EAI Grand Debate on the New Administration's Foreign Policy: Session 1: US-China Competition and South Korea's Security Strategy

YouTube Link : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=192tOj_P1gM

Video Script

Opening and Purpose of the Grand Debate on the New Government's Foreign Policy

Hello. I am Son Yeol, who was just introduced. Thank you very much for visiting the East Asia Institute (EAI). We appreciate you coming so early in the morning. The East Asia Institute (EAI) publishes a book every five years, during each presidential election, titled 'Proposals for the New Government's Foreign Policy.' This is not a compilation of campaign pledges. Rather, it is a collection of key foreign policy and security issues that the institute wishes for the new government, intended to assist in the formulation of its foreign policy. This year, due to the unexpected presidential election held after only three years, we have not yet been able to publish the book. Instead, our institute is holding a grand debate on four core themes that the new government will face. We are very grateful to Ambassador Wi Sung-lac and Ambassador Kim Gun for making time to attend this debate, especially during such a busy period just before the election. We also extend our special thanks to Chairman Park Tae-ho and all the participants.

Our debate in 2025 has three main objectives. First, after the new president is inaugurated on June 4th following the upcoming election, the G7 Summit will be held in Calgary, Canada, from June 15th to 17th, about a week after the inauguration. It is anticipated that the new president will be invited.

Therefore, the new president must attend international conferences immediately after taking office. A week later, on June 24th and 25th, the NATO Summit will take place in The Hague, Netherlands. This means attending major multilateral summits. In between these summits, on June 22nd, it will be the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan. The new president will face a month of June filled with crucial international meetings and significant international events immediately after inauguration. Beyond mere attendance, the new government will need to present its broad foreign policy framework. Consequently, the global events will necessitate articulating the new government's policy direction on major issues such as the international economic order, the international security order, the future of alliances, and the future of Korea-Japan relations, rather than focusing solely on the Korean Peninsula's peace or security issues, which presidential candidates are generally more familiar with.

The Direction of Trump's Foreign Policy and the Restructuring of the International Order

I believe we face a considerably challenging task. Today's conference will address precisely these issues, and we hope that through in-depth discussions, we can provide valuable input for the new government's policy direction. Second, the East Asia Institute believes that the core of the discussion, in a broad sense, lies in the future direction of the Trump administration's foreign policy. We are experiencing a major transformation or great confusion in the existing international order that has been in place since 1945, and we see Trump's foreign policy at the center of this confusion.

Therefore, we must determine whether Trump's foreign policy, or President Trump himself, intends to create a new order, and whether this represents a partial adjustment of the existing order or a complete redesign. What are the perspectives of major countries such as China, Japan, and Europe on this matter, and is alternative international cooperation even possible? Through today's debate, we aim to trace the flow of these changes. This is the second objective.

Finally, we aim to establish a bipartisan foreign policy. As you are well aware, there are differences in perception between the ruling and opposition parties regarding major foreign policy issues. There are differences in perception on North Korean issues, and particularly on recent issues with Japan, leading to the term 'internal conflict within the South.' Our EAI's perception surveys and public opinion polls indicate that the divergence in foreign policy stems significantly from the polarization of domestic politics. In other words, rather than fundamental ideological differences between the ruling and opposition parties or between progressives and conservatives on foreign policy, there is a strong tendency for foreign policy to be fragmented due to political confrontation, leading to a partisan division in foreign policy. Therefore, while some aspects require political solutions, there is ample room to establish bipartisan consensus on foreign policy matters. In this regard, we have invited members of the ruling and opposition parties, particularly those who are central figures and current presidential candidates.

They will be able to engage in discussions together. We have organized today's conference with these three objectives in mind. We have four presenters today. In fact, including these four, we formed a research team with Chairman Ha Young-sun, Professors Park Jae-jeok, Lee Dong-ryul, and Lee Seung-ju, and conducted four rounds of roundtable discussions on session themes. The policy directions derived from these discussions have been compiled and will be presented. Today's presentations represent the personal opinions of the presenters, but they can also be considered the views of the East Asia Institute. I would like to add that we hope today's three sessions will contribute to the formulation of the new government's foreign policy, and with that, I conclude my opening remarks. Thank you very much. As you know, there is a presidential candidates' debate this evening, and it is true that similar discussions are being held continuously by the media, broadcasters, and various think tanks. While observing these discussions, we felt a need to hold this small event, not just to add our voice or to simply jump on the bandwagon, for several reasons. First, the election of a new president in the coming years occurs at a critical juncture of civilizational transformation, as we see it. The success or failure in responding to the most significant event in the last 200 years hinges on who becomes president.

I offer these remarks. I hope that today's three forums will be helpful in establishing the foreign policy of the new administration. I will now conclude my opening remarks. Thank you very much. As you know, there is a presidential candidates' debate this evening, and it is true that the media, broadcasters, and various think tanks are holding numerous similar discussions daily. While observing these discussions, we felt a sense of regret, or rather than simply jumping on the bandwagon, we decided to host this small event for several reasons. First, electing a new president in the next few years, in our view, is significant because it occurs at a critical juncture of civilizational transition. The successful navigation of what may be the greatest event in the past 200 years hinges heavily on who becomes president.

Second, as Director Son mentioned earlier, the post-1945 order, orchestrated by the United States, is experiencing considerable turmoil during this so-called 'third phase,' a period of relative decentralization of power. It is crucial for the new president to accurately read this third phase. If misinterpreted as excessive multipolarity or viewed from a traditional, non-core perspective, it could lead to significant confusion. This presidential election seems to carry such weighty implications.

Finally, we need the emergence of new leadership capable of navigating industrialization and democratization. We must elect a leader who can accurately understand and overcome the two aforementioned issues. As you may have keenly felt, the current presidential election is taking place at a time when the public is concerned about the leader, rather than the leader addressing the public's concerns. Therefore, we believe this conference was organized to provide a critical assessment of how keenly these triple burdens are felt and how they will be overcome in a future-oriented manner, and to encourage a move in that direction.

Restructuring of the International Order by the Trump Administration and South Korea's Response

With these objectives in mind, let us begin the first session with a presentation by Professor Jeon Jae-sun. The focus is on an in-depth analysis of the changes in characteristics and two response strategies. As mentioned earlier, these were determined through discussions among multiple participants rather than by individuals. First, how to view the Trump administration's international order; second, the issue of strategic competition between the US and China; and third, our response. During the discussion process, the most significant point debated was, as Chairman Ha also mentioned, the greatest shift in the international order since World War II.

While this has been said before, it seems certain. This change is structural, and it appears to stem from the Trump administration's foreign policy. Why does the Trump administration exhibit such a fundamental reshaping and redesign of global leadership strategy? While it may seem like Trump's personal play, there are in fact much deeper structural factors at play. A judgment on these factors must precede our response, and our response must be commensurate with that level. This is because the current multilateral or liberal rules-based order operates on the principle of reliance on a hegemonic power, and the costs incurred by the hegemonic power to maintain this order are immense.

Economically and in terms of security. As these costs accumulate, and since it is not funded by fixed revenues from other countries, unilateral adjustments are inevitable during the process of hegemonic rebalancing. Therefore, we need to determine whether the current, rather extreme policies of the Trump administration are part of such an adjustment process, or if the hegemonic operating principle has reached its limit due to accumulated factors, necessitating a fundamental change. Our response should be based on this determination. In this regard, while the Trump administration's foreign policy may appear revolutionary and disconnected from previous administrations, it actually possesses structural continuity. The US policy objectives underpinning this continuity are, first, the recovery of the US economy and the restoration of its hegemonic base, and second, the recovery of the domestic US economy. Second, although often perceived as isolationist or protectionist, the US still strongly desires global leadership.

This is based on concrete interests such as maintaining its reserve currency status and its monopoly on nuclear weapons, so it is not at all about relinquishing its hegemonic position. Third, it aims to address the various difficulties faced by the American people in the post-COVID economic crisis, such as the decline of the middle class and the securing of essential economic security supply chains. It is pursuing these three objectives simultaneously. Therefore, while there is continuity in Trump's foreign strategy, the question is how wisely and efficiently the Trump administration is executing it. In the security domain, few policies have materialized thus far, and none have been successful. In fact, few of the policies advocated by the Trump administration have succeeded. In short, while the US has historically acted as a stabilizer, preventing instability in various regions, this required significant costs, insight, and effort. The Trump administration, rather than fulfilling this role, has focused on acting as a broker for episodic conflicts.

This involves more short-term, event-driven efforts rather than fundamental problem-solving, aiming to reduce costs through US disengagement. The probability of success for these efforts remains uncertain. Therefore, considering the success or failure of the Trump administration over the next four years, and the possibility of a second Trump term, a very meticulous and timely response is necessary, given that it will overlap with the term of the new government. This is my first point. The emphasis here is that if the administration pursues detailed policies without a clear understanding of the changes in the world order, it could lead to a haphazard approach. Therefore, a professional and long-term understanding of this situation is paramount, however difficult it may be.

US-China Strategic Competition and the Reconfiguration of the ROK-US Alliance

That is the first point. The second is the US-China relationship. I believe Dr. Park will elaborate further, but the core issue is that the US lacks the capacity to engage in simultaneous conflicts in multiple regions; it can only handle one at a time. It is largely refraining from intervention in Europe and the Middle East or other regions, prioritizing the fundamental defense of the United States, including its borders, Panama, and Greenland. Second, it is a deterrence strategy against China, the primary hegemonic challenger. While China's presence as a great power in other regions is not a major issue, its emergence as a regional hegemon would make US intervention difficult, and this must be prevented. Therefore, the most crucial strategy is the readjustment of US power priorities to prevent China from becoming a military hegemon in East Asia. This consensus has been consistently reached and is being heavily emphasized by the Trump administration.

This readjustment could involve a rebalancing towards Asia, but it also includes a readjustment between US deterrence against China and deterrence against other adversaries in Asia, primarily North Korea. Therefore, while preparedness for North Korea's military capabilities is crucial on the Korean Peninsula, the US's primary objective is China. As reported this morning, there is a high possibility of readjusting the role of US Forces Korea (USFK) or transferring deterrence capabilities against North Korea, thereby significantly reducing USFK's role in North Korean deterrence and emphasizing strategic flexibility, with South Korea taking primary responsibility for deterrence against North Korea. This is not merely a Korean Peninsula issue but part of a global US military strategy. Therefore, without significant consensus and effort between this US hegemonic readjustment strategy and the ROK-US alliance readjustment strategy, it will be difficult. This is my second point. Third, therefore, our broader foreign policy and security strategy...

South Korea's Grand Foreign and Security Policy and the 'Open Liberal Order'

The concept of a grand strategy, our positioning in the US-China relationship, the direction of the ROK-US alliance, maintaining and developing intermediary trade, and deterrence against North Korea must be consistently and hierarchically organized for the new government's inauguration. In particular, a grand concept for our foreign policy is needed. During discussions with Chairman Ha, the somewhat difficult concept of an 'open liberal order' was proposed. There is no need to exclude any particular great power. More importantly, since global leadership is insufficient for any single nation, the US, which seeks to operate the world order multilaterally, along with great powers including China and Russia, as well as developed and middle-income countries, should move towards more participatory and collective leadership. If geopolitical competition centered on great powers continues, or if the US fails to play its role effectively, pursuing a foreign policy of distancing from the US by unconditionally excluding it is still premature.

Therefore, given the uncertainty surrounding the direction of the world order, what South Korea can currently present is an open, trading nation and a liberal democratic country that is based on liberal norms. While observing the trends of US leadership, cooperation with other countries, especially those that hold hope for a liberal order, is crucial. In this regard, a cautious approach that monitors developments is necessary. Regarding the US-China strategic competition, there are discussions about a new Cold War and the urgency of our strategic choices or alignment, but this is difficult at present.

This is because the US-China competition is not one that can proceed antagonistically by completely severing economic interdependence, as in a new Cold War. The recent Geneva customs agreement also exists. Therefore, it is necessary to clearly define the nature of the US-China competition. Furthermore, by carefully monitoring the trends and responding accordingly, if the overarching principles of our grand foreign policy strategy are clear, then adjusting the ROK-US alliance and relations with China will not be overly difficult. This leads to the final conclusion. South Korea's strategic objective is to prevent war, including localized conflicts between the US and China. This is a matter of vital interest to us, requiring crisis management and conflict resolution through diplomatic means.

This is a strategic objective that we must present as stakeholders in the East Asian order. Securing North Korean military capabilities amidst US-China strategic competition is important, thus North Korean deterrence remains crucial even with the strategic flexibility of USFK. Simultaneously, maintaining the status quo in Northeast Asia based on the ROK-US alliance and multilateral security cooperation are also important. Further discussion on specific issues is possible, and I will conclude here. First, I have listened carefully to Professor Jeon Jae-sun's presentation. He has provided a macroscopically useful perspective on the background of current international order changes and US-China competition. I largely agree.

The Complexity of the Current External Environment and the New Government's Tasks

I particularly agree with the point that the current changes in US foreign policy are not merely a matter of Trump's personal disposition but a product of structural fatigue and strategic redesign, and that the strategic burden on us is increasing. Furthermore, the idea that we need to consider our foreign policy strategy as agents of order formation is visionary and normatively sound, but I believe the path is not easy. While South Korean foreign policy has achieved results in areas such as the ROK-US alliance, Korea-Japan cooperation, and ROK-US-Japan cooperation, current relations with China and North Korea are at their lowest point, and North Korea's nuclear and missile threats are at their peak. Moreover, due to domestic political crises, the liberal democratic values we have pursued have been significantly undermined, rendering ROK-US and Korea-Japan relations somewhat meaningless. South Korea's democracy is in a process of restoration, but for the past six months, it has been unable to adequately respond to external policy issues.

This can be considered a significant drawback. Amidst this situation, with the advent of the Trump administration, new challenges are emerging, not only in trade and commerce but also in security cooperation among allies. To put it dramatically, it is no exaggeration to say that the external environment we currently face is the most complex since the Korean War. With the new government entering office in this state, it must navigate these challenges effectively. The basic direction should be to manage relations with China and Russia, and with North Korea, while centering on cooperation with the US, Japan, and the US-Japan trilateral framework. Through this, South Korea should contribute to the creation of a new order in the long term amidst the US-China confrontation. To achieve this, it is essential to first pursue an integrated and coordinated macro foreign policy towards the major powers in our vicinity: the US, Japan, and China.

Setting Relations with Major Powers and Managing the Korean Peninsula Issue

In that regard, I believe past efforts were insufficient. Within such a macro foreign policy framework, there must be a clear coordinate and direction for South Korea regarding the extent of ROK-US cooperation and the diplomatic space with China and Russia. If we fail to properly manage relations with China and Russia, leading to a sustained highly adversarial relationship, the immediate tasks of denuclearization of North Korea, establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula, and pursuing unification will become nearly impossible. I will begin with these points.

To elaborate slightly, alliance relations are currently facing many challenges as the US prioritizes its own interests in alliance matters. This extends beyond trade and commerce to, more importantly, changes in the security framework. It appears the US is imposing new restrictions on the nature of security cooperation, the size and role of US Forces Korea, and so on. Furthermore, it increasingly expects our participation in its policy of rejecting China. How to handle this is undoubtedly a major challenge.

While there may not be a perfect solution, we must proceed with discussions based on the principle that the priority of the ROK-US alliance lies in addressing North Korea, its provocations, and its nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, wisdom must be exercised by both sides to not forget the overarching framework of alliance trust in any discussion. Professor Jeon's assertion that the US-China competition is a multi-layered competitive structure where cooperation and confrontation coexist, rather than a new Cold War, is an excellent point. Indeed, with this understanding, we can find diplomatic space for South Korea even amidst US-China competition. Therefore, while cooperating with the US, we must also consider diplomatic space with China. I believe we can narrow down the issues and consider the Korean Peninsula as an area where we can contribute. Currently, North Korea's denuclearization and the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula are hindered by the worsening US-China competition, making China significantly less cooperative than before. However, returning to the basics, the issues of denuclearization and peace establishment are also in China's interest.

Cooperative Measures for Denuclearization and Peace Settlement on the Korean Peninsula

Therefore, even if the US and China compete and confront each other in other areas, there is room for cooperation in certain areas on the Korean Peninsula. Should we not take on a greater role in this regard? At the very least, we need to establish it as an area where the US and China can cooperate on denuclearization and peace policies for the Korean Peninsula. While some may react skeptically, even during the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union cooperated in certain areas despite their overall confrontation. These included nuclear disarmament, strategic stability, and nuclear non-proliferation. I do not believe this is impossible. If such a role exists, we can make constructive contributions between South Korea and China, and create a new order, at least in certain regions. Hopefully, such constructive momentum could then spread to neighboring areas. Finally, regarding the North Korean issue...

I will briefly discuss the North Korean issue before concluding my remarks. Currently, discussions on North Korea's nuclear issue are moving backward following the breakdown of ROK-US relations. North Korea is relentlessly pursuing the advancement of its nuclear and missile capabilities, and there is no dialogue whatsoever. In fact, the effectiveness of the summit diplomacy that generated much anticipation in 2018 and 2019 has proven to be minimal. We must even reflect on whether the situation has worsened due to misguided attempts at summit diplomacy. Summit diplomacy is not something that regimes engage in lightly. It is typically a card utilized by leaders after accumulating practical conditions through traditional means. However, at that time, we did not think in those terms and believed that summit diplomacy was a trump card to solve the problem. That has not been the case. While the situation has become very difficult, it is currently focused on deterrence against North Korean provocations, but deterrence is not sufficiently assured under the current conditions.

Deterrence is a necessary condition. Therefore, sufficient negotiation is required. Negotiation and deterrence must be combined. However, the current situation is that we have become too adversarial with China and Russia, leading to unprecedented cooperation between China and Russia on the North Korean nuclear issue. Therefore, we face the challenge of strategically managing this situation and avoiding exclusion from discussions on the Korean Peninsula issue. Perhaps at some point, there may be dialogue between the US and North Korea, and dialogue between the US and China.

However, dialogue between South and North Korea is less likely than other dialogues, making it possible that we could once again be excluded from the Korean Peninsula issue. This issue must be handled carefully to secure South Korea's position, and managing relations with China well is crucial for this. I will conclude with these remarks. Furthermore, if US negotiations precede, we must have a close consultation mechanism to reflect our opinions and exert some control over the US negotiation process. However, will this be easy with the Trump administration? I believe much thought must be given to this as well.

A Grand Strategy for Regional Peace and Stability Based on the ROK-US Alliance

I will conclude my remarks. I have a vision for our nation's grand foreign policy strategy. In my understanding of foreign policy, and having worked with Ambassador Wi, over 35 years in diplomacy, I have come to believe that our grand foreign policy strategy is this: Did we not lose our country 100 years ago? To Japan. However, it was not a simple process. If we recall, first, China and Japan went to war, and then Russia and Japan went to war, and as a result, we lost our country. Reflecting on this, it seems there are three powers in this region. China, Russia, and Japan – three neighboring great powers – none of whom can tolerate the influence of another great power on the Korean Peninsula. This seems to be the fundamental premise.

Otherwise, why would they have gone to war? Even through war, the victor was determined, and Japan emerged victorious, leading to our experience of Japanese colonial rule. Perhaps after liberation and experiencing the Korean War, President Syngman Rhee, consciously or unconsciously, made a choice: to invite a global power, the United States, which has no territorial ambitions in the Korean Peninsula, to form an alliance, and with the strength of this ROK-US alliance, to serve as a balance of power in the region, thereby achieving peace and stability. If such a grand strategy existed, or even if it didn't, it seems to have become our grand strategy. And this strategy has been tremendously successful.

Because, based on the ROK-US alliance since then, peace and stability have been maintained in this region for nearly 80 years since 1953. As a result of this peace and stability, Japan has become the world's third-largest economy, China the second-largest, and we have grown into the world's tenth-largest economy. As you all know, economic development is impossible without peace and stability. Therefore, while the current region is a result of the ROK-US alliance, has it been easy to maintain such a grand strategy until now? I do not think it has been easy. Because, as I mentioned earlier...

As I mentioned earlier, the global power, the United States, having no territorial ambitions in this region, has always harbored doubts about why it should invest its resources here and has continuously re-evaluated this. President Nixon's visit and the Nixon Doctrine were a complete shock, leading to a collapse of the bipolar system, as it was an attempt to dismantle the fundamental structure of the Cold War order. Then, during President Carter's administration, he announced the withdrawal of US Forces Korea during his campaign. In any case, US policy towards the Korean Peninsula has changed with each change of US president, and we have had to constantly adapt to these challenges. The ROK-US alliance has been a process of overcoming these challenges. But how did we overcome them? If we think carefully, each time, we have evolved and developed the alliance as one that fulfills what the US desires and wants. The result is that what began as a military security alliance has gradually expanded into an economic alliance, then a science and technology alliance, and now, as we often say, it has developed into a strategic comprehensive alliance.

The Trump Administration's Hegemony Maintenance Strategy and Manufacturing

technology alliance, and now we are developing into what is commonly referred to as a strategic comprehensive alliance. Therefore, with the advent of President Trump, a new foreign policy, and likely a new policy towards the Korean Peninsula, is being formulated. While this naturally presents new challenges for us, our task is to adapt anew and make our ROK-US alliance more resilient. This is not only in our own interest but also serves to maintain peace and stability in the region, thus benefiting all actors in the region. Therefore, we can view it from this perspective. What is the Trump administration trying to achieve? This is speculation, and Professor Park Won-kyung may know better, but this is my understanding. China is growing, isn't it? China's economic growth is around 5-6% annually, while its defense capabilities are increasing by over 10% each year. Thus, responding to the rise of China has been a major challenge. Initially, the US thought this: to counter the military buildup, Asian allies like Japan and South Korea would significantly strengthen their military capabilities and integrate them with the US. This would maintain the existing gap, even if they couldn't keep pace with China's buildup.

And so, it has continued to lead in that direction. It has consistently emphasized the ROK-US-Japan trilateral cooperation, and we have been an excellent student. This is because, without being asked, we voluntarily sought to enhance our defense capabilities by pursuing the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON). Japan, on the other hand, was slow to follow initially but opened the way through reinterpreting collective self-defense, etc. Thus, the coordination between the US and Japan was strengthened when Prime Minister Kishida visited last year, and ROK-US security cooperation is now on track. This seems to be progressing, but the issue that arose with the Biden administration was science and technology. As AI technology advances...

From a security perspective, we are soon entering an era where Terminators will appear. It's an era where Terminators exist, and the candid opinion of Americans is that they cannot tolerate a world where the US has no Terminators but China does. Therefore, the US seeks to prevent China from developing Terminators first, which ultimately leads to controls on advanced high-tech industries. Since the US cannot tolerate a situation without such a foundation, it must re-establish its base in advanced industries domestically. This is why the IRA and the Semiconductor Act are all about advanced industrial manufacturing capabilities.

This is the semiconductor factory and so on. However, with the advent of President Trump, this seems to have expanded further, as seen in his writings. To maintain its hegemony, President Trump believes it is not enough to revive advanced industries; the entire manufacturing sector must be revitalized. The US is a maritime nation and must continuously produce military equipment. To produce military equipment, the shipbuilding industry must be alive, but it is not. This situation is untenable. Therefore, when President Trump called President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, the first topic of discussion was cooperation in the shipbuilding industry. That is what he is talking about. Furthermore, as we have all seen in the Ukraine war, tanks are important even in modern warfare. North Korean infantry soldiers are seen moving around as foot soldiers and being shot by drones. Therefore, the importance of armored vehicles like Bradleys and tanks on the battlefield has become evident. However, to competitively produce armored vehicles and tanks domestically, the steel industry must be alive, and the automobile industry must be thriving. But these industries are dying in the US. If the US manufacturing sector continues in this state, hegemony cannot be maintained. This is the thinking. Therefore, perhaps President Trump's tariffs and other measures stem from this desire to strengthen these sectors, but ultimately, the goal is to preserve American hegemony. Thus, if we are to maintain the ROK-US alliance relationship well, by cooperating with programs that align with such American objectives, we can become an 'Indispensable Alliance,' and the ROK-US alliance will be well maintained. This will ensure the continued peace and stability in this region.

This led to the establishment of semiconductor plants and similar developments. However, with the advent of President Trump, this trend appears to have intensified, as evidenced in his writings. He seems to believe that to maintain American hegemony, it is not enough to revive advanced industries; the entire manufacturing sector must be revitalized. The United States, as a maritime nation, requires continuous naval production, which in turn necessitates a robust shipbuilding industry, an industry that is currently in decline. This situation is unsustainable. Therefore, it is plausible that when President Trump telephoned President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, the first topic of discussion was cooperation in the shipbuilding sector. This is the context of such discussions. Furthermore, as we have all observed in the war in Ukraine, tanks remain crucial in modern warfare. We see North Korean infantry being decimated by drone-fired weapons while attempting to advance.

Consequently, we have witnessed the critical role of armored vehicles like the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and tanks on the battlefield in modern warfare. However, to competitively produce such equipment domestically, a strong steel industry and a vibrant automotive sector are essential. With these industries in decline in the United States, the nation's manufacturing base is eroding, raising concerns about its ability to sustain hegemony. This realization likely drives policies such as tariffs implemented by President Trump, with the ultimate goal of preserving American dominance. Therefore, to maintain a strong ROK-US alliance, aligning our cooperation programs with these American objectives would foster an 'Indispensable Alliance,' thereby ensuring the continued peace and stability in the region.

Strengthening the ROK-US Alliance and a Reciprocal Korea-China Relationship

I believe the new government should move in that direction, regardless of the bipartisan nature mentioned earlier. And some may worry that this might be too adversarial towards China, but I do not think so. Fundamentally, maintaining peace and stability in the region through strengthening the ROK-US alliance benefits all actors in the region. Even North Korea recognizes this. Do not Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un, when meeting directly, first discuss the value of USFK? In fact, everyone recognizes this. However, on such a firm foundation, we can pursue a reciprocal cooperative relationship with China based on mutual respect, without needing to be adversarial, and China understands the necessity of this. When we communicated this direction to China during the three years of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, China's initial reaction was not positive. During the APEC summit, our president met with the US and Japanese leaders but not the Chinese president. However, over time, after understanding our position, Prime Minister Li Qiang visited, and the trilateral summit among Korea, China, and Japan was held, normalizing Korea-China relations. China is making various efforts for President Xi Jinping's visit to South Korea at the end of this year. I believe this is our grand foreign policy strategy, and these efforts are worthy of praise. Thank you. The summary of the presentation is as follows. The assessment of the international structure centered on great powers and China's position in effectively utilizing this structure seem to be clearly organized.

When we communicated this approach, China's initial reaction was unfavorable. During the APEC summit in the United States, our president met with the US and Japanese leaders but not with the Chinese leader. However, as time passed and China came to understand our position, Premier Li Qiang visited and participated in the ROK-China-Japan trilateral summit, normalizing relations between South Korea and China. China is making considerable efforts for President Xi Jinping to visit South Korea by the end of this year. We believe this represents our grand diplomatic strategy and is worthy of commendation. Thank you. The main points of the presentation are as follows: The assessment of the international structure centered on great powers and China's position in effectively utilizing this structure appear to be clearly and well-articulated.

South Korea's Role in US-China Competition and Alliance with Like-Minded Countries

The US-China competition is a competition where the side that maintains its system stably wins, which seems correct. From the US perspective, it must economically and militarily overwhelm China, and China seems to have the mindset of becoming thoroughly militarized, which is frightening. In this context of inevitable structural US-China competition, the immediate issue we face is how long the US's unilateral foreign policy strategy will last. It seems likely to continue for at least four years, so preparing for this will be the first task for the new government. The alliance of like-minded countries is crucial. Of course, the US and China are the most important, but without alliance, we will face the worst-case scenario, like the prisoner's dilemma. If we form an alliance, we can expect to play a role in guiding the international order in a direction desired by the majority, even if we cannot fully achieve it.

Therefore, it is important for the new government to find South Korea's role and to communicate effectively with the National Assembly and the public. When formulating foreign and security strategies, we must consider not only threats but also our capabilities; we must look at both together. Today, if we lean too much in one direction, the balance seems to be shifting. Our policy towards North Korea should be part of a broader foreign policy strategy, and it is important to strike the right balance. I have had some recent experiences with visitors to our institute. One was a delegation from Australia. Australia, like us, is an ally that relies on US extended deterrence. The question raised was this: If North Korea amends its constitution and the younger generation in South Korea does not desire unification, why not simply border the DMZ and live well? I was asked this question. I replied that it is not a simple matter, given that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons while we do not, and North Korea is striving to obtain nuclear-weapon state status and is legalizing it. However, inwardly, I felt concerned. NATO also considers the North Korean nuclear issue a global problem, but as the international security environment becomes more unstable and competitive, I worry that it is returning to being our problem.

The second visitor was a researcher from a US think tank. He is a friend who studies China and was not well-acquainted with the Korean Peninsula. It was his first time in Korea, and he had thought a lot about South Korea's nuclear issue. He asked me, 'No matter how I think about it, North Korea doesn't seem likely to give up its nuclear weapons, and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula seems impossible. What do you think?' While answering, I felt that if the American perspective remains confined to the Trump administration's viewpoint, there is much that we truly need to lead.

Lastly, yesterday, representatives from the Heritage Foundation visited our institute. They came for another domestic event, but upon inquiry, it seemed they wanted to discuss the significant role they played during the Trump administration and the shift in its foreign policy stance. Despite being an institution that deals with Korean Peninsula issues, they stated that economic security is also crucial, and that South Korea is too dependent on China in the private sector, which needs to be cleaned up. They expressed a desire for future discussions on security with South Korea to include not only the North Korean nuclear issue but also such matters.

They emphasized that when the US manages its allies, it will employ political professionals rather than regional experts. They stressed that regional experts are not important to them, and therefore, policy experts will be prioritized to ensure that South Korea considers not only North Korea's nuclear issue but also other interconnected issues. This gave me pause.

Alliance Management and South Korea as a 'Capable Ally'

I reconsidered the idea that when the U.S. views the ROK-U.S. alliance, it might look only at China without looking at South Korea. Not long ago, President Trump gave speeches in Israel and Saudi Arabia. He told the Middle Eastern countries many grand stories, and the message seemed to be showing Israel that alliances without tangible results could be neglected. It seems he told them to focus on issues that can be integrated without disagreement. Although alliances are truly necessary, and the U.S. needs alliances to defeat China, I keenly felt how alliances are perceived. Therefore, while agreeing with the foreign policy goals proposed by Professor Jeon and the research team, I felt that strengthening our own capabilities centered on deterrence against North Korea and solidarity with like-minded countries based on capability would be very important. If there is a keyword needed to negotiate with Trump and impress this message upon him, I thought we should effectively use terms like 'capable'.

I thought we should effectively use terms like 'capable'. Although President Trump engages in relationships through bilateral negotiations with individual countries, there will come a moment when he realizes the need for like-minded countries. I don't know when that moment will be, but I felt that we have much to prepare for during that transition period, and that the first foreign policy of the new administration will be very important. While we cannot compare ourselves to the U.S., the Trump administration seems to have abandoned soft power.

What I feel is that many countries seem to perceive South Korea as having benefited too much from the ROK-U.S. alliance within the international order. Therefore, I believe there are many perspectives on us. They are not just looking at China but also at other Asian countries, and I strongly feel that Australia and the UK evaluate us similarly. When I see situations where even countries other than the U.S. and China are saying, 'Isn't the ROK-U.S. alliance a bit of a boutique alliance? Shouldn't they do more for the region?', I felt that we need to carefully consider like-minded countries, form new alliances, create new organizations, and work very hard on diplomacy. The important thing is that we seem to be increasingly tied to the 'Global West' with Japan, which gives a sense of dissonance, and to overcome that, our concept of like-minded countries should not be limited by race,

region, or ideology, but we need to develop and explain our own logic. While the U.S. is painfully busy preparing for a rebalancing of power, China and Russia are also busy expanding their influence. I believe that multiple international orders will coexist, and within that, it is important for South Korea to accurately assess its position. However, rather than simply choosing, it is crucial to find a 'small cosmos' centered on South Korea and to make efforts to create and sustain a layered, multi-faceted, and open security cooperation system. Grant Snyder is said to have stated that common interests create alliances, and alliances create new common interests. This seems to be most evident in the ROK-U.S. alliance, but Trump's tendency to enjoy the benefits of the alliance system while shedding responsibilities under the pretext of reduction and restraint is clear. If there is an image we need to impress,

it seems that jointly containing China to curb its rise is important from a competitive standpoint, but it also seems necessary to talk about being a 'capable ally' that stabilizes the Korean Peninsula and assists the U.S. in its pursuits. Studies on export controls have shown that the Rumpelstiltskin camp sometimes gains traction, more so than the hawks. I wanted to convey that by approaching security with a logic slightly different from containment work, we might be able to create some space, as I feel the pressure to counter China in my daily life. Then, regarding what South Korea's efforts should be to become a capable ally, I think it would be good to discuss that in the second round.

Next Administration's Strategy toward the U.S. and China, and ROK-Japan Relations

That is all. I would like to ask the two lawmakers about one or two core aspects of the next administration's foreign policy direction. Since the term extends to June 2030, it seems likely that the ruling and opposition parties will cooperate on foreign policy for five years, keeping in mind the success of South Korea's foreign policy strategy by June 2030. Looking solely at ROK-U.S. relations, we will have to deal with the Trump administration for about two and a half years. The election is in 2028, so it will be from early 2028. Since there will be three administrations dealing with the next Trump administration for over two years, for example, within the Democratic Party or among its supporters, there are movements to assume that the Trump administration's strategy is the U.S. strategy, and to distance ourselves from the U.S., not participate in the U.S.-China strategic competition, and distance ourselves from the Taiwan issue, and I believe these have some basis. Yes.

However, if we spend the next two years solely focused on that, and if the next U.S. president is from the Democratic Party, they might return to policies that emphasize alliances and check China. Therefore, the ROK's strategy toward the U.S. in the early to mid-term of the next administration could face difficulties in the latter half. This seems like a very difficult prediction, and I would like to ask for your thoughts. Secondly, regarding the U.S.'s containment of China, there seem to be two logics at play. One is the logic of hegemony centered on the U.S., and the second is the discourse of order, as we cannot yet be certain of the world order led by China. Like-minded countries also share this sentiment: 'Let's work together to contain China as much as possible, but let's not have an authoritarian-centered world order.' If discussions about reducing U.S. Forces Korea or readjusting alliances arise, the public is very likely to perceive it through the former hegemonic logic. Therefore, the next president

will have a significant part to play in explaining the U.S.'s logic for containing China very well. Otherwise, public perception could become skewed. I would like to ask whether the presidential candidates of both parties possess clear leadership regarding the discourse on the East Asian order or the readjustment of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Lastly, a brief word on Japan. As Dr. Kwon Tae-hoon rightly pointed out, like-minded countries are ultimately Japan, NATO members in Europe, and Southeast Asian countries, which are key to us. However, there seems to be a perception that cooperation with these countries is simply cooperation with Western or pro-U.S. countries. This is not the case. The U.S. is also changing due to structural reasons, so cooperation with like-minded countries is on a completely different level.

Realistic Response Measures in the Context of U.S.-China Competition

Regarding ROK-Japan relations, do you have a strategy to spread or solidify such perceptions? These are very difficult questions and difficult orders to fulfill. First, I will speak briefly. Whether the U.S. will continue to be Trump-like is a matter of utmost concern, so if we were to take office, we would have to prepare for both possibilities. While Trump is in office, we have no choice but to devise countermeasures against him, but we must also prepare for the possibility that this approach will continue even after Trump, so we must leave room for both scenarios. I believe we need to closely monitor the U.S.'s evolving trajectory. Dealing with the U.S.-China dynamic is truly a difficult challenge, and frankly, there is no answer. When I attend forums, many people press me on how we will deal with the U.S.-China situation or the Taiwan issue,

but frankly, these are not problems with model answers; they are navigated in reality. Navigating once, and navigating twice, may not yield the same results. I often receive questions demanding an answer as if these were such problems, but I believe there is no right answer. We make small choices at each juncture within the given circumstances, and our response is formed by aggregating those choices. I believe we have no choice but to adopt a stance of accommodating the various readjustments the U.S. is currently demanding.

While doing so, we must also manage our relationship with China and act in a compromising manner. Regarding extended deterrence, although there are differing opinions among the public, we firmly believe that improving and strengthening extended deterrence is the only option. We distance ourselves from any potential possibilities such as nuclear armament or calls for nuclear armament. ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation is, of course, something we must value and build upon as a fundamental pillar. While the Democratic Party has historically distanced itself from ROK-Japan cooperation, the changes in recent years have made us realize that it is difficult to cope with the changing situation without greater cooperation with Japan and ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation. Therefore, we will proceed in that direction.

The Taiwan Strait Issue and the Role of the ROK-U.S. Alliance

If there are any shortcomings, I will address them later. I believe there is a 'silent answer' when speaking at a general meeting. The Taiwan issue. The peace and security of the Taiwan Strait are crucial national interests for us, as they affect about 40% of our inflation rate. Therefore, we must have a clear stance on this matter. Our clear stance is as follows: First, we respect the One China policy. Second, we firmly oppose any unilateral change to the status quo. We must always express this stance clearly. The phrase 'opposition to unilateral change to the status quo' is understood by both China and Taiwan. China interprets it as opposition to Taiwan's independence, and Taiwan interprets it as an attempt by China to unify through force. Therefore, we must always maintain a clear stance

and express it clearly. People often ask, especially Americans, about concrete actions during a contingency. They repeatedly ask what South Korea would do if something happened in Taiwan. As our lawmaker mentioned, there is no silent answer to this; it will depend on the situation. However, what is certain is that we will respond in the spirit of the ROK-U.S. alliance. You mentioned readjustment and extended deterrence; I believe these two issues are intertwined. It seems likely that the U.S. will propose that South Korea take responsibility for the defense of the Korean Peninsula and North Korean threats, and that the presence of U.S. Forces Korea will be shifted to counter China, while they will take the lead in extended deterrence against North Korean threats. Therefore, I believe we must continue to strengthen extended deterrence between South Korea and the U.S., even under the Trump administration.

I believe so. And regarding the readjustment part, while we must consult if the U.S. has demands, as our committee member mentioned, the fundamental principle is that consultations must be based on the premise of further strengthening deterrence against North Korea. I believe there is no need for further discussion on pre-adjustments or statements made by the political sphere or high-ranking policy officials before entering negotiations or consultations. ROK-U.S. cooperation is about maintaining the existing balance of power, and therefore, it must continue to be strengthened by the new administration. Conceptualizing this, the upgrade of ROK-U.S. combined defense will be a task for the new administration.

Readjustment of ROK-Russia Relations and Cooperation with Like-minded Countries

The task for ROK-Japan relations is to make them sustainable after normalization, and for ROK-China relations, it is important to establish them as reciprocal relationships. ROK-Russia relations have deviated from the normal track due to the Ukraine war, so returning them to the normal track will be a major task for the new administration. Regarding relations with like-minded countries, the U.S. considers the Indo-Pacific region to be of utmost importance, and this will not change. Therefore, we must effectively manage our relationships with like-minded countries in the broader Indo-Pacific region on both bilateral and multilateral levels. There is a perception that these are countries that are particularly close to the U.S.

To dispel this perception, we must demonstrate a proactive approach, like Japan, by setting the agenda and taking the lead. It is important to persuade and actually demonstrate policy continuity regardless of changes in government, and for this, personnel reinforcement is necessary. In terms of multilateral cooperation, the reason countries lack strength appears to be the concentration of resources focused on the U.S. and North Korea. This may also be the case for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so I believe personnel reinforcement is absolutely necessary. There are many opportunities for defense industry cooperation and multinational training for South Korea, but there is a lack of clear criteria regarding the standards or agenda for multinational training.

We are more likely to participate in training that the U.S. participates in or leads, but there are few agendas that we lead. Therefore, there is a need to proactively change these aspects. Responding to climate change, which the U.S. neglects, presents a good opportunity. China is pursuing diplomacy by linking climate change response policies with economic development and influence expansion, and Chinese military forces intervene in disaster or humanitarian situations under the guise of training. If we respond to this as a secondary measure, the U.S. will be grateful, and it will be a good opportunity to inform neighboring countries that we are contributing to the regional security order. We need to identify such opportunities well, connect them within our strategy, and promote them.

I have one point to add, which I missed, so I will take one minute. Regarding cooperation with Japan, you mentioned the possibility of considering a new dimension, and that is correct. When the U.S. withdrew from the TPP during Trump's first term, Japan proposed CPTPP as an alternative, and there was a concept of assuming U.S. accession within a framework not led by the U.S. In Trump's second term, the U.S. approach to trade issues is more extreme, so like-minded countries such as South Korea, Japan, and the EU could consider similar concepts. This applies not only to trade but also to security. I do not know what Japan thinks, but we should also pay attention to it. In the initial stages, we can cooperate with the U.S. on a bilateral level, and if necessary, consider horizontal cooperation.

Readjustment of Relations with Russia and the Taiwan Issue

If we consider horizontal cooperation, Japan would be the first among our neighbors, and Japan's movements will also be important. I am Choi Sun-ho, a citizen. I would like to ask about relations with Russia. I believe Russia's role becomes even more important as the Asian front becomes crucial in President Trump's strategy to encircle China. I would like to ask the researchers and lawmakers to explain how readjusting relations with Russia would serve South Korea's interests.

This is Kim Ho-soo, Professor Emeritus at Chung-Ang University. I would like to ask about the Taiwan Strait issue. Among the presidential candidates' remarks, there were statements to the effect that there is no need to take sides, pursuing benefits from both China and Taiwan. I would like to know if this is political rhetoric or if they believe we can view the security situation around the Korean Peninsula from both perspectives. I believe it would be more appropriate for the two of you to answer the two questions. Professor Jeon and Dr. Kwon, please provide brief answers.

Answers on Readjusting Relations with Russia and the Taiwan Issue

First, since you served as ambassador to Russia, let's start with the question about Russia. Yes. In my opening remarks, I mentioned that ROK-China and ROK-Japan relations are at their lowest point, and indeed, relations with both countries are currently at their worst. It is best to avoid such situations, but circumstances have led to this. However, looking at the U.S.'s actions, there seems to be a possibility of some room emerging in relations with Russia compared to China, as discussions about a ceasefire in Ukraine are underway. Shouldn't we, too, consider lowering our relations with Russia somewhat compared to the present, given these broader trends? We should avoid having ROK-China and ROK-Japan relations simultaneously at their worst. I believe some room may emerge in our relations with Russia. It's not a significant opportunity,

because ROK-Russia relations have already faced a hurdle due to ROK-North Korea relations. During the Cold War, it was a military alliance; in the post-Cold War era, it was a friendly relationship; and now, in this new Cold War-like era, it has become an alliance again, so there are limitations. Nevertheless, I believe we must make an effort. Regarding the Taiwan issue, you mentioned the remarks made by our candidate. The intention was that there is no need to deepen hostile relations with various surrounding countries, including China, and that it is better to maintain good relations. These are expressions used to communicate with voters at campaign rallies. Politicians often do not speak as if they are debating at campaign rallies. When I am sometimes asked to speak at rallies, I reflect that I shouldn't speak like I am now. At campaign rallies, one should not speak like this; it should be expressed more simply. If I were to speak meticulously like I am now, it would be completely ineffective. Please understand that these are colloquial expressions.

I believe the situation regarding Russia will change once the Ukraine war ends. Recently, the Russian ambassador to South Korea visited the National Assembly and said something significant. He stated that Russia's relationship with Europe is over, and Russia's remaining front is the Far East, and that Russia's future in the Far East depends on South Korea. I responded that I agree with this sentiment. Therefore, there are sufficient incentives for both countries to readjust their relationship, and through this, I believe we can re-engage Russia.

Furthermore, as I mentioned earlier regarding the international situation, I believe we will have the conditions to do so, as Ambassador Wi Sung-lak mentioned. Regarding the Taiwan issue, I learned about pragmatic diplomacy from our lawmaker. The pragmatic diplomacy I learned was not ignorant pragmatic diplomacy. I learned that pragmatism is about adhering to principles while not losing flexibility in the execution process, and I believe our diplomacy should be the same. That is the pragmatic diplomacy I pursue and that our committee member pursues.

Reports on Reduction of U.S. Forces Korea and Strengthening Deterrence Against North Korea

However, statements prioritizing self-interest can be perceived as lacking principle and may lead to misunderstandings for the listener. South Korea could be misunderstood as a country without principles, selfish, and opportunistic, always prioritizing its own interests. I had hoped you would change your approach after making such remarks during the last general election, but I am disappointed to hear them again this time. I believe you should address this matter. Yes, hello. This is Jeonghoon Lee from News1. Regarding the reports of a reduction in US Forces Korea, while nothing has been decided yet and the details require further examination, I would like to ask about the implications and the response strategy our government should adopt if this materializes, considering the increased possibility of Kim Jong Un's provocations. I hope we do not react with alarm based solely on unconfirmed reports.

This is also a report and not yet a confirmed situation. According to the Ministry of National Defense, there have been no discussions between South Korea and the US, although there is considerable interest in the future adjustment of US Forces Korea. There is one principle we must adhere to: our deterrence against North Korea must never be weakened. All discussions should proceed under this principle. I believe this is all that needs to be kept in mind. As the content is similar, I will not comment further.

Understanding the Civilizational Transition and the US-China Competition

I was curious as to why this article was published at this particular time. While information leaks are common, the Shangri-La Dialogue is scheduled for next weekend, where the US and Chinese Defense Ministers will meet in person. Although they will meet in separate rooms, I considered whether the US might have something to convey to China or South Korea in relation to this. I will conclude the session. Firstly, I posed the question of how we can elect a president capable of navigating a civilizational transition, but this broad question will likely be addressed in the second session, particularly in the discussion on science and technology. In the 19th century, we belatedly pursued the Western modern international order model; now, we stand at a new civilizational turning point, pursuing composite strength beyond mere wealth and power, driven by revolutionary changes in science and technology. The second session may not require such a complex answer.

If we accurately read the Go game, the current phase of US-China competition is not shifting into the multipolar order framework advocated by China, Russia, and North Korea. Nor is it the US Go board of the 1940s-50s. Therefore, it is natural that we cannot interpret the overall trend of this Go board uniformly as it shifts. Regardless of who is elected president, the Taiwan issue is not merely a Taiwan issue. It is a profoundly global issue, and we must clarify that the US and China are not yet operating on a 5-5 basis. I will conclude here, and perhaps we will continue on the same topic in the second session. Thank you to the presenters, the discussants, and the floor for your attentive listening. This concludes our session.

■ Ha Young-sun, Chairman of the East Asia Institute. Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University.

■ Jeon Jae-seong, Director of the National Security Research Center at the East Asia Institute. Professor, Seoul National University.

■ Wi Sung-lak, Member of the National Assembly, Democratic Party of Korea.

■ Kim Gun, Member of the National Assembly, People Power Party.

■ Kwon Bo-ram, Senior Researcher, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

Managed and Edited by Song Chae-rin, EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 211) | crsong@eai.or.kr