[North Korea and the World] The Full Story of the 2018 Singapore North Korea-U.S. Summit: North Korea's Achievements and U.S. Failures

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4_vHq1LxQ04

Video Script

Review of the Trump Administration's First Term North Korea Policy

Previously, there was an expectation that North Korea's denuclearization would be fully achieved. However, upon seeing the actual content announced on June 12, a situation very different from my expectations occurred. I was so bewildered by the document that my reaction was, 'This is a historical fraud.' Hello, and thank you to everyone watching Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. It seems I will need to speak in a series. I believe it is necessary to review the first term of the Trump administration, starting from its inception. President Trump had a good relationship with Chairman Kim Jong-un of North Korea, and Chairman Kim Jong-un has also repeatedly stated that he would welcome President Trump's return. According to some reports, there is a possibility that a certain level of communication has already been established.

While it may not be immediately, there is a possibility that North Korea-U.S. negotiations could resume as early as the latter half of this year or around next year. Considering these points comprehensively, I believe that reviewing what happened between North Korea and the U.S. during President Trump's tenure from 2017 to 2020 will serve as a crucial guide for forecasting future North Korea-U.S. negotiations. Furthermore, one of the characteristics of the Trump administration's first term is the '30-year rule' for accurately understanding U.S. affairs. This means that most classified documents published or created by the government are declassified after a 30-year review period. Therefore, scholars specializing in diplomatic history or history review events from 30 years ago, and the Trump administration is a unique one among U.S. administrations. While very detailed information will only become clearer after 30 years,

much of what happened has been largely revealed as the Trump administration progressed. As many of you are likely aware, most senior officials in the Trump administration were either fired by President Trump or resigned voluntarily. While it is common to publish memoirs after the administration ends, many key figures in the Trump administration published their memoirs before the administration concluded. Additionally, journalists like Bob Woodward conducted direct interviews with President Trump and reported detailed behind-the-scenes stories from within the White House. Therefore, by synthesizing all this information, while we may not know perfectly how President Trump made all his decisions, I believe we can understand a significant portion. I have also written papers and articles on this topic. Today, as the first part, I will discuss the events of June 12, 2018.

2017 U.S. Policy Toward North Korea: Maximum Pressure and Engagement

I will discuss the Singapore agreement, the first summit between the United States and North Korea. If North Korea-U.S. summits resume, it is highly probable that North Korea will bring up this Singapore agreement. In that regard, I believe it is important to re-examine how this agreement was drafted and what its content signifies. Let's go back to 2017. Throughout 2017, the Korean Peninsula was in a state of severe crisis. One of the most frequent questions I received domestically and internationally at the time was, 'Is war imminent?' This indicates the period when North Korea and the Trump administration were engaged in a head-on confrontation without backing down. At that time, the Trump administration advocated 'maximum pressure and engagement' as a principle for its foreign policy, not just its North Korea policy. This was also applied to North Korea, and since North Korea did not respond to dialogue, significant pressure was applied. However, engagement was also pursued simultaneously, which was a characteristic of the Trump administration's North Korea policy in 2017. First, let me discuss the engagement aspect. Given the heightened tensions, many may have missed the efforts made by the Trump administration to engage, but they did attempt engagement to a considerable extent. The official policy principle stated by the Trump administration was to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through peaceful diplomatic means, excluding military options. This was announced multiple times as a very important principle.

Furthermore, then-Secretary of State Tillerson specifically stated four things that would not be pursued. Those four things were: not seeking regime change in North Korea, not pursuing the collapse of the North Korean regime, thirdly, not seeking to accelerate the unification of the Korean Peninsula, and finally, most importantly, not advancing or moving north of the 38th parallel. These were military assurances. Regardless of their truthfulness, these four points address the core factors that North Korea has always cited as threats to its security. The aim was to alleviate the so-called 'encirclement anxiety,' the security concerns that North Korea always feels it is being encircled. Then-Secretary of State Tillerson officially stated that these four actions would not be taken. I believe this was a significant measure for engagement. That was not all.

There was maximum military pressure, particularly military muscle-flexing, and beyond military demonstrations, senior policymakers in the Trump administration, including President Trump himself, continued to issue strong warnings to North Korea. A prime example is President Trump's statement of 'fire and fury' in August 2017. He said that North Korea would ultimately face fire and fury. Earlier, in July 2017, Mike Pompeo, then the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy (before becoming Secretary of State), stated that the North Korean people would also wish for the demise of Chairman Kim Jong-un. This was a public statement. Therefore, this was a very strong rhetoric implying the elimination of Chairman Kim Jong-un.

There was maximum military pressure, particularly military demonstrations of force. In addition to military demonstrations, senior policymakers in the Trump administration, including President Trump himself, continued to issue strong warnings to North Korea. A prime example is the ‘fire and fury’ that President Trump spoke of in August 2017, stating that North Korea would eventually face fire and fury. Earlier, in July 2017, then-Special Representative for North Korea Policy at the State Department (before becoming Secretary of State) Mike Pompeo stated that the North Korean people would also want Chairman Kim Jong Un to be gone. This was stated publicly. If so, this was very strong rhetoric suggesting the removal of Chairman Kim Jong Un.

Additionally, on September 19, 2017, in a speech at the United Nations, President Trump stated that the United States would have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea to protect itself and its allies. Coming from the U.S. President, this was the maximum level of pressure. The important question is how North Korea perceived all of this. There are several verifiable facts regarding this. In September 2017, the Institute for American Studies, affiliated with the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, invited U.S. journalists to Pyongyang.

During this visit, Park Sung-il from the Institute for American Studies asked the U.S. journalists the following question, which I will read verbatim from The New York Times: 'We don't know if Trump is rational, or perhaps too smart. It's too difficult to figure out where he is going, what he is doing, and what his next move will be.' This essentially reflected the concerns of Pyongyang and the North Korean government and regime. President Trump was making such strong statements, and President Trump's unpredictability, which we still observe today, significantly heightened tensions for North Korea. Furthermore, the U.S. conducted maximum military demonstrations on the Korean Peninsula at that time.

On November 11, 2017, three U.S. carrier strike groups were deployed to the East Sea for joint exercises with South Korea. The operation of three carrier strike groups by the U.S. is a force projection used when initiating a war, i.e., at the onset of hostilities. For example, three carrier strike groups were utilized during the invasion of Iraq. This can be seen as the maximum level of military demonstration. Additionally, large-scale joint exercises named 'Max Thunder' were conducted between South Korea and the U.S. This involved South Korean Air Force fighter jets and U.S. strategic bombers and fighter jets, including the B-1B, one of the U.S. strategic bombers that frequently flies in recent times. It is a strategic bomber with significant armament capabilities.

Typically, when a B-1B flies, it approaches via the East Sea. It flies along the Military Demarcation Line and then exits into the West Sea, which inevitably causes significant tension for North Korea. During operations, it proceeds as follows: entering the East Sea, it travels along the Military Demarcation Line, and since Pyongyang is to the west, it would cross over and directly bomb Pyongyang. North Korea has neither the detection and identification capabilities nor the capacity to intercept a B-1B. Therefore, the frequent appearance of the B-1B at that time is judged to have created a situation where North Korea felt a very significant threat.

North Korea's Declaration of Nuclear Force Completion and U.S. Pressure

I believe that one of the primary reasons why Chairman Kim Jong-un ultimately participated in the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics, subsequently reached the Singapore agreement I mentioned, and met with President Trump two more times, initiating the so-called Korean Peninsula Peace Process, was precisely this maximum pressure from the Trump administration. Let me provide another piece of evidence. As a result of this maximum pressure, Chairman Kim Jong-un declared the 'completion of nuclear force' on November 29, 2017. At that time, he launched the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and stated the following:

'The extraordinary achievements attained by our party, state, and people last year have led to the historic accomplishment of completing our state's nuclear force.' The term 'nuclear force' should be used cautiously. If the term 'nuclear force' is used exactly as North Korea expresses it, it would legitimize North Korea's nuclear status; therefore, it is appropriate to use the term 'nuclear capability.' In any case, the important point is that they did not complete their nuclear capability. This can be seen in the current situation as well. If the Hwasong-15 had completed their nuclear capability, then what North Korea has launched since then, most recently the Hwasong-19 ICBM in late October last year, is described as the ultimate ICBM they possess. If that is the case, there has been a seven-year period from 2017 to 2024, and during this time, there was still a perceived need for ICBM development, and although they did fire the Hwasong-19, there are various assessments regarding whether North Korea has truly acquired the capability to strike the U.S. mainland. We

have many unverified facts, such as re-entry technology, launching at a normal angle, or whether they have secured the multi-warhead capability that North Korea claims. However, the crucial point is that the declaration of completed nuclear capability in November 2017 was not achieved. I believe this serves as evidence of the pressure North Korea was receiving from the Trump administration. Furthermore, let me add this: due to the intense pressure and military demonstrations,

Meaning and Evaluation of the 2018 Singapore Agreement

Feeling a sense of crisis, Chairman Kim Jong Un needed to create a justification to come to the dialogue table. North Korea typically creates justifications by claiming to have achieved something itself. In this instance, they claimed to have achieved nuclear capabilities, proclaiming that North Korea and the United States could now begin negotiations from an equal footing as nuclear-armed states. However, as I have repeatedly stated, this announcement was made without actually completing their nuclear capabilities. I believe the pressure from the United States played a significant role. Moving to the next stage, I will discuss the first North Korea-U.S. summit, the Singapore summit, held on June 12, 2018. As a researcher, the Singapore summit holds significant personal meaning for me. I did not anticipate it at all. What I did not anticipate was the content of the joint statement. My expectation was that this North Korea-U.S. negotiation would be very different from previous agreements we have experienced, such as the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework or the September 19 Joint Statement of 2005, or even the agreement of the last day of February 2012. I expected an agreement that truly aimed for North Korea's denuclearization, achievable in a short period, with various conditions attached, such as a timetable. I will explain the basis for my expectations.

The Singapore agreement was on June 12, but on the previous day, June 11, then-Secretary of State Pompeo held a press conference in Singapore. He stated that the only outcome acceptable to the U.S. government was 'complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID).'

He stated that this was the definition of denuclearization, emphasizing that 'verifiable' was the most crucial aspect. While there had been various agreements between North Korea and the U.S. in the past, the core reason for the breakdown of these agreements was North Korea's ultimate refusal to accept verification. Of course, there were complex factors such as U.S. compensatory measures and the U.S.'s hostile policy toward North Korea, but it is true that the agreements collapsed because verification was rejected during the process. Therefore, Secretary Pompeo clearly indicated the importance of verification and his intent to achieve it. Regarding the denuclearization timeline, he stated that the two leaders would undoubtedly discuss the denuclearization timetable. At that time, the discussion was about completing North Korea's denuclearization within one or two years.

the intention was to conclude. North Korea has always been evaluated as having no will for denuclearization because it delays the denuclearization timeline as much as possible and proceeds with it in a salami-like fashion. However, then Secretary Pompeo and the Trump administration understood this, so they stated they would create a very shortened timeline to achieve the ultimate goal of North Korea's denuclearization, a precise and detailed timetable. They also clearly specified the denuclearization measures, i.e., North Korea's actions, and stated that the compensation conditions for those actions, i.e., what would be given to North Korea, would be fundamentally different and unique compared to the past. While this part has not yet been precisely revealed, based on the various materials I have mentioned, it is true that they had a clear plan for denuclearization. Therefore, this denuclearization was intended to be different from before, truly aiming for North Korea's denuclearization.

So, I had expectations. 'Ah, it seems North Korea's denuclearization will be fully realized, unlike in the past.' However, when the actual announcement was made on June 12, a situation very different from my expectations occurred. Personally, I did not go to Singapore; I was in Korea. Many Korean journalists who went to Singapore contacted me. They asked me to assess the meaning of the joint statement. It first came in English. After I read it and discussed it with the journalist, my first reaction was, 'Where is the next document?' The journalist seemed very flustered. I asked, 'Is this all?' Then I said, 'This is absurd. Trump and Kim Jong Un are signing many documents today related to the Singapore agreement; there must be other documents. This is not the document that specified the concrete details.' The journalist, flustered, said there were none.

At that moment, as a researcher, I had to speak as objectively as possible, but I was so bewildered by the document that my reaction was, 'This is a scam of the era.' I also stated that it was difficult to consider this a result of negotiation because it was written down by the United States exactly as North Korea dictated. The reason I say this is that if you look at the joint statement, when I first read it in English, the content seemed very familiar. I checked the North Korean Rodong Sinmun, and on the previous day, June 11, it published an article using the phrase 'summit between the leaders of North Korea and the United States.' It was a summary of what North Korea wanted from the US in the North Korea-US summit, essentially their hopes. However, the content of the joint statement on June 12 and the content published in the Rodong Sinmun on June 11 are identical in wording, in the exact same order. This means that the US accepted 100% of North Korea's demands.

Problems with the Singapore Agreement: Acceptance of North Korea's Demands

Let's examine it. The first point states the improvement of new North Korea-US relations. The June 10 North Korea-US joint statement and the North Korean Rodong Sinmun also list the establishment of new North Korea-US relations as the first item. The second is the 'establishment of a permanent and robust peace regime on the Korean Peninsula' in the Singapore agreement, and the Rodong Sinmun on June 11 also states the same: 'a permanent and robust peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.' Next, the third item is 'complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,' and the Rodong Sinmun also states 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.' Another issue is that these points are numbered 1, 2, and 3.

When I first saw the numbering, I couldn't understand it. It was an unavoidable reaction. Let me explain each point in more detail. The problem with this is that, first, typically, agreements are not numbered. They are simply listed. Numbering implies a prioritization. Therefore, North Korea speaks with confidence. It's not even 'North Korea's denuclearization.' It's 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.' The establishment of new North Korea-US relations is placed first, the peace regime on the Korean Peninsula is second, meaning two conditions precede it. And third, it's not North Korea's denuclearization, but 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,' which could be pursued.

In other words, the third point can only be achieved if the preceding two conditions are met. How, then, can this be considered North Korea's denuclearization? It is very far from what Secretary Pompeo described. Second, as I mentioned earlier, the fact that the order and wording from the Rodong Sinmun were exactly replicated in the joint statement means that North Korea's demands were accepted 100%. Third, I will elaborate later, but it concerns the concept of 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.' Not North Korea's denuclearization, but the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, or 'Joseon Bando' as North Korea calls it.

Background of the Trump Administration's Singapore Agreement

'Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' opens up a very different interpretation from what we understand as North Korea's denuclearization. From North Korea's perspective, it is a completely different matter from what we understand as North Korea's denuclearization. If so, I believe such an agreement represents a victory for North Korean diplomacy. Even after that, North Korea has continued to refer to the Singapore Agreement until recent years, emphasizing its importance and the need to respect it, precisely because it was an agreement constructed entirely in their favor. So, why did Trump enter into such an agreement? This has also been revealed.

In the negotiations with the United States, North Korea consistently refused to make any concessions. It is said that Secretary Pompeo then rushed to President Trump, reporting that North Korea was not agreeing to anything and not accepting any of the US demands. Trump reportedly became angry and said, 'These kinds of summits are just for show. So, we just need to sign a meaningless agreement, take pictures, and declare victory.' This is what led to the outcome. Furthermore, it is said that President Trump was not prepared at all before the summit. Despite receiving continuous briefings on the concept of denuclearization advocated by North Korea and its implications, President Trump reportedly did not pay adequate attention to these reports.

Therefore, Trump instructed them to reach an agreement in any form. 'Since we came to Singapore, we can't leave empty-handed, so just get an agreement.' This was a major misstep by the United States. I believe the starting point was when President Trump walked out of the negotiation room during the South Korea-US summit, which I will present later. He himself realized later that it was a very flawed agreement. For this reason, at the Hanoi Summit, there was no such approach; the US continued to press its demands, and when they were not met,

President Trump's remarks on suspending joint exercises

he broke off the talks and left. A situation. Another surprising development occurred here. I still vividly remember that President Trump, deeply disappointed with the Singapore agreement, held a press conference for over an hour with foreign correspondents, mostly American journalists, in Singapore. The American journalists persistently questioned President Trump, but he remained unfazed and spoke for over an hour about how well the Singapore agreement had turned out. However, more importantly, a statement that truly shocked us emerged: President Trump referred to the joint exercises between South Korea and the US and the deployment of strategic assets as 'expensive and provocative war games.'

He used the English phrase 'expensive provocative war game' and announced that he would suspend joint exercises and the deployment of strategic assets. This was a major shock because key aides such as then-US Secretary of Defense Mattis and then-US Secretary of State Tillerson were completely unaware of this, as was the South Korean government. The situation unfolded as follows: Kim Jong Un consistently raised the issue of joint exercises in his subsequent meetings with Trump. He must have raised it during the Singapore agreement discussions as well. From President Trump's perspective, he perceived 'joint exercises' as Kim Jong Un described them, and being sensitive to costs, Trump had always considered the financial aspect of joint exercises. This combined perspective led to a strongly negative perception being expressed at that moment.

Although it is a cause for great concern, President Trump still holds this view regarding joint exercises and the deployment of strategic assets. This poses a significant challenge to South Korea's security. To summarize: the Singapore agreement on June 12th. I believe I have already sufficiently explained its meaning. My interpretation is confirmed by what happened next. How is it confirmed? After the Singapore agreement in June, Secretary Pompeo visited North Korea for his third trip, from July 5th to 7th. He did not meet with Kim Jong Un, unlike previous occasions. During his visit, he found that the Trump administration had not properly understood the agreement. The Singapore agreement had three points, but the US focused only on point three, omitting points one and two. Pompeo's visit to Pyongyang was intended to discuss concrete measures for North Korea's denuclearization, but North Korea's response was predictably dismissive. They argued that point three could only be discussed after points one and two were addressed, and publicly criticized Pompeo for bringing up point three first. Secretary Pompeo

faced a painful moment. Upon returning to Osan Air Base in South Korea on July 7th, he held a brief press conference, claiming significant achievements. However, shortly thereafter, a statement from the North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson was released, which read verbatim: 'In contravention of the spirit of the Singapore summit consultations, they only brought up demands for unilateral and coercive denuclearization, including CBID [Chemical and Biological IHL Detection] and verification.' This was a direct criticism of Secretary Pompeo and the Trump administration. The latter part of the statement, which I mentioned earlier,

explained that first, North Korea-US relations must improve, a peace regime must be established, and then denuclearization measures could be considered. This is the essence of the Foreign Ministry spokesperson's statement. There are some behind-the-scenes details about what went wrong afterward, but Pompeo himself reportedly did not fully understand the situation at the time. He mentioned consulting with US State Department officials and long-time North Korea policy experts in the US to grasp the situation. Once he received an explanation, he understood. So,

Reinterpretation of 'Korean Peninsula Denuclearization' and North Korea's Demands

at that time, I believe the US Trump administration was not adequately prepared. Finally, I will address the issue with the third point of the Singapore agreement, 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,' which I briefly mentioned earlier. 'Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' is very different from 'North Korean denuclearization.' I will quote directly from North Korea's announcement. In a commentary by the Korean Central News Agency on December 20, 2018, North Korea provided a detailed and friendly explanation of what 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' agreed upon in the Singapore Summit means. It reads verbatim:

'Before eliminating our nuclear deterrent, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is defined as the complete elimination of the US nuclear threat to Korea.' No further explanation is needed, is it? Ladies and gentlemen, what North Korea means by 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' is not the elimination of the nuclear weapons North Korea has developed and possesses, but rather the prior removal of the US nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence provided to South Korea. So, what could be the meaning of the three points in the Singapore agreement? Is this truly North Korean denuclearization? Furthermore, regarding 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,' North Korea outlined five conditions in a statement by a spokesperson for its government on July 30, 2016. I will not list all of them but will start with the third condition: 'The United States must guarantee that it will not reintroduce nuclear striking means into the Korean Peninsula.'

This means not deploying strategic assets. The fourth condition is: 'The United States must pledge not to use nuclear weapons against our Republic.' And there is a fifth condition: 'The United States must declare the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, who hold nuclear authority.' This is what North Korea means by 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.' Therefore, the 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' mentioned in the Singapore agreement is a completely different concept from the North Korean denuclearization that the Trump administration envisioned at the time. I will conclude here for today. I have discussed how the Trump administration approached the Singapore agreement and its implications. Of course, the Trump administration learned from its mistakes afterward,

and President Trump himself later came to establish a concept of denuclearization for North Korea. However, the Singapore agreement itself can be considered a significant failure of US diplomacy, and perhaps even a victory for North Korean diplomacy. Thank you for watching.

■ Park Won Gon, Director of the North Korea Research Center, East Asia Institute (EAI); Professor of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Han Soo, EAI Research Fellow

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr