[EAI Commentary] Dialogue: Analysis of the 2024 EAI Survey on Korean Perceptions of Japan and Future Tasks

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J7aJY8b8MK4

Video Script

First, I will ask about four questions in total, and after you answer them for about 5 to 7 minutes, we will open the floor for Q&A. The first question is about your overall impression as an expert on the public opinion survey results announced this year, and whether there were any particularly noteworthy responses. Professor Kim Ya, would you like to speak first?

First, I would like to express my gratitude to Director Seon Yeol and the East Asia Institute for giving me this opportunity. Director Seon and I have known each other for nearly 35 years. As time is limited, I will read what I have prepared in response to the question. This public opinion survey was very beneficial in that it asked the same questions to both Korea and Japan, allowing for a time-series comparative observation of Korea-Japan relations.

Results of South Korea-Japan Relations Perception Survey and Expert Diagnosis

can be evaluated. Surveys were conducted in both Korea and Japan until last year, but unfortunately, I understand that this year only the survey in Korea was conducted. I hope that joint public opinion surveys in both Korea and Japan will resume next year. I have been lecturing on Korean Peninsula politics at various universities, including the University of Tokyo, and have assigned students the task of analyzing this survey. A common expression used to describe recent Korea-Japan relations is 'Japanese dissatisfaction,' and I believe this survey clearly shows significant Korean dissatisfaction. In Japan, many people highly value the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's efforts to improve Korea-Japan relations, but critical views prevail within South Korea. Furthermore, if the opposition party takes power after the 2027 presidential election, there are concerns that Korea-Japan relations, which are currently very good, might deteriorate again if the opposition party wins. To avoid misunderstanding, I would say that Japanese diplomacy should be premised on the possibility of a change in the South Korean government.

The idea that we must give up on Korea-Japan relations if a progressive government comes to power is absolutely unacceptable. From Japan's perspective, Korea-Japan relations are good in the short term, but unstable in the medium to long term. Critics of the Yoon administration's policy toward Japan, as well as those who believe that South Korea made concessions on issues like forced labor while Japan did not reciprocate, view the South Korean government's policy toward Japan as a complete failure. Moreover, even supporters of the Yoon administration, while acknowledging the success of the Yoon administration's policy toward Japan, express dissatisfaction that the Japanese government has not responded adequately.

Korea asks, but Japan only deletes the remaining questions. The survey results that clearly show this are, first, in the direct evaluation of support for the current administration, the negative evaluation increased relatively in 2023 compared to 2022. Second, the positive evaluation of the Japanese government's efforts to improve Korea-Japan relations has increased significantly. Finally, the perception of current affairs issues in Japan as a whole has also worsened considerably this year compared to last year. While I have only presented pessimistic content so far, I believe this survey also shows an opportunity to create a positive relationship, including the potential for further development in Korea-Japan relations, from two aspects. First, people-to-people exchanges between Korea and Japan can increase.

Not only has the number of Koreans with experience in Japan increased, but those who have a favorable view of Japan have also increased to nearly 75%. While the Hallyu wave is at a moderate level in Japan, the fact that exchanges with Japan will continue in the future is a basis for optimism regarding the development of relations. The number of Koreans who realize the importance of relations is increasing, and the number of Koreans who believe Japan can be trusted is also increasing. Furthermore, despite historical issues, the number of people who believe cooperation with Japan is important regarding issues related to the value of security is increasing. In particular, the fact that the proportion of people who trust Japan has significantly increased this year compared to last year is noteworthy. Of course, it also shows a polarization between conservatives and progressives regarding relations with Japan, but it is also possible to interpret this as an increase in the view that conservatives can trust Japan, while progressives find it difficult to trust Japan yet. Nevertheless, I consider these figures to be noteworthy.

Furthermore, it is pointed out that more people view Korea-Japan relations competitively rather than complementarily from an economic perspective. This can be understood as a shift from an asymmetric complementary relationship to a symmetric competitive relationship in Korea-Japan relations, in my own terms. I am confident that it is desirable for such competition to be based on a relationship of trust. Therefore, I am confident that the increase in mutual trust, despite the accumulation of many problems between Korea and Japan, is the most important core aspect.

Driving Forces and Prospects for Improving South Korea-Japan Relations

That is all. Yes, thank you. You have touched upon the overall issues of Korea-Japan relations. The increase in trust towards Japan is understandable, and the increase in trust was indeed striking to me as well, and I believe it truly requires explanation. Yes, Professor Cho Hyun. Yes, it's a pleasure to meet you. Thank you for inviting me to this esteemed event, and thank you for providing the embargoed materials in advance, which were very helpful for my reference.

