[North Korea and the World] The U.S. "Interim National Defense Strategy Guidance" and Korean Peninsula Security

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Video Script

Changes in U.S. Defense Strategy and Korean Peninsula Security

The U.S. has effectively declared that its conception of the ROK-U.S. alliance is one where South Korea takes the lead in preparing for North Korean threats, while the role of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) will focus on countering China. Hello, everyone. Thank you for watching Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. Today, I would like to explain the U.S. defense policy once again. This is Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World, and recently, there have been more discussions about the U.S. than about North Korea. The security environment, which is changing rapidly under the Trump administration, inevitably has a significant impact on Korean Peninsula issues. This is directly linked to the North Korean issue, making it imperative for South Korea to closely track changes in U.S. policy, especially its security policy. Therefore, we will analyze these issues whenever important developments occur. On March 29th, the Washington Post reported on what is called the interim national defense strategy guidance.

This guidance, consisting of nine pages, is a classified document, and the Washington Post obtained and reported its main contents. This is of considerable significance because the official US defense strategy document is currently under review and will take time to be officially released. Therefore, this interim guidance has been issued. US defense strategy cannot stop at any given moment, and especially with a change in administration, there is a need for clear guidance on the strategies that the Trump administration prioritizes.

This guidance is expected to play a key role until the official National Defense Strategy (NDS) is released. The title of the Washington Post article is 'Pentagon's Secret Memo on China and Homeland Defense Bears Heritage Foundation's Fingerprints.' This suggests that the Heritage Foundation's 'Project 2025' has been significantly reflected in the interim national defense strategy guidance of the Trump administration.

I will discuss the defense strategy guidance, including these contents. It is highly likely that this guidance was drafted under the leadership of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby. Under Secretary Colby has the primary mission of developing US defense strategy, which also includes alliance strategy and threat assessment. Based on Under Secretary Colby's remarks at a hearing in March and his writings, it can be seen that his ideas are almost entirely reflected in this interim national defense strategy guidance.

It appears clear that Colby is leading the drafting. He also led the drafting of the 2018 US defense strategy, at which time he was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development. As the current Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, it is highly probable that he played a more leading role. The arguments in Colby's 2021 book, 'The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict,' are still reflected. There are two core points.

Defense Strategy Designating China as the Primary Threat

The first point of the interim defense strategy released by the Washington Post is that China is the greatest threat. The Secretary of Defense has realigned US priorities to focus on deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and strengthening the homeland. The greatest threat perceived by the US is China. The second point is that US allies must take responsibility for their own defense. This means that the US may find it difficult to intervene in the defense of its allies as it did in the past to counter China, and thus each country must be responsible for its own defense. It is telling allies in Europe and Asia (including South Korea) to take risks.

This implies a significant reduction in direct US intervention or support in the event of a conflict. This is because, by doing so, the US can secure the resources and capabilities to deal with China. These points overlap with the Heritage Foundation's 'Project 2025.' 'Project 2025' emphasizes deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, homeland defense, and increased defense burden-sharing by allies, which is identically reflected in the interim national defense strategy guidance. This clearly shows the influence of 'Project 2025.' First, the threat from China is the top priority.

This is not new. The US has considered the threat from China important for quite some time. The title of Colby's book itself is 'The Strategy of Denial,' and the object of that denial is precisely China. The US argues that it must deny China the establishment of hegemony in Asia. Preventing China from occupying a dominant position is paramount. Previous defense strategies also identified China as the most significant challenge.

For example, both the 2018 and 2022 Defense Strategy documents identified China as the nation posing the most significant challenge. However, this differs from the current interim National Defense Strategy guidance. It is far more urgent and important to assume a military conflict with China and emphasize military preparedness for it. There is a significant difference in tone, importance, and emphasis on 'uniqueness' compared to the past. The Washington Post report is similar. While the first Trump administration and the Biden administration also defined China as the greatest threat to the United States, this guidance considers the scenario of a Taiwan invasion as the sole and primary issue, readjusting the entire U.S. military to the Indo-Pacific region.

The key concepts here are 'facing threat' and 'scenario.' 'Facing threat' refers to the benchmark threat, meaning the most significant threat that the U.S. Department of Defense uses as a basis for developing military strategy, force structure, weapons development, and budget allocation. In simple terms, it defines what we fear most and must prepare for. This is important because the overall direction of the U.S. military is determined by this benchmark. When a country or entity becomes a 'facing threat,' all U.S. military power, structure, strategy, and training change accordingly.

Therefore, if China becomes a 'facing threat,' all U.S. military assets change to align with China. Furthermore, 'facing scenario' is the most concerning actual war or conflict situation that the benchmark threat could cause, assumed as a scenario. Based on this, the U.S. Department of Defense prepares for war. According to the Washington Post report, the interim National Defense Strategy guidance states, 'China is the sole facing threat for the U.S. Department of Defense, and denying Taiwan's occupation while simultaneously defending the U.S. homeland is the sole facing scenario for the U.S. Department of Defense.' Consequently, military resource planning is conducted solely assuming war with China.

Reorganization of U.S. Military Operations Centered on China

It is stated in English as 'conflict only with China.' This means the benchmark threat is China, and all U.S. strategies and military strategic policies are adjusted accordingly. The scenario also assumes war with China, with the Taiwan Strait crisis being the top priority, and military resource planning is modified to assume only war with China. We will have to see how far this goes, but I believe it is a very significant change. Previous U.S. military strategy was not confined to China alone. For a long time, there was a 'win-all-at-once strategy,' which meant preparing simultaneously for potential wars in the Middle East and Asia (including the Korean Peninsula). Regional commands were established for this preparation. Of course, there were differences in priority and intensity, but the U.S. position was to maintain and develop military readiness from a global management perspective. Now, these elements are being removed, and it is being declared as preparation for war solely against China, which is a very significant development.

According to statements made during Colby's confirmation hearing, a specific year, 2027, has been mentioned. By 2027, China is expected to possess the capability to swiftly occupy Taiwan using military force. Conversely, this implies that by 2027, the U.S. must also establish a robust preparedness posture. The year 2025 is not far off. This carries significant implications. Such a rapid transition and shift in preparedness are directly linked to changes in the nature of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Previously, the ROK-U.S. alliance focused on preparing for North Korean threats, but now, the U.S. conception of the alliance is one where South Korea takes the lead in preparing for North Korean threats, while the role of USFK will focus on countering China. This can be seen as an effective declaration, even if not officially announced. While not officially stated, this direction has been reconfirmed.

Of course, there are cautious points. It is questionable whether the United States will truly use military force to defend Taiwan. When former President Trump was asked about defending Taiwan, he never mentioned military intervention. He stated he would respond by imposing a 200% tariff on China. Therefore, questions arise about whether military intervention would occur in the event of a Taiwan Strait crisis. First, will the United States truly use military force to defend Taiwan? Second, will China invade Taiwan in such a situation? Third, will Taiwan declare independence? None of these possibilities appear highly likely. If that is the case, it is reasonable to question whether the U.S. military power currently being developed and prepared will continue to be solely focused on deterring China. However, based on the announced content, it is appropriate to consider the possibility that it will move in that direction as well.

Demand for Enhanced Defense Responsibilities from Allies

Separately, the Trump administration has a clear stance on the role of allies. It asserts that U.S. allies must prioritize responsibility for their own defense. This is a separate issue from whether military force will be used in the Taiwan Strait, but it is connected. The interim guidance states, 'The United States must prioritize deterring China, thus taking risks in other theaters, and will pressure allies in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia to bear greater responsibility for deterring threats from Russia, North Korea, and Iran.' In other words, the U.S. cannot provide defense for its allies as before, and each ally must be responsible for its own defense while the U.S. focuses its efforts on the China threat. This is similar to the 'Lippmann Gap' mentioned by Colby during his hearing.

'Lippmann Gap' refers to a situation where a nation's resources are imbalanced in supporting its diplomatic and military objectives. Colby states that the United States is currently in such a situation. While it must confront and prepare for China, the U.S. currently has too many forces dispersed, including those of its allies, making it difficult. Therefore, the gap between desired objectives and the actual implementation of China deterrence is explained through the 'Lippmann Gap.' To resolve this, allies are expected to bear more of their responsibilities, and U.S. resources used for allied defense will be redirected to China. Let's re-examine the interim National Defense Strategy guidance mentioned by the Washington Post.

The Biden administration and the 2022 National Defense Strategy emphasized NATO allies to deter Russia, viewing Russia as a threat. At that time, mutually beneficial alliances and friendships were described as the United States' greatest strategic assets. However, the interim strategy guidance of the Trump administration tells a very different story. First, NATO must bear much greater defense responsibilities, and the U.S. will be reluctant to provide forces due to differing priorities. This means the U.S. will focus more on the China threat than on allied defense. However, according to the guidance, the issue of nuclear deterrence will continue to be provided.

NATO allies are exposed to Russia's nuclear threat, and South Korea is exposed to North Korea's nuclear threat. The United States provides nuclear deterrence to these countries, and according to the guidance, this will continue. While South Korea is not specifically mentioned, for Europe, it states, 'The United States will provide nuclear deterrence against Russia.' It also emphasizes that 'forces necessary for U.S. homeland defense or deterring China will not be available to NATO.' In other words, the U.S. will provide nuclear deterrence, but NATO allies must be responsible for the threat from Russia in Europe. Instead, the U.S. will use its forces and resources for homeland defense and deterring China. To conclude, I will discuss the implications for South Korea. South Korea must bear the primary responsibility for its own defense. There will be no further room for debate. This is clearly stated in the interim guidance, and the Trump administration's approach to costs...

The Biden administration and the 2022 National Defense Strategy emphasized alliances to deter Russia, meaning they highlighted NATO alliances and viewed Russia as a threat. At that time, mutually beneficial alliances and friendships were described as the United States' greatest strategic assets. However, the interim strategy guidance of the Trump administration tells a very different story. First, NATO must bear much greater defense responsibilities, and the U.S. will be reluctant to provide forces due to differing priorities. This has significant implications. It means the U.S. will focus much more on the China threat than on allied defense. However, one of the key questions in the guidance concerns nuclear issues.

NATO allies are exposed to Russia's nuclear threat, and South Korea is exposed to North Korea's nuclear threat. The United States provides nuclear deterrence to these countries, and according to the guidance, this will continue. While South Korea is not specifically mentioned, for Europe, it states that the U.S. will provide nuclear deterrence against Russia. However, it emphasizes that forces necessary for U.S. homeland defense or deterring China will not be available to NATO. In other words, the U.S. will provide nuclear deterrence, but NATO allies must be responsible for the threat from Russia in Europe. Instead, the U.S. will use its forces and resources for homeland defense and deterring China. To conclude, I will discuss the implications for South Korea. Therefore, South Korea must bear the primary responsibility for its own defense. There will be no further room for debate. This is clearly stated in the interim guidance, and the Trump administration's approach to costs...

Changes in the ROK-U.S. Alliance and South Korea's Independent Defense System Construction

This is highly sensitive information and can be interpreted as an effort to guide South Korea to assume greater responsibility for its own defense, within the broader framework of reducing the Lippmann Gap, which Colby mentioned. This suggests a high probability of criticism directed at South Korea. Under the current ROK-U.S. operational plan, which assumes large-scale U.S. reinforcement deployment in the event of a crisis in South Korea, such as a war initiated by North Korea's invasion, this possibility has become very low. Furthermore, the ROK and U.S. are building a combined system and operating the Combined Forces Command (CFC). Currently, the Commander of the CFC is the Commander of USFK, a U.S. military officer, but the nature of the CFC may also change in the future. There is a possibility that preparations for North Korean threats may not be conducted through combined efforts.

This is also related to the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON). Colby clearly stated in his writings and during his confirmation hearing that South Korea should take over wartime OPCON. He mentioned that President Trump's foreign policy vision includes empowering influential and willing allies like South Korea with greater authority. In essence, this means that South Korea should ultimately take over wartime OPCON. I have considerable doubts about whether OPCON transfer will occur and whether the combined system will be maintained as it is. If so, the U.S. will likely ensure that South Korea bears the responsibility for the defense of the Korean Peninsula, and will change the nature of USFK to more actively counter China. I believe this is the correct interpretation. Consequently, the transfer of wartime OPCON is likely to occur sooner, and combined operational plans are likely to be redrafted in a manner that does not involve large-scale reinforcement troop deployments.

However, what about extended deterrence, which is of greatest interest to us? The question is whether the Trump administration will even touch the extended deterrence provided to South Korea. As of now, based solely on the interim National Defense Strategy (NDS), there is a high probability that extended deterrence will be provided. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. has stated it will provide its nuclear umbrella against Russian nuclear threats to Europe. Therefore, it is highly likely that nuclear deterrence against threats from North Korea will continue to be provided to countries like South Korea, and this could potentially proceed within the existing framework of ROK-U.S. extended deterrence. However, concerns remain that combined exercises and the deployment of strategic assets may be suspended or reduced.

The Trump administration may consider these as separate issues. However, if such a situation arises, it would pose a significant threat to South Korea's security and present a serious security challenge, leading to a loss of deterrence against North Korea's nuclear capabilities. There is much we need to prepare for in this regard. Unfortunately, it appears that overdue homework has suddenly become an urgent priority. The transfer of wartime OPCON implies that South Korea must bear the primary responsibility for its own defense, a transfer that has been postponed multiple times. Each time it is postponed, when I speak with U.S. strategists, they say the following.

South Korea keeps postponing the submission of its final report. At some point, South Korea must take responsibility for the defense of the Korean Peninsula, but it continues to delay. This is a sentiment expressed by U.S. strategists not just under the Trump administration, but for the past decade or so. They argue that South Korea must assume greater responsibility. However, this is a very sensitive issue, and there were concerns that if the combined system shifted from its current structure to one centered on South Korea, North Korea might miscalculate due to a perceived weakening of ROK-U.S. combined deterrence. Therefore, these discussions have been part of South Korea's negotiations with the U.S., which has contributed to the maintenance of the existing operational plans.

I believe these times have passed. We inevitably must strive to strengthen our own defenses quickly. To that end, defense spending must naturally increase, and we must secure the capability to formulate and execute our own operational plans. We must deploy all necessary strategic assets and, above all, establish an independent system capable of directing warfare, with complete command and control, rather than relying on the United States. This is not easy. It is a situation that compels us to reflect on how diligently we have prepared thus far. However, if we remain idle in the face of these already-initiated changes, I believe it will only become more difficult in the future.

Therefore, I reiterate that we need to take proactive measures in this regard. I will conclude my remarks here today. Thank you.

■ Park Won-gon: Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute (EAI); Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Editor: Park Han-soo, EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr