[North Korea and the World] The Reality of North Korea's Nuclear Threat and Decisive Deterrence by South Korea and the U.S.

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ht6YpkKzV5o

Video Script

North Korea may launch a preemptive nuclear strike, suggesting that conventional warfare could escalate into nuclear war at any time. Ultimately, if North Korea initiates a preemptive nuclear strike, it will inevitably lead to unavoidable consequences. Welcome to "North Korea and the World with Park Won-gon." I sincerely thank you for watching. Today, I will be discussing content that builds upon the research achievements of the late Professor Hwang Il-do, who passed away last December. I previously presented on this topic in January at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, in commemoration of Professor Hwang. Today's discussion can be considered a follow-up to that presentation.

This time, I am teaching a graduate course on North Korea's nuclear capabilities at the Department of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University. The core question of the course is, 'Can North Korea use nuclear weapons?' I have been contemplating this question for 15 weeks with about 20 graduate students, reviewing numerous papers and books. I have carefully examined the materials from domestic researchers to distinguish what should be read. Perhaps it is due to my limited knowledge, but I still believe Professor Hwang Il-do's research reports are the most outstanding.

North Korea's Nuclear-Powered Submarine Unveiling and Strategic Implications

In all aspects, including the level of various materials, logical development, and theoretical review, I have not yet found anything superior to Professor Hwang Il-do's research achievements. Please consider this as the second session following the one in January. The reason I prepared this content again is that on March 8th, North Korea announced that it was building a nuclear-powered submarine and released photos of Kim Jong-un personally directing the construction site. In North Korean terminology, it is called a 'nuclear-powered strategic missile submarine.' Simply put, it is a nuclear-powered submarine.

North Korea has constructed a highly unconventional submarine, referred to as the "Hero Kim Jong-un." At the 8th Party Congress in 2021, North Korea announced a five-year plan for defense development, which included the construction of a nuclear-powered submarine as a key weapons system. This is an extremely challenging undertaking. Consequently, North Korea has not accurately shown progress until now, but has revealed it through this recent unveiling. This year marks the final year of the five-year defense development plan claimed by North Korea. The 9th Party Congress is likely to be held around next year, at which point the past five-year plan will be evaluated. North Korea has, to a considerable extent, fulfilled the strategic weapons outlined as core components of its five-year plan.

North Korea's Potential for Nuclear Use and U.S. Response Capabilities

Of course, regardless of its actual completeness or practical usability, North Korea has showcased most of its planned developments. The nuclear-powered submarine was the last remaining puzzle piece, and it has now been revealed. There are, of course, various interpretations. We cannot precisely ascertain its true functional capabilities or its level of development. What I wish to convey to you today is why North Korea is pursuing the construction of this nuclear-powered submarine and what strategic significance it holds. I will begin from this point. At the very beginning of this discussion lies the premise that the question raised in January, in commemoration of Professor Hwang Il-do, remains valid. Following that question, I will discuss the nuclear-powered submarine at the end. The core question is this:

Why does North Korea, which lacks the capability to properly conduct a nuclear attack against the United States, constantly claim it will use nuclear weapons first? In short, can North Korea actually use nuclear weapons? A detailed answer to this question today will be difficult, but I refer you to the video I filmed in January. The important point is that North Korea must possess at least a minimal capability to attack the United States with nuclear weapons in order to use nuclear weapons against South Korea. This is a phenomenon observed not only in existing theories but also in past cases like Pakistan and India. However, North Korea does not yet have the capability to strike the U.S. mainland. To put it more simply: If North Korea had used nuclear weapons, and the target was South Korea, the United States could completely destroy North Korea's nuclear capabilities with its overwhelming nuclear power.

This is called the capability for assured retaliation. In such a situation, North Korea would need to be able to attack the U.S. mainland with its own nuclear forces, but it lacks that capability. Whether it will ever acquire that capability in the future remains a constant question. Nevertheless, I would like to present my thoughts today for your consideration. I still believe North Korea does not have the capability to wage nuclear war against the United States, but some U.S. officials claim that North Korea has the capability to attack the U.S. mainland.

A prominent figure is former Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby. In various domestic and international interviews, before becoming Under Secretary, he made a highly provocative statement that became widely known in Korea: that North Korea has the capability to strike major cities on the U.S. mainland, and questioned whether the U.S. could provide extended deterrence to South Korea while assuming such a risk, which caused significant controversy. Among the interviews on this topic, the most notable is the one with Elbridge Colby by Voice of America.

You can find the content in "Washington Talk," where such remarks also sparked debate. To summarize, what I want to convey to you today is this: What are North Korea's military capabilities? Ultimately, for North Korea's nuclear weapons to be effective and for them to be able to use nuclear weapons as they have repeatedly declared, they must possess the capability to attack the United States. What is the extent of this capability, and is it even possible? Today, I will focus on this.

North Korea's Nuclear Capabilities and U.S. Deterrence Strategy

This is the fundamental basis of what I have been discussing and what Professor Hwang Il-do and I have contemplated together. The core basis for my remarks today is a report authored by Professor Hwang Il-do at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy in December 2023. The report's title is 'Issues and Hypotheses in Determining North Korea's Actual Nuclear Capabilities.' It is available on the Korea National Diplomatic Academy website. Today, I will combine Professor Hwang Il-do's research with my own considerations to discuss the current level of North Korea's nuclear capabilities and whether the United States can indeed counter them. The first topic will be North Korea's Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). What capabilities do they possess? The U.S. concept regarding North Korea is 'damage limitation response.' In other words, it refers to the capability for a disarming first strike and interception. This implies that North Korea cannot use nuclear weapons against the United States at all. If North Korea were to use nuclear weapons,

the United States can perfectly block it, meaning all situations where North Korea could use nuclear weapons. There are two types of deterrence theory: retaliatory deterrence and defensive deterrence. Simply put, defensive deterrence is when you block an attack from the other party, thus preventing damage to yourself. This is defensive deterrence. Retaliatory deterrence means that if the other party attacks you, you will inevitably suffer damage, but you can also strike back. Therefore, because both sides strike, damage is unavoidable. The first attacker would then calculate, 'If I strike, I will also be hit; is it worth the risk?' Especially with nuclear weapons, a single exchange of attacks causes catastrophic damage, leading to a balance of terror where nuclear weapons cannot be used.

North Korea aims to possess deterrent nuclear capabilities, meaning that if the United States launches nuclear weapons, it will respond with its own nuclear weapons and inflict damage on the United States. However, the damage limitation or disarming first strike I mentioned implies that the United States will fundamentally prevent North Korea's attack when it attempts to launch. Even if a missile is launched, the U.S. can prevent it from reaching its destination, and the U.S. can detect and attack the missile before launch, thereby preventing the launch itself.

These two aspects are being discussed. To reiterate, one method is preemptive, precise ground-based strikes if a launch is deemed imminent. Another is that even if North Korea narrowly survives the first strike and successfully launches a missile, it can be intercepted by Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) deployed in Alaska or California. Therefore, the logic is that any missile launched by North Korea cannot hit the U.S. mainland. This is the most crucial point:

North Korea's Attempts to Enhance Nuclear Capabilities and U.S. Response

I will discuss these capabilities. Of course, North Korea has undertaken three tasks in recent years to acquire these capabilities. The first is concealment. Hiding the nuclear capabilities they possess. This prevents the U.S. from detecting them preemptively or seeing them. This naturally increases the survivability of their nuclear capabilities, thereby increasing their options for attacking the U.S. This is the first concealment effort. The second is hardening. Protecting the forces they possess. By placing them underground or storing them in bunkers, they aim to prevent preemptive destruction by the U.S. The third is securing reserves. That is, increasing the number of ballistic missiles. By possessing a large quantity, even if some are destroyed or eliminated by the U.S., they can still attack the U.S. with the remaining quantity. North Korea has been carrying out all three of these efforts: concealment, hardening, and securing reserves.

Now, let me discuss how effective these efforts are. First, what is the level of the U.S. capability to strike North Korea? Professor Hwang Il-do's report, mentioned earlier, provides details on this. According to U.S. studies cited in this report, such as the 2017 Congressional Research Service report and Stratfor reports, among others. Based on various materials, Professor Hwang explained that although the time of the 2017 report is somewhat dated, I will include developments since then to the best of my knowledge. The U.S. has the capability to strike North Korea's nuclear weapons. The primary assets the U.S. can utilize to strike North Korea's nuclear weapons are fighter jets and strategic bombers. For those interested in this area, the B-2 stealth strategic bomber and the F-22 Raptor stealth fighter jet are well-known. These two, called the world's strongest,

I will now discuss the extent of its effectiveness. First, what is the level of the United States' capability to strike North Korea? Professor Hwang Il-do's report, mentioned earlier, details this. Among the U.S. studies cited in this report are the 2017 Congressional Research Service report and the Stratfor report. Professor Hwang explained this based on various other materials. Although the 2017 data is somewhat dated, I will include developments since then to the best of my knowledge. The U.S. possesses the capability to strike North Korea's nuclear facilities. The primary assets the U.S. could utilize to strike North Korea's nuclear weapons are fighter jets and strategic bombers. For those interested in this area, the B-2 stealth strategic bomber and the F-22 Raptor stealth fighter jet are well-known. These are considered the world's strongest.

These two assets can be utilized to strike North Korea's key nuclear facilities. For instance, a single B-2 bomber can deploy 20 GBU-57s and 160 GBU-32s. GBU refers to precision-guided munitions. This means that one B-2 strategic bomber carries approximately 180 precision-guided bombs, which can be used to attack North Korea. When a B-2 conducts this attack, North Korea will be absolutely unable to detect it in advance. In fact, even if it flies to Pyongyang, it will not be detected, and even if it were detected, North Korea's air defense system is virtually nonexistent, rendering it incapable of interception. Therefore, approximately 180 precision-guided bombs (GBUs) can be used to attack North Korea's core nuclear facilities. If F-22s are also deployed, the capability increases significantly. According to the report, the B-2 and F-22 alone can attack and destroy almost all of North Korea's primary nuclear forces and development assets. The United States does not rely solely on this strategy. One of the formidable strategies possessed by the U.S. is its nuclear-powered submarines. Ohio-class submarines, for example, can carry approximately 300 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Including these, the B-2, F-22, and submarines can simultaneously engage and strike around 1,000 ground targets and about 100 hardened underground North Korean targets. This demonstrates formidable capability. However, this discussion has focused only on U.S. assets, omitting South Korean capabilities. South Korea possesses F-35s and precision-guided munitions. If South Korean forces are also mobilized, the report's core assertion is that North Korea's disarmament is practically achievable. While South Korea is not explicitly mentioned in the report, the U.S. strategy alone is deemed sufficient. For the past year and a half, South Korea and the U.S. have been enhancing extended deterrence through C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence) integration. This involves the integrated use of conventional and nuclear weapons. As mentioned, the U.S. possesses nuclear and conventional weapons, and while South Korea does not possess nuclear weapons, it can integrate its conventional capabilities to strike and neutralize North Korea's key targets. South Korea and the U.S. are continuously refining this process. North Korea is aware of this and is undertaking various measures to reduce destruction and enhance survivability. Specifically, regarding intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), North Korea showcased its final model, the Hwasong-19, in October of last year. The ICBMs recently displayed have two key characteristics.

One is the use of solid fuel, and the other is mobility. Mobility means, literally, that it can be moved and concealed, while solid fuel allows for rapid launch due to shorter fueling times. North Korea is developing these capabilities because it is aware of the forces possessed by South Korea and the U.S. The problem is that these developments may not be as effective as North Korea hopes. This is primarily because North Korea's territory is too small. A small territory means that surveillance and reconnaissance are more feasible. For example, China and Russia have vast territories, allowing them to conceal their key assets, but North Korea cannot do so. Although this information is classified, South Korea and the U.S. have clearly identified targets among North Korea's nuclear assets and are conducting surveillance and reconnaissance.

This is what I have been discussing, and what Professor Hwang Il-do and I have contemplated together, forming the fundamental basis of our analysis. The primary basis for my remarks today is a report authored by Professor Hwang Il-do at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy in December 2023, titled 'Key Issues and Hypotheses Regarding North Korea's Actual Nuclear Capabilities.' This report is publicly available on the Korea National Diplomatic Academy website. Today, I will combine Professor Hwang Il-do's research with my own long-held considerations to discuss the current level of North Korea's nuclear capabilities and whether the U.S. can effectively counter them. I will begin with North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and assess their capabilities. The U.S. employs a concept known as 'damage limitation response' towards North Korea. In other words, this involves a 'disarmament first strike capability' and 'interception capability.' This means that North Korea would be completely unable to use nuclear weapons against the U.S. If North Korea attempts to use nuclear weapons, the U.S. would be able to completely thwart any scenario where North Korea could employ its nuclear capabilities. There are two primary deterrence theories: retaliatory deterrence and defensive deterrence. Simply put, defensive deterrence involves preventing an attack when one is targeted. This ensures no damage is incurred. This is defensive deterrence. Retaliatory deterrence means that if one is attacked, they will inevitably suffer damage, but they also possess the capability to retaliate. Therefore, mutual retaliation leads to unavoidable damage. Consequently, the initial attacker would calculate, 'If I attack, I will also be hit; is this attack worth the cost?' Especially with nuclear weapons, a single exchange of attacks can inflict catastrophic damage, leading to a balance of terror that prevents nuclear use.

The U.S. and its allies possess approximately 20 satellite surveillance and reconnaissance assets that can be activated during emergencies. Additionally, four fixed high-altitude unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and four stealth unmanned reconnaissance aircraft that penetrate North Korean airspace are added. According to U.S. research, 97% of North Korean roads will be under constant surveillance during emergencies. This implies the ability to detect missile launches or nuclear preparation activities by North Korea.

It is likely that these capabilities are being further enhanced and developed. While the highest levels of secrecy prevent external knowledge, it is highly probable that the U.S. has significantly improved its surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities by utilizing artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced technologies. Alongside North Korea's efforts to enhance its survivability, I will now discuss the second aspect: strengthening defenses. Strengthening defenses refers to the measures North Korea takes to protect its nuclear assets. If South Korea and the U.S. conventional forces alone cannot completely eliminate North Korea's core nuclear capabilities, the use of nuclear assets will become unavoidable. Let us examine whether the U.S. possesses such capabilities.

U.S. Nuclear Capabilities and Measures to Neutralize North Korean Nuclear Capabilities

North Korea's Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Warheads and U.S. Response

The U.S. nuclear triad is commonly referred to as the 'triad.' The first is nuclear weapons used from fighter jets and strategic bombers. The second is nuclear delivery using Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). The third is Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) launched from nuclear-powered submarines. Among these three, the most emphasized and effective for the U.S. is the SLBM. Currently, approximately 70% of the U.S.'s deployed nuclear warheads are SLBMs. The Minuteman ICBMs at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California are for backup purposes, and in the event of actual combat, SLBMs are much more likely to be used than ICBMs.

Specifically, over 40% of the U.S.'s total nuclear arsenal is operated in the Pacific region. For example, one Ohio-class strategic nuclear submarine carries approximately 20 Trident SLBMs. Each Trident missile can carry four to five Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs). In simple terms, a Trident SLBM, with a range of over 10,000 km, equivalent to an ICBM, effectively acts as five missiles. Its destructive power is immense. Furthermore, the Trident II missile is undergoing upgrades, and it is assessed that two to three of the 20 missiles will carry low-yield warheads. The rest will carry strategic nuclear missiles or

high-yield nuclear warheads. Additionally, one to three low-yield, tactical nuclear warheads can be carried. Therefore, one Ohio-class strategic nuclear submarine can launch over 90 strategic nuclear warheads. With the submarine forces operating in the Pacific alone, approximately 100 SLBMs carrying over 500 strategic nuclear warheads can be launched towards North Korea, and additionally, 20 to 30 low-yield nuclear warheads can be operated. This is an extremely powerful capability. The U.S. will not use all of these at once, but even using a portion would be sufficient to completely neutralize North Korea. This is the level of capability possessed.

The number of targets realistically expected to be hit by strategic nuclear warheads is estimated to exceed 250. It is difficult to accurately determine the current extent of mobile missile storage facilities and underground silos that North Korea has constructed. This is from a civilian perspective. Of course, government officials in South Korea and the U.S. are likely to have some level of assessment.

Assuming, hypothetically, that North Korea possesses 100 mobile missile storage facilities and 200 silos, if the U.S. were to attack North Korea using SLBMs, only 0 to 1 North Korean nuclear missile would likely survive. It is reasonable to consider this as completely neutralizing North Korea's nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, during the first Trump administration, a significant nuclear capability modernization program was undertaken.

The focus was primarily on developing low-yield nuclear weapons, with the W76-2 low-yield submarine-launched nuclear weapon being deployed in 2020. With the current Trump administration, the nominee for Secretary of Defense, Hagerty, stated at a Senate hearing that they would further strengthen not only low-yield nuclear warheads but also the overall nuclear capability modernization program. Although this program was also pursued under the Biden administration, the budget was reportedly reduced. The Trump administration intends to significantly enhance this, and North Korea was one of the primary targets mentioned by Secretary Hagerty.

This is to strengthen the modernization of low-yield nuclear weapons as a response to North Korea's nuclear capabilities. Therefore, the currently mentioned figures are likely to be further amplified by future U.S. capabilities. The danger of low-yield nuclear weapons is as follows: If low-yield nuclear weapons are used to penetrate North Korea's underground bunkers, they can be neutralized, and the fallout or radioactive contamination, the biggest problem with nuclear weapons, can be minimized. It is known that current U.S. low-yield nuclear weapons allow for precision strikes and precise control of yield, capable of striking with minimal casualties, reportedly affecting fewer than 100 people.

This will continue to improve. Of course, this does not mean the U.S. intends to attack first, but if North Korea were to use nuclear weapons, using low-yield nuclear weapons to completely paralyze North Korea's nuclear capabilities could be a viable and executable option for policymakers. In this regard, the U.S. capability is once again confirmed. Furthermore, China, unlike in the past, is continuously increasing its nuclear warhead count with the intention of possessing a nuclear strategy nearly on par with the U.S., and is consistently advancing its missiles.

North Korea's Potential for Preemptive Nuclear Strike and Its Consequences

The important point is that China, well aware of U.S. nuclear strategy, is continuing its nuclear modernization efforts in conjunction with Russia to counter the U.S. This implies a doubling of capabilities. From the U.S. perspective, as China and Russia are doubling their nuclear capabilities, their deterrence and strike capabilities against North Korea will also be significantly enhanced. This raises serious doubts about whether North Korea can achieve practical effectiveness, even with enhanced defensive capabilities, given its small territory. Thirdly, let me discuss securing reserves.

Another path North Korea could choose is to possess more nuclear warheads. North Korea has recently shown great interest in developing multiple warhead technology, where several warheads separate from a single missile. North Korea claims to have developed this independently, but it is a very difficult technology, and concrete evidence is lacking. Even if North Korea completes this, the U.S. will enhance its capability to intercept them. Currently, 44 Ground-Based Interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska, are intercepting North Korean missiles. If North Korea succeeds in developing multiple warheads and increasing the number of warheads, the U.S. will procure more interceptor missiles. Of course, there are studies and debates on this.

Some argue that U.S. interceptor missiles are insufficient, but this assumes that North Korea's multiple warhead capability is complete, which has not yet been confirmed. In any case, North Korea is making such efforts, and there are doubts about their feasibility. Currently, North Korea's efforts are focused on acquiring assured retaliation capabilities against the U.S. after defense, which I believe is nearly impossible.

North Korea's thinking is as follows: Even with the U.S.'s overwhelming capabilities, if there is even a 1% chance, meaning just one missile, that can overcome all U.S. interception or preemptive destruction capabilities and strike the U.S. mainland, perhaps they can deter the U.S. In deterrence theory, this is called 'first-strike uncertainty.' That is, even if the U.S. has a 99% capability to completely eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons through a first strike, and only a 1% deficiency exists, if they can strike the U.S. mainland with the destructive power of nuclear weapons, this provides North Korea with deterrence. Is this truly possible? If the U.S. cannot guarantee the complete elimination of all North Korean long-range missiles during a disarming strike, and even one or two remain, North Korea might believe it has a deterrent effect. However, this is extremely difficult.

It is very difficult due to the U.S. capabilities mentioned earlier. A bigger problem is that for North Korea to achieve minimal deterrence through this first-strike uncertainty, it requires the premise that they will not launch a preemptive nuclear strike. North Korea must not use nuclear weapons first. What is meant here is that if the U.S. attacks North Korea first, North Korea would retain one or two nuclear weapons to strike the U.S. mainland. It is nonsensical to claim that after first using nuclear weapons against the U.S. or South Korea, they would maintain their nuclear capability to retaliate. However, North Korea has consistently demonstrated its capability for preemptive nuclear strikes over the past two to three years. In particular, they have mentioned that conventional warfare could escalate into nuclear war at any time.

Effectiveness of Nuclear-Powered Submarines and Detection/Interception Capabilities

North Korea's belief that they can protect themselves with even one missile through this uncertainty is a means of self-defense, and it cannot function within North Korea's offensive nuclear logic. Ultimately, if they were to launch a preemptive nuclear strike, it would be an act of suicide. The probability of striking the U.S. mainland with even one missile in such a highly unstable situation is slim, and conversely, North Korea's nuclear capabilities, and indeed the nation itself, could be annihilated by the U.S.'s overwhelming nuclear power. This corresponds to the U.S.'s assured retaliation capability and first-strike capability. This remains a challenge for North Korea to overcome and is the core basis for my argument that North Korea cannot use nuclear weapons. If North Korea were to use nuclear weapons, it would signify the end of the North Korean regime and the Kim Jong-un system. What Kim Jong-un is doing in the final stage is precisely the submarine-launched ballistic missile. This is one of the reasons for the development of the nuclear-powered submarine, which Kim Jong-un showcased during his site visit on March 8th.

In terms of naval operational capabilities, the U.S. is vastly superior, followed by Japan. Two nations with world-class capabilities are safeguarding the East Sea, and South Korea's naval operational capabilities are also excellent. The likelihood of North Korea being able to penetrate all of this is considered extremely low. So, what should be done? This is similar to the past approach of the Soviet Union or China: deploying nuclear-powered submarines far offshore. Instead of directly targeting the U.S. mainland, the strategy involves using submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with ranges comparable to ICBMs to strike the U.S. mainland. North Korea could also pursue such a plan. To achieve this, North Korea must complete the development of an SLBM with intercontinental range from a nuclear-powered submarine, but is this feasible?

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles fired from nuclear-powered submarines, called the ultimate form of nuclear weapons, become the most reliable strike capability. This is because detecting submarines is never easy. Therefore, key nations secure minimal deterrence through nuclear-powered submarines. The UK and France also consider this a major strategy. Of course, the U.S. and Russia possess far more offensive and extensive nuclear capabilities. This is necessary even for securing minimal deterrence for self-protection. North Korea speaks offensively beyond minimal deterrence, but the important point is that it is necessary even for securing minimal deterrence capabilities. Therefore, I will discuss whether the nuclear-powered submarine showcased by Kim Jong-un on March 8th will be effective, whether it can be deployed operationally, and whether South Korea, the U.S., and Japan will have the capability to detect, identify, and intercept it.

To state the conclusion upfront: it is difficult. It will be very difficult for North Korea to use this to strike the U.S. mainland. The submarine must go out into the East Sea, but this route is already under the intensive submarine surveillance system of South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. We often conduct anti-submarine warfare exercises with South Korea and Japan after improving relations, and the core objective is to detect the appearance of North Korean submarines and guard the passage.

Therefore, the operation of North Korean submarines is highly questionable. During the Cold War, despite the U.S. and the Soviet Union possessing formidable nuclear capabilities, there were no instances of Soviet submarines crossing the Pacific to reach the vicinity of the U.S. mainland. This was due to the U.S.'s overwhelming anti-submarine warfare capabilities, which allowed for constant and thorough deterrence. The Soviet Union also never had a doctrine of approaching the U.S. mainland with their submarines.

It is highly questionable whether North Korea can achieve this. During the Cold War, despite the U.S. and the Soviet Union possessing formidable military and nuclear capabilities, there were no instances of Soviet submarines crossing the Pacific to reach the U.S. mainland coast. This was possible due to the U.S.'s overwhelming anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and the Soviet Union never had a doctrine of approaching the U.S. mainland coast with their submarines to attack.

In terms of naval operational capabilities, the United States is superior, followed by Japan. Two countries at the world's highest level are defending the East Sea, and South Korea's naval operational capabilities are also excellent. It is judged that the likelihood of North Korea being able to break through all of this is very low. So, what should be done? This is a method previously employed by the Soviet Union or China, which is to deploy nuclear-powered submarines at a long distance. Instead of directly targeting the U.S. mainland, the plan is to strike the U.S. mainland via submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a range comparable to intercontinental ballistic missiles. North Korea could also conceive of such a plan. This would require North Korea to complete an SLBM with a range of 10,000 ri from a nuclear-powered submarine, but is this truly feasible?

It is true that North Korea is currently developing missiles in the Bukgeukseong series. North Korea refers to these as submarine-launched ballistic missiles. However, these are short-range or medium-range missiles, and their launch capability from a fully submerged state has not been confirmed. It is highly unlikely that these will evolve into missiles with intercontinental range. Submarine-launched ballistic missiles require a significantly higher level of technology than intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

Therefore, there is considerable doubt as to whether North Korea can achieve both the construction and operational deployment of nuclear-powered submarines and the completion of SLBMs. Some suggest that Russia's technical assistance could make this possible. However, Russia has no precedent of providing sensitive technology even to its allies or friendly nations since the Soviet era, and this is related to Russia's proprietary interests. Furthermore, given Russia's current need to cooperate with the U.S. to end the war in Ukraine, providing North Korea with technology capable of striking the U.S. mainland could provoke a response from the Trump administration.

China would also not want to transfer such technology. If North Korea acquires the capability to attack the U.S., it would provide the U.S. with justification to increase its military presence in the region, which could benefit China's containment. Following North Korea's unveiling of its nuclear-powered submarine on March 8th, most U.S. reactions have been negative. Acquiring the materials and knowledge for nuclear propulsion requires immense time, and China also took a long time. Moreover, designing the nuclear materials required for a nuclear-powered submarine is inherently very difficult. Furthermore, launching ballistic missiles from a submarine is significantly more challenging than from land. Even if all of this were possible, it takes at least 8-9 years for countries with the highest level of technology and experience, like the U.S., to build a strategic nuclear submarine, and an additional 2-3 years for actual operation. If North Korea proceeds without regard for safety, it might do so faster, but the probability of failure would increase accordingly.

Furthermore, U.S. experts believe that even if North Korea builds a nuclear-powered submarine, they can sufficiently detect and neutralize it. The Romeo-class submarines North Korea is developing are noisy and easily detectable, and the superior naval operational capabilities of South Korea, the U.S., and Japan make detection, identification, and neutralization possible. In conclusion, North Korea lacks sufficient nuclear capabilities. Nevertheless, mentioning the possibility of a preemptive nuclear strike or nuclear use in conventional warfare would clearly be an act of suicide for Kim Jong-un. I believe no country can surpass the combined forces of South Korea and the U.S.

This provides ample reason for Kim Jong-un's North Korea to pursue denuclearization.

■ Park Won-gon, Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Professor at the Department of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Han-soo, EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr