Need for a Cautious Approach to Foreign Policy and Security Discussions

The foreign policy and security discussion is on the 28th, but today's discussion is on a different topic. The three major terrestrial broadcasters will likely cover foreign policy and security in their debates. I agree with the sentiment that it would be better not to discuss it. If one makes a slip of the tongue in an unprepared state, they will be nitpicked, leading to the thought that it would be better not to engage. However, I am unsure if this is a genuine thought or a lack of consideration. In any case, mitigating immediate problems is important.

Urging the Establishment of Bipartisan Foreign Policy and Security Guidelines

I find the Korean political situation, which is forced to hold a hasty presidential election where crucial foreign policy and security agendas cannot even be discussed, to be deeply regrettable. The role of the East Asia Institute seems to have become even more important. I urge that when a new government is inaugurated, the wise thoughts of the Chairman, the President, and the professors be pooled to establish bipartisan, crucial foreign policy and security guidelines. I would like to conclude by applauding the presenters and discussants for their hard work today.

Lee Sook-jong, Senior Fellow at the East Asia Institute and Distinguished Professor at Sungkyunkwan University.

Park Won-gon, Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute and Professor at Ewha Womans University.

Koo Kap-woo, Professor at the University of North Korean Studies.

Kim Byung-yeon, Distinguished Professor at Seoul National University.

Lee Dong-ryul, Director of the China Research Center at the East Asia Institute and Professor at Dongduk Women's University.

Managed and Edited by Song Chae-rin, EAI Research Fellow.

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | crsong@eai.or.kr