North Korea and the World: The Reaffirmed Goal of "North Korean Denuclearization"… What Bill Will Korea Face?

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NDe6LQkjMiY

Video Script

This reflects the U.S. perspective on ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation. I believe the inclusion of such strong language signifies a commitment to future ROK-U.S. cooperation. Thank you to everyone watching "Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World." Today, I intend to discuss two very important political events: the U.S.-Japan summit held on February 7th and the ROK-U.S.-Japan Foreign Ministers' Meeting on February 15th. Focusing on these, I will attempt to analyze how the Trump administration is leading on issues concerning North Korea, nuclear weapons, and alliance policy. Given that joint statements were issued at both events, it is essential to first examine these documents. In summary, the U.S.-Japan summit can be described as a victory for Japanese diplomacy, as widely assessed by Japanese media. As I will elaborate later, many of Japan's objectives were met. It is particularly significant in that the unpredictability and uncertainty in the security domain have been largely resolved.

In conjunction with the aforementioned ROK-U.S.-Japan Foreign Ministers' Meeting, this summit also contains considerable encouraging content from South Korea's perspective. What made the U.S.-Japan summit particularly noteworthy was that the first summit hosted by the Trump administration and President Trump in the United States was with Israel. As you are well aware, the relationship between Israel and the United States is unique. Although not bound by treaty, they are the United States' most crucial allies.

In a sense, whatever Israel does, the United States thoroughly defends it, treating Israel almost as if it were its own territory. Some might argue that the U.S.-UK relationship is similar, but the U.S.-Israel relationship is far deeper. I believe the discussions from the first U.S.-Japan summit have limitations in their general applicability to all U.S. allies.

Conversely, Japan, like South Korea, is a treaty ally of the United States, with which the U.S. has treaty alliances with about 50 countries. Therefore, the summit can be considered a more typical alliance summit. Consequently, the U.S.-Japan summit would have garnered even greater attention from South Korea's standpoint. The reason for this heightened attention is, as you know, that since the first Trump administration, the U.S. has consistently displayed a cost-benefit approach towards its allies, friendly nations, and even adversaries, shaking the global order. Given this considerable uncertainty, the U.S.-Japan summit attracted significant attention. For South Korea, the situation is particularly acute due to a perceived leadership vacuum, making the summit a crucial opportunity to gauge the direction of the Trump administration's alliance policy toward Korea. This is because South Korea and Japan share many similarities as U.S. allies.

US-Japan Summit and South Korea's Position

Firstly, both countries are commonly exposed to North Korea's nuclear threat and rely on U.S. extended deterrence for nuclear security. Secondly, both are host nations to U.S. troops. They are countries that have agreements on the status of forces (SOFA) and have negotiated Special Measure Agreements (SMA) to share a portion of the stationing costs. The 11th round of negotiations between South Korea and the U.S. took place last October, and I understand Japan will soon have similar negotiations. As countries that share costs through such special agreements, Japan is the primary nation facing President Trump's demands regarding defense cost sharing. Thirdly, if the U.S. views South Korea and Japan as key partners for containing China in the Indo-Pacific region, then these are indeed the countries. In this regard, the joint statement issued at the U.S.-Japan summit officially announced

the contents of the document were highly significant from South Korea's perspective. I will begin with that discussion today. The ROK-U.S.-Japan Foreign Ministers' Meeting was also very important in this regard. Its very convening raised considerable doubts about whether ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation would continue and whether the Trump administration could lay the foundation for institutionalizing such cooperation. However, the meeting's occurrence has significantly increased the likelihood of continued ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation, provided Japan does not adopt a negative stance. Despite the current political instability, this summit was crucial as it provided significant momentum for the continuation of ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation. Of course, ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation itself presents considerable burdens for South Korea. As I will discuss in more detail later, it involves a more sophisticated containment of China than under the previous Biden administration. Therefore, I will now combine the joint statements from the U.S.-Japan summit and the ROK-U.S.-Japan Foreign Ministers' Meeting

and explain their significance. Firstly, regarding the U.S.-Japan summit, and indeed both meetings, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was the first to articulate the concept of the Indo-Pacific geopolitical space and subsequently established the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) policy. This initiative began during the Trump administration. The question was whether the Trump administration would adopt Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy under Prime Minister Abe, and it did. Consequently, since the Trump administration, FOIP has been officially recognized as the Indo-Pacific strategy, and this was reaffirmed at the recent U.S.-Japan summit.

US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Reaffirmation of Defense Commitments

Although the term was partially used during the Biden administration, the phrase "Indo-Pacific strategy" was more commonly employed than "Free and Open Indo-Pacific." The re-emergence of FOIP during the Trump administration signifies that the Trump administration intends to continue pursuing its Indo-Pacific strategy. The fact that this strategy has been maintained indicates that the fundamental framework has not changed, suggesting that, although we must observe future developments, the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific strategy is likely to be sustained by the Biden administration as well. Secondly, the U.S. reaffirmed its defense commitments to its bilateral allies in the Indo-Pacific region. This is a crucial point. As I mentioned earlier, the Trump administration, and indeed the current administration, has consistently expressed negative views on alliances, arguing that allies do not contribute sufficiently. Therefore, there was undoubtedly skepticism about whether the U.S. would properly uphold and recognize its treaty alliances and associated defense commitments. However, the U.S.-Japan summit clearly reaffirmed the U.S. defense commitment to Japan, including areas vital to Japan's interests. "Vital interests" refers to the Senkaku Islands, known as the Diaoyu Islands in China, and the U.S. commitment to defend them has been confirmed. This point was reiterated at the ROK-U.S.-Japan Foreign Ministers' Meeting, with the precise wording being: "The U.S. side reiterated its firm defense commitments to the Republic of Korea and Japan, backed by unmatched U.S. military power, including its nuclear capabilities."

This is a highly significant statement. It implies that the U.S. will utilize all available strategies, including its nuclear capabilities, to defend South Korea and Japan. While this specific phrasing has not yet been used, the Biden administration has consistently conveyed a strong deterrence message to North Korea: that any use of nuclear weapons by North Korea would result in the end of its regime. Although not yet at that level, the confirmation in the joint statements from the U.S.-Japan summit and the ROK-U.S.-Japan Foreign Ministers' Meeting that the U.S. will employ all available capabilities, including nuclear weapons, to counter the North Korean threat is encouraging from our perspective. Another important aspect is this part of the U.S.-Japan summit. Typically, the Trump administration has consistently sought reciprocal benefits for its defense commitments. A prime example is NATO allies, where the U.S. has demanded a more than twofold increase in defense spending, up to 5% of GDP. However, in the U.S.-Japan summit,

the U.S. reaffirmed its defense commitment to Japan, but no specific reciprocal benefits were discussed. During the press conference, it was mentioned that Japan's defense spending would double, but this point is somewhat ambiguous. I will elaborate on this later, but the crucial point is that a doubling of defense spending is highly probable. This is a separate issue, which I will briefly address. What is the significance of Japan doubling its defense spending? The current U.S. defense budget is approximately $900 billion, with projections to exceed $1 trillion soon. $900 billion is an enormous sum. China's defense spending has also increased by nearly 7% annually in recent years. According to official figures, China's defense budget is just under $300 billion. Official announcements state it is only up to $230 billion,

but due to China's accounting methods, the U.S. and the international community estimate it to be between $330 billion and $450 billion. If it is $450 billion, that is about half of the U.S.'s $900 billion expenditure, a substantial amount. In this context, South Korea and Japan each spend about $50 billion on defense. If Japan doubles its spending, it would reach $100 billion, and if it triples, as some media reports suggest, it would be $150 billion. If South Korea's $50 billion also increases, potentially reaching $150 billion to $200 billion, this combined defense spending by key U.S. allies South Korea and Japan would be highly significant. The reason I mention this is that the U.S. and China will inevitably continue their strategic competition, and the ability to secure and utilize resources will be crucial. In this regard, increased defense spending by South Korea and Japan is becoming a vital factor in the U.S.'s containment of China in the Indo-Pacific region. I will elaborate on this further in a separate YouTube video if I have the opportunity. Thirdly, focusing on the summit, the U.S.-Japan summit joint statement detailed the U.S.'s core objective in the Indo-Pacific region: containing China. This was also included in the ROK-U.S.-Japan Foreign Ministers' Meeting. Comparing the two documents, they are nearly identical. The only difference lies in one aspect: Taiwan. The U.S.-Japan summit expressed support for Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations.

Containing China and the Taiwan Issue

However, the ROK-U.S.-Japan Foreign Ministers' Meeting stated support for Taiwan's "appropriate" participation in international organizations. This is a sensitive issue. China emphasizes its One China policy and opposes Taiwan's participation in international organizations. The U.S.-Japan summit and the ROK-U.S.-Japan Foreign Ministers' Meeting joint statements both included this issue. If the South Korean government is to comment, the phrase "appropriate" international organization participation reflects the South Korean government's stance. Previously, South Korea had not officially expressed support for Taiwan's participation in international organizations in this manner. However, the phrase has now emerged, along with the qualifier "appropriate." Another point from the ROK-U.S. Foreign Ministers' Meeting is the issue of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. This has been included in previous joint statements between South Korea and the U.S., but

this time, it is accompanied by a statement opposing any attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. Those who are interested may recall that shortly after the Yoon Suk-yeol administration took office, President Yoon officially stated his opposition to changing the status quo in the Taiwan issue by force. This elicited a strong, negative reaction from China, officially stating its "displeasure." This was likely China's red line for South Korea regarding the Taiwan issue. Since then, the South Korean government has not made such statements. However, the current joint statement, within the framework of ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation, clearly includes opposition to changing the status quo by force. Today is the 17th. I have not yet seen China's reaction to the ROK-U.S.-Japan Foreign Ministers' joint statement. It remains to be seen how China will respond. Given that this statement includes a significantly higher level of China containment than before, it warrants close observation. The uncertainty surrounding future developments suggests that China may keep various options open. However, as the Taiwan issue is of paramount importance to China, a strong reaction remains a possibility. Crucially, as I have emphasized, this statement fully reflects the U.S. perspective on ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation. While previous statements also included China containment, the inclusion of such strong language

signifies a greater willingness to actively utilize ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation for China containment moving forward. Furthermore, ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation holds significant meaning for South Korea. The Trump administration's approach to ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region builds upon initiatives established during the Biden administration. There were doubts about whether AUKUS would be respected, as Trump tends to distrust and dislike small-scale multilateral frameworks, and even more so large-scale ones like the European Union or NATO. Instead, he favors diplomacy that pressures other countries through bilateral relationships. Therefore, there were doubts about its sustainability. However, the U.S.-Japan summit confirmed the continuation of these multilateral frameworks, and the ROK-U.S. Foreign Ministers' Meeting itself serves as strong evidence of this continuity. Security cooperation in this area is now highly likely to continue, as clearly stated in the ROK-U.S. Foreign Ministers' Meeting joint statement. It not only strengthens and sustains trilateral security cooperation among the ROK, U.S., and Japan but also reaffirms the need for technological cooperation.

This includes artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum science and technology, cybersecurity, and biotechnology. These areas were previously detailed in the Washington Declaration during the ROK-U.S. summit in April, following the U.S.-Japan summit in January 2023. Therefore, it is highly probable that the cooperation agreements strengthened and continued under the Biden administration will also persist under the Trump administration. To summarize briefly: Firstly, the issue of North Korea. Denuclearization of North Korea is confirmed. Notably, the U.S.-Japan summit joint statement explicitly refers to "denuclearization of North Korea," not "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." The use of the term "denuclearization of North Korea" reaffirms the ultimate goal of the Korean Peninsula issue and carries significant weight as it is confirmed in an official document like the U.S.-Japan summit joint statement. This confirmation is reiterated at the ROK-U.S. Foreign Ministers' Meeting. The precise wording is as follows:

The Ministers reaffirmed their firm commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions. This unequivocally states "denuclearization of North Korea." Why is the denuclearization of North Korea important? Previously, it was often conflated with the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and this confusion may persist. However, I believe it is appropriate to distinguish between the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the denuclearization of North Korea. This is because the concept of "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" as interpreted by North Korea could be dangerously similar to their own definition. North Korea's definition of "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" has been stated multiple times, but the definition issued on December 20, 2018, is particularly clear. I will read it verbatim: "The complete elimination of the U.S. nuclear threat to Korea before the elimination of our nuclear deterrent." In other words, North Korea's concept of "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" or "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" does not simply mean eliminating North Korea's nuclear weapons but also simultaneously eliminating the extended deterrence that the U.S. provides to South Korea.

North Korean Denuclearization Goals and Extended Deterrence

This is a critical issue for South Korea's security. Therefore, by explicitly using the term "denuclearization of North Korea," the U.S. has clearly indicated its intention to maintain the extended deterrence it provides to South Korea. This holds significant implications as a countermeasure against North Korea's nuclear threat. Furthermore, the U.S.-Japan summit joint statement clearly expressed U.S. support for strengthening Japan's defense capabilities. This signifies the U.S.'s positive assessment and support for Japan's efforts to enhance its self-defense capabilities. This can be seen as a reflection of the U.S.'s perception of the evolving security environment in the Indo-Pacific region.

Finally, these meetings provide crucial insights into the Trump administration's foreign policy direction. President Trump tends to prioritize cost-benefit analysis in relations with allies and favors diplomacy of pressure through bilateral ties. However, the outcomes of the U.S.-Japan summit and the ROK-U.S.-Japan Foreign Ministers' Meeting joint statements demonstrate a willingness to maintain and strengthen existing alliance structures within this framework. In particular, they suggest a potential for enhanced ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation under the shared objective of containing China. This holds significant implications for South Korea as well. In a situation of leadership vacuum, it serves as an important reference for understanding the U.S.'s policy direction toward Korea and formulating future diplomatic strategies.

In a way, this implies that the latter must precede the former. I will now elaborate further on North Korea's self-defined "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." This was officially articulated by North Korea in a government spokesperson's statement in July 2016. It includes five conditions, the fifth and final of which is: "Declaration of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea possessing nuclear use rights." Therefore, North Korea's concept of "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" ultimately includes the withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea and the dissolution of the ROK-U.S. alliance. For this reason, I have long argued that the term "denuclearization of North Korea" is crucial. The confirmation of "denuclearization of North Korea" in these two documents is highly encouraging.

I believe so. Furthermore, the confirmation that ROK-U.S. cooperation is the most important mechanism for responding to the North Korean threat is included, as is the provision of extended deterrence to South Korea and Japan to deter North Korea during the denuclearization process, as mentioned earlier. Overall, it is true that several key security uncertainties have been significantly mitigated through these two meetings. However, this does not mean that negative factors affecting South Korea's security have been entirely eliminated. Uncertainties remain, and while South Korea and Japan share similarities, they also have differences.

These aspects need to be considered comprehensively. Therefore, I will conclude by discussing a few challenges that South Korea still faces. First, and perhaps most regrettable, is the missed opportunity for normalization. The normalization of relations between South Korea and the U.S., and Japan and the U.S., has brought about mutually complementary synergistic effects. What I mean by this is that there was a U.S.-Japan summit in January 2022, which resulted in a detailed and significant joint statement. Subsequently, during the ROK-U.S. summit in April, the Washington Declaration was issued, also including a joint statement. Comparing these two joint statements, the ROK-U.S. joint statement built upon the U.S.-Japan joint statement, incorporating further advancements. In essence, based on the agreements and joint statements of the respective parties, progressively enhanced proposals have emerged. This ultimately led to the ROK-U.S.-Japan summit at Camp David in August 2024. Therefore, if a ROK-U.S. summit had followed immediately after the U.S.-Japan summit, it would have been possible to incorporate the direction of ROK-U.S. relations within that framework, which is a regrettable missed opportunity.

I believe so. Furthermore, the confirmation that ROK-U.S. cooperation is the most important mechanism for responding to the North Korean threat is included, as is the provision of extended deterrence to South Korea and Japan to deter North Korea during the denuclearization process, as mentioned earlier. Overall, it is true that several key security uncertainties have been significantly mitigated through these two meetings. However, this does not mean that negative factors affecting South Korea's security have been entirely eliminated. Uncertainties remain, and while South Korea and Japan share similarities, they also have differences.

