[North Korea and the World] Prospects for Resumption of US-North Korea Dialogue under a Second Trump Administration

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJ7pTuQ8l0E

Video Script

In the eyes of Kim Jong Un, all these series of events would remain as a kind of trauma. Even though all circumstances are present, Trump continuously returns to the White House and speaks as if nothing happened, saying, 'He liked me,' 'He wants me to return.' From Kim Jong Un's perspective... this is my judgment. Hello. Thank you to everyone watching Park Won Gon's North Korea and the World. Today, I intend to cover a recently unfolding issue. I believe many of you watching this video will have a great deal of interest in it. About a month after Donald Trump's return to the White House, how is the relationship with North Korean Chairman Kim Jong Un progressing, and can the widely discussed US-North Korea summit be raised again? We experienced much in 2018 and 2019. Uh, during that time, there were three Trump-Kim Jong Un, Kim Jong Un-Trump summits. Including the surprise meeting at Panmunjom in June 2019.

There is considerable interest in whether such 'summit meetings between leaders' (in North Korean terms, 'Chomi Sudoe Hoedong,' meaning meetings between leaders) as occurred in 2018 and 2019 can be repeated. Today, I intend to focus on that aspect. The starting point, as always, is President Trump's inauguration as the 47th President of the United States. What I mean is, as many of you likely already know, on his first day in office, he signed executive orders in the Oval Office, the White House study. True to form, he continuously communicated with reporters. When reporters asked questions, he kept answering them, essentially holding a brief press conference.

Trump's Remarks on Kim Jong Un and the Possibility of US-North Korea Summits

A reporter asked a question there. The question was, for previous presidents, upon leaving office, they brief their successor on important security issues for the United States. Was there any briefing on security issues from the previous President Biden to him, and specifically regarding North Korea? This question was asked. This is likely because President Obama reportedly briefed Trump, the 45th president, on the North Korean threat as one of the most significant threats, and the reporter might have recalled that. Trump's response was, 'North Korea as a nuclear power'... the term 'nuclear power' is incorrect.

However, many domestic media outlets used the term 'nuclear power' in English. I will explain this shortly, but the correct term is 'nuclear-armed state.' He said, 'Kim Jong Un will be happy when I return.' This is not the first time; he has constantly invoked Kim Jong Un during his campaign and even after being elected president. At the Republican National Convention in July, he spoke of his good relationship with Kim Jong Un, consistently offering positive evaluations of Kim Jong Un and keeping the possibility of dialogue open. He showed this demeanor on his inauguration day as well. So, will Trump truly meet Kim Jong Un? Many domestic and international media outlets suggest a high possibility. I believe we need to carefully assess this. Of course, as this concerns the future, it is very difficult for me to say with 100% certainty what I will say today. However, based on historical experiences from 2017 to 2020, during Trump's presidency, the US

There is experience with the relationship, and there is a considerable amount of empirical data on what Trump thinks. North Korea also has various known official and unofficial policy directions toward the United States, which can be called its stance. Based on this, I will make a cautious prediction. As I just mentioned, Trump continues to call out to Kim Jong Un. He mentioned it on his inauguration day, and again in a Fox News interview on January 23rd. What does Trump say about Kim Jong Un? 'He is not a religious fanatic.'

Kim Jong Un's Antagonism Towards Trump and the Lessons of the Hanoi Summit

'He is a smart person. He liked me, and I got along with him.' When asked by the anchor, 'Will you contact Kim Jong Un again?' he replied, 'I will.' This is perhaps the most public and clear statement in recent months that he would re-establish contact with Kim Jong Un. From Trump's perspective... he is laying all the groundwork for dialogue, to put it crudely, and is essentially extending an invitation. This is how I interpret the situation. The crucial question here is, first and foremost, does Kim Jong Un want to meet Trump? That would be the next point. I have mentioned this several times in videos, but from Kim Jong Un's perspective, he absolutely does not like Trump. Beyond simply not liking him, his actions reveal a significant sense of being exploited.

I am mentioning this starting from February 2019. In February 2019, there was what is called the Hanoi humiliation. I believe many people remember it. Kim Jong Un traveled from Pyongyang to Hanoi by train, a journey of 60 hours. However, the summit ultimately failed due to Trump, and he returned by train, a journey of 68 hours. At that time, it is reported that Kim Jong Un said, 'Did I come all the way here for 60 hours on a train for this?' This is a widely known fact. In this context, there is a piece of evidence that reveals Pyongyang's true intentions. It emerged last year, concerning the Ch'ungbuk Dongjihoe case, a spy case involving individuals arrested and convicted for acting under directives from North Korea. The verdict in this spy case includes directives sent by Pyongyang to these individuals. One of these directives is dated March 12, 2019. The significance of this date is that it was sent by Pyongyang to a spy ring in South Korea after the Hanoi summit failed in February 2019.

Therefore, I believe it most accurately reflects Kim Jong Un's sentiments at the time of Hanoi. The directive states the following regarding Trump: to quote precisely, 'He is ignorant of basic etiquette and diplomatic norms and acts with impunity. We must inform the world of Trump's robber-like nature and shamelessness.' It also says, 'Announce that Trump was defeated in the Hanoi negotiation.' I believe this, in a way, reflects Pyongyang's and Kim Jong Un's true feelings at the time. It confirms that there was a significant level of animosity towards Trump due to the humiliation in Hanoi. Of course, even at that time, over twenty personal letters were exchanged between Kim Jong Un and Trump, and a considerable number of them were made public. However, such sentiments are never expressed in these letters. For example, in a letter from Kim Jong Un to Trump dated June 10, 2019, it reads: 'I believe that the magic of the deep and special friendship between us will act as a force.' This shows an effort to please Trump.

However, I believe what is revealed in the directive is actually his true feelings. Reading that directive, I believe it reveals an emotion that goes beyond mere dislike and approaches hatred towards Trump. Yet, Trump's consistent message in response is, 'I am getting along well with him.' To elaborate, the message Trump has been sending to Kim Jong Un is this: 'I am getting along well with you. Therefore, I will contact you soon, so please receive this contact.'

And in the subtext, there is likely something like, 'If you don't receive the contact, then you might have a problem.' We can reasonably infer this nuance. I will explain further in a moment, but from Kim Jong Un's perspective, receiving such a message could feel very aggressive. This is because Kim Jong Un feels hurt by Trump and believes he was wronged. Therefore, he would expect an apology before any attempt to re-establish a relationship or communication channel. However, without any apology process, Trump is sending a message that says, 'We got along well, and you will likely welcome my return to the White House.' This is not a message Kim Jong Un wants to hear at all, and in a way, it is a message that would make Kim Jong Un very angry. To use a metaphor, from Kim Jong Un's perspective, this message is akin to the strong rhetoric used by the United States in 2017 when relations were very poor, and Trump used such strong language.

For example, the representative phrase is 'fire and fury.' 'North Korea will face fire and fury if it does not abandon its nuclear weapons.' Such strong language was employed. Although the expression is different, from Kim Jong Un's perspective, Trump's continuous assertion that they are getting along well can be perceived as an equally strong message. The current situation, I believe, strongly recalls June 2019. As I briefly mentioned earlier, there was a surprise meeting at Panmunjom in June 2019. It began on the morning of June 29th. Trump was in Japan for a G20 summit and posted the following on Twitter, now known as X: 'I am scheduled to visit the DMZ tomorrow. If Chairman Kim Jong Un sees this, I wonder if he would meet me for a handshake. Can I say hello?' He posted this.

In other words, he expressed a desire for Kim Jong Un to come and meet him while he was in South Korea. However, this was not an official communication but a post on Twitter. Astonishingly, within seven hours, North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a public statement: 'If formally invited, we will consider it.' Many North Korea analysts were quite perplexed. Ultimately, exactly 30 hours after the initial tweet, at 3:45 PM on the 30th, the meeting between Trump and Kim Jong Un took place at the House of Freedom on the South Korean side. Ladies and gentlemen, what do you make of this? If we consider this again, he summoned the leader of the other country via Twitter. Not just any leader, but the supreme leader of North Korea, a unique totalitarian state, referred to as the 'Supreme Leader,' Kim Jong Un, was summoned via Twitter. Secondly, this is a gross violation of diplomatic norms. Most countries cannot respond to such an action. Furthermore, a summit requires considerable preparation.

A minimum of six months to a year of preparation is needed to coordinate security, protocol, agenda, and other matters. This is not a simple task. This is true even with ordinary countries, so to summon the supreme leader of North Korea via Twitter? It's unthinkable. Therefore, many North Korea analysts, including myself, said at the time, upon seeing this, that Kim Jong Un had fallen into Trump's trap. Ultimately, Trump is manipulating Kim Jong Un. This clearly demonstrates it.

Further evidence of this can be seen in what was discussed that day. At the Panmunjom meeting, Kim Jong Un's first statement to Trump was reportedly: 'You promised not to conduct ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, so why are you conducting them?' In June 2018, there was the initial Singapore agreement between the U.S. and North Korea. Following the press conference, one of the first things Trump said was that ROK-U.S. joint military exercises are 'very provocative' and 'costly war games,' and he announced a reduction or suspension of these exercises. Many people were surprised. The South Korean government was unaware, and even the then U.S. Secretary of Defense was reportedly unaware. Joint exercises are a sensitive issue, and North Korea has consistently demanded their suspension.

Therefore, joint exercises continued to be a problem in the ongoing U.S.-North Korea talks and negotiations. On that day, Kim Jong Un's first remark upon meeting was to Trump: 'You said you would suspend joint exercises, so why did you conduct them?' To which Trump reportedly replied, 'Joint exercises? We have no plans for joint exercises.' However, the reality is that joint exercises were already planned for the latter half of 2019, in August. Trump was likely aware of this. Because after the summit, there were no measures taken to suspend joint exercises. The joint exercises proceeded as scheduled. While the scale was certainly reduced, and there were no large-scale field maneuvers, joint exercises did take place. From Kim Jong Un's perspective, it is conceivable that he felt deceived once again. All these series of events likely remain a form of trauma for Kim Jong Un. Despite all these circumstances, Trump continues to return to the White House and speak as if nothing happened, saying, 'He liked me,' and 'He wants me to return.'

Furthermore, the principle of military response to North Korea's nuclear weapons is unlikely to change. This is the exact opposite of what Kim Jong Un wants to hear and cannot be seen as accepting North Korea's demands. Therefore, it does not emotionally satisfy Kim Jong Un's sentiments, and from a strategic perspective, the Trump administration is not reflecting North Korea's interests. In this context, I am very cautious about whether the negotiations Trump desires will materialize. However, it is highly possible that Trump will make contact. Primarily, the likelihood of him contacting to resume communication with Kim Jong Un should be considered high. Whether Kim Jong Un can completely ignore this is a separate issue. He might completely ignore it and engage in high-intensity provocations as North Korea has always done.

From Kim Jong Un's perspective, it is inevitable that he would be deeply emotionally hurt. However, the relationship cannot be solely discussed in emotional terms, so let us set aside emotions. What remains? Is Trump reflecting, to some extent, the strategic interests that North Korea truly desires? In other words, do Trump's statements or the various remarks by his officials serve as sufficient incentives for Kim Jong Un to resume U.S.-North Korea talks? I believe not. Regarding this, the term 'nuclear power,' which I mentioned at the beginning, is important. Trump has used this term, and former Secretary of Defense Peter Haye also considers it. Officially, under the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, recognized nuclear-weapon states are referred to in English as 'nuclear weapon states.' Therefore, 'nuclear power' is distinct from that, but when translated into Korean, it carries the meaning of 'possessing nuclear weapons.' The precise term is 'nuclear-armed state.' If we want to be more precise, the term 'illegal' should precede it. This is an 'illegal nuclear-armed state.' Then, North Korea's

current status is most accurately described. However, the crucial point is whether Trump's administration, including Trump himself, truly recognizes North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, as some domestic media outlets suggest by referring to North Korea as a 'nuclear power.' I believe this is an entirely separate issue. Calling it a 'nuclear power' does not equate to recognizing it as a nuclear-armed state. There are several reasons why I make this assertion. To briefly address the controversy, on January 28th of this year, the White House clarified this point in response to a question from a domestic media outlet. They stated, 'President Trump, like during his first term, will pursue the complete denuclearization of North Korea.' They used the phrase 'complete denuclearization of North Korea.'

This is quite significant because it refers to the complete denuclearization of North Korea, not the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has been the phrase consistently used by the Biden administration, originating from the 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' stated in the June 2018 Singapore agreement. North Korea's announcement refers to 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' (조선반도 비핵화). The concept of 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' or 'denuclearization of the Choson Peninsula' is open to interpretation. This is because North Korea's interpretation of 'denuclearization of the Choson Peninsula' does not involve eliminating North Korea's nuclear weapons, which they possess and have developed, as we might assume. Instead, it involves eliminating some of North Korea's nuclear weapons while simultaneously eliminating the extended deterrence provided by the United States to South Korea. Furthermore, North Korea's 'Five Conditions for Denuclearization of the Choson Peninsula,' announced in 2016, include the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea as the fifth and final condition. Therefore, the term 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,' or 'Choson Peninsula,' which is what North Korea refers to, and the expression 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' should be used cautiously, which is what I have consistently

advocated. The White House's statement on January 28th clearly states 'complete denuclearization of North Korea,' not even 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.' Therefore, even if Trump called it a 'nuclear power,' the ultimate goal has been reaffirmed as the complete denuclearization of North Korea. Another piece of evidence is the statement made by former Secretary of Defense Peter Haye on January 24th at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. He also used the term 'nuclear power' at that time. This led many domestic media outlets to speculate that the Trump administration was acknowledging North Korea's nuclear weapons. In such cases, it is essential to consider his entire statement at the Senate hearing. We must examine his overall remarks regarding the threat posed by North Korea. He stated, 'While it is true that North Korea is referred to as a nuclear power, the threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons is undeniably real. Therefore, the United States will respond in two ways.' First, 'We will further strengthen the modernization of low-yield or tactical nuclear weapons, which began during Trump's first term.' This is actually very significant. During Trump's term, usable nuclear weapons were strengthened, and in 2020, low-yield nuclear weapons deployable from submarines, the W76-2, were operationally deployed. These are highly potent weapons capable of striking North Korea from anywhere in the world. Second, he stated, 'We will further enhance missile defense to ensure the safety of the U.S. homeland.' He also mentioned this. Ultimately, there is no indication of recognizing North Korea's nuclear weapons; instead, he discussed concrete methods for deterring and responding to North Korea's nuclear capabilities. How can this be interpreted as recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-armed state? Of course, the review of the Trump administration's North Korea policy, which is now beginning in earnest, may take some time, perhaps three to six months, but it will be clarified over time. However, within this broad direction, the complete denuclearization of North Korea

and the principles of military response to North Korea's nuclear weapons are unlikely to change. Therefore, this is the opposite of what Kim Jong Un wants to hear and does not represent an acceptance of Kim Jong Un's demands. Consequently, it fails to satisfy Kim Jong Un emotionally and does not reflect the strategic interests of North Korea by the Trump administration. In this situation, I am very cautious about whether the negotiations Trump desires will materialize. However, there is a possibility that Trump will indeed make contact. It is highly probable that he will initiate contact to resume communication with Kim Jong Un. Whether Kim Jong Un can completely ignore this is another matter. He could completely ignore it and resort to high-intensity provocations, as North Korea has often done.

Furthermore, it appears that the principle of military response to North Korea's nuclear weapons will not change. This is the exact opposite of what Kim Jong Un wants to hear and cannot be seen as accepting what North Korea desires. Therefore, it is not emotionally satisfying Kim Jong Un's thoughts, and I believe the Trump administration is not reflecting North Korea's interests from a strategic perspective. In this situation, I am very cautious about whether the negotiations Trump speaks of, and that Trump desires, will materialize. However, there is a possibility that Trump will clearly make contact. Primarily, we must assume there is a high probability he will contact Kim Jong Un to resume communication. Whether Kim Jong Un can completely ignore this is a separate issue. He might completely ignore it and engage in high-intensity provocations as North Korea has always done.

For example, if an intercontinental ballistic missile is launched again, Trump could change his stance at any moment. He could impose maximum pressure as he did in 2017. I believe Kim Jong Un knows this better than anyone in the world. Considering all these factors, Kim Jong Un's mind must be complex. This is my overall judgment. Finally, I will mention one concerning situation. As I briefly mentioned in other videos, despite the difficulties between the two sides, I believe US-North Korea negotiations are likely to resume at some point.

The Possibility of 'Dual Suspension' When US-North Korea Negotiations Resume

I believe this will occur after the Russia-Ukraine war has settled to a certain extent. In any case, if negotiations resume, there is a possibility of what is called 'dual suspension' at the outset or during the discussion process. Dual suspension refers to the suspension of ROK-US joint military exercises and strategic asset deployments, in return for North Korea suspending nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests. This occurred in 2018. In April 2018, North Korea announced a moratorium on ICBM and nuclear tests, and after the Singapore summit in June, joint exercises were effectively suspended. The reason this is considered possible is that both the United States and North Korea have aligned interests.

From the US perspective, Trump consistently speaks sensitively about costs, and he has misinformation regarding ROK-US joint exercises and strategic assets. Believing these are very expensive and 'war games,' Trump, who demands burden-sharing and cost-sharing, is reportedly considering reducing or suspending them. While I cannot disclose specifics, I have confirmed through highly credible sources that these remarks have been made. This is a cause for concern.

From North Korea's perspective, joint exercises and strategic asset deployments were continuously discussed in the 2018 and 2019 US-North Korea negotiations, and now, their suspension is even more crucial for North Korea than it was then. ROK-US joint exercises have changed since the latter half of last year. During the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise in the latter half of last year, as I mentioned in other videos, the focus shifted from deterring North Korea's nuclear weapons to specific responses, implementing tailored extended deterrence. This was the first instance of actually practicing how the ROK and US would respond if North Korea used nuclear weapons. Furthermore, regarding strategic assets, unlike before, discussions have taken place on what specific strategic assets should be deployed to the Korean Peninsula for the ROK and US to counter North Korea's nuclear capabilities. For those interested, there is something called CNI, which stands for 'Conventional Nuclear Integration'.

The Importance of Denuclearization and Institutionalizing Extended Deterrence for South Korean Security

This is the integration of conventional and nuclear forces. It significantly strengthens existing extended deterrence, and strategic asset deployment is one of its means. From Kim Jong Un's perspective, the more this is strengthened, the less effective his nuclear weapons become, making the suspension of joint exercises and strategic asset deployments a matter of significant interest. If these two collide, such a possibility exists. If dual suspension truly occurs, it poses a grave security threat to South Korea. As I mentioned, extended deterrence has been developed over the past year and a half to two years, and if its two pillars, joint exercises and strategic asset deployments, are reduced or suspended, it will mark the moment when the institutionalization of extended deterrence halts. In such a scenario, I cannot help but be deeply concerned about South Korea's security. Therefore, I will continue to advocate for this: US-North Korea negotiations are welcome.

What is important is that these negotiations must proceed with at least these two conditions being met. First, regardless of realism, the ultimate goal of US-North Korea negotiations is the complete denuclearization of North Korea. The moment the negotiation objective is weakened or removed, it effectively amounts to recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state. This must never be abandoned. Second, the continuation of existing joint exercises, strategic asset deployments, and the institutionalization of extended deterrence, which includes them. There are ongoing plans for future development, and plans for this year have been released. These must not be suspended.

■ Park Won Gon: Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute (EAI), Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

Park Won Gon, Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute. Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

Managed and Edited by Park Han Soo, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr