[Special Feature on US Presidential Election: Visible Commentary] III. Foreign Policy Outlook:

YouTube Link : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z8oXxr0ZMOo

Video Script

Can America truly become 'MAGA (Make America Great Again)'? Everyone wants it, whether Republican or Democrat. However, there is a path to achieving it through Trump's methods, and the Democrats also have their own approach. How can we evaluate and forecast the next four years as a long track? If we proceed in this direction, is there a possibility that America will truly become 'MAGA'? Let's discuss that. An interesting point is the prediction that Trump is an unchangeable person and will act arbitrarily for four years as an avenger if he returns to power. On the other hand, there is a possibility that one's governing ability may decline after failing to win an election and then regaining power, similar to Abe, who, after failing, regained power five years later with a diminished capacity compared to his previous governance.

what should we consider as the so-called 'MAGA'? What is the 'end point' that Dr. Gong mentioned? Is it a smooth transition to a post-industrial society? If so, the Republican Party and populists talk about 'Drill, Baby, Drill.' Regarding energy policy, the structural transition to a post-industrial society is ultimately related to science and technology, yet the Republican Party consistently opposes it. Comparing the United States to countries like South Korea or Japan presents distinct characteristics. America has abundant resources, vastly different social strata, and different political and economic structures. For example, manufacturing is collapsing, and the economy is sustained only by finance and services. In this context, does 'MAGA' mean restoring manufacturing? Restoring manufacturing is not compatible with a post-industrial society. Therefore, I don't think it can be considered a direction.

What should be considered the so-called 'MAGA' you mentioned? What is the 'end point' that Dr. Gong mentioned? Is it a flexible transition to a post-industrial society? If so, the Republican Party and populists talk about 'Drill, Baby, Drill.' This applies to energy policy as well. The structural transition to a post-industrial society is ultimately related to science and technology, yet the Republican Party consistently opposes it. The United States has characteristics that make it difficult to compare with countries the size of South Korea or Japan. It possesses abundant resources, vastly different social strata, and distinct economic structures, not just political ones. For example, the US economy is currently experiencing a collapse in manufacturing, sustained only by finance and services. In this context, does 'MAGA' mean restoring manufacturing? Manufacturing restoration is not compatible with a post-industrial society. Therefore, I do not think it can be considered a direction.

Economic Policies and Practical Limitations of the Trump Administration

We can consider what you've said. If that happens, what about the goals they are currently setting? For example, protecting the working class. To achieve this, manufacturing jobs are ultimately necessary, and the key means for manufacturing jobs is 'free trade.' There is a formula for this, but aren't the people currently thinking that this formula is flawed? The formula seems perfect. However, it has several assumptions, and these seem to be faltering. One of these points was raised by Daron Acemoglu, this year's Nobel laureate in Economics, in his criticism of Trump: it is true that if Trump raises tariffs, various companies will return to the US to manufacture goods. But where are the 'skilled workers'? Such 'skilled workers' no longer exist within the US.

a modified outcome that shifts elsewhere. Perhaps Trump is aware of this. With a four-year term, Trump will likely evaluate foreign capital investment in US manufacturing through FDI as a success. I fully agree with what you just said. Paradoxically, the original Democratic plan to pursue a manufacturing renaissance through retraining and social safety nets could create a situation where the Republican Party also needs it. From a long-term perspective. Trump doesn't need to think he's doing it, nor does he have a reason to, but at least the way he presents it to voters, as if change is happening, could provide a viable agenda for the Republican Party for the next 10 years, or two presidential elections.

Whether this constitutes the success of 'MAGA' is debatable. However, it is certainly possible that the impetus for change could paradoxically come in the form proposed by the Republican Party. Dr. Kwon, you mentioned earlier, 'Doesn't Trump only paint a rosy picture?' This thought keeps nagging me. What about Ukraine? Clearly, from this year to next, and into the middle of next year, the Trump administration's decisions will significantly impact alliances and partners. However, it remains to be seen whether voters will cast their ballots based on this. I am skeptical. I agree with Professor Seo's assessment. However, the message to existing media, such as the New York Times or the Washington Post, will be very strong. If he fails to achieve success in that regard, in reality,

The War in Ukraine and the Trump Administration's Decisions

Whether this constitutes the success of 'MAGA' can be evaluated or not. However, it does seem that the impetus for change could paradoxically come in the form proposed by the Republican Party. Dr. Kwon, you asked earlier if 'Trump only paints a rosy picture,' but this thought immediately comes to mind: What about Ukraine? It is clear that the Trump administration's decisions, from this year to next, and into the middle of next year, will significantly impact the alliances and allied nations. However, it is uncertain whether voters will cast their ballots based on this. I am skeptical. I agree with Professor Seo's assessment. However, the message conveyed to existing media outlets, such as The New York Times or The Washington Post, will be very strong. If they fail to achieve success in that regard, in reality,

they could face immense criticism from the media, regardless of whether there are sufficient economic benefits for the middle class or lower classes. Allies will also join in such evaluations. Will he care? He will call it 'fake news.' However, the scrutiny from allied nations and their attitudes will be important. In fact, the variable of Trump has been so large that the international community has been treated almost as a constant, but in reality, the international community is the variable. Due to the two wars, we will experience unprecedented situations, and as you said, signals may come much sooner than expected. That's right. What I want to ask is whether Israel will be controlled under the Trump administration. Wouldn't that be a very important test? Immediately upon taking office, Netanyahu will likely intensify the offensive. Will the re-emergence of a global economy, or a leadership that suppressed such things in the 1950s, as another pillar of 'MAGA,' occur? Experts believe it will not, but will there be points that appeal to American voters, different from the previous four-year term? Back then, he could meet with North Korea and make gestures to do something, and he led very successful initiatives in East Asia against China with the capable partnership of Abe. However, I have concerns about whether he can create a legacy of that magnitude over the next four years. I sympathize with Dr. Kwon's concerns. I see Ukraine differently; I believe the US is overreaching.

It can simply be cut off. From the US perspective, they just need to stop supporting Zelensky. Cut it all off. The same applies to Putin. From Putin's perspective, it's not a losing proposition; it could even be quite advantageous. There likely won't be significant domestic backlash.

I think one variable in the process of returning to an industrial society is the US-China competition. When Biden took office, he did not dismantle most of what Trump had done, including tariffs. The reason for this is the entry into US-China competition. If it were a globalized world without US-China competition, it would have been nonsensical and immediately reversed. However, due to the challenge of US-China competition, even economically illogical choices are somewhat covered by security logic. In that sense, what is happening now, although absurdities will occur in execution and management, such as reshoring factories only to find them filled with AI, still

has the momentum to sustain this risk and decoupling for quite some time. I hold a similar view. There are also arguments that world peace will come with Trump's arrival, as with Ukraine. Regarding Ukraine, as I've mentioned several times, Trump's most powerful tool is 'no.' In the US political process, when the President requests Congress to pass a Ukraine aid bill, Congress resolves and approves it. If Trump doesn't even request aid, there's no historical precedent for the US Congress to proactively assist Ukraine.

North Korea's Dispatch of Troops to Russia and Prospects for Peace Negotiations

This connects to what I was asked yesterday at the National Assembly: why were North Korean troops deployed to Russia at this particular time? This suggests that Putin has calculated that this will lead to the swift initiation of armistice or peace negotiations. The crucial factor then becomes: who has secured the most territory by that point? Following the Wagner mercenary rebellion, the Russian military suffered significant losses, and its territory was encroached upon. The analysis suggests that by utilizing North Korean troops, they can quickly recover and secure a certain amount of territory, thereby gaining an advantageous position in armistice or peace talks.

Therefore, if Trump does not request aid for Ukraine, Congress will not act, and Ukraine aid will cease. How will NATO allies respond? It is difficult to imagine NATO allies independently continuing to support Ukraine if US leadership withdraws. Especially considering the natural gas economic relationship between Germany and Russia, this would eventually lead to international pressure on Zelensky to negotiate, perhaps along the lines of the Korean Peninsula model. In the case of Israel, from Netanyahu's perspective, it would be better to have

Trump in power. He could declare victory over Hamas, thereby ending the war after aggressively suppressing Hamas. He could then engage in hostage negotiations with Trump, offering Trump the element he desires: the accomplishment of rescuing American hostages whom Biden could not save. Thus, while it might sound like a novel, this international situation could potentially lead to greater stability with Trump's arrival. Whether America can return to its hegemonic status depends on whether the will follows the physical capabilities. However, it seems we all agree that even Trump's solutions will not be easy. Consequently, hegemony continues to weaken, and Trump, in a sense, is not explicitly moving to restore that hegemony's

position; he seems to be pursuing only strong national interests. If all of that is achieved, he might rise again as a hegemonic power at some point, but that doesn't seem to be within Trump's current vision. That's what we're curious about. Can he re-emerge in the primaries? Can order be restored? These are the thoughts we're having, and the outlook seems to be taking shape. Then, within that outlook, we need to discuss the issues related to Korea, starting with the initial points raised. Earlier,

you mentioned the point that Trump's America is now a given constant, and what's important is not Trump's intentions but us. We've seen the last four years, so we can roughly predict his return. Then, what can allies do? What can partners do? Looking at Asia, the domestic politics of two important countries are very fragile, making it difficult to exert diplomatic leadership. Whether it's a middle power coalition or an alliance coalition without the US, it's difficult in the short term.

Alliance Solidarity and South Korea's Diplomatic Strategy

Indeed. Normatively, it's crucial for allies to play a role in uniting with the US and ensuring a smooth transition upon his departure. To what extent is this possible, Dr. Kwon? That seems to be the most difficult question. First, how can we maintain a good relationship with the US, even if it means paying a bit more? We had the US, China, Japan, and North Korea.

So, seeing some of those aspects, we seem to be overly fearful. Based solely on the experience of the first term, the international situation has changed so much, and we also have past experiences, so the landscape may have shifted, but I feel we are too stuck in the past. In fact, regarding North Korea's dispatch of troops, which was briefly mentioned earlier, did North Korea dispatch troops without any consideration? It was an enormous gamble. Perhaps North Korea could be the one to poke holes in Trump's 'MAGA' plan the fastest, given its aptitude for creating problems. Therefore, some speculate that North Korea's decision to ally with Russia and dispatch troops was calculated with the autumn peace or end-of-war negotiations in mind.

disarmament. So, our calculations become complex. Therefore, while the ultimate goal of denuclearization should remain, we need to think concretely about how to establish intermediate steps, how to coordinate with the US, and how to achieve domestic consensus, and prepare accordingly. I believe we can endure. However, nothing is easy. There's no need to worry excessively about a path not yet taken. There is time until January 20th, and everyone is acting as if they have simulated and experienced it yesterday, but the results came out only a day ago. We are overly apprehensive. Therefore, we should engage in consensus projection and proactive contact with neighboring countries, Japan and Australia, and other countries with which we have relationships. This can be done within two months. Through Track 2 and Track 1.5, continuous contact is essential so that we can

We need to maintain a flexible stance to negotiate with North Korea as needed, rather than worrying in advance. I agree 50% with your statement that these voices should spread widely through the media and various channels so that our citizens can also adopt such perceptions. Because that is a good thing. The America of Trump represents a completely changed America, and it has indeed presented us with homework. However, this is no longer the America of the 70-year-old ROK-US alliance, but a populist America, an interventionist America, an America demanding increased defense cost-sharing; this is a completely changed America that cannot be dismissed as merely a temporary phenomenon of Trump.

Therefore, we have indeed been given a significant task regarding how we should view and understand America, and we must do this homework. Some are already suggesting that instead of giving the requested amount for defense cost-sharing, we should seek approval for nuclear armament. This is humiliating. If we believe that indigenous nuclear armament is necessary, we should simply pursue it independently; the idea of asking the US President for approval is something I cannot agree with. More specifically and realistically, how can we trust Trump's promises? Do you think Trump will provide written promises, or that Congress will pass laws? I am frustrated by how such ideas can emerge. Trump was talking about other things yesterday, like tax cuts in Texas.

and shipbuilding. We are engaging in discussions among ourselves about 'how much should we give?' or 'they haven't even asked for it yet,' with intellectuals and experts discussing it extensively. This can lead to unnecessary strategic exposure and a disadvantage in negotiation status, so we need to be vigilant. Experts, the media, and think tanks should discuss this together. As you know Trump's tendencies, he will demand $10 billion. He sees South Korea as a 'money machine.' We have already agreed to 1.5 trillion won. If it goes up to 10 trillion won, the increase rate will be enormous. Nevertheless, negotiating as Trump speaks is not advisable.

A Multipolar World Order and the Role of the United States

We do not need to be easily drawn into Trump's negotiation strategy and bring about our own defeat. There is no need for internal confusion either. If Trump talks about $10 billion, it is important to remain silent for a few months and observe North Korea's reaction. While we must study and research how to deal with Trump and populist America, sometimes it is necessary to remain silent. We should not fall into the Democratic Party's fear-based lack of imagination. Considering the ideal end state of the United States in international politics, it does not seem to be the recreation of the liberal world order or hegemonic order. Trump, and especially Pence, explicitly acknowledge that we have entered a multipolar world.

China has already become a great power; it will not disappear just because we don't acknowledge it. Using Trump's logic, we have already started the poker game. The great powers have begun the 19th-century great power game, and they are making deals there. Sometimes they use force or cheat, but a situation has arisen where great powers gather and play poker. If America is to shape the world order with this kind of realistic image going forward, the situation we will witness for some time to come will likely be challenging.

The Ukraine war seems similar. It's a matter of where to draw the line near Russia. In East Asia, Taiwan emerges as the most urgent issue. Where does Taiwan fit in? Neither Trump nor Pence answers when reporters ask repeatedly. When asked if he would intervene in a Taiwan contingency, Biden had no hesitation. Because it is a democracy. However, the fact that Taiwan is a democracy means nothing in their minds. The calculation begins here.

If they take Taiwan like a tributary state, what will they give us? They will have to take TSMC, and the calculations are proceeding in this manner. Therefore, we are seeing a situation that is both strange and familiar, reminiscent of the 19th and early 20th centuries. This seems to be part of that process.

The Role of the EU and South Korea's Diplomatic Partnership

What Trump envisioned was building a 'Trump World' in Wonsan and bringing Kim Jong Un into it. The agenda was not denuclearization but deal-making, an agenda within the liberal world, aiming to draw North Korea closer to the US than to China and gain a favorable geopolitical position. The approach to North Korea based on norms like democracy, human rights, and non-proliferation has ended. We must be prepared. Considering how the international community operates within the liberal world order, we will be significantly impacted, not only on the Korean Peninsula but also by these key players. Especially how the EU will respond to the Russia-Ukraine war is important.

I do not expect the EU to be largely absent. The biggest variable is the EU's attitude. Within the EU, there are heated debates about 're-arming' or 'accepting and strengthening relations with the US.' From Trump's perspective, the EU is an important player, not just the Korean Peninsula. If we can form a coalition that can provide balance, even if not an alternative to Trump, the EU would be an invaluable partner. The EU has the leverage to pull Trump towards democratic values. However, in discussions within South Korea, while Japan, Taiwan, and Australia are mentioned, the EU is rarely discussed. Conversely, in discussions about international affairs or trade within the US, the EU is naturally mentioned, along with the UK. There is this disconnect.

Pragmatic Approach and the Specifics of South Korea's Diplomatic Strategy

So, the problem arises because they don't meet. Finally, as we've run out of time, I agree with everything you've just said. In a situation where the liberal order has collapsed, is there a need to be bound by past imagination? In other words, we need to approach it pragmatically, synthesizing all possible events that could occur, as we experienced during the four years of the Trump administration.

For example, in terms of industrial policy, we can consider the nominal repeal of the IRA. There are many aspects that can be affected by executive orders. Designating countries of concern can lead to trade restrictions. If South Korea is designated, the IRA stops. Even if Trump does not control both houses of Congress, there are ways to circumvent it. However, regarding Korean companies or the government leveraging Trump's transactional nature to strengthen individual cooperation with his staff, according to the ideology of the Trump administration, they would not prevent it individually.

Therefore, I hope we can evolve by exercising our imagination through transactional attributes, and regarding the new deal with North Korea that you mentioned, Professor, instead of applying moral standards from a Cold War mindset, we should aim to secure what can be obtained. To make this possible, we must continue to operate a group of pragmatic experts who can formulate practical policies and hold the political sphere accountable. This should naturally extend to the EU, as well as India and Southeast Asia. As the hegemonic war between China and the US becomes visible, South Korea's diplomatic strategy must become more concrete. Various plans need to be developed before that event occurs.

It is natural for us to feel fear because it is difficult, but now that it has become a reality, we must use this as an important opportunity to prepare for an era of increasing uncertainty. The same applies to security issues. After listening to you for two hours, I believe the Democratic Party will face considerable hardship in US domestic politics. There are many concerns about whether they can find a way forward within the short period of four years. While the Republican four years might proceed that way from a domestic political standpoint, externally, it is questionable whether the current Republican Party or Trump's policies can secure leadership or achieve what the US desires. Taken together, it seems that not only the next four years but also the subsequent administration will find it difficult for the US to find a way forward.

If that is the future of America, what should we do? There are two points. First, we must not grovel. Second, it is because there will be no dawn in four years. There will be no dawn in four years. The overall trajectory of the United States is moving towards a different America than the one we imagined. Trump is also a manifestation of this phenomenon. This means we must approach the US from a long-term perspective, and that involves two things.

First, solidarity and cooperation among allies dependent on the US are crucial. This includes not only Japan and Australia but also the EU, as you rightly emphasized. We need to think broadly and plan accordingly. Second, we must now abandon the US-centric mindset. This has been discussed for a long time, but we are now facing it head-on. It seems to be the time to fundamentally rethink the basis of our national strategy, starting now.

In this regard, I believe the US experts here should play a significant role, and I would like to conclude today's discussion here.