Challenges to South Korean Security and Defense Cost Sharing

I believe it is necessary to read these aspects comprehensively. Therefore, I will conclude by briefly discussing several challenges that still face South Korea. First, and perhaps one of the most regrettable points, is that the normalization of relations has brought about mutually complementary synergistic effects in the relationships between South Korea and the US, and Japan and the US. What does this mean? There was a US-Japan summit in January 2022. A joint statement was released, which was quite detailed and significant. Subsequently, in April, during the ROK-US Summit and the Washington Declaration, our own joint statement was issued. Comparing these two joint statements, the ROK-US joint statement contained further advancements based on the US-Japan joint statement. In other words, more developed proposals are continuously emerging, based on the mutual statements and agreements of the respective parties. Ultimately, this became the catalyst for the development leading to the Camp David ROK-US-Japan Summit in August 2024. Therefore, if a ROK-US summit had immediately followed this US-Japan summit, based on that, between the ROK and the US

Second, defense cost sharing. While Trump did not specifically demand defense cost sharing from Japan, there is some ambiguity in interpretation. Reports suggest that Japan will double its current defense spending by fiscal year 2027. It remains unclear whether this refers to the previously agreed-upon increase of 2% of GDP or a 3% increase, leaving room for interpretation. Some believe it refers to the latter. However, the key point is that a doubling of spending has been proposed. Japan has moved past this issue, but what about South Korea? I believe this presents a significant challenge. There are several aspects where South Korea differs from Japan. Japan contributes to the costs of U.S. forces stationed there in the manner previously described.

Japan generally tends to accept what the U.S. proposes. The reason for this is that for a long time, they have operated under a "requirements-driven" approach, meticulously addressing U.S. needs, which has prevented a significant increase in demand. Therefore, the process has proceeded at a predictable pace. Furthermore, the Japanese public is largely uninterested in these issues, and it does not become a political agenda item. This provides the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party government with greater flexibility. Moreover, Japan's economy is still larger than South Korea's, so the costs incurred are not substantial relative to the overall economy.

Conversely, South Korea's situation is different. Defense cost sharing is a highly politicized and sensitive issue in South Korea. Not only the media but also the public reacts strongly to it. Moreover, we do not operate under a "requirements-driven" model. I will elaborate on this later if given the opportunity, but there is a clear stance on whether moving towards a "requirements-driven" model is truly beneficial for South Korea. Considering these factors, we are utilizing existing methods. This does not mean that significant increases have not occurred. The issue is that while the Trump administration did not aggressively demand defense cost increases from other countries as it did with Japan during the U.S.-Japan summit, there are concerns about whether the same will apply to South Korea. This is because, although Trump has mentioned Japan's defense spending, he has not done so as frequently or specifically as he has with South Korea. Trump has had more positive discussions with South Korea regarding issues other than defense cost sharing, and he has even expressed dissatisfaction with the 12th Special Measures Agreement concluded between South Korea and the U.S. last October.

Costs of Strategic Asset Deployment and South Korea's Response Measures

He has also consistently raised cost issues related to ROK-U.S. combined training and the deployment of strategic assets. I have discussed the significance and implications of these issues for South Korea's security on multiple occasions on this program. If a summit between Trump and the ROK president takes place, it is entirely possible that demands for increased defense cost sharing or costs for the deployment of strategic assets and combined training will be made, unlike the situation with Japan. The issues of strategic assets and combined training costs have been the two core pillars of extended deterrence that South Korea and the U.S. have developed over the past year and a half. If these are reduced or suspended, the deterrence capability and effect against North Korean threats will inevitably diminish, posing a significant security threat. Therefore, the possibility of such demands cannot be entirely ruled out, which is a key difference compared to the U.S.-Japan summit. So, how should South Korea respond? Given the leadership situation,

That is the situation. Even so, we must do our best. What I mean is that the U.S. government has initiated its policy review, which typically takes at least three to six months. While some efforts are already visible to incorporate South Korea's position to the greatest extent possible during this period, it is crucial to maximize these efforts. Furthermore, the most critical aspect is to minimize the potential erosion of our security, which could arise from the security commitment, specifically through defense cost-sharing or by bearing the costs of joint military exercises and the deployment of strategic assets. In this regard, the best outcome for South Korea would be aligned with the U.S.-Japan summit.

It's like the outcomes mentioned in the joint statement. For example, Japan states it will increase its defense budget, but this is left somewhat ambiguous and vague. South Korea's defense budget is also bound to continuously increase. We are already scheduled for annual increases. In particular, as our military personnel numbers are inevitably decreasing, we are compelled to increase the number of professional soldiers, which consequently leads to an unavoidable rise in personnel costs. Therefore, defense spending must increase. Furthermore, as North Korea continues to possess nuclear weapons, we are forced to continuously develop our deterrence capabilities, which also inevitably increases costs. From South Korea's perspective, if we follow a similar direction to Japan, by increasing our defense budget without specifying exact figures and maintaining a level of ambiguity, I believe this would be the best possible outcome. If not, I am hesitant to say, but it could involve increasing the costs for stationing U.S. Forces Korea as stipulated in the 12th Special Measures Agreement, or, of course, as Trump has said...

we must do our best regardless. What I mean is that the U.S. government has initiated its policy review process, which typically takes three to six months. During this period, there are already some efforts to reflect South Korea's position, but these efforts must be maximized. Furthermore, it is crucial to minimize the security risks that may arise from accepting commitments such as defense cost sharing or bearing the costs of combined training and strategic asset deployment. From South Korea's perspective, the ideal outcome would be similar to the results of the U.S.-Japan summit joint statement.

For example, Japan's defense spending is stated to increase, but the details remain ambiguous and vague. South Korea's defense spending is also bound to increase continuously. We already have annual increases scheduled. Specifically, as our military personnel numbers are expected to decrease, we will inevitably need to increase the number of professional soldiers, leading to higher personnel costs. Consequently, defense spending is bound to increase further. Moreover, as North Korea continues to possess nuclear weapons, we must continuously develop our response capabilities, which will also inevitably increase costs. Therefore, if South Korea, like Japan, increases its defense spending without specifying exact figures, I believe it would be the best possible outcome. If not, I am cautious, but at the very least, we must avoid a situation where the ROK-U.S. combined training and strategic asset deployment costs, which Trump has demanded to be increased significantly, are not accepted, leading to the suspension or reduction of training. The most important thing is to continuously communicate the significance of these issues to the Trump administration. We must explain how undermining extended deterrence poses a serious problem for South Korea's security and how it could significantly influence domestic media and public opinion. If combined training and strategic asset deployment are suspended or reduced, I believe that proponents of South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons will inevitably gain a much louder voice. We have already seen public opinion polls indicating that 60% to 70% of South Koreans believe nuclear armament is necessary. This situation, coupled with the potential suspension or reduction of extended deterrence, combined training, and strategic asset deployment, could lead to a much more complex security environment. Therefore, we need to address these issues comprehensively and convey them to the U.S. side. We will have to wait and see what happens in the coming months, but it is clear that this is a critical juncture. I believe it is a time when we must unite our efforts. Thank you for watching.

Comprehensive Assessment and Policy Recommendations

Park Won-gon, Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies and Professor at Ewha Womans University, analyzes the Trump administration's approach to North Korea cooperation and denuclearization as expressed in the US-Japan summit on February 7 and the US-ROK-Japan foreign ministers' meeting on February 15, and presents the challenges to South Korean security accordingly. Director Park assesses the US intention to strengthen US-ROK-Japan cooperation to counter China, evident in both meetings, and the reaffirmation of the goal of "complete denuclearization of North Korea" as encouraging. However, he advises that as the burden of costs associated with the US defense commitment is likely to increase, South Korea must realistically manage the extent of defense cost increases and persuade the Trump administration to ensure that ROK-US combined exercises and the deployment of US strategic assets are not reduced.

■ Park Won-gon: Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Editor and Producer: Park Han-soo, EAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr