[North Korea and the World] The Direction of Trump's Foreign Policy as Seen Through the Nominee for Deputy Secretary of Defense

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Video Script

Prospects for the Second Trump Administration's Defense Policy: Analysis of Nominee Elbridge Colby

The issue is that the United States argues it does not have the capacity to adequately fulfill its roles in multiple ongoing conflicts. This confirms the view that future core conflict preparedness will be given much greater emphasis. Greetings, and thank you for watching Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. Today's topic, for those of you who are interested, will be about a name you may recognize: Elbridge Colby, the nominee for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Of course, this is not about him personally; as his appointment has not yet been confirmed at the time of this recording, I will refer to him as the nominee. However, on March 4th, he appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee and, for over two hours, detailed his views on how the defense policy of the second Trump administration will be led.

In addition, he submitted a written response of 76 pages, a rather lengthy document. Synthesizing these, we will discuss the defense policy of the second Trump administration as envisioned by Elbridge Colby, which includes alliance policy and discussions on North Korea. Therefore, this will be a very important policy for us. You might ask, why focus on Elbridge Colby as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy? The reason is that looking at the second Trump administration, there aren't many individuals who seem capable of formulating a coherent strategy. This may be due to my limited knowledge, but it certainly presents a contrast to the Biden administration. For example, the Biden administration had Kurt Campbell, the Deputy Secretary of State. He is a very well-known figure who, in fact, led the crucial national security strategy for the four years of the Biden administration and established the Indo-Pacific strategy. Others who may still be familiar to us

include Jake Sullivan, then National Security Advisor in the Biden administration, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, all of whom have demonstrated the ability to formulate grand strategies and exert significant influence. In contrast, the key personnel within the second Trump administration, as extensively analyzed, are very limited in their ability to present such a strategic vision. For instance, Mike Waltz, the former House Representative appointed as National Security Advisor, and Peter Navarro, have been extensively analyzed, but there are questions about their capacity to formulate a proper strategy for the second Trump administration. Peter Navarro, in particular, has been assessed as lacking sufficient experience and qualifications. Therefore, the focus is on Elbridge Colby, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Colby's career shows he is recognized to some extent as a national security policy expert. While he may not be at the level of Kurt Campbell, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development during the first Trump administration in 2017-2018.

He personally led the development of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Therefore, it can be judged that he possesses a certain level of experience and precedent in shaping the defense policy framework of the U.S. administration. Furthermore, he has relevant publications and writings. For example, a book published in 2013, titled 'Strategic Stability: Contentious Interpretations.' However, the book published in 2021 is likely more widely known. It is titled 'The Strategy of Denial'.

A translated version of this book was released in 2023, and these books are frequently discussed. Particularly, with Elbridge Colby's appointment as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, analyses of the strategies he outlined in these books are being attempted in policy circles and academia for the reasons mentioned earlier. Additionally, we need to consider the responsibilities of the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. This role involves developing and essentially overseeing the creation and release of the NDS, the National Defense Strategy. In essence, it is a role of strategy formulation. Furthermore, the responsibilities include developing operational plans, contingency plans, and execution plans. Moreover, the role involves developing and implementing global readiness posture and strategies for forward-deployed U.S. forces worldwide, including U.S. Forces Korea. While implementation might be an immediate concern, the overall development of strategy and principles for deploying major forces falls under the purview of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for assessing the significant global threats facing the United States and for developing alliance policy and strategy, which are of utmost importance to us. Therefore, his statements during the Senate confirmation hearing and his 76-page written response hold considerable significance for us. Before delving into the details, I will briefly outline the core content of Colby's 2021 book, which I mentioned earlier. The central theme is his strong conviction and primary objective: emphasizing China as the foremost threat to the United States. Consequently, he argues that all alliance policies and readiness postures must be aligned to counter the threat from China.

Colby's Core Strategy: Containing China and the 'Strategy of Denial'

One aspect is the book's title itself, 'The Strategy of Denial.' Denial implies that the U.S. must refuse to allow China to establish hegemony in Asia. This is embedded in the book's title. He argues that preventing China from achieving a dominant position in Asia militarily, economically, and diplomatically is of paramount importance. While I will elaborate further later, a key point from 'The Strategy of Denial' is that the U.S. must focus its efforts on this objective, while simultaneously emphasizing the importance of allies' responsibilities, burden-sharing, and their roles.

However, he does not specifically mention South Korea. For countering China, the key allies the U.S. must work with in the Indo-Pacific region are Japan, Australia, and India. While not an ally, Taiwan is a friendly nation, and in the context of a potential conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific, Taiwan is identified as a crucial partner. South Korea is relatively absent from this discussion. One reason for South Korea's limited mention is that it prioritizes the North Korean issue. Therefore, compared to the U.S. focus on countering China, South Korea traditionally concentrates on the Korean Peninsula issue. These aspects are becoming apparent. Overall, although the book was written in 2021, I perceive a shift in Elbridge Colby's stance on South Korea since then. If South Korea was not emphasized in the 2021 book, its importance appears relatively high in his current statements during the Senate confirmation hearing and his responses. For over a year, during the U.S. presidential election campaign, our government, as well as researchers like myself and academics, have shown great interest in who would shape the defense policy and security strategy of the Trump administration. Elbridge Colby has emerged as one of the prominent figures expected to play a significant role in the second Trump administration. Consequently, South Korean researchers have made it a point to meet with Elbridge Colby during their visits to Washington D.C. Elbridge Colby has visited South Korea quite frequently. I recall briefly meeting him at a seminar last April. His frequent visits suggest a heightened understanding of South Korea.

This increased understanding implies that he has had opportunities to comprehend South Korea's environment and the challenges it faces, leading to a more comprehensive understanding of South Korea's position within the alliance framework. In conclusion, I do not perceive any overtly hostile stance towards South Korea. This is evident in his recent confirmation hearing and written responses. I will now proceed with more detailed explanations. A central concept in Elbridge Colby's defense and security strategy is what is known as the 'Lippmann Gap.' 'Lippmann' refers to a person's name.

Walter Lippmann, an American political commentator and journalist, proposed this concept. The 'gap' signifies a disparity. It refers to the imbalance between a nation's foreign and military objectives and the resources available to support them. In simpler terms, a nation has certain aspirations and goals. However, to achieve these, it requires military strength, economic power, and political will. Colby asserts that the United States currently faces a significant gap in these areas. This is the fundamental concept of the Lippmann Gap, which Colby diagnoses as the current state of affairs in the U.S.

The Lippmann Gap and Multidimensional Threat Perception

Colby explains this by stating that the goals the U.S. aims to achieve globally are severely misaligned with the resources and political will available to attain them. This fundamental misalignment necessitates efforts to bridge the gap. The current world faces multi-front conflicts, and the U.S. has not yet adequately responded or prepared for them. This is manifested as the Lippmann Gap. The primary threat identified is China, followed by North Korea and terrorism. Therefore, the U.S. is facing these multiple threats simultaneously but is not responding appropriately. Consequently, Colby proposes that the U.S. cannot simply disengage from global issues, adopt isolationism, or withdraw entirely from the world stage. He aligns his views with Trump's core message.

He advocates for resolving these issues through 'America First' and 'Peace Through Strength.' The core focus is China. China has been identified as the most significant challenge for the U.S. Department of Defense in the 2018 and 2022 U.S. Defense Strategy documents. Colby agrees with this assessment. The 2018 document was from the first Trump administration, and he naturally concurs, having been involved in its creation. However, the 2022 document was under the Biden administration. He argues that the threat posed by China is a bipartisan consensus issue, regardless of party affiliation. Therefore,

What Colby is saying is this: the goals the United States seeks to achieve in the world are severely misaligned with the resources and political will to achieve those goals. This is his most fundamental concern. Therefore, efforts are needed to align these misalignments. The current world is facing multi-frontline, or in English, multi-dimensional conflicts, and the United States has not yet properly responded or prepared for them.

he repeatedly emphasizes its urgency and importance as a central focus of U.S. defense and security strategy. He also makes specific projections, such as China potentially possessing the capability to invade Taiwan by 2027, enabling a swift occupation. He clearly articulates that the most urgent scenario facing the U.S. Department of Defense is to prevent China from using force to occupy Taiwan, which aligns with the concept of 'denial' mentioned earlier.

Bipartisan Consensus on the China Threat and the Taiwan Issue

He then elaborates on related issues, including the role of Taiwan. The Trump administration has consistently debated Taiwan's defense capabilities. When asked directly by numerous journalists whether the U.S. has an obligation to defend Taiwan, President Trump has never provided a definitive answer. Colby also evades direct responses on this matter. During his Senate confirmation hearing, when questioned by many senators, Colby consistently sidestepped the issue. In his written response, he stated that deterring and blockading an invasion of Taiwan is crucial, but emphasized that Taiwan itself must significantly enhance its defense capabilities. He further noted that Taiwan has not made sufficient efforts in this regard. Therefore, Taiwan must take far more measures for its own defense, thereby implementing a 'denial defense,' as previously mentioned. Here, Colby, like Trump, does not explicitly commit to defending Taiwan. As some may know, President Trump has even suggested that Taiwan should increase its defense spending to 10% of its GDP. Therefore,

in a broader context, his views align with Trump's. Ultimately, the primary responsibility for Taiwan's defense rests with Taiwan itself, which must significantly bolster its military capabilities. Recently, TSMC pledged substantial investment in the United States. While this is a separate matter, investment is investment, and defense is necessary for Taiwan's security. It appears likely that this approach will be a fundamental characteristic of the Trump administration. Russia is also a significant consideration. The Russia-Ukraine war continues, and North Korean troops are reportedly deployed there, impacting the Korean Peninsula depending on the outcome. President Trump's recent overtures towards Russia pose a considerable challenge to traditional security, particularly concerning territorial integrity, and are a source of significant concern. Colby clearly identifies Russia as a serious threat to Eastern Europe and NATO, necessitating deterrence. However, he stresses that Europe must bear responsibility. He emphasizes the critical importance of European allies leading security assistance to Ukraine and deterring further Russian aggression.

During the Senate confirmation hearing, Democratic senators primarily asked about responsibility for the Russia-Ukraine war. The established position of the U.S. government, under the Biden administration, is that Russia's invasion was illegal. Many senators sought Colby's confirmation of this view, but he consistently avoided a direct answer. He stated that the situation is highly sensitive and that the issue must be resolved through future negotiations, making it inappropriate for him to comment. He thus evaded the question. Democratic senators, naturally, wished to hear his perspective, as they perceive President Trump as siding with Putin. They sought a dissenting voice, but Colby did not provide one. Nevertheless, his overall assessment confirms that Russia is indeed a security threat, and the policy direction is clear: Europe must respond to this threat. Ukraine is also important. Colby made a statement regarding Ukraine, emphasizing the need for Ukraine to maintain sufficient armaments for its self-defense even after the war concludes. A crucial point emerges here: who will provide these armaments? He states quite clearly that the U.S. will no longer be involved. He quoted Colby's written statement: 'The United States has already made significant contributions to Ukraine's defense, and currently, the U.S. has other priorities in other regions, making it difficult to expand military support to Ukraine.' This is a highly significant statement. Given the likelihood of a protracted war in Ukraine and continued Russian aggression, the U.S.'s decision not to expand military support implies that Europe's role in Ukraine's security and defense will become increasingly crucial.

This indicates that the U.S. faces urgent and critical priorities, particularly the threat from China and securing U.S. territorial integrity. The implication is that efforts to defend Ukraine are now Europe's responsibility, and the U.S. has already borne sufficient defense costs. He explicitly states that Europe leading these efforts is the solution. This aligns with our expectations and Trump's assertion that the Ukraine issue is a European matter, with NATO allies bearing responsibility. Colby accurately reiterates this point. This raises the question of NATO's stance. Some express concern that Trump's perceived support for Russia in ending the war might lead to U.S. withdrawal from NATO or undermine NATO's collective security commitments under Article 5. However, there is no explicit indication of this. He continues to emphasize NATO's importance. Yet, as repeatedly mentioned, Colby echoes Trump's dissatisfaction: the current situation, where the U.S. contributes significantly to NATO, is unfair. Therefore, the U.S. should prioritize China and project its readiness, forces, and resources towards that objective. As a solution, he suggests that Europe, with its strong economy, should take on greater responsibility, demanding a 5% increase in defense spending and the acquisition of substantial conventional forces by European nations themselves. In summary, the approach towards Europe, as observed since the inception of the Trump administration, appears to be consolidating. The Russia-Ukraine war will move towards a conclusion, with Europe bearing responsibility for Ukraine's defense and costs thereafter. While the U.S. will not withdraw from NATO or disavow its defense commitments, it is clear that it will not assume a leading role or significant cost-sharing as before. It is highly probable that a National Security Strategy will be released first, followed by a Defense Strategy for the second Trump administration. These developments are likely to become clear. There are also several aspects of interest to us. For instance, when asked about cooperation between Russia, China, and North Korea, Colby responded that their collaboration increases the likelihood of multi-front warfare. The problem is that the U.S. lacks the capacity to adequately manage such simultaneous or sequential conflicts in multiple theaters. He attributes this to allies not being adequately prepared.

The Russian Threat and Emphasis on European Responsibility

This confirms the view that future core conflict preparedness will place greater emphasis on the role of allies rather than the U.S. He also addresses alliance strategy, which is interconnected. In broad terms, Colby believes alliances are a core element. He states that, as President Trump has articulated, alliance relationships must be built on a more realistic and substantive foundation. He raises the issue that allies have not fulfilled their roles adequately in return for U.S. protection and have not contributed sufficiently to defense spending. He explicitly states: 'There has been a significant imbalance in the level of contribution among many allies.' He then identifies three exceptional countries that contribute adequately: Israel, Poland, and South Korea. He refers to them as 'exceptional countries that contribute sufficiently.' The inclusion of South Korea among these three is significant. While President Trump himself has consistently criticized South Korea for not contributing enough, Colby, who is developing and will lead the actual policy strategy, recognizes South Korea's adequate contributions. However, it is unlikely that Trump will overlook the cost-sharing issue with South Korea. Nevertheless, Colby, within the core policy circle, understands this. He acknowledges that South Korea is contributing sufficiently. In summary, Colby's central message is that allies must take greater responsibility for their own defense.

He also suggests the possibility of applying pressure if necessary. Another approach is to resolve issues through engagement with potential adversaries. China may pose a risk of war. However, the U.S. does not intend to respond with war but rather to take various measures to prevent such conflicts. One such measure is for Taiwan and other relevant countries to enhance their readiness, thereby achieving 'Peace Through Strength' by possessing overwhelming power and capabilities to prevent war. This is the essence of his argument. His precise wording is: 'Engage potential adversaries to prevent unnecessary conflict and exploit available fissures to achieve outcomes of peace through strength.' This approach is reflected in the recent U.S.-Russia relationship. As some have analyzed, one reason for Trump's efforts to improve relations with Russia is to counter China. As you know well, China and Russia are closely cooperating, so separating them would be more advantageous for the U.S. in countering China. This sentiment is also present here: 'Exploit available fissures,' meaning seeking opportunities to create divisions within the China-Russia relationship. These expressions suggest a high probability that this will be a core operational method in future defense and security strategies. Before discussing South Korea, I will briefly touch upon Japan. Colby's remarks regarding Japan fall into two categories.

Since other regions have different priorities, it is difficult to further expand military support for Ukraine. This is a very important point. Because the war in Ukraine is likely to be prolonged and Russia is likely to continue its attacks, the United States' decision not to further expand military support for Ukraine implies that Europe's role in Ukraine's security and defense will inevitably become much more important. Therefore, Colby clearly states that Europe must take responsibility for Ukraine's security.

There are urgent and important priorities. Specifically, the threat from China and securing the territorial integrity of the United States are the top priorities. He wrote this in a way that is fully understandable. The meaning is that defending Ukraine is now Europe's responsibility. The United States has already spent enough on defense costs. He also states this very clearly. It says, 'Europe leading this effort is the solution.' We are already anticipating this, and as Trump said, the Ukraine issue will be a European issue, so European allies and NATO allies must take responsibility. Colby also accurately reiterates this. This then leads to the question: what does NATO think? Some express concerns that Trump appears to be siding with Russia in the process of ending the Russia-Ukraine war, leading to concerns about the US withdrawing from NATO or undermining NATO's Article 5 collective security commitments.

Redefining NATO's Role and Strengthening Allies' Responsibilities

However, there is no clear statement to that effect. He still states that NATO is important. However, as I have repeatedly mentioned, Colby echoes the dissatisfaction expressed by Trump. He says that the situation where the United States is making a very large contribution to NATO is very unfair. Therefore, the United States must prioritize China and project its readiness, forces, and resources towards that. As a solution, he argues that Europe, possessing strong economic power, must play a greater role, demanding a 5% increase in defense spending and the acquisition of large-scale conventional forces by Europe itself. In summary, I believe that the posture towards Europe, as seen since the launch of the Trump administration, has been clarified. The war in Ukraine will move towards an end, and during and after that process, Europe must be responsible for Ukraine's defense, and Europe must bear the costs. Regarding NATO, while the US will not withdraw or deny its defense commitments, it is clearly confirmed that it does not intend to play a leading role as before, especially in terms of cost-sharing. In the second term of Trump, a defense strategy document will be issued, preceded by a national security strategy document. These contents are highly likely to be clearly presented. There are a few situations that are of interest to us. For example, when asked about cooperation between Russia, China, and North Korea, Colby responds that their cooperation has increased the possibility of multi-front wars. The problem is that the United States does not have the sufficient role and capacity to handle these simultaneous or temporally staggered wars in multiple locations. He then blames the allies for not being adequately prepared.

These appear to be a set of demands. First, regarding the ROK-U.S. alliance, which is a joint system, Japan needs to develop a similar integrated model of military cooperation as South Korea. I will elaborate on this if given the opportunity later, but Japan is, in fact, moving in that direction and is discussing it with the U.S. Colby's emphasis within the Department of Defense could accelerate this process. Second, he addresses defense spending. Japan has announced a plan to increase its defense budget to 2% by 2027. However, Colby demands an increase to 3% by 2027, deeming the current target insufficient.

Alliance Strategy: South Korea's Contributions and Redefined Role

Finally, regarding South Korea, which I'm sure many have been waiting for. Ultimately, the most crucial aspect is how he views South Korea, including the North Korean issue. The preceding discussion on strategy, alliances, and threat perception provides context for his views on South Korea. Regarding South Korea, there were specific questions, and I will present his answers in response. One question was: 'How do you assess the value of the ROK-U.S. alliance from the perspective of U.S. national security interests?' This is a critical question, given the significant erosion of alliance values observed during the Trump administration. Colby's response was: 'The ROK-U.S. alliance is central to U.S. interests and serves as a cornerstone supporting the U.S. geopolitical position in Asia.' This is an accurate assessment, consistent with how the ROK-U.S. alliance has been described, and it does not differ significantly from the description of the U.S.-Japan alliance. This confirms its importance in principle.

The second question was: 'How do you assess the threat posed by North Korea to regional and global security?' This is a very important question. The assessment of this threat and the resulting threat perception can inform the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance and the implications for South Korea's defense. Colby's response was: 'North Korea poses a direct military threat and simultaneously presents nuclear missile and various asymmetric threats to the U.S., Japan, and other allies.' This clearly indicates a recognition of the threat and an acknowledgment that North Korea poses a threat. The third question concerned the conditions for the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) and the criteria for such a transfer.

The Trump administration has not been in office for long, and key security and defense policies are still under review. Nevertheless, based on Colby's statements today, his written responses, and his writings, it is highly probable that these elements will be reflected in the broader framework of the Trump administration's policies. Therefore, South Korea needs to be adequately prepared for the evolving military and security alliance policies of the Trump administration. Thank you for watching.

Strengthening Japan's Role and Demands for Increased Defense Spending

As you all know well, China and Russia are closely cooperating, so separating them would be more advantageous for the United States in containing China. This expression also appears here: 'exploitable fissures,' meaning that there are times to seek fissures in the relationship between China and Russia. I believe these are expressions that greatly increase the likelihood of this proceeding as one of the core operational methods of future defense and security strategy. Before discussing Korea, I will briefly mention Japan before moving on to Korea. Colby discusses two points regarding Japan.

This appears to be a set of demands. First, regarding South Korea and the United States: we have the ROK-US combined system, don't we? We have the most institutionalized military cooperation system at the highest level, and it is necessary for the combined forces to develop into an integrated model similar to South Korea's in the future. I will organize and explain this at a later opportunity, but Japan is actually moving in that direction. This is something being discussed with the United States. Colby emphasizes this aspect more within the Department of Defense, so it is likely to accelerate further. In addition, he discusses defense spending and defense budgets. Japan has so far announced a 2% increase by 2027, but Colby demands that a 2% increase in defense spending by 2027 is insufficient and calls for an increase to 3%.

The Value of the ROK-US Alliance and Perceptions of the North Korean Threat

Finally, regarding South Korea, you have probably been waiting for this. The most important thing is how he views our Korean Peninsula, including the North Korean issue. The overall flow, strategy, alliances, and threat perceptions must be confirmed before discussing issues related to Korea. There were specific questions regarding South Korea, and I will answer them in the form of responses to those questions. The question asked was: 'From the perspective of U.S. national security interests, how do you assess the value of the ROK-US alliance?' This is an important question. This is because we have seen the value of alliances significantly undermined during the Trump administration, and specifically, when asked about the ROK-US alliance, Colby responds: 'The ROK-US alliance is central to American interests and is the cornerstone supporting America's geopolitical position in Asia.' This is the correct answer. These are the descriptions that have consistently been used to portray the ROK-US alliance, and they are not significantly different from the description of the US-Japan alliance mentioned earlier. I believe the principle of its importance is being confirmed.

This is the second question. 'How do you assess the threat posed by North Korea to regional and global security?' This is a very important question. The importance of the ROK-US alliance and the meaning of defending South Korea can be found in how this threat is assessed and perceived. Colby answers: 'North Korea poses a direct military threat and simultaneously poses nuclear missile and various asymmetric threats to the United States, Japan, and other allies.' There is certainly an awareness of the threat. He acknowledges that a threat is being posed. This is the third question.

Transition of Wartime Operational Control and Missile Defense Systems

Interpreting this, I do not believe he denies the importance of trilateral cooperation itself. Trilateral cooperation is important, and one of its objectives should be the establishment of a missile defense system. This is also significant and I will elaborate on it if given the opportunity later. The question is whether this includes not just missile defense but also missile attack systems. The U.S. refers to this as Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), a system shared with Japan. This concept encompasses not only defense but also offensive missile systems. While it has not been precisely clarified, my understanding is that the IAMD concept is included in the U.S.'s strategic vision. Another topic of great interest and considerable debate is extended deterrence. How important is the extended deterrence commitment in deterring attacks from China and North Korea and preventing further nuclear proliferation? This is a core question. Domestically, there is constant concern about whether the Trump administration will defend South Korea, and whether it will uphold and strengthen the extended deterrence developed thus far. I have also raised this issue repeatedly. Colby's response is very general. He stated: 'The strategic deterrence and defense posture of the ROK and the U.S. must be credible and robust.' This is ambiguous. If based on credibility, strengthening extended deterrence is appropriate. 'Robust' also implies strengthening extended deterrence, but without the explicit mention of 'extended deterrence,' credibility and robustness could be achieved through other means. Therefore, he did not provide a precise answer on this matter either. One more point relevant to South Korea: regarding countering China, Colby did not directly address South Korea's role. However, concerning China deterrence, as mentioned earlier, he stated that allies, including Japan and Taiwan, must significantly enhance their defense capabilities to counter China. While he does not explicitly name South Korea, his remarks indirectly suggest a call for participation. Colby emphasizes that it is a top priority for allies to possess sufficient military capabilities to execute 'denial defense.' In this context, for South Korea to directly participate in countering China, or for U.S. forces in Korea and other forward-deployed Indo-Pacific forces to strengthen their role in countering China, it is paramount that South Korea first enhances its defense capabilities against the North Korean threat.

Extended Deterrence and Modernization of U.S. Nuclear Capabilities

This is likely to change. The role of the ROK-U.S. alliance and U.S. Forces Korea will no longer be limited to defending against North Korea. Instead, South Korea will take the lead in responding to conventional attacks from North Korea, and OPCON transfer will facilitate this, aligning with the U.S. strategy. In return, there is a possibility of reorganizing U.S. Forces Korea to play a greater role in countering China in the Indo-Pacific region. This could happen sooner than expected. Although not explicitly stated, this strategic direction appears relatively clear. In addition, he mentions one or two related situations. You may have heard of the 'Golden Dome,' which Trump has referred to. This refers to a next-generation missile defense system to protect the U.S. homeland. While the specifics are not yet clear, Colby mentions this. The 'Golden Dome' aims to strengthen the defense of the U.S. homeland against incoming missiles and is likely to be pursued vigorously and intensively in the near future. For the Korean Peninsula, this means that as the U.S. homeland's defense capabilities are enhanced, the effectiveness of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) developed by North Korea will diminish. I have discussed this previously and plan to provide more detailed explanations in the future. Even if North Korea develops ICBM capabilities, its nuclear capabilities will inevitably be diminished if the U.S. significantly enhances its existing defense capabilities.

In conjunction with this, the modernization of nuclear capabilities, which began during the first Trump administration, has been reaffirmed by Colby. He states: 'We must possess nuclear forces capable of deterring multiple nuclear-armed states.' This includes the modernization of existing nuclear weapons, including low-yield or tactical nuclear weapons. The U.S. intends to enhance its nuclear capabilities through such efforts. The primary target is China. However, strengthening nuclear capabilities against China will also significantly enhance deterrence against North Korea's nuclear capabilities. These elements form the foundation of Colby's views on alliances and the U.S. national security and defense strategy.

Golden Dome and Deterring North Korea's Nuclear Capabilities

Enhancing capabilities is very important. That seems clear. I believe this is highly likely to change. The role of US Forces Korea and the ROK-US alliance will no longer be limited to defending against North Korea. Instead, South Korea will take a leading role in North Korea's conventional warfare and conventional attacks, and to that end, the transfer of wartime operational control is part of the US's vision. Instead, there is a possibility that US Forces Korea will be reorganized to play a role in containing China in the Indo-Pacific region. I believe this could happen sooner than expected. Although this was not explicitly stated, the strategy appears relatively clear. In addition, he mentions one or two related situations. You may have heard of it, but Trump is talking about 'Golden Dome.' What is this? It refers to a next-generation missile defense system to defend the U.S. mainland. While it has not been specified exactly what this is, Colby mentions this: 'Golden

The 'Golden Dome' is intended to strengthen the defense of the U.S. homeland against external missile threats and is likely to be pursued vigorously and intensively in the near future. For the Korean Peninsula, this means that as the U.S. homeland's defense capabilities are enhanced, the effectiveness of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) developed by North Korea will diminish. I have discussed this previously and plan to provide more detailed explanations in the future. Even if North Korea develops ICBM capabilities, its nuclear capabilities will inevitably be diminished if the U.S. significantly enhances its existing defense capabilities.

In conjunction with this, the modernization of nuclear capabilities, which began during the first Trump administration, has been reaffirmed by Colby. He states: 'We must possess nuclear forces capable of deterring multiple nuclear-armed states.' This includes the modernization of existing nuclear weapons, including low-yield or tactical nuclear weapons. The U.S. intends to enhance its nuclear capabilities through such efforts. The primary target is China. However, strengthening nuclear capabilities against China will also significantly enhance deterrence against North Korea's nuclear capabilities. These elements form the foundation of Colby's views on alliances and the U.S. national security and defense strategy.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations for South Korea

Although the Trump administration has not been in office for long and key security and defense policies are still under review, based on Colby's statements today, his written responses, and his writings, it is highly probable that these elements will be reflected in the broader framework of the Trump administration's policies. Therefore, South Korea needs to be adequately prepared for the evolving military and security alliance policies of the Trump administration. Thank you for watching.

■ Park Won-gon, Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute, Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

The Trump administration has not been in office for long, and key security and defense policies are still under review. Nevertheless, based on Colby's statements today, his written responses, and his writings, it is highly probable that these elements will be reflected in the broader framework of the Trump administration's policies. Therefore, South Korea needs to be adequately prepared for the evolving military and security alliance policies of the Trump administration. Thank you for watching.

■ Park Won-gon, Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute, Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Produced and Edited by Park Han-soo, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr