← Back · ← Home · ← Back to list
[Visible Commentary] Prospects and Responses to North Korea-China-Russia Trilateral Cooperation under the Trump Administration
Editor's Note
Eom Gu-ho, professor at Hanyang University, analyzes that while Russia is strengthening its relationship with North Korea to promote a multipolar order and expand buffer zones, the North Korea-China-Russia alignment remains an asymmetrical coexistence, fluid according to strategic interests, and has not reached full solidarity. Furthermore, he identifies the future of the North Korea-China-Russia alignment as contingent upon variables such as the Trump administration's second-term foreign policy, the Ukraine war, and changes in China's stance. He emphasized that to solidify South Korea's diplomatic position going forward, it must check the deepening ties between North Korea and Russia by clarifying its denuclearization roadmap and actively utilizing diplomatic means and economic incentives.
YouTube Link : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_4sCwEQ3jws
Video Script
Russia's Multipolar Order and Motivations for Strengthening Ties with North Korea
Since Putin's third term began in 2012, Russia's foreign policy strategy has become distinctly characterized by two grand strategies: establishing a multipolar order and expanding its buffer zones of influence. In this context, it appears Russia is motivated to use North Korea as a buffer zone to secure its vulnerable Far East and to counter the growing anti-China and anti-Russia global security structure, NATO Plus IP4. Recently, statements such as 'Korean unification would confront Russia with an Asian NATO' have become openly discussed in Russia. Regarding Sino-Russian-North Korean solidarity, it is reasonable to consider that Russia is proposing the necessity of a North-China-Russia triangle as a counter-triangle to the activated US-China-Russia grand triangle and the South Korea-US-Japan mini-triangle, and discussions are proceeding at this level.
This is the current situation. Given that Trump's second-term foreign policy is highly variable and uncertain, the North Korea-China alliance will also undergo changes depending on Trump's second-term foreign policy. Specifically, it will depend on US-Russia, US-China, and US-North Korea relations. First, regarding US-Russia relations, the key issue is whether improved US-Russia relations could ease the North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia alliances, as Trump is poised to resolve the Ukraine war early, and some argue for separating China and Russia to strengthen pressure on China. Second, US-North Korea relations. The question is whether US-North Korea relations will improve, as they did during the Trump administration, creating conditions for North Korea to slow down its pace with Russia. Third, the China issue, which our former doctor mentioned. If, as Trump has promised, US pressure on China intensifies, will China, which has maintained a passive or ambivalent stance on the North Korea-China alliance, have a greater incentive to view North Korea or Russia as strategic assets for its leverage against the US?.
Analysis of the Asymmetrical Core-Periphery Relationship in Sino-Russian-North Korean Solidarity
Let us predict these issues and present our direction based on the outcomes. Currently, there are various arguments regarding the nature of North Korea-China relations, but they can be broadly divided into two. First, the argument that the activation of bilateral relations, such as North Korea-Russia and China-North Korea/China-Russia relations, effectively functions as a North Korea-China alliance, creating a virtuous cycle. Second, the argument that the bilateral relations are not actually that activated, and it is an unstable, asymmetrical patron-client relationship due to each party's structural flaws. I lean towards the latter.
Looking at North Korea-Russia relations first, although they appear to be evolving into a relationship of blood allies, the gap in expectations is their Achilles' heel. There is a disparity between the support Russia can provide within the sanctions framework as a UN Security Council member and the level of advanced military technology that North Korea demands. While the North Korea-China relationship is formally one of blood allies, it is uncertain whether the military alliance treaty was renewed along with the Korean War treaty in June 2021. Above all, given that there have been no joint military exercises since 1961, the argument that the North Korea-China relationship is bound by security ties remains uncertain. China-Russia relations are debated. A majority of opinions from outside Russia suggest that the current China-Russia relationship is closer to one of benevolent neutrality than what is discussed abroad.
Russia's Deepening Dependence on China and Diplomatic Concerns
China has not provided military support to Russia, and in some aspects, it is participating in sanctions against Russia. Furthermore, there is an argument that Russia needs to diplomatically mitigate the perception of excessive reliance on China in Russian public opinion. As seen in Prime Minister Modi's remarks during his visit to Vietnam, diplomacy utilizing Vietnam and India to counter China is a traditional Russian strategy to check China. Therefore, we must also consider that Russia is concerned about deepening its dependence on China. Currently, there is no policy coordination or communication on micro-level issues between North Korea and China. Academically defined, it would be most accurate to describe it as a relationship akin to a strategic alliance, where relations can change flexibly and variably based on interests. Let's examine the first issue I raised, US-Russia relations. Trump has stated he would resolve the Ukraine war within 24 hours.
Uncertainties in Trump's Second Term Foreign Policy and Prospects for US-Russia Relations
He appointed Keith Kellogg as his special envoy for Russia and Ukraine. Although Kellogg's plan is not 100% confirmed, its core components are fourfold. First, it aims to normalize US-Russia diplomatic relations. Second, it proposes a 10-year postponement of Ukraine's NATO membership. Third, it acknowledges Ukraine's territorial losses. This plan offers additional security if Ukraine accepts such negotiations. Therefore, Trump appears to have an intention to resolve the Ukraine war. However, there are substantial practical issues. First is the issue of bearing the cost of Ukraine's reconstruction. Second is the issue of indictment by the International Criminal Court. Third are the current sanctions against Russia, numbering 20,000. Considering that sanctions against Iran numbered 3,000, it is uncertain how quickly sanctions relief plans can proceed. These are the aspects. Furthermore, Trump
We need to look back at his first term. During Trump's first term, there was a strategic discussion, dubbed 'Reverse Nixon,' to embrace Russia and pressure China. However, in reality, it was Trump who created the executive order for the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), and it was also Trump who created the European Energy Security Act. Most importantly, Trump was the president who first approved the provision of weapons such as Javelins to Ukraine. Therefore, it is problematic to assume that this issue will proceed very favorably based solely on Trump's words. We also need to consider the domestic situation in the United States. In the US, there is a general tendency for the president's foreign policy to follow bipartisan consensus or structural factors, so it remains uncertain how much difference in stance the Republican and Democratic parties will have on Russia policy. Above all, there is also the possibility that the European Union (EU) will oppose a pro-Russian positioning towards Russia. Therefore, my personal outlook is that improving US-Russia relations will not be as easy as it seems.
Strengthening Pressure on China and Potential Changes in China's Stance on Sino-Russian-North Korean Solidarity
The second issue is whether China's stance will change due to intensified pressure on China. Until now, China's position on the North Korea-China-Russia alliance has been negative or passive. The primary reason is that China has to engage in various negotiations with the United States and cannot afford to be associated with rogue states as a responsible major power. Above all, I believe China harbors discomfort with Russia encroaching on its sphere of influence, particularly in North Korea, which is a neighboring country within its sphere of influence. I believe it is highly probable that China pre-approved the deepening of North Korea-Russia ties. Otherwise, it would be unlikely for Russia-China summit meetings at events like the Kazan BRICS summit to proceed normally.
Some argue that this situation offers a seemingly effortless advantage. While Russia cannot militarily support Russia due to sanctions, it effectively aids Russia's victory in the war. Similarly, although North Korea cannot be aided due to sanctions against it, it effectively receives assistance. Most importantly, this Russia-North Korea closeness creates a situation where South Korea and Japan must appeal to China's goodwill to resolve these issues, thereby increasing leverage over South Korea and Japan. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that China's overall stance would be unconditionally negative.
What stance will China take then? China is likely to strategically manage this issue, potentially extending to a front that bears the political burden of escalating nuclear issues in the region. The means of management will likely be economic or sanctions-based. For example, delays in payments to Russia by some Chinese regional banks or the withdrawal of high-tech companies from Russian factories demonstrate that China holds leverage over Russia. We also need to predict what Trump's strategy towards China will be. Based on my analysis of the core content of what Trump has said regarding this issue,
I have concluded that Trump's primary concern in matters concerning China is economic rather than security issues. Therefore, it is more likely that he will use security issues as a means to facilitate trade issues, rather than escalating security issues, including the Taiwan issue, to complicate trade. Furthermore, Trump appears to emphasize a bilateral or unilateral approach to resolving China issues, unlike Biden's multilateral approach. Strictly speaking, this will likely provide China with more opportunities to respond.
Sustainability of Russia-North Korea Closeness and Deepening Military Cooperation
Moreover, Trump has not mentioned cooperation between South Korea and the US, but instead advocates for the revitalization of the Quad, which he revived in 2017 and is currently focused on economic agendas. Therefore, it is unlikely that US-China relations will escalate into security conflicts to the extent that China needs to activate the North Korea-China alliance. The third issue is the sustainability of close North Korea-Russia ties. Initially, I also believed the sustainability of close North Korea-Russia ties was weak, as Russia's need for North Korean arms support would diminish after the war. However, observing Russia's various actions, doctrinal revisions, and recent diplomatic documents, I have concluded that the deepening of these ties ensures considerable sustainability.
Russia's Nuclear Multilateralism and the Implications of Nuclear Doctrine Revision
The level of military cooperation in a relationship of blood allies may exceed conventional expectations. Furthermore, if a defense industry value chain begins to form through the provision of aircraft and anti-aircraft systems, which are North Korea's most vulnerable areas, it could lead to a more sophisticated problem than anticipated. The second concern is the nuclear issue. Although it is not Russia's official stance, Putin's associates speak of 'nuclear multilateralism.'
While Russia's official position is that it will fulfill its responsibilities as a pillar of the NPT regime, frankly, they openly state that North Korea would have been purged if it did not possess nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Russia is quite passive regarding the extension of the New START treaty in 2026. As you know, Russia's military strategy, with its revised nuclear doctrine, is based on nuclear deterrence, and all military strategies are linked to nuclear weapons. Therefore, considering these factors, even if we employ various means, the North Korea-Russia relationship will likely experience a slowdown but maintain a certain degree of sustainability. Based on what I have discussed so far, I have made four projections. Overall, the trend of North Korea-China cooperation, which will undergo a slowdown, is expected to continue even during Trump's second term.
Long-term Prospects for Sino-Russian-North Korean Solidarity and South Korea's Diplomatic Challenges
Based on this, the first conclusion is that the North Korea-Russia relationship has a long-term strategic foundation, and even if the Ukraine war ends, it will be difficult to detach North Korea from Russia or China if US-North Korea relations do not improve quickly. The second conclusion is that while efforts to improve US-Russia relations may be attempted during Trump's second term, the core issue, considering current economic dependencies and various situations with China, is that third, during Trump's second term, intensified pressure on China will strengthen its tendency to view North Korea or Russia as strategic assets, but for the reasons mentioned above, it will be difficult for China to weaken or functionalize the North Korea-China alliance. Fourth, despite this, the common anti-US stance held by North Korea, China, and Russia is likely to be maintained, and this will be included in the context of global efforts to create an anti-US structure, expanding the Global South network. That is my view. Finally, my greatest concern is that North Korea, China, and Russia have recently shown a tendency to jointly assetize nuclear weapons. Russia is advocating for a nuclear umbrella theory despite North Korea possessing nuclear weapons, and as Professor Ahn Gyeong-mo mentioned, if South Korea does not clarify its South Korea-led denuclearization roadmap, there is a very high possibility that South Korea's position will be disregarded and neglected during this chaotic period. I cannot emphasize this enough. Furthermore, regarding Russia, South Korea must aim for a 5+1 framework in the long term. Within the framework of the South Korea-US alliance and South Korea-US
Red Lines in Diplomacy with Russia and Strategic Management Measures
security cooperation, we must move towards a direction where sufficient economic and strategic interests of China and Russia are shared. In that case, as our former doctor mentioned, we must strive for strategic management measures that allow for communication. I am unsure if this is possible in the current situation. The most important thing is what I consider the red line for diplomacy with Russia. We respond situationally, but we do not know the response for each situation. Therefore, I view the provision of advanced military technology as a red line and believe it must be concealed behind diplomatic channels. If it is before that stage, instead of unnecessary messages, we should utilize diplomatic means, attacks on Russia's most feared Security Council status, and strengthened communication with China. Russia also worries about this, so diplomatic means should be employed. Economic incentives should also be utilized. Unbeknownst to us, the Ukraine war is making many governments difficult. President Biden's approval ratings have fallen due to inflation caused by the Ukraine war, President Yoon Suk-yeol is also likely to lose, and Macron is in a difficult position. Our electricity bills have also increased significantly. Therefore, efforts to decouple the North Korea-Russia relationship through economic incentives must be made. That is the only means to decouple the current North Korea-Russia relationship.
Although these are difficult times, I hope that we can overcome this crisis through effective strategic management.
We must manage diplomatic relations well. If it is before that stage, diplomatic means should be utilized rather than unnecessary messages. Russia's greatest concern is its Security Council status, so we must use diplomatic means, considering attacks on this status and strengthened communication with China. Economic incentives should also be utilized. Unbeknownst to us, the Ukraine war is making many governments difficult. President Biden's re-election has become difficult due to inflation caused by the Ukraine war. The Spanish general election is similar, and President Macron is also in a difficult position. Our electricity bills have also increased significantly. Efforts to improve relations through economic incentives must be made. That is the only means for current relationship improvement.
Although it is a difficult time, I hope we can overcome this crisis through strategic management.
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.