[Visible Commentary] The New Cold War and the North Korea-China-Russia Triangle: North Korea's Strategy and Its Implications

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-_ldbf56Mzg

Video Script

Changes in North Korea's National Strategy and the North Korea-China-Russia Triangular Relationship

Yes, it is a pleasure to meet you. I am Professor Ahn Gyeong-mo from the Department of Security Policy at the Korea National Defense University, and I will be presenting the first session today. I am grateful for this important topic and for the opportunity to present here today. The title of my presentation is 'The North Korea-China-Russia Triangular Relationship in the New Cold War.' As the moderator mentioned, experts from each of the three countries were asked to research their respective relationships, and I will focus on North Korea's strategy and its implications in my presentation today.

The first title is 'Why North Korea's National Strategy?'. Given it is a triangular relationship, the national strategies of the three countries would naturally be important. However, North Korea's national strategy holds particular significance for this North Korea-China triangular relationship. This is because, first, despite the term 'triangular relationship,' our specific interest lies in whether the trilateral alliance will function, and in relation to this alliance, it is because North Korea and the Korean Peninsula ultimately serve as the core medium and arena for this alliance, even amidst the global issue of the war in Ukraine.

Second, North Korea plays a crucial mediating role in the recent North Korea-China-Russia triangular relationship. In particular, North Korea's strategy is the result of relatively rapid and significant changes, and its content and direction have played a very important role in the North Korea-China trilateral alliance. Therefore, the research has focused on North Korea's national strategy. The first part examines the content of the changes in North Korea's national strategy, ultimately showing that these strategic changes are significantly influencing the North Korea-China triangular relationship as an outcome.

National strategy is very comprehensive, allowing for various discussions and diverse conceptualizations. However, to briefly introduce the content I wish to convey today, I have conceptually defined it. If we categorize national strategy, particularly focusing on security strategy, two main types are possible. The first is 'balancing strategy,' which offsets threats through power, in other words, a strategy to counter threats. It is a strategy that pursues structural peace based on physical power. While such balancing strategies are generally well-known in international politics, they are divided into internal balancing strategies based on one's own power and external balancing strategies through alliances, etc. The second category is 'bandwagoning strategy,' which, rather than confronting threats, aims to reduce hostility and thereby mitigate threats, pursuing relational peace. This, in turn, is based on power

These strategies began to change slightly from 2009, when the succession to Kim Jong-un's leadership was fully underway, and the key point is that under Kim Jong-un, it shifted to a balancing strategy. The 'Byungjin Line,' which you have likely heard much about, was central to this. The Byungjin Line was the result of the shift from the existing bandwagoning strategy to a balancing strategy, and it was the core of the balancing strategy that formalized and fully pursued nuclear development. This flow, codified in the Party Charter at the 7th Party Congress in 2016, marked the initial transition from a bandwagoning strategy to a balancing strategy. So, when did it fundamentally shift again? As many of you know, it was in 2018. You likely witnessed many unusual scenes during the 'Korean Peninsula Peace Process.' While there were symbolic scenes of this process revealed externally, I believe there were less noticed but domestically more significant scenes related to its true intentions. The beginning of all this can be found in the 7th Central Committee's 3rd Plenary Session, the most important political event under the Party-state system. Exactly one week before the inter-Korean summit, Kim Jong-un gathered all North Korean elites and clearly explained the meaning of this change. Here, he stated, 'We will cease the Byungjin Line, the core of the balancing strategy I mentioned earlier.'

He explicitly declared an end to it and a transition to a new strategic line. He also clarified its relationship to the subsequent Peace Process and the overall national grand strategy. The statement was: 'We must create a favorable international environment for socialist economic construction and defend peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the world.' This statement became a significant issue for many Chinese researchers, including North Korean specialists, as well as Dr. Gu Ja-seon, who is present here. This is because it bore a strong resemblance to China's declaration in 1978 of moving towards reform and opening up in a stable and peaceful external environment, following the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China in 1979. From this perspective, there was a significant shift to a bandwagoning strategy in 2018-2019. The outcome, as you all know, was a dramatic failure, which neither North Korea nor anyone else could have predicted. Consequently, during this prolonged period, North Korea's national grand strategy underwent a process of formation and selection. The core outcome of this process is the current North Korea-China-Russia trilateral solidarity. Examining these aspects in more detail, the period when the results of these considerations began to emerge was 2022, following the dismantling of the mutual moratorium that was a prerequisite for the 2018 Peace Process. As you can see, starting in March, the mutual moratorium—the suspension of ROK-U.S. military exercises and the suspension of nuclear and ICBM tests—began to be lifted by North Korea, leading to the complete dismantling of the Peace Process. As a result, and as a core component, the Law on the Policy of Nuclear Armed Forces was legislated in September. Ultimately, what this signified was that North Korea, after more than three years of prolonged deliberation, clearly reaffirmed its return to the Byungjin Line, which pursues structural peace based on its own capabilities, rather than continuing a new strategic line that aimed for relational peace based on mutual goodwill. This was the core of North Korea's new national grand strategy, which combined a realist perspective that aligns military capabilities with the logic of an arms race centered on nuclear forces, aiming to break through sanctions and achieve prosperity through self-reliance.

I will stop now and clearly declare a shift to a new strategic line. I will also clarify what this has to do with the peace process or the overall national grand strategy going forward. That part was, 'Create a favorable international environment for the construction of a nuclear socialist economy and defend peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the world.' In fact, this became an issue for quite a few Chinese researchers, including North Korean researchers, and Dr. Gu Ja-seon was also present here at the time.

So, what is the connection to the North Korea-China-Russia triangular relationship? The key question here is: 'Given that this strategy has reversed before, is there a possibility of reversal again?' I have addressed this in Chapter 3, titled 'The Evolution of Extended Internal Balancing Strategy and the North Korea-China-Russia Triangular Relationship.' The core question and test there is precisely this: ultimately, predicting whether this reversal will occur or not depends on understanding the process and considerations through which the strategy changed. From that perspective, to offer a brief conclusion, there were very deep considerations and trials in that process, and the current national strategy is a result of this strategy evolving further in that direction, with the North Korea-China-Russia trilateral solidarity being its core component.

This is precisely the point. Therefore, the possibility of reversal is very slim, and the current direction of North Korea's national grand strategy, which emphasizes strengthening the North Korea-China-Russia trilateral solidarity, is likely to continue for a considerable period. Now, why is that? As I mentioned earlier, the balancing strategy, which Reinhardt discussed, inherently involves immense risks and costs. Therefore, the question of whether it could revert to a bandwagoning strategy has been tested for a very long time.

The Sustainability of the Strengthening North Korea-China-Russia Triangular Relationship

However, it became increasingly clear that the United States, the core partner in such a strategy, had no intention of doing so. This led to the conclusion that the 'practical approach,' touted as the Biden administration's new strategy, was essentially no different from 'strategic patience.' Second is the issue of the feasibility of implementing a new strategy. Regardless of the intentions and will, it must be achievable. The core considerations for feasibility are twofold: First, is it possible to construct a deterrent force through independent internal balancing with nuclear capabilities? Second, can North Korea withstand the sanctions during this process with its self-reliance capabilities? Regarding nuclear strategy, as you know, since 2019, the mutual moratorium—which only prohibits ICBM and nuclear tests—has allowed North Korea to rapidly expand its indirect deterrence capabilities, using South Korea as a hostage through tactical nuclear weapons, thereby ultimately expanding its internal balancing capabilities. This has achieved considerable success. The second is self-reliance capability. Due to highly unusual circumstances, self-reliance capability has been proven, perhaps unintentionally. That is COVID-19. Starting with COVID-19, North Korea took the highly unusual step of completely closing its borders in 2020. U.S. experts, including the prominent hawk John Bolton, assessed that North Korea was imposing sanctions on itself stricter than any they had anticipated and predicted its collapse within a year due to this blockade. However, as you know, it has not collapsed to this day. It has maintained a self-imposed blockade for three years, which, paradoxically, has proven its capabilities. Because this strategy has been transformed through deep trials and tests of capability and resilience, it is not easy to change it internally. Furthermore, there has been a further evolution in this strategy. That is the strategy we are currently observing. The core of this, as everyone knows, is the war in Ukraine. However, I believe the prolonged nature of the Ukraine war was more significant than the outbreak itself. The prolongation led to numerous structural consequences in international politics, the core of which was the strengthening of the new Cold War structure and the rise of multipolarity. As mentioned earlier, this strengthening of the new Cold War structure and the rise of multipolarity have led to a situation where the balancing strategy, which consists of internal and external balancing, has expanded to include external balancing, encompassing alliances and solidarity, whereas previously it was primarily focused on internal balancing.

This is precisely the point. Therefore, the possibility of regression is very slim, and it is highly likely that the current direction of North Korea's national grand strategy, which champions the strengthening of the North Korea-China-Russia trilateral alliance, will continue for a considerable period. Now, why is that? As I mentioned earlier, it is a balancing strategy, and a balancing strategy is bound to entail immense risks and costs. Therefore, the question of whether it is possible to revert to a bandwagoning strategy has been tested for a very long time.

The evidence of such a change is that North Korea has been discussing the new Cold War and multipolarity for some time. However, following the developments of the Ukraine war in 2022, its tone has significantly changed. Previously, these were discussed as normative aspirations, but they have now begun to be discussed as realities to adapt to, and even as targets to be utilized. In this context, the original balancing strategy operated under a binary logic of self-reliance over dependence and security over economy. However, this has expanded and evolved, leading to North Korea's current national strategy, which actively utilizes alliances and solidarity.

Another point I would like to make is that while China and Russia showed signs of rapprochement after the Peace Process, the current strategy is distinct from that. The current strategy is fundamentally different from previous ones because the needs of China and Russia have changed significantly. Therefore, I want to emphasize that the current direction is considerably different from the past. Next, regarding the future of the North Korea-China-Russia triangular relationship and the Trump era: How will the internal dynamics of this strengthened North Korea-China-Russia triangular relationship move, and what are its specific prospects? I believe we need to consider two main points. These are the structure of interests among the three countries and the structure of power.

As you know, all alliances, despite the modifier 'blood alliance,' have fundamentally failed to transcend the politics of national interest, and this has been true for socialist states and existing hegemonic orders. Therefore, it is necessary to examine these realist points of interest and power structures. Regarding the structure of interests, the core question is: What does North Korea ultimately seek to gain through the North Korea-China-Russia triangular relationship? What is the core of its interests? As I have repeatedly stated, the core is to secure balancing deterrence, specifically internal balancing. In this regard, North Korea desires two things: First, to gain time by securing implicit support for its nuclear development or by leveraging international pressure, and second, to shorten the time by securing practical support, as seen in military cooperation with Russia. However, the problem, which will likely be pointed out later, is that there is potential for conflict in the interest structures of China and Russia.

While there are differences between Russia and China, China, in particular, feels considerable pressure regarding North Korea's current direction and its eventual nuclear armament, which negates the NPT regime. Therefore, although the interest structures align broadly in terms of national interest, there are clear differences in speed and specific issues. This must be noted. Second is the structure of power. The most crucial aspect to examine in the power structure is asymmetry. This is because the core of the North Korea-China-Russia triangular relationship is an asymmetric alliance. The most critical aspect of this asymmetric alliance concerns the extent to which the autonomy of the great powers will be infringed upon—meaning the limitation of North Korea's autonomy—amidst the fear of entanglement and defection, and the extent to which North Korea's efforts to exert its 'weakness strategy' will be successful. It is necessary to examine these issues.

The relevant points of discussion are broadly two: First, the extent to which this is necessary from the perspective of the great powers' consensus, and second, the extent to which North Korea possesses the structural capability and will to exercise such autonomy. Regarding the first point, necessity, as I just mentioned, there are disagreements on issues and speed, but in the broader context, given the constant factor of the U.S. containment strategy, the necessity is likely to be structural and long-term. The second point is North Korea's capability. Regarding North Korea's capability, I would like to state that the internal balancing strategy has achieved considerable success. Additionally, I want to emphasize that alongside capability, will is also important. Ultimately, the will of a weak state is a crucial factor concerning its autonomy. In relation to this will, the multipolar debate I mentioned earlier is very important. This is because the multipolar debate, while superficially about the decline of U.S. hegemony, internally reflects a reduced crisis within its own bloc, meaning a perceived mitigation of asymmetry between China, Russia, and North Korea. The key term here is 'strategic state theory.' This strategic state theory has consistently garnered attention among North Korean scholars, as these shifts in perception are expected to act as variables that mitigate asymmetry. Despite these understandings and the significant limitations of asymmetry, the current situation, which is unfolding concurrently with nuclear armament, combined with the trends of the new Cold War and multipolarity, appears to be creating a significant window of opportunity for North Korea, a revisionist weak state, to pursue a balancing strategy.

The Future of the North Korea-China-Russia Triangular Relationship and the Trump Era

Furthermore, the emergence of a Trump administration could act as a direct variable. As seen in Kim Jong-un's speech on November 21st, what we should pay attention to is that North Korea's capabilities—in other words, its bargaining power—have changed. Moreover, one of the biggest lessons learned during the transition to this strategy is that one must deal with the state, not the regime, and focus on capabilities, not intentions. From this perspective, despite changes in the U.S. stance, contact between North Korea and the U.S. is likely to be managed by North Korea without being desperate, meaning they will not actively seek it, which is a highly probable forecast. Finally, regarding recommendations, I would like to add a few points. The current situation is quite similar to the crossroads of the previous Cold War. Our choice at that crossroads, as you know, was to decisively accept and reflect the Cold War. However, at the end of that path lay division and war, as we all know. From that perspective, history has proven that following such a Cold War and conflict order carries immense risks. Therefore, I would like to emphasize that we need to carefully consider whether to follow the new Cold War at this juncture.

In addition to such caution, what preparations should we make? First, we need to clearly distinguish between what we desire and what is achievable. Pursuing what we desire, what we hope for, and what is right are aspirations we all share. In that process, we need a sober and realistic judgment about what we can and cannot do. Second, this does not mean we should simply conform to reality; rather, we need to possess a certain degree of firm confidence. That is, these words do not mean we should be intimidated and follow suit. Instead, we must soberly assess what we possess and respond proactively with confidence. The most significant difference and hopeful aspect between the current crossroads and the previous Cold War crossroads is that the Republic of Korea's influence today is incomparably stronger than it was during the previous Cold War. This is what I want to convey.

Finally, regarding this matter, the expert wisdom of many specialists is indeed needed. However, I must express considerable regret that efforts to synthesize the diverse views of experts from various countries have been insufficient. From this perspective, I would like to conclude by emphasizing the need for very balanced and broad listening. Thank you.

There is a potential for conflict in the interest structures of China and Russia. While there are differences between Russia and China, China, in particular, feels considerable pressure regarding North Korea's current direction and its eventual nuclear armament, which negates the NPT regime. Therefore, although the interest structures align broadly in terms of national interest, there are clear differences in speed and specific issues. This must be noted. Second is the structure of power. The most crucial aspect to examine in the power structure is asymmetry. This is because the core of the North Korea-China-Russia triangular relationship is an asymmetric alliance. The most critical aspect of this asymmetric alliance concerns the extent to which the autonomy of the great powers will be infringed upon—meaning the limitation of North Korea's autonomy—amidst the fear of entanglement and defection, and the extent to which North Korea's efforts to exert its 'weakness strategy' will be successful. It is necessary to examine these issues.

The relevant points of discussion are broadly two: First, the extent to which this is necessary from the perspective of the great powers' consensus, and second, the extent to which North Korea possesses the structural capability and will to exercise such autonomy. Regarding the first point, necessity, as I just mentioned, there are disagreements on issues and speed, but in the broader context, given the constant factor of the U.S. containment strategy, the necessity is likely to be structural and long-term. The second point is North Korea's capability. Regarding North Korea's capability, I would like to state that the internal balancing strategy has achieved considerable success. Additionally, I want to emphasize that alongside capability, will is also important. Ultimately, the will of a weak state is a crucial factor concerning its autonomy. In relation to this will, the multipolar debate I mentioned earlier is very important. This is because the multipolar debate, while superficially about the decline of U.S. hegemony, internally reflects a reduced crisis within its own bloc, meaning a perceived mitigation of asymmetry between China, Russia, and North Korea. The key term here is 'strategic state theory.' This strategic state theory has consistently garnered attention among North Korean scholars, as these shifts in perception are expected to act as variables that mitigate asymmetry. Despite these understandings and the significant limitations of asymmetry, the current situation, which is unfolding concurrently with nuclear armament, combined with the trends of the new Cold War and multipolarity, appears to be creating a significant window of opportunity for North Korea, a revisionist weak state, to pursue a balancing strategy.

Furthermore, the emergence of a Trump administration could act as a direct variable. As seen in Kim Jong-un's speech on November 21st, what we should pay attention to is that North Korea's capabilities—in other words, its bargaining power—have changed. Moreover, one of the biggest lessons learned during the transition to this strategy is that one must deal with the state, not the regime, and focus on capabilities, not intentions. From this perspective, despite changes in the U.S. stance, contact between North Korea and the U.S. is likely to be managed by North Korea without being desperate, meaning they will not actively seek it, which is a highly probable forecast. Finally, regarding recommendations, I would like to add a few points. The current situation is quite similar to the crossroads of the previous Cold War. Our choice at that crossroads, as you know, was to decisively accept and reflect the Cold War. However, at the end of that path lay division and war, as we all know. From that perspective, history has proven that following such a Cold War and conflict order carries immense risks. Therefore, I would like to emphasize that we need to carefully consider whether to follow the new Cold War at this juncture.

Diplomatic Recommendations for South Korea in the New Cold War Era

One of the biggest lessons learned during the transition was the need to deal with states, not regimes, and to focus on capabilities, not intentions. From this perspective, despite changes in the U.S. stance, the prospect is that contact between North Korea and the U.S. will be managed by North Korea without being overly reliant on it, even if they do not reject it. Finally, regarding recommendations, I would like to add a few more points. Ultimately, the current situation is quite similar to when we stood at a crossroads during the previous Cold War. As you know, our choice at that crossroads was to fully embrace and reflect the Cold War. However, as everyone knows, the end of that path led to division and war. In that sense, it is historically proven that following this order of Cold War and conflict carries immense risks. Therefore, we are at a crossroads of whether to follow the new Cold War, and I would like to emphasize that careful consideration is needed. In addition to such caution, what preparations should we make

Finally, regarding this matter, the expert wisdom of many specialists is indeed needed. However, I must express considerable regret that efforts to synthesize the diverse views of experts from various countries have been insufficient. From this perspective, I would like to conclude by emphasizing the need for very balanced and broad listening. Thank you.

Finally, regarding this matter, the expert wisdom of many specialists is indeed needed. However, I must express considerable regret that efforts to synthesize the diverse views of experts from various countries have been insufficient. From this perspective, I would like to conclude by emphasizing the need for very balanced and broad listening. Thank you.