[Commentary] Strengthening North Korea-Russia Relations and China: A Geopolitical Perspective

YouTube Link : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DRGHu6fLPk8

Video Script

Strengthening Russia-North Korea Relations and China's Geopolitical Perspective

I am very pleased and honored to participate in a forum where we can gather wisdom regarding North Korea-Russia relations today. As mentioned, I will be presenting on the topic of 'Strengthening North Korea-Russia Relations and China's Geopolitical Perspective.' This paper consists of five parts. The first part summarizes China's reaction to the deepening North Korea-Russia ties. I have synthesized various official statements, remarks from former officials and Track 1.5 or Track 2 dialogues, and reports from major media outlets. It can be concluded that China currently perceives the potential for North Korea-Russia relations to drive bloc formation within the region and maintains a cautious stance, characterized by principled statements and a degree of distance. The second part summarizes historical precedents of North Korea-Russia cooperation. There have been three historical instances. The first period is from the end of World War II until the so-called 'Suryeong Incident' in 1956. From the Soviet perspective, this period was one in which North Korea's geopolitical value as a bridgehead for managing and expanding its sphere of influence was recognized. From North Korea's perspective, Soviet support was crucial for establishing its government and during the post-Korean War reconstruction. However, starting with the so-called 'Suryeong Incident' in 1956, it became difficult for China and Russia to align their interests. Amidst this, Kim Il-sung consolidated power in North Korea and emphasized self-reliance, making the close ties between North Korea and Russia unsustainable.

The second period overlaps with the Sino-Soviet split and the Vietnam War in the 1960s. These two events were closely interconnected. In the 1960s, Khrushchev pursued a strategy of supporting Ho Chi Minh's invasion of South Vietnam to bring China back under Soviet influence. Concurrently, on the other hand, pressure on China was increased by strengthening relations with China's neighbors, particularly Vietnam, India, and North Korea. During this period, MiG-21 fighter jets, which were advanced weapons at the time, were supplied to North Korea by the Soviet Union, a point I will revisit later when discussing the possibility of Russian arms support to North Korea. The strategic dimension behind providing such advanced weaponry was the geopolitical location of North Korea, adjacent to China's capital, Beijing, which could pose a significant burden to China.

North Korea's cooperation with the Soviet Union was deeply linked to China's attitude towards supporting Vietnam. In fact, Mao Zedong believed that the emergence of a large, unified state directly below China would not serve China's national interests, and thus adopted a passive stance on support. Furthermore, Soviet support would inevitably pass through China, exposing China to two dilemmas: the justification of supporting communism and the risk that the Soviet Union might expose sensitive Chinese facilities and personnel. Due to these complex reasons, China's stance on supporting Vietnam became very passive. From North Korea's perspective, this raised doubts that China might adopt a similar stance in the event of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, North Korea strategically opted for closer ties with the Soviet Union.

The third and final period is during the Reagan administration in the United States. During this time, particularly from 1983 to 1986, the U.S. was pursuing a full-scale containment policy against the Soviet Union, including the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). In this context, the Soviet Union strengthened its relations with North Korea as part of its sphere of influence management. Similarly, during this period, North Korea received aircraft such as MiG-23s, Su-25s, and MiG-29s, and North Korea also granted overflight rights. After examining these historical precedents, I considered what implications they might have for the current North Korea-Russia alignment. In this regard, the first and third cases have fundamental aspects that are difficult to apply to the present situation. It is unlikely that Russia currently views North Korea as a bridgehead for its expansion, unlike the Soviet Union in the past. Given that the primary focus of the United States is on China,

Historical Precedents and Implications of Russia-North Korea Cooperation

the first and third cases are deemed inapplicable to the current context. However, the second case, which reflects the 1960s when relations between China and Russia, despite outwardly friendly declarations, evolved from soft competition to severe conflict, offers significant implications for the current North Korea-Russia alignment, particularly in the context of Russia strengthening relations with neighboring countries to secure leverage over China. Therefore, the second case is considered the most relevant to the present situation, and I have delved deeper into it.

In this context, another variable to consider is the current China-Russia relationship. China-Russia relations are ostensibly strengthening to an unprecedented degree. Since the early 2010s, interdependence has deepened across political, diplomatic, economic, and military spheres. Notably, Russia has transformed into a food exporter since 2014 and has rapidly become a major food supplier to China. However, despite this superficial and substantive strengthening, the issue of asymmetry, with China holding a strategic advantage, is a significant reality between the two countries. Furthermore, as the war in Ukraine prolongs, concerns about Russia's strategic vacuum in the Eastern Siberia region are growing.

The Asymmetry of China-Russia Relations and North Korea's Strategic Space

Previously, when considering Eastern Siberia, Russia might have viewed South Korea as a potential balance in cooperation. However, it is currently difficult to expect such a role from South Korea, making North Korea a viable alternative with certain value. There is a complex logic whereby North Korea's role as a buffer for China has changed due to its nuclear armament, driven by its own needs or perceived needs. To reiterate, North Korea's geopolitical location is a traditional invasion route from China's perspective. This invasion route has been completely blocked by North Korea's independent nuclear armament. Paradoxically, this has significantly reduced China's incentive to support North Korea beyond preventing a sudden collapse. This also signifies a considerable weakening of North Korea's leverage over China.

In summary, North Korea's intention in developing nuclear weapons was likely to reduce its dependence on great powers and enhance regime stability. However, paradoxically, its strategic isolation and economic dependence have deepened due to nuclear weapons, and China's incentive to support North Korea has diminished. In the long term, North Korea's reliance on China for regime stability could pose a threat. Therefore, North Korea has pursued strengthening relations with Russia to address this asymmetry in security autonomy and long-term regime stability. The question then arises whether these logical and circumstantial evidences support this assertion. We can identify three pieces of circumstantial evidence. The first is the plan mentioned in the recent North Korea-Russia treaty to build a new bridge in the lower Tumen River. In fact, a month before the North Korea-Russia summit in May, during the China-Russia summit, both countries stated that they would engage in constructive dialogue with North Korea regarding Chinese vessels navigating through the Tumen River estuary to the sea. However, at the North Korea-Russia summit held the following month, instead of content related to this, it was announced that North Korea's Minister of Land and Environment Protection and Russia's Minister of Transport signed an agreement to build a new road bridge across the Tumen River. This implies the construction of an additional bridge for vehicular traffic, in addition to the existing Friendship Bridge at the Tumen River estuary. This can be interpreted as a dual obstruction of China's strategic goal to access the sea via the lower Tumen River, indicating an intention by both China and Russia to strengthen their leverage over China. China reacted very sensitively and immediately to the announcement of this plan. A new road was constructed east of the observation post in the Tumen River estuary area,

Circumstantial Evidence of Closer Russia-North Korea Ties and China's Response

and numerous facilities of unclear purpose were installed along the road. New port facilities were also established adjacent to the observation post. Given that the Tumen River estuary has historically served as a practical gauge for trilateral cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia, these series of measures, rather than being part of trilateral cooperation, represent China's immediate reaction to Russia's preemptive actions and interests. Therefore, they can be considered circumstantial evidence supporting the aforementioned dynamic. The second piece of evidence is Putin's diplomatic activities. Immediately after concluding the summit with North Korea in June, he visited Vietnam, and in July, he hosted Indian Prime Minister Modi in Russia. This pattern of diplomacy is highly reminiscent of the period in the 1960s when China strengthened relations with neighboring countries to exert pressure on China. The third piece of evidence is a leaked Russian secret document from February 2024.

While time constraints prevent a detailed explanation of this secret document, I will focus on its core significance. Despite the no-first-use nuclear agreement signed with China in 2001, the document reveals that Russia is conducting scenarios and drills in preparation for a Chinese invasion, including nuclear operations. It specifically mentions concerns about the strategic vacuum in Eastern Siberia. Synthesizing these three pieces of circumstantial evidence, it can be confirmed that the deepening North Korea-Russia ties clearly serve the purpose of strengthening leverage over China. So, why does China repeatedly adopt a seemingly principled and distant stance in response to this North Korea-Russia alignment? Naturally, China is aware of the historical precedents and current circumstances of the deepening North Korea-Russia ties. However, this may be displeasing, and furthermore, it could increase the burden of externally imposed roles on China by the West, led by the United States, by driving bloc formation within the region. Despite these concerns, from a broader perspective, as it may reflect a weakening of U.S. dominance or the rise of an order opposed to the U.S., the incentive to prevent this by damaging North Korea-Russia relations is offset. Additionally, North Korea appears to intend to create strategic space not only within a dual strategic framework through its relationship with Russia but also between China and Russia.

However, whether this will lead to tangible results is addressed in the next section. The fourth part, 'Prospects for North Korea-China Relations,' evaluates the extent to which North Korea's current pursuit of creating this dual strategic space has been successful in the past. While there have been some successful instances, particularly the 1961 bilateral and alliance agreements where North Korea pursued equidistant diplomacy by leveraging the soft competition between China and Russia, the current security environment is assessed as vastly different. Some argue that North Korea's current moves are driven by economic considerations. Victor Cha of CSIS is a prominent proponent of this view. I believe this is unlikely to be the decisive factor, given that North Korea and Russia already settled 90% of their debt in 2014, and the remaining 10% was agreed to be repaid in installments every six months over 20 years. While economic motives exist, they are unlikely to be the primary driver.

China's Cautious Stance on Closer Russia-North Korea Ties

As I mentioned earlier, I believe these moves by North Korea are highly strategic decisions. Specifically, I do not believe North Korea thinks that strengthening its relationship with Russia will decisively alleviate its dependence on China. Furthermore, I believe these moves by North Korea, which consider integration into the international order, serve as a catalyst. The final section, 'Prospects,' addresses the often-discussed possibility of Russia providing advanced weapons to North Korea. I believe the likelihood of such support is currently low, and I have presented four grounds for this assessment. First, consider the historical precedent of Russia providing advanced weapons to North Korea. As mentioned earlier, the supply of advanced aircraft, which were cutting-edge weapons at the time, occurred only in the second and third historical cases. The commonality in both these instances is that they occurred when Russia, or the Soviet Union at the time, faced threats to its vital interests, including potential nuclear conflict with major powers like China or the United States. Support was provided as part of sphere of influence management. The question is whether Russia, despite the ongoing war in Ukraine, is currently facing threats to its vital interests involving major powers, and the answer is no. Second, does Russia currently value North Korea's geopolitical significance as a bridgehead for expansion in the same way it did in the past? The answer is no. Third, unlike during the Cold War, the United States' strategic focus is currently on China.

This may increase the burden of the West's imposed China-centric role narrative. Despite these concerns, when viewed in the larger picture, the motivation to thwart this by undermining North Korea-Russia relations is offset because it could reflect the weakening of US dominance or the rise of anti-US forces in the order. Additionally, North Korea appears to intend to create strategic space not only through its relationship with Russia within a dual strategy framework but also between China and Russia.

North Korea's Dual Strategy and Efforts for Integration into the International Order

However, whether this will lead to substantial results is discussed in the next chapter. The fourth section, 'Prospects for North Korea-China Relations,' assesses that while North Korea's current efforts to create this dual strategic space have had some successful precedents in the past, particularly the 1961 bilateral and alliance treaty cases where it pursued equidistant diplomacy by leveraging the soft competition between China and Russia, the current security environment is vastly different.

Some argue that North Korea's current moves are economically driven decisions. Victor Cha of CSIS is a prominent proponent of this view. I assess that while economic motives exist, they are unlikely to be the decisive factor, given that North Korea and Russia already wrote off 90% of debt in 2014, and agreed to repay the remaining 10% in installments every six months over 20 years.

The Possibility of Russia Supplying North Korea with Advanced Weapons

As I mentioned earlier, I believe these North Korean moves are highly strategic decisions. Specifically, I do not believe North Korea thinks it can decisively mitigate its dependence on China by strengthening its ties with Russia. Furthermore, North Korea's actions, which consider incorporation into the international order, serve as a catalyst for such a goal. The final section, 'Outlook,' addresses the possibility of Russia providing North Korea with advanced weaponry, a topic frequently discussed recently. I believe the likelihood of such provision is currently low, and I have presented four grounds for this assessment. The first is the historical precedent of Russia providing advanced weaponry to North Korea. As mentioned earlier, the cases where advanced aircraft were supplied are only the second and third historical examples, and a commonality between these two cases is that Russia, or the then-Soviet Union, provided them to China or

Fourth, consider Russia's track record and patterns in selling advanced weapons. For instance, Russia has sold strategic weapons, particularly strategic submarines, to India. This was possible because India is geographically distant and is a partner in strategic cooperation against China. The sales process involved a lease and joint operation over nearly a decade, with the strategic submarines being transferred only upon mutual satisfaction. There are also cases of submarine sales to China, but these were limited to diesel submarines, and core technologies such as noise reduction were not transferred. The transfer of China's S-400 air defense system was possible in 2014, but this occurred when the security environment had significantly changed due to the Crimean crisis, and the relationship between China and Russia entered a phase of closer alignment. More importantly, Russia had already formulated military plans to move beyond the S-400 system to the S-500 by 2012. In other words, Russia transfers advanced weapons to other countries only when these considerations are met. Considering all factors, including the potential changes in the Russia-Ukraine war, it is highly probable that demand for military supplies will sharply decrease once the war ends. Therefore, in conclusion, the current alignment between Russia and North Korea is very likely a strategic decision. Finally, let's discuss the policy implications. In this section, we observe that North Korea, China, and Russia all employ strategies that prioritize great power politics and geopolitics. I argue that South Korea should do the same. We must examine the extent to which South Korea understands how great powers instrumentalize the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, the geopolitical significance of the Korean Peninsula today differs from the Cold War era when it was exposed to Soviet expansion. At that time, national interests were focused on Soviet expansion, whereas current Chinese expansion is from East to West. Given this fundamental difference in geopolitical significance, strategies must be formulated by prioritizing these factors. As an initial policy recommendation, we must revitalize communication with neighboring countries to restore a minimal state of soft balance. This concludes my presentation.

The transfer of China's S-400 air defense system was possible in 2014, but this occurred when the security environment had significantly changed due to the Crimean crisis, and the relationship between China and Russia entered a phase of closer alignment. More importantly, Russia had already formulated military plans to move beyond the S-400 system to the S-500 by 2012. In other words, Russia transfers advanced weapons to other countries only when these considerations are met. Considering all factors, including the potential changes in the Russia-Ukraine war, it is highly probable that demand for military supplies will sharply decrease once the war ends. Therefore, in conclusion, the current alignment between Russia and North Korea is very likely a strategic decision. Finally, let's discuss the policy implications. In this section, we observe that North Korea, China, and Russia all employ strategies that prioritize great power politics and geopolitics. I argue that South Korea should do the same. We must examine the extent to which South Korea understands how great powers instrumentalize the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, the geopolitical significance of the Korean Peninsula today differs from the Cold War era when it was exposed to Soviet expansion. At that time, national interests were focused on Soviet expansion, whereas current Chinese expansion is from East to West. Given this fundamental difference in geopolitical significance, strategies must be formulated by prioritizing these factors. As an initial policy recommendation, we must revitalize communication with neighboring countries to restore a minimal state of soft balance. This concludes my presentation.

South Korea's Diplomatic Strategy Considering Great Power Politics and Geopolitics

The transfer of China's S-400 air defense system was possible in 2014, but this occurred when the security environment had significantly changed due to the Crimean crisis, and the relationship between China and Russia entered a phase of closer alignment. More importantly, Russia had already formulated military plans to move beyond the S-400 system to the S-500 by 2012. In other words, Russia transfers advanced weapons to other countries only when these considerations are met. Considering all factors, including the potential changes in the Russia-Ukraine war, it is highly probable that demand for military supplies will sharply decrease once the war ends. Therefore, in conclusion, the current alignment between Russia and North Korea is very likely a strategic decision. Finally, let's discuss the policy implications. In this section, we observe that North Korea, China, and Russia all employ strategies that prioritize great power politics and geopolitics. I argue that South Korea should do the same. We must examine the extent to which South Korea understands how great powers instrumentalize the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, the geopolitical significance of the Korean Peninsula today differs from the Cold War era when it was exposed to Soviet expansion. At that time, national interests were focused on Soviet expansion, whereas current Chinese expansion is from East to West. Given this fundamental difference in geopolitical significance, strategies must be formulated by prioritizing these factors. As an initial policy recommendation, we must revitalize communication with neighboring countries to restore a minimal state of soft balance. This concludes my presentation.

prioritize great power politics and geopolitics. I argue that South Korea should do the same. We must examine the extent to which South Korea understands how great powers instrumentalize the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, the geopolitical significance of the Korean Peninsula today differs from the Cold War era when it was exposed to Soviet expansion. At that time, national interests were focused on Soviet expansion, whereas current Chinese expansion is from East to West. Given this fundamental difference in geopolitical significance, strategies must be formulated by prioritizing these factors. As an initial policy recommendation, we must revitalize communication with neighboring countries to restore a minimal state of soft balance. This concludes my presentation.

Thank you.