[New Year Special Visible Commentary] The Crisis and Opportunity of Three Major Global Leadership

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=enGOhbR1las

Video Script

Hello, I am the Director of the East Asia Institute. Thank you very much for your great interest and for listening to and reading our content in 2024. We will do our best to produce excellent articles and videos in 2025. While 2024 was a tumultuous year, we are concerned that 2025 may be even more so. Externally, many challenges lie ahead, and internally, we do not know how long the leadership vacuum will last. It seems that the Republic of Korea is facing difficulties and will spend a significant part of 2025 in a double bind.

In such times, we need guidance. To mark the new year of 2025, we have invited Chairman Ha Young-sun of the East Asia Institute to share his valuable insights. Chairman, thank you for joining us. Yes, it's a pleasure. Another year has passed, and we are having a discussion looking ahead to 2025. It feels like we are in a time when it's difficult to even look one day ahead, so I often wonder if it's unreasonable to forecast the coming year. Nevertheless, I believe that sketching out a broad picture might help the airplane called Korea fly, even a little, so I would like to discuss a few things. Personally, I believe we need to approach the outlook for 2025 with a different perspective than in the past.

Prospects for China-US Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era

I believe the focus on the triad of geopolitical leadership crises and opportunities will be crucial. Leadership in major countries is undergoing changes, leading to issues concerning leadership in China-US relations, North Korean leadership, and our domestic leadership challenges. We need to discuss these together and consider what outlook and countermeasures are necessary, especially in international affairs, to avoid major disasters. Yes, you mentioned the 'three leadership crises.' The first, undoubtedly, comes from the United States, which has shown global leadership, perhaps a kind of risk? Therefore, we need to consider the prospects of Trump's foreign policy 2.0. Since the China-US relationship remains the most significant variable defining the international political lives of Koreans, how we view the changes brought about by Trump 2.0 is likely one of the most important issues.

First, as President Trump is scheduled to be inaugurated on January 20th, various forecasts and debates about Trump 2.0 are underway domestically. Personally, I interpret this not merely as a forecast and exploration of Trump 1.0 in a narrow sense, but rather as a broader issue of global leadership crisis and opportunity associated with Trump's second term, which will be more helpful in looking ahead and forging our path.

To that end, although it may seem like a distant past, I believe it is necessary to revisit the summit meetings between the leaders of the US and China during the previous Biden administration. Among them, the Biden-Xi summit held in Lima on November 17th is particularly noteworthy. Interestingly, as always, we see the US and China each summarizing and presenting their own accounts of the meeting. Both countries are now conducting interim assessments, suggesting that since Biden's initial appearance, when they were at odds in Alaska, a certain direction has been established.

Therefore, there is some consensus in principle with the interesting expression of competition, cooperation, and conflict management. It is easier to summarize the Chinese approach, as both sides are discussing whether there is something on which we have reached a general agreement in principle regarding the seven items. In Chinese terms, the seven points of agreement are: first, mutual respect; second, peaceful coexistence; third, securing communication; fourth, preventing conflict; fifth, adhering to the charter; and the remaining two are to pursue mutual cooperation and common prosperity based on shared interests, and to seek win-win strategies in areas of cooperative prosperity. Finally, for areas where agreement is difficult, it is suggested that they should be managed appropriately. China particularly emphasizes what it calls the four red lines. From China's perspective, these are the issues of Taiwan, democracy and human rights, its domestic system, and finally, the right to development. These are the issues of decoupling and risk, which are currently trending. From a Chinese viewpoint, they emphasize acknowledging the differing understandings on these four points and managing them.

The reason I specifically introduce President Biden's past remarks is to consider what changes might occur in the context of a second Trump term regarding the agreement reached between Biden and Xi Jinping in Lima. Will a second Trump term pursue a similar path to the Biden-Xi approach, or will it worsen, or is it relatively unlikely but could it improve? These are crucial questions for the future of global leadership.

That is my thought. To elaborate further on the discussion, the personnel appointments for Xi Jinping's second term are nearing completion, and these individuals are actively engaged. Observing the appointment process, it suggests a tendency towards stronger rhetoric compared to Biden's stance. With figures like Rubio appointed as Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell as National Security Advisor, and Jake Sullivan as Secretary of Defense, it is anticipated that the initial period of the second term will feature more assertive statements. On the other hand, we must also consider the more flexible perspectives, such as that of Gina Raimondo, who will serve as Secretary of Commerce, representing the interests of the U.S. business community. Additionally, figures like John Kirby, recently appointed as Under Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, might offer a more balanced approach. In summary, to realize the 'America First' agenda envisioned in the first term, the U.S.-China relationship is clearly a central focus for the second term. It is likely that a transactional conflict relationship will be attempted with China as the primary target, while simultaneously seeking transactional cooperative relationships with allies and partners like South Korea. This is expected to be the scenario for the first two years, around 2025-2026. In essence, however, this leadership approach is unlikely to achieve a major breakthrough in U.S.-China relations, presenting a challenging path ahead. Therefore, it is probable that in the latter half of a second Trump term, adjustments will be necessary to navigate this leadership crisis, seeking further opportunities before the next election.

China's 2025 Foreign Policy Strategy and Response

That is the forecast. Yes, some predict that the U.S.-China relationship will escalate into a severe conflict. However, you suggest a period of about two years characterized by a mix of transactional conflict and cooperation, with significant difficulty in achieving breakthroughs. Now, I am curious about China's policy toward the U.S. Could you elaborate on that part? While I tend to view the common predictions about a second Trump term with some caution, I believe China's response will be a crucial determinant of its trajectory. Therefore, it is necessary to examine China's outlook for 2025. To do so, we must first look back at 2024. If we were to identify the most significant meeting in 2024, it would undoubtedly be the Central Work Conference held in July, following the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. This conference set economic targets for the long term, extending to 2050, with an interim review in 2035. Unusually, during this conference, Foreign Minister Wang Yi presented a report in mid-August on how China's diplomacy should foster a favorable external environment for the successful execution of these plans. This basic guideline was further elaborated upon on December 17th at a research seminar hosted by the China Institute of International Studies, affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, titled 'International Landscape and China's Diplomacy in 2024'.

He delivered a lengthy speech. I believe this speech best encapsulates China's review of 2024, its assessment of Xi Jinping's diplomacy, its direction for 2025, and its strategy for responding to a potential second Trump administration. Notably, at the end of the speech, he summarized five key areas that China will prioritize in 2025. At first glance, these might seem like colloquial statements, but I found them quite insightful. The five priorities for 2025 are: first, peace; second, unity; third, openness; fourth, justice; and fifth, inclusiveness. While these might sound plausible and familiar, they warrant closer examination. The emphasis on 'peace,' a long-standing theme, in the context of peaceful development, suggests that China does not yet perceive itself as an equal power in the global order and that it is not yet time for confrontation. This is a significant point. Interestingly, while emphasizing peace, the speech also highlights 'unity' amidst a world increasingly divided into unipolar and multipolar structures. This unity, however, is not with the U.S. but rather with other nations. It implies that while maintaining peace with the core powers, including the U.S., China's engagement with global standards and its own capabilities through unity with other countries will be paramount in the next phase. The third point is particularly intriguing. The U.S. replaced the term 'decoupling' with 'de-risking' in 2023, reducing its scope and intensity. What is interesting is that China has not altered its Chinese translation. It continues to use the term '탈구조화' (de-structuring), which was used when 'decoupling' was first introduced. This suggests lingering dissatisfaction with the shift to 'de-risking.' Therefore, as a third objective, China seeks openness to counter this de-structuring. In other words, it advocates for openness. Alongside strengthening its domestic capabilities, particularly in advanced technologies, China will emphasize openness under the guise of building its own global network. This is a crucial point for 2025. A major concern is whether Trump, if re-elected, will revert from Biden's de-risking strategy back to decoupling. China's response, anticipating this possibility and seeking an escape route, is identified as a top priority for 2025. The fourth point, 'justice,' signifies China's continued focus on promoting its legitimacy within the international legal and normative framework for operating the global order. This also extends beyond the U.S.

This looks ahead to around 2035, generally from 2025, and a longer-term view is 2049, looking 50 years ahead. Emphasizing peaceful coexistence implies that China is not yet an equal power in the world order and that it is not yet time to fight, which I believe is an important expression. However, what is interesting is that, secondly, while emphasizing peaceful coexistence, it highlights unity within a world that is becoming divided, so to speak, into bipolar and multipolar structures. This foreshadows unity not with the United States, but with countries other than the United States. Peaceful coexistence is fine, but maintaining peace with the central powers, including the United States, while forging global standards and uniting with American capabilities is crucial for the next stage. Thirdly, I found this particularly interesting. The United States changed the term 'decoupling' to 'de-risking' in 2023. Although the scale and intensity were relatively reduced, what is intriguing is that China has not changed its Chinese translation. What is being used in China is

In the process of moving from unipolarity to multipolarity, this aims to strengthen influence. Perhaps this is not a goal for 2025 but rather a part of capacity building for a longer-term objective. Finally, the emphasis on 'inclusiveness' suggests a strengthening of inclusive capabilities in terms of consciousness, looking towards 2050. Paradoxically, this is presented as a response to the emphasis on 'America First.' By emphasizing inclusive consciousness, China aims to lay the groundwork for potentially taking a central role on the global stage by 2050. This indicates that while the second Trump term might pursue a more direct and confrontational approach in U.S.-China relations compared to the Biden administration, China, while maintaining peace as a base, cannot be unilaterally dictated to. Therefore, this response is understandable. You have provided a very insightful analysis.

This is a part of capacity building for a longer-term objective. Finally, the emphasis on 'inclusiveness' suggests a strengthening of inclusive capabilities in terms of consciousness, looking towards 2050. Paradoxically, this is presented as a response to the emphasis on 'America First.' By emphasizing inclusive consciousness, China aims to lay the groundwork for potentially taking a central role on the global stage by 2050. This indicates that while the second Trump term might pursue a more direct and confrontational approach in U.S.-China relations compared to the Biden administration, China, while maintaining peace as a base, cannot be unilaterally dictated to. Therefore, this response is understandable. You have provided a very insightful analysis.

U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific and the Future of South Korea and Japan

Wang Yi's five keywords seem to suggest an intent to exploit the weaknesses of the Trump administration and fill the perceived void in global leadership. This speech appears to strongly convey such a nuance. Based on your analysis, China's response strategy to Trump's policies involves five key principles. In this context, the U.S.-China competition in the Indo-Pacific region will heavily depend on the stance of allied nations. The future trajectory of South Korea and Japan is particularly crucial, making the future of South Korea-Japan relations a significant factor. The divergence between Trump's and Xi Jinping's positions arises from the 'America First' doctrine: how will it redefine relationships with allies, partners, and friendly nations? In the Indo-Pacific context, this raises questions about the future of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy. The cooperative relationship, a key element, will likely undergo changes. While the trilateral cooperation at Camp David aimed for equal partnership, Trump's approach might prioritize U.S.-Japan cooperation significantly more, relegating South Korea to a more subsidiary role. A particularly interesting point is found in Elbridge Colby's book, 'The Strategy of Denial,' published a few years ago. In it, he discusses how the U.S. can prevent China's hegemonic order from taking root in the Indo-Pacific by drawing a defensive line, similar to the Acheson Line. He identifies Japan, Australia, and India as essential partners for cost-effective cooperation, while South Korea is considered relatively costly and thus excluded from this primary defensive line, or at best, on the borderline. This suggests a complex and evolving relationship. In contrast, Xi Jinping's perspective is that while peaceful development is essential in principle, China cannot be subservient to the U.S. Therefore, it must strengthen its domestic capabilities and pay attention to relatively weaker links to build its own network. From this perspective, South Korea is likely considered a target for engagement within the Indo-Pacific region.

What is the future of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy? And how will the cooperative relationship, one of its key elements, change? While the trilateral cooperation at Camp David aimed for equal partnership, Trump's approach might prioritize U.S.-Japan cooperation significantly more, relegating South Korea to a more subsidiary role. A particularly interesting point is found in Elbridge Colby's book, 'The Strategy of Denial,' published a few years ago. In it, he discusses how the U.S. can prevent China's hegemonic order from taking root in the Indo-Pacific by drawing a defensive line, similar to the Acheson Line. He identifies Japan, Australia, and India as essential partners for cost-effective cooperation, while South Korea is considered relatively costly and thus excluded from this primary defensive line, or at best, on the borderline. This suggests a complex and evolving relationship. In contrast, Xi Jinping's perspective is that while peaceful development is essential in principle, China cannot be subservient to the U.S. Therefore, it must strengthen its domestic capabilities and pay attention to relatively weaker links to build its own network. From this perspective, South Korea is likely considered a target for engagement within the Indo-Pacific region.

In contrast, Xi Jinping's perspective is that while peaceful development is essential in principle, China cannot be subservient to the U.S. Therefore, it must strengthen its domestic capabilities and pay attention to relatively weaker links to build its own network. From this perspective, South Korea is likely considered a target for engagement within the Indo-Pacific region. In contrast, the U.S. strategy, as outlined in Colby's book, prioritizes Japan, Australia, and India for cost-effective cooperation, while South Korea is considered a more costly option, potentially on the periphery. This suggests a complex and evolving relationship. China, on the other hand, aims to strengthen its domestic capabilities and build its own network, viewing South Korea as a potential partner in this endeavor. This creates a complex dynamic where South Korea finds itself caught between the two major powers.

North Korean Leadership Crisis and 2025 Outlook

Therefore, this could paradoxically lead to a delicate position in 2025, requiring careful consideration. What, then, should South Korean leadership pursue to navigate this adversity and move towards a better direction for South Korea and the Indo-Pacific region? The evolution of the Camp David framework presents a crucial experiment. Discarding it is an unreasonable demand. However, considering the changes around us, particularly from China, how should it evolve? This poses a significant challenge for us. Now, let us bring the discussion of leadership crisis down to the Korean Peninsula. Please begin by discussing North Korea's leadership. First, I addressed the crisis of global leadership; second, I intend to discuss the crisis of North Korean leadership.

Some who view the North Korean issue narrowly might wonder why the crisis of North Korean leadership is emphasized for 2025. However, looking back at the past year and forward to 2025, I believe North Korea must wisely overcome a leadership crisis in 2025, comparable to the crises in global leadership and South Korean domestic leadership. The reason is that the 8th Party Congress and the 7th Plenary Session of the Central Committee, held from December 23rd to 27th, have just concluded, and a summary of their outcomes has been disseminated.

This could paradoxically place us in a delicate position, caught between both sides. Thus, 2025 demands careful consideration. What, then, should South Korean leadership pursue to navigate this adversity and move towards a better direction for South Korea and the Indo-Pacific region? The evolution of the Camp David framework presents a crucial experiment. Discarding it is an unreasonable demand. However, considering the changes around us, particularly from China, how should it evolve? This poses a significant challenge for us. Now, let us bring the discussion of leadership crisis down to the Korean Peninsula. Please begin by discussing North Korea's leadership. First, I addressed the crisis of global leadership; second, I intend to discuss the crisis of North Korean leadership.

Those who view the North Korean issue narrowly might wonder why the crisis of North Korean leadership is emphasized for 2025. However, looking back at the past year and forward to 2025, I believe North Korea must wisely overcome a leadership crisis in 2025, comparable to the crises in global leadership and South Korean domestic leadership. The reason is that the 8th Party Congress and the 7th Plenary Session of the Central Committee, held from December 23rd to 27th, have just concluded, and a summary of their outcomes has been disseminated.

Looking at the developments over the past year, such as Kim Jong Un's speech on September 9th, the anniversary of the founding, and the expanded summary of the plenary session, the reasons for viewing this as a crisis of North Korean leadership are as follows. As you know, 2025 is a pivotal year for North Korea, a turning point. It also marks the conclusion of the five-year economic plan set forth at the 8th Party Congress. Therefore, the emphasis in North Korea's overall discourse and Kim Jong Un's speeches in 2024 will inevitably be on the economy. They must demonstrate some level of achievement over the past five years and present a blueprint for the economy in the coming five years, making 2025 a crucial year leading up to it.

However, what is the problem? In my opinion, economic development is an absolute priority in 2024. North Korea is particularly emphasizing regional development, with plans to foster development in 20 key regions over ten years, aiming to showcase a new North Korea with balanced development between the central and regional levels. However, what truly concerns me is that 2024 has been a year of continued involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war and the strengthening of North Korea's nuclear capabilities. Considering these factors when looking at 2025, on the surface, things appear to be progressing well. Nuclear capabilities are advancing rapidly according to their objectives, and tactical nuclear weapons targeting South Korea are also being enhanced.

Through participation in the Russia-Ukraine war, there is an expectation of short-term military and economic benefits. If such expectations exist, despite the significant risk of casualties among young North Koreans, some argue that North Korea may not face a crisis. However, my cautious assessment is twofold. First, will participation yield positive effects? Many North Korean and Russian experts predict positive outcomes. What can Chairman Kim Jong Un gain? My cautious view is that this will be fundamentally different from South Korea's participation in the Vietnam War. From North Korea's perspective, participation might be seen as a decision made after careful consideration as part of strengthening its international capabilities for survival. However, the difficulty in achieving significant results stems from Russia's current position. The position of the U.S. during the Vietnam War and Russia's position in the current Russia-Ukraine war are fundamentally different. To illustrate with just two indicators: the estimated global GDP for 2024 is approximately $105 trillion, with the U.S. at $25 trillion, China at $19 trillion, Japan at $4.4 trillion, Russia at $2.1 trillion, and South Korea at $1.7 trillion. This means Russia's economy is slightly larger than South Korea's. Beyond its relationship with China, the benefits North Korea can derive from Russia are likely to be very limited. China will undoubtedly be observing these developments closely. In terms of military spending, last year's estimated military expenditure was around $2.4 trillion, with the U.S. at $900 billion, China at approximately $300 billion, and Japan and South Korea each around $50 billion.

We might conventionally assume that Russia, engaged in a conflict across Europe, is incurring enormous military expenses. However, the estimated expenditure, including war costs, is around $100 billion, roughly equivalent to the combined military spending of Japan and South Korea. Therefore, while participation might offer minimal short-term international capacity building, it is likely to be a misguided choice in the long run. More importantly, Russia is receiving extensive military and economic support from China.

This is a very difficult situation. If forced to choose one, it would naturally be China. Therefore, if nuclear development was North Korea's first strategic mistake over the past 20-30 years, participation in the war is likely the second. More importantly, the need to demonstrate economic performance in 2025 appears challenging. However, visible progress is being made this year, with some improvement. As I always say, China's economic growth cannot be sustained by single-digit growth. Unless China catches up to the level of economic growth achieved during its reform and opening-up period, or Vietnam's current reform and opening-up, with double-digit growth over a generation, it will be difficult to maintain its position on the global stage. In conclusion, the leadership in 2024 has not been wise in fulfilling these three conditions: nuclear development, participation in the war, and economic growth.

That will be a very difficult story. If forced to choose between the two, it would naturally be China. Therefore, if North Korea's first wrong choice in its survival strategy over the past 20-30 years was nuclear development, the second was likely dispatching troops. More importantly, it needs to show economic performance in 2025, which may seem ambitious. However, tangible results are being seen as this year is relatively improving. As I always say, China's economic growth cannot be achieved with single-digit growth. Unless it catches up with double-digit economic growth for a generation, not just a year, at the level of reform and opening up that China experienced or Vietnam is experiencing, it will be very difficult to remain on the stage. Therefore, to summarize, the leadership in 2024 was not wise in meeting these three conditions: nuclear development, troop deployment, and economic growth.

South Korea's Leadership Crisis and Setting New Goals

In my view, although North Korea will announce its plans for the next five years in 2025, the continuation of nuclear armament, the lack of expected results from military participation, and the difficult relationship with China suggest that North Korea will face a challenging 2025. This outlook is somewhat somber and differs from common predictions. The general view is that the war participation will strengthen the Cold War dynamic between North Korea, China, and Russia on one side, and South Korea, the U.S., and Japan on the other, with China gaining significant strategic advantages. However, your analysis suggests that the negative consequences of military participation will far outweigh the positive ones from a structural perspective. Now, let us move to the final crisis: the crisis of South Korean leadership.

This leadership crisis is a daily reality for us. Therefore, the question is whether the ship of the Republic of Korea can navigate smoothly in 2025, especially amidst a highly strained international environment. We seem to lack a captain. Without a captain, how can we ensure a safe landing without a crash landing? It appears to be a critical juncture. What are your forecasts and advice? As you pointed out, with no captain or first officer, and with the autopilot seemingly malfunctioning, what should we do? What is the secret to avoiding a crash landing? This is undoubtedly our biggest challenge for 2025. Reflecting on our current reality, I have this thought: the current leadership vacuum and confusion we are experiencing can be viewed in a longer historical context, dating back to the late 19th century and the process of nation-building over the past 200 years. More recently, it has been 80 years since we began these efforts in earnest. We have undertaken compressed nation-building for 80 years, achieving industrialization and democratization simultaneously, a rare success story that fills us with pride, leading to discussions of K-industrialization and K-democratization. However, why are we experiencing what appears to be a simultaneous crisis of 'political division' and 'economic stagnation' today? I believe that to overcome this crisis, a leadership that can clearly set a new direction is essential. In nation-building, at the very least, we need to set clear goals for constructing a modern nation and determine how to achieve them. In the 21st century, simply pursuing the goals of the late 19th or early to mid-20th centuries is insufficient. The side effects of rudimentary industrialization, whether authoritarian or democratic, are acutely manifesting in our current reality. The breakthrough will not come solely from efforts to overcome authoritarianism and populism, but from establishing new goals that look beyond them, requiring national consensus or agreement among political leaders. Without this roadmap, the plane is destined to crash. In this sense, 2025 is a critical year.

In this sense, 2025 is a critical year. What I have long advocated for is that South Korea's goal in the 21st century should transcend mere modernization and move towards the construction of a 'new civilization state.' This involves building a complex state capable of responding to new civilizational transformations. This requires setting complex goals. The emergence of foundational advanced technologies, the quest for cooperative governance beyond mere authoritarianism or populism in the political sphere, the dilemma of growth and distribution in the economic sphere, the tension between globalization and nationalism in the cultural sphere, and advanced approaches to environmental issues – ultimately, how can we achieve cooperative governance? Setting goals that simultaneously pursue these six or seven objectives is urgently needed, and accordingly,

efforts in each field are required. Simply put, the people are following. The people are making individual efforts in their respective fields but lack a cohesive vision. The political forces that should be drawing this vision are polarized by narrow partisan interests, with little regard for the overall direction of the plane. Instead, they are preoccupied with internal struggles, such as who gets first or business class. In such a situation, we face a grave challenge. Given the time constraints, let us focus on how this domestic leadership crisis will manifest in 2025, particularly in the foreign policy domain.

In this sense, 2025 is a critical year. What I have long advocated for is that South Korea's goal in the 21st century should transcend mere modernization and move towards the construction of a 'new civilization state.' This involves building a complex state capable of responding to new civilizational transformations. This requires setting complex goals. The emergence of foundational advanced technologies, the quest for cooperative governance beyond mere authoritarianism or populism in the political sphere, the dilemma of growth and distribution in the economic sphere, the tension between globalization and nationalism in the cultural sphere, and advanced approaches to environmental issues – ultimately, how can we achieve cooperative governance? Setting goals that simultaneously pursue these six or seven objectives is urgently needed, and accordingly, efforts in each field are required. Simply put, the people are following. The people are making individual efforts in their respective fields but lack a cohesive vision. The political forces that should be drawing this vision are polarized by narrow partisan interests, with little regard for the overall direction of the plane. Instead, they are preoccupied with internal struggles, such as who gets first or business class. In such a situation, we face a grave challenge. Given the time constraints, let us focus on how this domestic leadership crisis will manifest in 2025, particularly in the foreign policy domain.

The people are making individual efforts in their respective fields but lack a cohesive vision. The political forces that should be drawing this vision are polarized by narrow partisan interests, with little regard for the overall direction of the plane. Instead, they are preoccupied with internal struggles, such as who gets first or business class. In such a situation, we face a grave challenge. Given the time constraints, let us focus on how this domestic leadership crisis will manifest in 2025, particularly in the foreign policy domain.

Washington Declaration and the Evolution of Camp David

Two issues have become particularly urgent due to recent events in December. These are as significant as impeachment proceedings. First, the Washington Declaration in 2023 under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration addressed how to effectively manage the North Korean nuclear issue. Second, the joint declaration on trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan at Camp David in August 2023. However, both of these initiatives

are now facing 2025 without the key signatories. The Trump transition team is likely grappling with significant decisions regarding these declarations. Will they inherit the declarations made under the Biden administration, discard them, or modify them? I believe this decision is as critical as overcoming the domestic leadership vacuum and will significantly impact South Korea's international standing. To briefly explain, Camp David is more urgent in terms of timing and risk. Considering the global power distribution map I presented earlier, the trilateral declaration at Camp David cannot be discarded. Efforts to evolve it are necessary. How will we evolve it? As I mentioned earlier,

Trump lacks a long-term vision, and Japan is also facing significant domestic political challenges. Therefore, how we move forward is a point strongly emphasized in North Korean documents, suggesting that this trilateral cooperation will lead to the downfall of the three countries and the Indo-Pacific. To ensure the prosperity of the three countries and the Indo-Pacific, how can we develop the Camp David framework? I believe two prerequisites are necessary. Whichever government takes office, discarding this framework would be inappropriate. It must be maintained, strengthened, improved, and evolved in some form, considering its global implications. Can we find ways to absorb the concerns of China and North Korea regarding this? I believe it is not impossible to embrace and improve it. Moreover, with Trump's potential position in a second term being somewhat stronger than Biden's,

I do not necessarily believe that. International politics is dynamic, and our ability to set a forward-looking direction is crucial, requiring sophisticated South Korean leadership. This involves not only the U.S. and Japan but also other stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific. Even China, as Trump's second term progresses, might realize that simply continuing the current path is unsustainable. Within the context of de-risking, while the term 'management' may be undesirable, the issue requires careful consideration. Therefore, based on the U.S.-South Korea alliance, a plan for integrating China and North Korea should be developed and presented to the U.S. transition team. However, with the current leadership vacuum, neither the executive branch, think tanks, nor academia are actively engaged, leaving the situation adrift. The second critical issue is the North Korean nuclear problem. The Washington Declaration established a basic agreement on 'integrated deterrence' between South Korea and the U.S. Should this be discarded? At this juncture, with leadership absent on all sides, I believe the most cost-effective solution for North Korea, China, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea is not to discard it. Why not discard it? North Korea's pursuit of survival through nuclear weapons is, as I have stated, a misguided choice.

Furthermore, in a new era where nuclear weapons are linked with AI, the cost-effectiveness of nuclear weapons is likely to decline rapidly, contrary to North Korea's expectations. Therefore, seeking new survival strategies is inevitable. Of course, there is a dilemma, as nuclear weapons are one of the two pillars supporting the North Korean regime, making it difficult to abandon them easily. However, objectively viewed, this appears to be the result of a highly imprudent choice. While some progressive voices argue for a peaceful missile relationship in response to North Korea's declaration of hostile missile relations, this is not a cost-effective solution in reality. North Korea clearly articulates its nuclear strategy. It argues that since it possesses nuclear weapons, it cannot strategically threaten the U.S. comprehensively, thus it must utilize them tactically against South Korea.

Under such circumstances, they believe that South Korea, lacking nuclear weapons, must comply, even if unfairly. To demonstrate that nuclear weapons do not play such a decisive role, a response is necessary. However, the argument that South Korea should also acquire nuclear weapons is, in my view, not a cost-effective option. Particularly, those who hold this hope believe that Trump might permit South Korea to possess nuclear weapons. One of the sources of this idea is Elbridge Colby's book, where he suggests that if the cost-effectiveness of deterring North Korea's nuclear armament is too high, the U.S. might say, 'We must first deter threats to ourselves. If the threats to South Korea and Japan are also to be deterred, then perhaps you should handle it.' This implies that the U.S. might focus solely on its own defense. However, this statement is made without considering the context: it is a potential option only when the cost-benefit calculation drastically shifts, and even then, it is a possibility. The domestic view that 'Trump will effectively allow South Korea and Japan to possess nuclear weapons' is a misperception. Therefore, in our case, despite the negative side effects of integrated deterrence, we have no choice but to maintain it for the time being. However, it is important to emphasize that this might be perceived as overly aggressive by North Korea and China.

This implies that the U.S. might focus solely on its own defense. However, this statement is made without considering the context: it is a potential option only when the cost-benefit calculation drastically shifts, and even then, it is a possibility. The domestic view that 'Trump will effectively allow South Korea and Japan to possess nuclear weapons' is a misperception. Therefore, in our case, despite the negative side effects of integrated deterrence, we have no choice but to maintain it for the time being. However, it is important to emphasize that this might be perceived as overly aggressive by North Korea and China.

This implies that the U.S. might focus solely on its own defense. However, this statement is made without considering the context: it is a potential option only when the cost-benefit calculation drastically shifts, and even then, it is a possibility. The domestic view that 'Trump will effectively allow South Korea and Japan to possess nuclear weapons' is a misperception. Therefore, in our case, despite the negative side effects of integrated deterrence, we have no choice but to maintain it for the time being. However, it is important to emphasize that this might be perceived as overly aggressive by North Korea and China.

Therefore, there might be considerable room for adjustment regarding China, and another channel can be opened towards North Korea. Since this was developed as a deterrent against North Korea's nuclear program, our ultimate goal is peace, and therefore, the path to peace must remain open. Thus, while maintaining integrated deterrence, we must also consider how to combine this with a framework that simultaneously pursues improved inter-Korean relations. As I mentioned earlier, Camp David needs to be nurtured with a comprehensive evolutionary perspective of competition, coexistence, and evolution. Just as the evolution of South Korea, the U.S., and Japan is necessary, and ways to achieve cooperative evolution with China and Russia must be sought, the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue ultimately depends on how we envision a new complex state for North Korea in the 21st century, if North Korea has indeed made a wrong choice for its survival strategy and is facing real threats.

This is a crucial homework assignment for South Korea, and we must work towards discussing it with Japan, China, and the U.S. Even if Chairman Kim Jong Un finds it difficult to accept in the short term, such discussions should gradually be pursued globally. The crisis in global leadership, both domestically and internationally, is characterized by a lack of clear objectives. Overcoming this crisis involves not merely overcoming populism, authoritarianism, or the hegemony of the U.S. or China, but establishing new targets for civilizational transformation. This requires leadership that can articulate these new goals, and a focal point must be established. This involves creating a breakthrough in discourse, and to solidify this discourse, we must consider how to cultivate political leadership and forces. Domestically, this relates to improving the presidential system, parliamentary system, and central-local government elections. Globally, serious discussions and efforts are needed to envision a new order that transcends mere U.S. or Chinese dominance. 2025 should be the inaugural year for this transformation, shifting from a country facing an unmanageable crisis over the next 30 years to a nation of hope. I hold this hope. You have spoken with considerable passion today, which is somewhat different from your usual tone. This New Year's dialogue can be summarized into three main points. First, you discussed the crisis of global leadership, using the metaphor of an airplane.

This is not mere turbulence in global leadership. Upon closer examination, the direction of the air currents is discernible, and we must effectively catch them. You have effectively conveyed the necessity of closely observing and analyzing the directions of the U.S. and China. Second, you view North Korea's current movements as indicative of a crisis in leadership, suggesting that North Korea is heading in the wrong direction.

You have effectively conveyed the necessity of closely observing and analyzing the directions of the U.S. and China. Second, you view North Korea's current movements as indicative of a crisis in leadership, suggesting that North Korea is heading in the wrong direction. Therefore, considerable thought is needed on how to guide North Korea back on track. Third, regarding South Korea, there are two urgent tasks that the current pilot must address in 2025. The first is how to successfully evolve the trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, established at Camp David, towards competition and coexistence. This will be the primary task facing us in 2025. The second is the Washington Declaration concerning North Korea's nuclear program, which we must also lead effectively. Within this context, we need to explore discourse that enables North Korea to survive in the 21st century without nuclear weapons.

In summary, South Korea must now firmly grasp the rudder for the construction of a new civilization state. The miracles of industrialization and democratization achieved thus far are now facing a crisis. In this crisis, a new discourse for the future must be established, requiring leadership to formulate this discourse and a driving force to implement it. Your message is one of profound urgency, especially at this moment. As we usher in 2025, we have engaged in a weighty conversation. EAI pledges to conduct extensive policy research and present its findings, focusing on the critical discourse we have discussed today. We will now conclude this New Year's dialogue. Thank you for your time, Chairman. Thank you very much.

In summary, South Korea must now firmly grasp the rudder for the construction of a new civilization state. The miracles of industrialization and democratization achieved thus far are now facing a crisis. In this crisis, a new discourse for the future must be established, requiring leadership to formulate this discourse and a driving force to implement it. Your message is one of profound urgency, especially at this moment. As we usher in 2025, we have engaged in a weighty conversation. EAI pledges to conduct extensive policy research and present its findings, focusing on the critical discourse we have discussed today. We will now conclude this New Year's dialogue. Thank you for your time, Chairman. Thank you very much.