I will speak based on a few points I prepared while reviewing the materials. I believe these materials themselves will be valuable not only for our policy research but also for academic research, and I have been tracking the annually published data. Today, my remarks are my personal opinions and, naturally, may contain biases. With that in mind, I would say that about four points stood out. While it may overlap with what Mr. Son mentioned in his introduction, in my own words, the first is the 'trend of preference in perceptions of Japan.' Excluding the COVID-19 pandemic and economic disputes, the continuous increase in perceptions of Japan at the private level is a very significant point. I believe this can be seen as Japan becoming normalized as a consumption target in our citizens' consumption lives. Visits to Japan are increasing, and visits to Japan are becoming ingrained not as one-off events like studying or business trips, but as part of one's own economic life.

visits have become experiential. Moreover, the number of citizens who have not visited but wish to visit in the future is increasing. Regarding the reasons for having a favorable view of Japan, factors related to visiting Japan, i.e., direct experience, are increasing rather than advanced electronics in developed countries or Japan. These include friendly national character, popular culture, shopping, and cuisine. Therefore, this is a result of Korea-Japan relations converging overall due to the rise in South Korea's national power, and because the consumption capacity of the public has converged, we can view Japan without burden, and these factors are ultimately 'symmetrized,' to borrow Professor Kim Ya's expression. This is a result reflected in the dialogue on Korea-Japan relations. While perceptions of Japan's future remain pessimistic, the 'lost 30 years' seem to be strongly imprinted in the minds of our citizens. However, at the same time, there is high interest in Japanese culture, such as anime and movies, and many citizens believe this soft power will contribute to improving Japan's image.

Second, regarding historical issues, there were still many who predicted stagnation and a sense of frustration. The fact that many predicted stagnation regarding the future of Korea-Japan relations leads me to believe that a sober realism is becoming the mainstream rather than idealism. Although the majority of the public agrees on the goals that Korea and Japan should pursue, namely historical issues and regaining trust, the prospect that historical issues will also be resolved if we create future-oriented cooperation is decreasing.

Polarization of South Korea-Japan Relations and the Future

Despite this decrease, the fact that they still pursue it is dualistic, but this complex perception may stem from a sense of fatigue arising from the judgment that the recent policies of the South Korean government regarding historical issues, despite being largely concessions from our government, have not been met with a corresponding response from Japan. If Japan feels fatigue regarding its reflection on historical issues, it can be interpreted that our citizens also feel a certain fatigue because their demands for Japan's response have not been met. The negative evaluation of Sado Mine reflects the reality that external explanations are not being accepted by the public. Third point, and this is a truly important part, is dissatisfaction regarding Korea-Japan relations, and the fact that many citizens consider Korea-Japan relations important. Why is that? Apart from historical issues, Japan is considered to have strategic value in terms of current affairs, security, and economy. This data was also available last year. Last year's

survey also showed that while there was dissatisfaction with the government's response to historical issues, there was a reality of acceptance, stating that if improving Korea-Japan relations is necessary for the development of the Korea-US alliance, then it is acceptable, even if unavoidable. I may elaborate on this point later. And the last point, which I would like to capture with the keyword 'polarization.' I believe polarization is deepening not only in politics but in many areas of our society. Consequently, it is likely that judgments regarding relations with Japan are increasingly being made through the lens of polarization. Korea-Japan relations can be broadly viewed as a confrontation between historical issues on one hand, and economic and security interests on the other. Until now, there have been situations in Korea-Japan relations where neither side could have both. Historical issues concern national pride, and tangible benefits are about our livelihood and survival strategy for future generations. While we do not want to lose either, we have not been able to achieve both. However, this is a choice that can be clearly made depending on whether one is conservative or progressive, and this is a phenomenon that arises as polarization progresses. I wonder how the younger generation reacted, and how the elderly generation reacted; this is also an interesting point of the results. Professor Son Yeol pointed out that further analysis is needed on the change in perceptions of those aged 70 and above, and I am also very interested in this aspect. Based on my fragmented speculation, one possibility is that it is a result of increased awareness of economic and security crises. That is, with the US-China competition and North Korea's threats becoming constants in our security,

I believe that the generation that has experienced war and feels a sense of crisis, those over 70, have become more sensitive to this. Another possibility is the alleviation of complexes towards Japan. In other words, Japan is the perpetrator of historical issues, and the situation where Japan is economically superior to us was an uncomfortable truth for our citizens, but perhaps those grievances have been somewhat alleviated through recent consumption of Japan. I am in my 50s, and I also experience this.

In the past, when we were struggling economically, the tendency to criticize Japan from above was strong. However, with Japan's recent economic stagnation and South Korea's relative rise, perhaps those over 70 who remember the past now have the leeway to view Japan with confidence and magnanimity. This is my conclusion. Yes, Professor Cho Young-hyun mentioned those in their 70s, and it seems to be an interesting phenomenon that the 70s are becoming an issue in Korean society. This is due to the aging society.

This is why the 70s played a very significant role in the current president's election. Professor Kim Ya, do you have any particular opinions regarding the 70s? Yes, yes. Professor Cho explained it well, but the problem is that the second factor could be shared not only by those in their 70s but also by those in their 60s, 50s, and 40s. Why is it only the 70s that have changed? I believe this question remains. I am also turning 65 this year and my retirement from university is approaching. As people age, the need to protect their own interests grows, and their overall ideology tends to become more conservative. Therefore, it is not just the 70s, but perhaps perceptions of Japan are beginning to change due to the overall conservative trend, and that is my interpretation.

Thus, the 70-something age group played a significant role in the current president's election. Professor Cho, do you have any particular opinions regarding the 70-something demographic? Yes, yes. Professor Cho explained it well, but the second factor, which could be shared not only by those in their 70s but also by those in their 60s, 50s, and 40s, raises the question of why only the 70-something group is changing so much. I myself am turning 65 this year and am nearing retirement age at the university. As people age, the parts they feel need to be protected grow, and their overall ideology tends to become more conservative. Therefore, not only the 70-something group but also the general trend of conservatism may lead to a shift in perceptions of Japan, which is how I interpret it.

The Yoon Suk-yeol Administration's Diplomacy Towards Japan and its Strategic Implications

You mentioned the conservatism of those in their 70s. I would like to ask one more question based on your remarks. You both discussed the driving forces behind the improvement of Korea-Japan relations. One is the spread of consumption, people-to-people exchanges, and cultural exchanges. On the other hand, regarding South Korea's strategic interests, cooperation with Japan, especially within the framework of Korea-US-Japan cooperation, makes Korea-Japan cooperation very important.

In that regard, you mentioned that there are trends in viewing Japan anew from a security perspective, both traditional security and economic security. These two seem to be structural factors. However, if the current government hears this, they might feel offended. Isn't the government's role also significant? While the structure is changing, what do you think is the role of the Yoon administration? Yes, Professor, Professor Cho. Yes, you made a good point. I believe the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's firm determination to improve Korea-Japan relations is the driving force behind this improvement. Considering the strong public opinion in South Korea, it was a very difficult choice. From the perspective of the Japanese government, they would have been satisfied on the surface but would have inwardly appreciated the difficult decision made. Therefore, I believe viewers should also take this as an opportunity to improve Korea-Japan relations. In that respect, this Korea-Japan

relations improvement is limited to the improvement of intergovernmental relations, and it could be said that the Japanese government, to use an excessive expression, has 'transformed.' However, I also have something to ask of Korean society. Regarding why the Yoon administration made such a choice, there is a debate about whether it is pro-Japan or anti-Japan, which I consider to be utter nonsense. I believe that for the Yoon administration to smoothly advance its security and diplomatic strategy for its vision of a Global Pivotal State, freedom solidarity, and a new unified Korea, improving Korea-Japan relations is essential for relations with the United States, and it should be seen as having led the improvement of Korea-Japan relations for this purpose.

In other words, I believe it was a description of the meaning brought about by the transition in the security diplomacy of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration as a whole, in contrast to the Moon Jae-in administration. Therefore, to conduct diplomacy towards Japan under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, it should not be solely based on historical issues but critically examined in relation to the broader scope of security diplomacy. From this perspective, I question whether the progressive camp or the opposition party in South Korea has focused only on measures that are easily acceptable to the public, while offering alternatives for security diplomacy as a whole. Furthermore, I wonder if these alternatives are not divorced from reality.

While there is not enough time to fully discuss the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's security policy here, I believe a more intellectual and inclusive policy is needed regarding North Korea policy. Of course, the logic that normalization is a priority because the Moon Jae-in administration's North Korea policy failed, leading to an abnormal relationship, is understandable. However, how long will we be preoccupied with normalization efforts? There will not be much time. In fact, North Korea has begun to legally abandon the policy of one Korea, which presupposes the existence of exploitation, by advocating for a 'North Korean version of two Koreas' policy this year. Therefore, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration is hastily trying to respond by creating 'two Koreas' (humanitarian aid), but 'two Koreas' is essentially a rehash of the 'one Korea' theory and is unlikely to elicit a positive response from North Korea. While it is possible to argue that integration and unification can be achieved slowly, starting from the reality of 'two Koreas' rather than hastily pursuing unification, a government-led response is urgently needed amidst escalating crises. Based on this assessment,

and yet, to respond to the current situation—the escalating crisis, the military confrontation triggered by the US-China rivalry heading towards a new Cold War and the Russia-Ukraine war, and the threats from all directions in the US-China hegemony competition—in a word, the policies the Yoon Suk-yeol administration intends to pursue are more desperately needed than those pursued by the Moon Jae-in administration. In other words, the Moon Jae-in administration's foreign policy must be seen as having lost its realistic foundation for now. Therefore, South Korea's progressive opposition parties or other entities will need new strategies to respond to this new phase, but these are not yet clearly visible.

And within this new phase, regarding South Korea-Japan relations, I have expectations as someone concerned about Japan regarding how to set up diplomacy towards Japan, but I fear that realistic and sincere measures have not yet been presented. Therefore, it is understandable that Japan is concerned about what will happen if the progressive ruling party takes power following a change in administration, as you just mentioned. In South Korea, the voice that relations with the US are important and therefore the alliance must be strengthened is relatively dominant, but it is generally understood that relations with Japan are constrained due to historical issues, leading to limitations on strengthening the relationship. In other words, the schema is that relations with the US and relations with Japan are separate issues. Of course, I am not questioning such a schema.

However, I question whether relations with the US and relations with Japan can be viewed separately in the current situation. Does not the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's logic that improving relations with Japan is necessary to strengthen relations with the US have high validity? Furthermore, for South Korea, a prime example illustrating that relations with the US and relations with Japan are interdependent is the process by which the Moon Jae-in administration's Korean Peninsula Peace Process was frustrated. This is because, after the Hanoi no-deal in February 2019, it is a well-known fact that the Abe administration in Japan influenced all channels regarding North Korean issues. Whether Abe truly changed his stance is a matter that needs further review, but here, it is necessary to examine the Moon Jae-in administration's perspective on this. In 2018, the relationship between the Moon Jae-in administration and the Abe administration deteriorated over issues such as comfort women, territorial disputes, and responses to them. That government, under the assumption that 'this time they have no choice but to follow,' effectively neglected relations with Japan. However, around that time, the Abe administration persuaded the Trump administration, which ultimately led to the breakdown of negotiations with North Korea. While there may have been other judgments involved, it must be seen as siding with Japan between South Korea and Japan, who had different positions. Can we learn lessons from this process? Of course, there may be a view that Prime Minister Abe was a 'bad guy' regarding the forced labor issue, but I believe that for the sake of South Korea's overall security diplomacy, it should have been necessary to have not only the US but also Japan support its foreign policy. From that perspective, it is similar to the Clinton administration in the US around 2000

and the Obuchi government in Japan, by effectively persuading them and gaining their support for its reconciliation and cooperation policy towards North Korea, was able to achieve the inter-Korean summit in June 2000. The strategic excellence of the Kim Dae-jung administration must be re-evaluated. Similarly, I expect that the Yoon Suk-yeol administration will be able to effectively pursue its North Korea policy by consolidating relations with the US and Japan. Thank you. Yes, thank you. You have touched upon issues ranging from very small ones to overall diplomacy towards Japan. Professor Cho. Yes. Professor Kim has provided an excellent explanation of the meaning of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's decisions in the context of overall international relations. I would also like to delve into the driving forces behind improving South Korea-Japan relations. In my own terms, I believe that South Korea-Japan relations are the result of the interplay of three factors: individual leaders, domestic politics, and the international situation.

Analysis of Complex Factors for Improving South Korea-Japan Relations

and the Obuchi government in Japan, by effectively persuading them and gaining their support for its reconciliation and cooperation policy towards North Korea, was able to achieve the inter-Korean summit in June 2000. The strategic excellence of the Kim Dae-jung administration must be re-evaluated. Similarly, I expect that the Yoon Suk-yeol administration will be able to effectively pursue its North Korea policy by consolidating relations with the US and Japan. Thank you. Yes, thank you. You have touched upon issues ranging from very small ones to overall diplomacy towards Japan. Professor Cho. Yes. Professor Kim has provided an excellent explanation of the meaning of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's decisions in the context of overall international relations. I would also like to delve into the driving forces behind improving South Korea-Japan relations. In my own terms, I believe that South Korea-Japan relations are the result of the interplay of three factors: individual leaders, domestic politics, and the international situation.

I believe that the Korea-US relationship, Korea-Japan relationship, and Korea-US cooperation are linked in a virtuous cycle, and the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's foreign policy vision is easily understood within that framework. Second, regarding the international situation, there is a significant aspect of the international environment surrounding South Korea and Japan that neither country can control. Currently, South Korea's relations with China are strained. We are easily mistaken; during the Moon Jae-in administration, Korea-China relations were very strained. Why was that? The relationship did not improve due to the THAAD deployment and the Korean Wave ban in 2016. What about North Korea-China relations?

The Korean Peninsula Peace Process itself was derailed. The Russia-Ukraine war broke out, and after COVID-19, as supply chains were fragmented, even the immediate act of wearing masks. And recently, with the urea solution, citizens perceive that economic activities are no longer as safe as they used to be. This situation, where economic activities are no longer as safe as they used to be, coupled with the crisis of military conflict, has greatly amplified the sense of crisis among our citizens. To put it more simply, the more opaque and uncertain the international situation becomes, the more often South Korea and Japan have cooperated on security and economy, setting aside historical issues. The Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun Joint Declaration after the end of the 1990s is also, I believe, a result derived from that environment. There was the IMF crisis. From 1997. So, how to overcome it? It was the biggest task of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations that launched in 2008. They had to restore relations with the US and Japan. They had to join hands with Japan. And North Korea launched a missile in 1998.

The Sunshine Policy was at risk of derailing. As international pressure on North Korea increased. Therefore, I believe they took a realistic approach toward Japan in order to somehow maintain the momentum of the Sunshine Policy by joining hands with Japan. What was the situation in Japan at that time? We are aware of the fact that Japan did not acknowledge that its colonial rule was illegal. It was an apology of emotion and ethics, a sincere reflection and apology from the heart. However, we engaged in dialogue and cooperation with Japan. Why? Because the situation at the time was difficult. The same was true in 2008 when the Lehman crisis occurred and the government was launched. They declared that historical issues would not be on the agenda for summit meetings with Japan. At that time, I believe this was a period of greatly heightened sense of crisis when the Yoon Suk-yeol administration was launched, and this gave the public ample room to cooperate with Japan on security and economy, even if Japan did not offer the level of apology we desired for historical issues. Therefore, strategic thinking at the leadership level regarding Japan, and the increased sense of crisis regarding the international environment, are likely the important driving forces behind the improvement of Korea-Japan relations under the current administration. Conversely, domestic politics has largely acted as an obstacle, which I will discuss if given more time. Yes. Thank you for your insightful remarks. We are running quite late, and I believe there are many people in the audience who wish to ask questions, as well as experts. I would like to ask one final question to each of you. Professor Cho Yang-hyun, please go first, and then Professor Kim Hee-ah. The question is related to historical issues.

As mentioned earlier, the Korean government has filled half the cup, but why hasn't the Japanese government filled the other half? This question is often asked. Starting with whether this is a legitimate question, there is considerable dissatisfaction among the public with the Korean government. This is at the public level, but as experts, how should the Korean government resolve this issue? And in relation to that question, the general election is approaching. While we don't know who will become the leader or prime minister, keeping that in mind, how should the Korean government respond to the current issues that the public is significantly dissatisfied with? That's my first question. For my second question, Professor Kim Hee-ah, I would like to ask the same question: Is Japan doing nothing and intending to continue this way, even with the next government? And if so, what recommendations do you have for the Korean government?

Past Issues and South Korea's Response Strategies

Yes. Professor Cho, would you like to go first? Yes. These are weighty questions. I believe the dissatisfaction of Koreans towards Japan is justified. There are aspects that make it unavoidable. Under the current administration, there has been unilateral concession after concession regarding historical issues, and it appears that Japan has offered little in return. However, if we understand the structural reasons why this situation has become unavoidable, we can perhaps calmly resolve this situation. Earlier, I mentioned that domestic politics is a factor that does not greatly contribute to the improvement of Korea-Japan relations. With the conservative shift in Japan, particularly since the Abe administration in 2012, Japan has openly stated that it will not pursue historical issues anymore. Why is that? Ultimately, it is due to the conservative trend in society as a whole. I will not explain why conservatism is occurring. But what about Japan in the 1990s? At that time, it was the era of so-called liberals. A tradition of announcing the government's stance on historical issues through prime ministerial statements, released every ten years, was established. During that period, making forward-looking historical statements was not an act that cost votes. There was ample room to do so. But now, making such statements is tantamount to losing votes for politicians. Conversely, what about South Korea? Public perception regarding historical issues is actually moving in the opposite direction. What does this mean? The sentiment that the government should demand what is rightfully due from Japan is growing and becoming the mainstream. This societal change is also influencing judicial rulings. The fact that the two countries' directions in viewing historical issues are in conflict makes it difficult to converge.

As mentioned earlier, there is much discussion about the South Korean government filling half the glass, and why the Japanese government is not filling the other half. My first question is whether this is a legitimate question, and given the high level of public dissatisfaction with the South Korean government, how should the South Korean government, as experts, resolve this issue? My second question, also for Professor Kim Hee-ah, is whether Japan intends to do nothing and continue as is, even if a new government comes into power. And if so, then for the South Korean government

Do you have any suggestions for such a policy? I would like to ask two questions. Professor Cho, would you like to go first? Yes. These are weighty questions. I believe Koreans' dissatisfaction with Japan is justifiable. There are aspects that make it inevitable. Since the current administration came into power, there has been a unilateral concession regarding historical issues, and it appears Japan has offered little in return. However, I believe that if we understand the structural reasons why this situation has become inevitable, we can calmly assess the situation. I mentioned earlier that domestic politics is a factor that does not significantly aid the improvement of Korea-Japan relations. Following the conservative shift in Japan, particularly during the Abe administration after 2012, Japan has openly stated that it will no longer dwell on historical issues. Why did this happen? Ultimately, it is due to a conservative trend in society as a whole. Explaining why this conservatism is occurring...

Prime Minister Kishida has not personally used the phrase 'heartfelt reflection and sincere apology.' However, the statement that he will comprehensively inherit the positions of previous cabinets can be seen as a political declaration. I believe that was the extent of what Prime Ministers Abe and Kishida could do. And considering the backlash from conservatives, this was perhaps the most that could be expected from the Japanese side in terms of a response. However, it was not enough to meet our expectations. So, what can we expect from the current situation going forward? Will Japan improve? I doubt it.

The overall conservative trend in Japan is likely to continue. Therefore, it is unlikely that we can expect the level of apology we desire, and this is an uncomfortable reality. I believe there is a structure in place where dissatisfaction among Koreans will inevitably persist, rather than be resolved. This brings me to my second point: What should we do? There are two options. If Japan does not apologize to the extent we desire, we can cease dialogue with Japan. This is what was done in the early days of the Park Geun-hye administration regarding the comfort women issue, and during the Moon Jae-in administration, the government stepped back, focusing on victim-centered approaches, essentially avoiding active dialogue with Japan and trying to contain the narrative. The second option is to continue dialogue, state our position, and persistently leave our points with Japan.

I sometimes refer to the Kim Dae-jung administration's declaration as a 'Sunshine Policy' towards Japan. The Sunshine Policy towards North Korea actually had an element of this towards Japan as well. Ambassador Kang Chang-il often uses this expression, which I may have mentioned elsewhere. He says that when nature blooms, humans say it's spring, but if you give a microphone to the flower, it has no sense of seasons like spring or summer. It just blooms when the temperature and humidity gradually increase each day. Expecting Japan to apologize for historical issues to the extent we desire and then moving to the next stage is, in a way, a sequential way of thinking. However, the approach of the Kim Dae-jung administration and the current administration seems different. It is to continue cooperation even if opinions on historical issues do not converge through dialogue. By continuing cooperation, there is an effect of deterring Japan's historical provocations.

This can be compared to a fight. Why? Because through dialogue with South Korea, Japan is less likely to move towards conservative and right-wing extremism, and considering South Korea's strategic value, Japan may also move more proactively regarding apologies and reflections on historical issues because they are engaging in dialogue. In that sense, I believe this is the second approach. We seem to have these two approaches before us. To be objective, the day after the Korea-Japan agreement was concluded, President Park Chung-hee issued a statement to the nation. He read it himself. He said, 'Japan has been our eternal enemy for thousands of years, but considering the harshness of the times, we must even join hands with our enemy.' In reality, considering national pride regarding historical issues and the tangible benefits of economic security, which did he choose? He ultimately chose the latter, and that's how we have come this far. Is engaging in dialogue and cooperation harmful to us? I believe it has benefited both sides and us. So, what should we do going forward? I don't think this structure will disappear. While we are frustrated and dissatisfied due to historical issues, from Japan's perspective, based on the premise of not acknowledging the illegality of colonial rule, Japan has its own logic. Therefore, the diplomatic policies Japan intends to pursue are twofold regarding the Korean Peninsula. One is to manage historical issues at the 65th anniversary of the normalization of relations and expand cooperation with South Korea on issues like North Korea or security. The latter aligns with our interests. Therefore, I believe the latter approach, which is the current administration's strategy, is a realistic solution. Considering this, even though we are frustrated by Japan's lack of apology and reflection to the extent we desire, there seems to be no other option but to maintain our position and continue dialogue.

The second question is, well, I don't know who will take the lead. But politics is important right now, and especially the US presidential election issue is very significant. There are occasional discussions about the possibility of readjusting Korea-US relations if Trump is elected. From the perspective of Japanese leadership, it is highly likely that they will continue the improved Korea-Japan relations and cooperation with South Korea. This is because the evaluation of improved Korea-Japan relations among the Japanese public is positive, and as I just mentioned, it is judged to be advantageous for Japan to cooperate with South Korea in terms of Japan's foreign policy. Therefore, barring any major issues, the basic line of improving Korea-Japan relations is expected to be inherited by the successor. However, the personal policy priorities of the prime minister may differ among candidates. For example, if Mr. Shingiro becomes prime minister, there is a possibility of visiting Yasukuni Shrine and pursuing a North Korea-Japan summit.

Prospects for South Korea-Japan Relations with Japan's Next Leadership

In that case, cooperation on North Korea issues among the US, South Korea, and Japan may pose a challenging task. Individuals like Sanae Takaichi are viewed as relatively passive regarding Korea-Japan relations. We need to consider these variables to some extent. That is all. Yes, I also understand the dissatisfaction within Korean society. I believe the Japanese government's response in this situation was inadequate. For example, regarding the compensation fund for victims of forced labor, Japanese companies insisted that it was merely 'voluntary,' and that contributions should be made voluntarily, and the Japanese government should also encourage state funding for companies. Of course, the basic position of the Japanese government is that all issues were completely and financially resolved according to the 1965 Korea-Japan Claims Agreement, and therefore, the Korean judiciary has no obligation to do anything as it contradicts such an agreement. However, the Korean judiciary has made such a judgment. I believe the South Korean government is in a difficult balancing act between this judicial decision and Japan's promises. Despite the South Korean government's position, Japan faces diplomatic burdens due to this. By fully recognizing that bilateral relations are deteriorating day by day, Japan must realize that maintaining relations is also in its interest, and to this end, it must not only assert its own position on historical issues but also respect and understand the other party's position, and consider all possible options. There are issues that Japan needs to consider. The concept of 'Japan Passing' you mentioned earlier is admirable. However, we need to consider whether it is a universally applicable concept that goes beyond 'Japan Passing.' Also, regarding historical issues, the Japanese government and society.

There are occasional discussions about this, but from the perspective of Japan's leadership, there is a high probability that they will continue the improved South Korea-Japan relations and cooperation with South Korea. This is because the Japanese public evaluates the improvement in South Korea-Japan relations favorably, and from Japan's foreign policy perspective, cooperation with South Korea is deemed advantageous. Therefore, barring any significant issues, the basic line of improving South Korea-Japan relations is expected to be inherited by the successor. However, the policy priorities of individual prime ministers may vary among candidates. For example, if Shinjiro Koizumi becomes prime minister, there is a possibility of visiting the Yasukuni Shrine and pursuing a North Korea-Japan summit.

In such a case, how to cooperate on North Korea issues among the US, South Korea, and Japan may emerge as a challenging task. Figures like Sanae Takaichi are viewed as relatively passive regarding South Korea-Japan relations. These variables should be considered to some extent. That is all. Yes, I understand the dissatisfaction within South Korean society. I also believe that the Japanese government's response in this situation was insufficient. For example, regarding the compensation fund for victims of forced labor, Japanese companies insist that it is merely a 'deemed' contribution and must be a voluntary contribution, and I believe the Japanese government should also encourage corporate contributions from national funds. Of course, the basic position of the Japanese government is that all issues were completely and financially resolved under the 1965 South Korea-Japan Claims Agreement, and therefore the South Korean judiciary has no obligation to do anything as it contradicts this agreement. However, the South Korean judiciary made such a ruling. I believe the South Korean government is in a difficult balancing act between this judicial ruling and Japan's promises. Because it was done despite the South Korean government's position, it is a diplomatic burden for Japan from a national interest perspective. By fully recognizing that South Korea-Japan relations are deteriorating day by day, Japan should recognize that maintaining bilateral relations is also in its interest, and to achieve this, it should not only assert its own position on historical issues but also respect and understand the other party's position, and consider all possible actions. There are issues that Japan needs to consider. The concept of 'Japan Passing' you mentioned earlier is appealing. However, we need to consider whether it is a universally applicable concept that can go beyond 'Japan Passing.' Also, regarding historical issues, the Japanese government and society's research

It is a very difficult part. In the past, Japan, through external support such as the Asia Fund, showed goodwill towards South Korea, but the South Korean government and society did not appreciate it at all and further demanded stronger actions. Therefore, the prevailing assessment within the current government and some segments of society is that goodwill does not work with South Korea, or that South Korea easily betrays past promises. Consequently, the lesson learned is that one should not easily concede to South Korea, which is also something that needs to be understood. I am not suggesting that such a lesson is correct. However, South Korea must also accurately understand Japanese public opinion, and therefore, to foster Japanese public opinion in a desirable direction, we must deeply consider what needs to be done. I believe that regarding historical issues, unlike in the past, the recent South Korea-Japan relations show that Japan's actions have created a South Korea that Japan does not desire, and South Korea's actions have created a Japan that South Korea does not desire. That is why

It is a very difficult part. In the past, Japan, through external support such as the Asia Fund, showed goodwill towards South Korea, but the South Korean government and society did not appreciate it at all and further demanded stronger actions. Therefore, the prevailing assessment within the current government and some segments of society is that goodwill does not work with South Korea, or that South Korea easily betrays past promises. Consequently, the lesson learned is that one should not easily concede to South Korea, which is also something that needs to be understood. I am not suggesting that such a lesson is correct. However, South Korea must also accurately understand Japanese public opinion, and therefore, to foster Japanese public opinion in a desirable direction, we must deeply consider what needs to be done. I believe that regarding historical issues, unlike in the past, the recent South Korea-Japan relations show that Japan's actions have created a South Korea that Japan does not desire, and South Korea's actions have created a Japan that South Korea does not desire. That is why

From the Japanese side, regardless of how Korea-Japan relations unfold, they are currently relieved. They strongly desire to maintain the status quo, so it is unlikely that whoever becomes prime minister will try to make any symbolic changes. However, I believe that it will be difficult to form a government that possesses both high public support and high party support, as is likely to be the case with the upcoming party leadership election. Therefore, both the Japanese government and the Korean Yoon administration are weak, and it is difficult for such weak governments to have a productive relationship. This is what concerns me. Thank you for your insightful analysis. Today, we conclude the East Asia Perception Survey, particularly the Korea-Japan relations segment, along with the press conference. I would like to thank all those who participated in the dialogue. I look forward to meeting you again at our institute on another occasion, and we will now conclude today's session.

Regarding North Korea, he responds by saying, 'I am about the same age as Kim Jong-un, so I can talk to him.' Therefore, Koizumi Shinjiro's approach, especially regarding overall security and diplomacy, is highly uncertain. He might do well, but there is also a possibility that he will not do well at all, so it is very uncertain. Finally, Ms. Sanae Takaichi. I believe that if she becomes prime minister, the red light will be on for Korea-Japan relations. She is called the successor to former Prime Minister Abe, and Japanese right-wingers tend to support Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae. Ms. Takaichi also receives support from the right-wing regarding historical issues, and regarding the Yasukuni Shrine issue and apologies, the Japanese right-wing believes that no further apologies should be made, and Ms. Takaichi is likely to follow such claims.

Regarding North Korea, he responds by saying, 'I am about the same age as Kim Jong-un, so I can talk to him.' Therefore, Koizumi Shinjiro's approach, especially regarding overall security and diplomacy, is highly uncertain. He might do well, but there is also a possibility that he will not do well at all, so it is very uncertain. Finally, Ms. Sanae Takaichi. I believe that if she becomes prime minister, the red light will be on for Korea-Japan relations. She is called the successor to former Prime Minister Abe, and Japanese right-wingers tend to support Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae. Ms. Takaichi also receives support from the right-wing regarding historical issues, and regarding the Yasukuni Shrine issue and apologies, the Japanese right-wing believes that no further apologies should be made, and Ms. Takaichi is likely to follow such claims.

Regarding North Korea, the response is that I am of a similar age to Kim Jong-un, so I can talk with him. Shinjiro Koizumi, however, is a complete unknown, especially in terms of overall security and diplomacy. He might do well, but there is also a possibility that he might not do well at all; he is a complete unknown. Lastly, Sanae Takaichi. I believe that if she becomes Prime Minister, it will be a major red flag for Korea-Japan relations. She has been called a successor to former Prime Minister Abe, and Japanese conservatives tend to support Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. Ms. Takaichi also receives support from the right-wing for historical issues, including the Yasukuni Shrine and apologies. The Japanese right-wing believes that no more apologies should be made, and Ms. Takaichi aligns with this view.

In my view, even former Prime Minister Abe, while receiving support from the right-wing, showed a pragmatic stance, such as visiting Yasukuni Shrine once but not going again. However, politician Takaichi is not like that. What the right-wing wants this time is a political leader who is not afraid of relationships with neighboring countries regarding historical issues, and there is a possibility of that. Therefore, even if she is right-wing, I worry that if Prime Minister Takaichi takes office, there might be some room for moderation regarding historical issues. Of course, as Professor Cho Yang-hyun mentioned, Japan is currently relieved regarding Korea-Japan relations with the Yoon administration. While it may seem unfavorable from the Korean side, from the Japanese side,

Thank you very much. ■ Son Yeol_Director, East Asia Institute. Professor, Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies. ■ Kimiya Tadashi (木宮正史)_Professor, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo. ■ Cho Yang-hyun_Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy. Director, Center for Japanese Studies, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security. ■ Planning and Editing: Park Han-su_EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr

Thank you very much. ■ Son Yeol_Director, East Asia Institute. Professor, Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies. ■ Kimiya Tadashi (木宮正史)_Professor, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo. ■ Cho Yang-hyun_Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy. Director, Center for Japanese Studies, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security. ■ Planning and Editing: Park Han-su_EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr

■ Son Yeol_Director, East Asia Institute. Professor, Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies.

■ Kimiya Tadashi (木宮正史)_Professor, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo.

■ Cho Yang-hyun_Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy. Director, Center for Japanese Studies, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security.

■ Planning and Editing: Park Han-su_EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr