[EAI Conference] The Future of Korean Democracy and Institutional Reform: Crisis and Alternatives 1

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VAhN4sc_8CE

Video Script

Yes, hello. I am the Director of the East Asia Institute. Usually, when we hold meetings, people arrive slowly, but for some reason, everyone is here before the meeting even starts today. Therefore, for the first time in the history of the East Asia Institute, we will begin 3 minutes earlier than scheduled. Thank you for coming on such a cold day. Today's conference is titled 'The Future of Korean Democracy and Political Reform.' We planned this conference last November. At that time, during our initial meeting, one of the problems facing Korean politics was polarization, and there was a discussion that we needed to seriously address the issue of polarization in Korean society and politics. Thus, we have been conducting research as part of this effort.

However, a major incident occurred on December 3rd, and such incidents are deeply related to the phenomena and reality of Korea's division and fragmentation, aren't they? Therefore, although we were greatly shocked during the research process, these events themselves significantly strengthened the justification for our research. While conducting this research, we conducted a public opinion poll from January 22nd to 24th. Based on the results of this poll, we have conducted our research and will present the findings today. Our research presentation today will cover five topics, and we will hold the second part this Friday at 3 PM in a similar time and location. So, the topics presented today are listed, and in the second part, we will delve deeper into the political tendencies of young men and women in their 20s regarding the recent impeachment...

...and the political tendencies of those aged 70 and above, with an analysis of social media as well. Furthermore, as you are likely aware, polarization and factional confrontation are also evident in foreign policy. Therefore, we will also address the issue of polarization in foreign policy, and finally, we will discuss political reform as a comprehensive conclusion on Friday. I am providing this preview and will not present the main results that are already available.

Regression of Korean Democracy and Decline in Institutional Trust

Several daily newspapers reported on these findings this morning, and those who will present today will provide detailed explanations, so I will not go over the main public opinion poll results. Instead, I will briefly summarize four key points that run through our ten topics. The first is that Korean democracy is in decline, or 'backsliding.' The proportion of citizens who view the Korean political system as democratic is less than half. And this proportion has worsened slightly compared to the survey conducted four years ago. In other words, citizens consistently hold a negative view of democracy in Korean politics. In this process, the proportion favoring dictatorship over democracy, although still around 20%...

Severe Political Polarization and Emotional Division

...is also emerging, which is a point we must be vigilant about. Furthermore, the trust in major political institutions such as the National Assembly, the courts, and the election commission is only around 20% to 30%. Therefore, regardless of how the current decisions turn out, based on our data, we cannot help but worry about the extent to which these decisions will gain persuasion when they are trusted by only about 20-30% of the population. Thus, the first point is that the indicators have significantly worsened. The second point is that this decline in democracy and severe political polarization are ongoing. As will likely be presented in the papers today, the 2021 survey, conducted four years ago, was done before the presidential election. In the current survey, the proportion of citizens who identify their ideological orientation remains unchanged: 27% progressive, 27% conservative, and 46% moderate over the past four years. However, while the ideological landscape has not changed...

...dislike towards the two major parties, which can be said to represent ideologies, has sharply increased. More than half of the citizens express dislike towards both the Democratic Party and the People Power Party, and furthermore, the dislike of People Power Party supporters towards the Democratic Party, and Democratic Party supporters towards the People Power Party, reaches nearly 90%. This is higher than the dislike towards North Korea or the North Korean regime, according to other surveys by the East Asia Institute.

Therefore, the division within our society has reached a very serious emotional state. Thus, we refer to this as 'emotional polarization,' and our second point is that rather than ideological polarization, Korea is experiencing intense emotional polarization. The third point is that this polarization, the division and polarization between the Democratic Party and the People Power Party, is leading to divisions on major policy issues and, furthermore, to a lack of trust in major institutions...

Deepening Polarization and the Potential Rise of Populism

...as I mentioned earlier. Therefore, when trust in institutional politics and institutional bodies continues to decline, it ultimately leads to the rise of what we commonly call populism, meaning that dissatisfaction with the existing institutional politics may re-emerge in new forms. This is not just a problem in other countries like the United States or the United Kingdom, but a concern that the ground is slowly being laid in South Korea, which we must seriously consider. This is our third point. Finally, because of this, it will be very difficult to restore democracy unless we resolve the polarization issue in our society and politics. Therefore, while there are various institutional reform efforts underway in the current political sphere, such as how to change the current imperial presidency, if we look deeper, we must seriously consider whether there is a way to constitutionally address the division in our society.

Therefore, I will conclude my remarks by presenting these four points. The first session, 'Martial Law and the Crisis of Korean Democracy,' featured presentations on topics such as emergency martial law, the center-leaning voters, election fairness, and comparisons with the 2016 impeachment. Ye-jin Seong, a research fellow at the Center for Good Democracy at Sungkyunkwan University, analyzes the relationship between emergency martial law and citizens' demands for institutional reform. Beom-seop Park, a professor at Soongsil University, analyzes public opinion surrounding President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of martial law, suggesting that a preference for a strong government, dissatisfaction with democracy, and emotional polarization are closely related to support for martial law. Won-taek Kang, Director of the Center for Democracy Studies at EAI (and Director of the Future Strategy Institute at Seoul National University), highlights the role of 'quiet moderates,' who are politically apathetic, and points out the structural problem of their exclusion from public discourse due to low political efficacy. Ji-hye Kim, a professor at Sogang University, analyzes the influence of political orientation and values on the formation of conspiratorial beliefs. Sung-jin Yoo, a professor at Ewha Womans University, points out that unlike in 2016, the current situation of martial law and impeachment proceedings is spreading beyond partisan confrontation to a skepticism about democracy itself.

Diagnosis of the State of Emergency and the Crisis of Democracy

The session 'State of Emergency and the Crisis of Korean Democracy' featured presentations on topics such as emergency martial law, the political center, electoral fairness, and comparisons with the 2016 impeachment. Seong Ye-jin, a research fellow at the Center for Good Democracy Studies at Sungkyunkwan University, analyzed the relationship between emergency martial law and citizens' demands for institutional reform. Park Beom-seop, a professor at Soongsil University, examined public opinion surrounding President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of martial law, concluding that a preference for strong government, dissatisfaction with democracy, and affective polarization are closely linked to support for martial law. Kang Won-taek, director of the EAI Center for Democracy Studies and director of the Future Strategy Institute at Seoul National University, highlighted the role of the 'silent center,' a politically apathetic group, and pointed to the structural problem of their exclusion from public discourse due to low political efficacy. Kim Ji-hye, a professor at Sogang University, analyzed the influence of political orientation and values on the formation of conspiratorial beliefs. Yu Seong-jin, a professor at Ewha Womans University, noted that the current martial law-impeachment situation, unlike in 2016, is spreading beyond partisan confrontation to a skepticism about democracy itself.

Discussion on the Restoration of Democracy and Institutional Reform

Session 2, 'Restoration of Democracy and Direction of Institutional Reform,' discussed the problems facing Korean politics and various reform measures to address them. Myung-lim Park, a professor at Yonsei University, explained that while direct public participation in politics is increasing, representative democracy through parties and institutions is weakening, and political polarization is further exacerbating this trend. Sung-hak Lim, a professor at the University of Seoul, emphasized that the role of political elites is crucial in the process of democracy's collapse, warning that the rejection of election results and the tolerance of political violence strengthen anti-democratic forces and ultimately pose a risk of collapsing the democratic system. Director Won-taek Kang pointed out that the crisis of Korean democracy stems not merely from institutional problems but from the political culture itself.