[7th EAI Academy] VIII. The Youth in the Future: Dreams of Korea in the 21st Century

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=koY_nLqGBzQ

Video Script

Future Prospects and the Role of the Younger Generation

Today is our last session. You have likely heard many good stories, so I will not tell you anything particularly special. To conclude, I want to talk about the future. It is the future for me, but it will be the present for you. I will briefly discuss what kind of international politics you will be living in, or trying to change, when you are in your 50s or 60s. I titled this 'The Young People in the Future' because about ten years ago, I had the opportunity to publish a book called 'The Young People in History.' Most of the books I have written were not because I wanted to write them, but rather were compiled from lectures at the suggestion of those around me who thought it would be good to transcribe them. 'The Young People in History' was similar. I was invited to give a series of lectures on the formative years of notable figures who were born and lived on the Korean Peninsula over the past two to three hundred years, and I lectured on eight individuals.

The title at the time was 'The Young People in History.' Chronologically, they included figures like Park Ji-won, Dasan Jeong Yak-yong's junior, Jeong Yak-yong, Park Gyu-su, Kim Yang-su, and Ahn Jae-hong. Ah, Syngman Rhee is also missing. We must include complex figures at the end. At the time, I used my own face as a substitute, and I spoke about how these eight individuals viewed and anticipated the future in their youth, and consequently, what realities they faced within the futures they had envisioned. The story I will tell today can be a very important imagination and resolution, concerning whether you will be able to say, when you are in your 50s or 60s, 'I misunderstood the world, if I had known that, I wouldn't have lived like this,' or 'The world changed as predicted, and I became a protagonist of the future because I prepared accordingly.' The world will change by the mid-21st century, that is, between 2050 and 2060.

Changes in International Political Paradigms and Complex Order

First, we must discuss how the world will change between 2050 and 2060, and then, within that context, where the Korean Peninsula, to which I belong, will head, and ultimately, what will become of me. There are various ways to forecast the coming future. Those who have seen 'The Young People in the Future' or 'The Political Economy of Love' will immediately recognize that diagram. About ten years ago, in the summer of 2013, I was staying in London, England. Hyde Park is a representative park in London. Behind Hyde Park is a small gallery called 'Fountain Gallery,' which connects to the 'Serpentine Gallery,' an art museum. This place became famous because it annually selects and awards a promising architect from around the world. Instead of prize money, the awardee is allowed to build a structure of their own design in front of the gallery. Since it is selected annually, a structure built in June is usually dismantled around November. The awardees are typically in their 40s, and later, when they reach their 50s and 60s, they often receive awards considered the Nobel Prize of architecture. In 2013, although I didn't know it at the time, the moment I saw that structure, a thought occurred to me. In the process of contemplating where the world order would go in international politics after the end of the Cold War, I reached a tentative conclusion. I began to imagine that the world order was not simply moving towards a post-Cold War era, but that a new order, characterized by complexity, was emerging within a civilizational transformation, moving from simple international politics to complex international politics. About 15 years have passed. I have spoken about many things. When you look at

In my previous writings, I often discussed stories like 'The Wolf and the Spider' and 'Building Dabotap,' but for 15 years, no one believed them. They would ask, 'What does that mean? What does it have to do with the world order? We don't understand.' However, when I saw this architectural work, I had an epiphany: this is exactly how international politics works. What I envied was the recipient of that award, Sou Fujimoto, who was Japan's most promising architect in his 40s. He remains very active and has received numerous awards. Fujimoto conceived of architecture itself as the shape of new architecture for the 21st century. It was so fascinating that I delved into his books, and he talks about this: looking towards the future, he aims to build architecture accordingly, and what he truly loves is the 'forest.' He wants to create forest architecture. The reason he likes forests is,

because when you go into a truly dense forest, you find not only old trees but also young ones, moss, and even lifeless stones. Everything lives its own life. He built his architecture with the idea that architecture should be like a forest, free from complaints and seemingly devoid of conflict. So I thought, 'What an interesting person,' and when I went to Tokyo, I visited many of the buildings he designed. I believe it's a misconception to learn international politics solely by reading textbooks on international politics.

Instead, things like that can be more helpful in envisioning and imagining the future of international politics. Surprisingly, many people who study international politics are not particularly imaginative. On a global level, most of them would have been unknown if they had pursued second or third-rate art. For example, Fujimoto designed an apartment building in Tokyo, which is different from our apartments. The apartments worth billions of won that we live in are not built in a traditional architectural style. Western-style apartments were introduced to Korea after the 1970s.

Debates on Unipolar, Multipolar, and Apolar International Politics

Yet, you see they are packed tightly together. Fujimoto argued that to ensure the happiness of all apartment residents, buildings should not be constructed this way. He designed them in a complex, fragmented manner, allowing each resident to transform their apartment, regardless of its size, into a space centered around them. Therefore, my intention today is to unpack and re-examine the rather stifling and uninspiring field of international politics. Since suddenly diving into it might be overwhelming, my first question to you was to write about your thoughts on 'Will the international politics you will live in during the 21st century be multipolar or unipolar?' I consider this question itself to be quite naive and lacking imagination.

The lack of imagination among scholars of unipolar international politics or practitioners in the field is likely to perpetuate such tragic debates. However, you might wonder why this matters. Consider this: when you are in your 50s or 60s, what difference would it make to your country and to you whether the world order is unipolar, with a specific country at its center, or multipolar, or even anarchic? I am not the UN Secretary-General, nor the President; I am just living day by day. Nevertheless, I believe it would make a difference. For instance, countries strongly advocating for and believing in a multipolar order include China, Russia, North Korea, and some nations in the Global South. What would happen if the unipolar moment collapses? Even linguistically, if China becomes the leading power in the world order, most people will speak English, but very few will speak Chinese, which would be quite inconvenient. If China, not the United States, becomes the center of the world order, I would decide to invest as much time in studying Chinese as I do in English, believing it's a multipolar shift. If I'm right, it's a huge win; if I'm wrong, it could lead to various personal setbacks. The same applies at the national level. Therefore, how we envision the future and the foreign policy we pursue is extremely important. However, this is a very American question. Nyst and Posen have been asking this question for the past two decades. They have strongly argued that it is too late for the United States to transition to multipolarity, because, in their logic, the term 'multipolarity' itself is logically flawed. For it to be 'polar' or 'multi,' there needs to be a 'two,' but with only the US and China, how can it be multipolar? Furthermore, they do not see acknowledging China and preparing for a bipolar system as a viable option. They believe the US must continue to strive to shape the world order while maintaining a partial unipolar system, and it would be best for other countries to think similarly. Thus, R. Times For argues otherwise, and if we live in a bipolar international system, it will truly be a 'rough time.' While this might sound like someone else's problem, considering it as a personal issue makes it quite serious. Should we brace ourselves for 'rough times,' or is the outlook of Bruce and Posen internationally convincing? This is a crucial question. After that article was published, many people engaged in debates, both for and against, and we published a few meaningful responses. The notion of 'The End of America' concerns the distribution of power, which Nyst and Posen measure in terms of military, economic, and technological strength. Since the disparity is still significant, they question whether the US can maintain a partial unipolar system. Looking back at modern Western international history since the 19th century, it's not always the case that only when power is nearly equal has a pole emerged. Even with a considerable power gap, there is room for significant influence, leading to the question of whether the US can still wield a partial unipolar system, despite its remaining vulnerabilities. Mary Stern, a female international relations scholar from Princeton who also served as Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, argues that the very fact that we are having these discussions implies that it will be difficult for the US to remain the sole superpower in the future. This is because the actors have changed, with not only states but also large corporations and civil society emerging, and the issues themselves are far more complex than can be measured by global standards, with these actors becoming the protagonists. Is this framework too outdated? A third critique, perhaps memorable because the author is a former Singaporean diplomat, questions the limitation of judging international politics solely by material foundations. While material foundations are important, the utilization of psychological influence is also a crucial form of power. Of course, both aspects have their challenges. If we consider only non-material power, North Korea has almost no economic strength, yet it claims it will fight against American imperialism and the Belt and Road Initiative. No one believes this, and it is objectively difficult. So, should we emphasize physical power, or consider psychological factors simultaneously? Those who calculate solely based on physical foundations might argue that psychological factors should also be considered to some extent. Therefore, we need to seriously reconsider what power will mean in the mid-to-late 21st century. Similarly, those trained in international politics often emphasize scholars like K. J. Holsti, who advocate for liberal institutionalism. They tend to view international politics more complexly, considering not only military and physical power but also factors like leadership and the orders they create. The question then arises: whose opinion should we trust? Personally, I don't think this question is well-posed. However, I asked it because I was curious about how everyone thinks. First, I am grateful to those who responded. However, I believe a bit more boldness is needed, as in 'the young people in history.' A more youthful perspective is necessary. Perhaps the rigid framing of the question leads older generations to view it in a certain way. As a new generation, there is a need for more courage and appeal to tackle problems from the perspective of a startup rather than a large corporation employee. Of course, writing like that might lead to failure, as the graders are all older and unfamiliar with such approaches. However, for a nation or an individual to progress proactively, a new perspective on issues is essential. Broadly speaking, the level of debate among these individuals revolves around three frameworks, and I have re-displayed the recent data for your reference and study. First, they emphasize GDP. According to global GDP projections, as of 2023, the US has $27 trillion and China has $19 trillion. The rest range from $4 trillion to $2 trillion, with Korea around $1.7 to $1.8 trillion at 11th, 12th, or 13th place. I would like to point out one or two things: when looking to the future, you need to understand the whole picture. We are not accustomed to global statistics when looking at such data. Even if we talk about becoming a 'Global G7 country,' if asked about the size of the global economy, it doesn't readily come to mind. The global economy exceeds approximately $100 trillion.

If China were to become dominant, most people would likely know English, but few would know Chinese, which would be quite difficult. If the US were not at the center of the world order and China were, I would decide to pursue a multipolar world and thus invest as much time in studying Chinese as in English. If this proves correct, it would be a tremendous success; if not, it would personally lead to various side effects. The same applies at the national level. Therefore, it is extremely important to envision the future and pursue foreign policy accordingly. However, this is a very American question. Nyssa and Foss have been asking this question for the past 20 years. They have strongly argued that the US is too old to transition to multipolarity, because their logic is that the term 'multipolarity' itself is logically flawed. They argue that to be 'poly' or 'multi,' there must be at least 'two' players. If there are only the US and China, the concept of multipolarity makes no sense. Furthermore, they do not see the wisdom in acknowledging China and thus accepting a bipolar system and preparing accordingly. They believe the US should still strive to maintain a partial unipolar system and shape the world order, and it would be best if other countries also considered this approach. Therefore, if R Times For argues otherwise, and if we were to face a bipolar international system, the nation might dismiss the idea of a 'rough time' as someone else's problem, but it is a very serious issue when considered from an individual's perspective. The question of whether we should prepare for a rough time or whether Bruce and Foss's forecast is internationally persuasive is extremely important. After that article was published, many people engaged in debates, and we published a few meaningful responses. The idea of 'the end of America' revolves around the presence or absence of power. Nyssa and Foss measure power in terms of military strength, economic power, and technological capability. They argue that because the disparity is still very large, the US can maintain a partial unipolar system. However, looking back at modern Western international history since the 19th century, it is not the case that only when power distribution is nearly equal have there been dominant powers. Even with a considerable power gap, there is room for significant influence. Thus, they raise the question of whether the US can still utilize a damaged partial unipolar system. Mary Stern, an international relations scholar from Princeton who also served as Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, believes that the very fact that we are discussing these issues indicates that the US is unlikely to become the sole dominant power in the future. This is because the actors have changed significantly, with not only states but also large corporations and civil society emerging. The issues themselves involve actors who must resolve much more complex problems than those measured by global standards. Therefore, is this framework too outdated? The third critique suggests that perhaps, given his background as a Singaporean diplomat, there are limitations to judging international politics solely on material foundations. While material foundations are important, the utilization of psychological influence is also a significant form of power. Of course, both aspects have their challenges. If we consider only non-material power, North Korea has almost no economic strength, yet it claims it will fight US imperialism alone. No one believes this, and objectively it is difficult. So, should we emphasize physical strength, or consider psychological factors simultaneously?

Those who focus on material foundations might argue that psychological factors should also be considered to some extent. Therefore, we need to seriously reconsider what constitutes power in the mid-to-late 21st century. Similar arguments are made in other contexts. Those who study international relations often consider figures like K. J. Holsti, who emphasize liberal institutionalism. They tend to view international politics in a more complex manner, incorporating factors beyond military and physical strength, such as leadership, and analyzing the orders they create as intricate systems. The question then arises: whose perspective should we trust? Personally, I believe this question is not well-posed. However, I asked it because I was curious about how everyone else thought. First, I am grateful to those who responded. However, I believe we need to be a bit bolder, like the 'young people in history' mentioned earlier. We need a more youthful mindset. Is it because the older generation sees things in a conventional way, given the overly structured nature of the question? As a new generation, I feel a greater courage and attractiveness are needed to tackle problems from the perspective of a startup entrepreneur rather than a corporate employee. Of course, if one writes like that, they might not be selected. The graders are likely older individuals who are not accustomed to such thinking. However, for a nation or an individual to move forward progressively, it is necessary to view problems anew. The level of debate among these individuals largely revolves around three frameworks, which I am presenting again with recent data for your reference and study. First, what these individuals emphasize is GDP. According to global GDP projections for 2023,

What percentage of global military expenditure do you think it will be? Last year, global military expenditure was estimated at approximately 2.4 trillion dollars. But what is the significance of knowing this figure? While it might be useful to know apartment prices, what relevance does 2.4 trillion dollars in military spending have for me? It doesn't affect whether I will serve in the military or not. However, it is significant for understanding international politics as a whole. Regarding the question of why knowing GDP is not sufficient, there is data that clearly shows the difference in proportions. The US spends generally over 900 billion dollars, while China spends 290 billion dollars. Although the economic gap is about 80%, the military expenditure gap is about threefold.

The US debate represents the thinking described in the second column. The modern historical period in the West is generally considered to be the 15th-16th centuries, but we did not fully experience this period. Although some intellectuals traveled to China, we did not truly feel its impact until the 19th century. Next is the complex order, which is somewhat controversial. When I mentioned this, people thought, 'Why is he saying that?' However, recently, the term 'Age of Empires' has begun to sound less awkward.

The problem is that what we are experiencing now is the final stage of this pattern. According to Paul Kennedy's well-known work, 'The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,' the nations leading the world order over the past 500-600 years have generally changed every 100 years. Starting with Portugal, the Netherlands dominated for 100 years in the 17th century, and Britain controlled two cycles before handing over to the United States. The US cycle began in 1945, and if we divide the 100-year cycle again,

Indicators of 21st Century International Politics: GDP and Military Power

it can be divided into four stages of approximately 25 years each. Individuals are similar. If we assume an average lifespan of 100 years, a person is active around age 50, then gradually experiences aging, and passes away in their 70s or 80s. Interestingly, I believe great powers have undergone a similar process. For the United States, 100 years from 1945 would mean until 2045. More than 50 years have already passed. In 100 years, around 2045, the time will come to hand over the position to another country. Among these stages, how the final fourth stage is navigated is crucial. The reason AI is suddenly mentioned is that when asked about the most essential element among technology, information, and knowledge, the artificial intelligence sector receives the highest weighting in the table. I provided one sample for you to read: a book written by Henry Kissinger and Eric Schmidt. Kissinger lived to be nearly 100 years old.

The US accounts for about 26-27%. China has caught up more than expected. $19 trillion is a significant amount, even if it's somewhat exaggerated. Therefore, it is necessary to internalize such figures when looking at future international politics. When asked about the worldviews of those who identify as conservative or progressive, or left or right, I believe they are living in a world from 50 to 100 years ago. Yet, they call themselves conservative or progressive.

The reason I urge you to look ahead and become the conservatives and progressives of the 21st century is that the current perceptions of the surrounding great powers among political leaders still linger. There are no longer surrounding great powers. Russia, for instance, doesn't even rank in the top 12 by GDP. It's slightly larger than ours. In terms of GDP, it's comparable to ours. Yet, they think of four great powers surrounding us. The US and China are somewhat accurate. Japan, with its GDP of around $4 trillion, has a per capita income similar to Korea's. Therefore, imagining the future with a spatial concept based on the fixed idea of four surrounding great powers versus a divided Korea is an anachronistic way of thinking. However, the difficult part is that we must internalize the relative importance of the US and China. What will the US-China relationship be like in 2050? Ah, I consider myself quite progressive for thinking that Korea will be situated amidst US-China competition, rather than thinking like people from the past. However, it is very difficult to move forward in the 21st century with just that level of thinking. This is because one of the biggest debates currently is how to evaluate China. As mentioned earlier, it was $26 trillion versus $19 trillion, but there are very complex discussions about China's evaluation. The E Project also agonized over the prospects of US-China relations in 2050. Most data indicated that China would surpass the US by 2050 until about three years ago. After the COVID-19 pandemic, the prevailing thought was that while China might come close by 2050, it would not overtake the US. However, discussions in the last one to two years have shifted towards the 'Peak China' theory. If the US and China become 50-50 by 2050, you will be told, 'Ah, you haven't studied.' You will hear this in the last two to three years. So, what will be said in the next 30 years? That is very important. The Economist first mentioned 'Peak China,' predicting that China would reach about 87% of the US's economic power by 2050. This means China's GDP would be 87% of the US's. They cited data from 2011, 2021, 2022, and 2023.

Based on US$27 trillion for the US and US$19 trillion for China, with other countries ranging from $4 trillion to $2 trillion, Korea stands at approximately $1.7 to $1.8 trillion, ranking 11th, 12th, or 13th. A couple of points to consider are that when you look to the future, you need to understand the overall picture. We are not accustomed to global statistics. Even when we hear about becoming a 'Global G7 country,' the total size of the global economy is not easily grasped. The global economy exceeds approximately $100 trillion.

This was the prevailing view until three years ago. After the COVID-19 pandemic, the conclusion was that China might not surpass the US by 2050, even if it performed exceptionally well. However, discussions in the last one to two years have shifted towards the 'Peak China Theory.' If China and the US were to reach a 50-50 balance by 2050, one would be told, 'You haven't studied properly.' This has been the case for the past two to three years. Therefore, what will be said in 30 years is crucial. The Economist first mentioned 'Peak China,' predicting that China would reach about 87% of the US's economic power by 2050. It cited data from 2011, 2021, and 2022 as examples.

Initially, it was thought that China could catch up by 2026, but predictions shifted to 2030, 2035, and 2041, eventually concluding that it would be difficult to catch up. Next is military spending. The question of why economic and military power are measured as components of future power is crucial. As you know, this was not the case until the mid-19th century. Until the mid-19th century, developed and developing countries were distinguished by the standard of 'Li' (propriety/rites). The 'Land of Etiquette' was considered developed, while nations lacking etiquette were seen as uncivilized barbarians. However, as Western powers, advocating for national strength and prosperity, advanced with military and economic power, they were defeated in the short term. In other words, Western metrics triumphed. It is uncertain whether this will last forever for 150 years. Let's discuss further. Regarding military power, if you ask economic or military experts about the ratio of global military spending to global GDP, you can find out how much is spent on the military worldwide annually. However, even international relations scholars would struggle to get it right by more than 5%.

What percentage of global GDP do you think is spent on the military? Last year, global military spending was estimated at approximately $2.4 trillion. But what is the significance of knowing this figure? You need to know the price of your apartment, but what meaning does $2.4 trillion in military spending have for me? It doesn't affect whether I go to the military or not. However, it is significant for understanding international politics as a whole. Regarding why knowing GDP is not enough, there is data that clearly shows the difference in ratios. The US spends generally over $900 billion, while China spends $290 billion. The economic gap is about 80%, but the military spending gap is about threefold.

Military Spending and the Redistribution of Power

Does President Xi Jinping not know this and engage in international politics? He cannot afford to alienate all surrounding great powers. They are aware of the approximately 3-to-1 gap. Therefore, the final boundary for how far to play the game and where to stop is inevitably measured by military spending. Russia's military spending has significantly increased to around $100 billion due to the war in Ukraine. Before the war, it was not much higher than South Korea's. In terms of GDP, it is comparable to ours. If South Korea were to fight Russia one-on-one, could it win? Ukraine is fighting fiercely with less than one-tenth of Russia's military power. Of course, actual assessments require more consideration, but based on such data, there will be a significant difference between those who grasp the world three-dimensionally and those who simply memorize surrounding great powers. If you ask what the 21st century will be like, those who can envision the future using certain indicators and drawing certain pictures will become the protagonists of history. Last year was shocking for Japan in many ways. Its per capita income became equal to South Korea's. For Japan, the fact that a country it considered a colony has reached parity in per capita income is a complex issue. Even more complex is that last year, South Korea's military spending began to surpass Japan's. This is likely a more difficult pill to swallow. Currently, discussions about Korea-Japan relations revolve around pro-Japan or anti-Japan sentiments, whether to sing 'Chang-ga' or 'Aegukga,' but what if South Korea's military spending and Japan's military spending, or their GDP and population, were in a 2-to-1 or 3-to-1 ratio? Currently, the population ratio is 2-to-1, but Japan's total GDP is higher, exceeding $2 trillion. If it becomes 3-to-1, the era when South Korea demanded repentance from Japan will be over.

can be divided into four stages of approximately 25 years each. Individuals are similar. If we assume an average lifespan of 100 years, a person is active around age 50, then gradually experiences aging, and passes away in their 70s or 80s. Interestingly, I believe great powers have undergone a similar process. For the United States, 100 years from 1945 would mean until 2045. More than 50 years have already passed. In 100 years, around 2045, the time will come to hand over the position to another country. Among these stages, how the final fourth stage is navigated is crucial. The reason AI is suddenly mentioned is that when asked about the most essential element among technology, information, and knowledge, the artificial intelligence sector receives the highest weighting in the table. I provided one sample for you to read: a book written by Henry Kissinger and Eric Schmidt. Kissinger lived to be nearly 100 years old.

Japan will proactively offer apologies, and we will say it's enough. The answer to whether repentance is still necessary is that data like this is far more important than mere words. Blues and Posen added technological capability. They argue that the core components of the coming order will be military power, economic power, and technological capability, which is difficult to accept. However, measuring technological capability is very challenging. Various methods are being attempted. The AI Index Report, published annually, proposes using the number of machine learning models created as a metric. This argument has some merit. Choosing 2023 as a specific year is because it was immediately after the public release of generative AI. Before that was the transition from machine learning to deep learning.

The gap between the US and China is 61 to 15, a significant disparity. Estimating from this, China has caught up considerably since 2003, from a ratio of 15 to 61. Given China's rapid pace of change, if deep learning models, rather than general machine learning, are dominating the world today, is the gap narrowing further? The trend over the last two to three years suggests the US still holds the lead. This is merely a reference. Military and economic power are essential elements for great powers, and so is technological capability. Since there is an argument that in the 21st century, technology's importance lies in who possesses the knowledge it generates, we asked about the opinions of global think tanks as a measure of the world's knowledge order. We asked which are the most influential think tanks.

The Importance of Technological Prowess and the Knowledge Order

The reason for having only 2018 data is that the director of the team that produced the annual data passed away in 2018 and 2019, and it could not be sustained. Although the data is a bit old, looking at 20 think tanks, the US still accounts for 12. These include the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The disparity is also considerable. The Brookings Institution has an annual budget of $100 million and 1,000 employees. This is only 1/150th.

While there are discouraging aspects, as we will discuss further, it cannot be viewed solely in that light. For example, let's compare the Brookings Institution and CSIS on East Asian issues. Especially in times like these, the big data processing methods they use and what we focus on become relatively similar in the age of AI. Therefore, while we cannot speak solely in terms of material numbers, it is essential to keep this basic framework in mind. There is no need to despair, nor is there a need for excessive self-confidence. Perhaps this is the appropriate balance. What I want to convey is the question of which indicators you should use in the world you inhabit. I do not believe that the so-called American perspective represents a forward-looking vision that demonstrates the imagination befitting youth. The title is 'New Civilization Order and AI in the 21st Century.' As you can see, the preceding section represents the thinking in the second column, the 'American debate.' The modern historical period in the West is generally considered the 15th-16th centuries, but we did not fully experience it then. Some intellectuals went to China, but we truly felt it in the 19th century. Next is a complex order, which is somewhat controversial. When I mentioned such things, people thought, 'Why is this person saying that?' However, recently, the term 'Age of Empires' has begun to sound less awkward.

Something seems to be changing. We are moving from an 'Age of Simplicity' to 'Complexity.' Explaining one box would take an hour. Changes are occurring in all aspects: the protagonist, the stage, the acting, and the institutions. In the final complex stage, such changes can be assumed. The indicators we used here are security and prosperity, with technology underneath. However, the era you will live in will be a much more complex one. Individuals, instead of being modern subjects, will likely become the center of the stage by being able to think complexly, or they will form complex entities by gathering together rather than acting alone. There are six Dabotaps there. I apologize for borrowing the Dabotap to insert text. Information and knowledge originating from technology have become the foundation in the 21st century.

Complex Order and the K-Complex State

This has not always been the case in human history. In the beginning, religion determined everything. People relied on religion for the unknown, whether it was Buddha, God, or Allah. After a certain period, politics became the foundation. In the 19th century, economics became the center of the world order. Figures like Marx argued that the world should be viewed through the logic of capital. This was not a universal truth throughout human history but reached its peak with the development of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century, creating new stages for everything else. However, after 200 years, that foundation has weakened, and a knowledge order based on technology has begun to color the remaining domains. Technology's integration into security is causing significant changes, as are economic, cultural, and ecological orders. The 'Gongchi (共治)' I refer to here is a translation of the English term 'governance.' Even domestically, we struggle to translate 'governance,' which signifies a deficiency in our thinking ability. It must be translated in some form. Domestically, the term 'Hyeopchi (협치)' is used, but 'Hyeopchi,' based on its Hanja characters, implies 'collaboration' with three 'strength' radicals. Governance, however, encompasses not just strength but also the basis of legitimacy. Therefore, 'Gongchi' is the closest term we have used. To measure the 21st century, we must understand complexity. At the very least, depending on how these six forces are consolidated, nations, powers, or individuals will inevitably gain more attention.

The US debate represents the thinking described in the second column. The modern historical period in the West is generally considered to be the 15th-16th centuries, but we did not fully experience this period. Although some intellectuals traveled to China, we did not truly feel its impact until the 19th century. Next is the complex order, which is somewhat controversial. When I mentioned this, people thought, 'Why is he saying that?' However, recently, the term 'Age of Empires' has begun to sound less awkward.

The problem is that what we are currently experiencing is the last box in this diagram. According to Paul Kennedy's 'The Rise and Fall of Great Powers,' the nations that have led the world order over the past 500-600 years have generally changed every 100 years. Starting with Portugal, the Netherlands dominated for 100 years in the 17th century, and Britain held sway for two cycles before handing over to the United States. The US cycle began in 1945, and if we consider the 100-year cycle again, it can be divided into four stages of approximately 25 years each. Individuals are similar. From birth to growth, assuming an average lifespan of 100 years, one is active around age 50, then gradually experiences aging, and passes away in their 70s or 80s. Interestingly, I believe great powers have gone through similar processes. For the US, 100 years from 1945 would be around 2045, and more than 50 years have already passed. In 100 years, around 2045, the time will come to hand over the reins to other nations. Among these, how the final fourth stage is navigated is crucial. The reason AI suddenly comes up is that when asked what is the most crucial element among technology, information, and knowledge, the artificial intelligence section receives the most weight. I provided one text as a sample for you to read: a book by Henry Kissinger and Eric Schmidt. Kissinger lived to be nearly 100 years old.

Knowledge-Based Society and Co-Governance in the 21st Century

He co-authored it with Eric Schmidt, a professor of Science, Technology, and International Relations at Harvard University. He likely passed away a few months after this book was published. He began focusing on AI about 4-5 years ago. Before this book was released, Eric Schmidt and the CEO of Google warned that if the US did not lead in AI, it would eventually lose its hegemony. Thus, they wrote a voluminous report of 700-800 pages called 'NSC AI' and began making famous statements.

stating that whoever controls AI in the 21st century will hold the reins of international policy. Eric Schmidt persuaded Kissinger. Kissinger is one of the most knowledgeable individuals in international relations theory and practice alive today. Therefore, they co-authored a book on AI and international politics. The book states that one cannot discuss international politics in the 21st century without studying AI. He wrote this article just before his death on October 13th, a few days before Biden and Xi Jinping met. This was a message sent when Biden and Xi were to meet at the APEC summit. Those who have read it know that the title, 'America and China Must Work Together to Avert Catastrophe,' is not merely an academic article but a letter to Xi Jinping and Biden. It conveys the message that the fate of humanity rests on them, and they must reach at least basic agreements, even if reluctantly. They then discuss how many people

The Rise and Fall of Global Powers and the Emergence of AI

The problem is that what we are experiencing now is the final stage of this pattern. According to Paul Kennedy's well-known work, 'The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,' the nations leading the world order over the past 500-600 years have generally changed every 100 years. Starting with Portugal, the Netherlands dominated for 100 years in the 17th century, and Britain controlled two cycles before handing over to the United States. The US cycle began in 1945, and if we divide the 100-year cycle again,

it can be divided into four stages of approximately 25 years each. Individuals are similar. If we assume an average lifespan of 100 years, a person is active around age 50, then gradually experiences aging, and passes away in their 70s or 80s. Interestingly, I believe great powers have undergone a similar process. For the United States, 100 years from 1945 would mean until 2045. More than 50 years have already passed. In 100 years, around 2045, the time will come to hand over the position to another country. Among these stages, how the final fourth stage is navigated is crucial. The reason AI is suddenly mentioned is that when asked about the most essential element among technology, information, and knowledge, the artificial intelligence sector receives the highest weighting in the table. I provided one sample for you to read: a book written by Henry Kissinger and Eric Schmidt. Kissinger lived to be nearly 100 years old.

believe that the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945 fundamentally changed international politics. Kissinger lived through that era, and while nuclear weapons were not his primary specialty, he felt that the changes AI would bring to international politics would be greater than those brought by nuclear weapons. He then passes away, leaving a message for the next generation, urging the two old men to serve. When the atomic bomb appeared, no one foresaw how much it would alter international politics. Initially, the 'Baruch Plan' emerged in 1940. It proposed joint management by all nations, not just a single country, as the world was facing destruction. However, when there are those who possess power and those who do not, the powerful rarely relinquish it. Thus, the Baruch Plan ultimately failed. In reality, history stands at a crossroads: either complete nuclear war or avoiding nuclear war and achieving limited nuclear disarmament.

The Combination of AI and Nuclear Weapons: A Threat to Human Civilization

Partial agreements like SALT, START, and New START were reached in 1972. The NPT and other treaties also spread. Kissinger's argument is that this is even more urgent. An agreement is absolutely necessary. Why is it so urgent? Because there is no time. Jumping to the US-China discussion, it seems three major issues will arise. After his passing, the first issue you will face is the combination of AI and nuclear weapons. We think we are living in a nuclear age, but when the nuclear age and AI become intertwined, it will become very complex. How complex will it be? To avoid making it too abstract, let's use North Korea as an example. North Korea has become a typical 'mini nuclear power.' People say, 'This is a disaster! What should we do? We need to deter it through extended deterrence with the US.' However, I have a different perspective. Ultimately,

North Korea's decision to develop nuclear weapons is one of its biggest mistakes. Especially in the age of AI, the effectiveness of nuclear weapons will rapidly diminish. Regarding North Korea's development of nuclear weapons, we are debating domestically whether to develop our own, borrow from the US, or remain under the US nuclear umbrella. This discussion is based on the reality of half a century ago. Furthermore, looking 50 years ahead from now, people in 50 years will likely think, 'How did our ancestors respond within such outdated thinking?'

Changes in the Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons in the AI Era and North Korea's Nuclear Issue

North Korea has its justifications for developing nuclear weapons. Subjectively, it claims to have developed them for survival amidst US hostility. However, the issue now is why it has become so complicated. The phrase 'combination of AI and nuclear weapons' means this: what changes has AI development brought to the nuclear age? AI weapons are not separate entities. Nuclear weapons become nuclear weapons once they are manufactured. AI has the effect of vastly expanding the effectiveness and efficiency of existing weapons. For example, last year, the Presidents of South Korea and the United States met and issued the Washington Declaration. President Biden stated that if Chairman Kim Jong Un decides to launch a nuclear weapon at South Korea and attempts to fire it, it would simultaneously mean Kim Jong Un's death. We might dismiss this as mere saber-rattling. However, from North Korea's perspective, with the integration of AI, the past

effectiveness of nuclear weapons brought about by AI has become far greater than previously anticipated. This is because South Korea's response transparency has dramatically increased with the introduction of AI in case North Korea attempts to launch nuclear weapons. In the past, a simple retaliation logic of 'if you fire, you die' might have sufficed, but now, every move by North Korea is meticulously tracked through AI. In the case of the United States, AI technology development allows for real-time surveillance of North Korea's every move in cyberspace. This means Chairman Kim Jong Un's 24 hours are exposed, indicating maximized transparency. Even hiding in underground bunkers makes it difficult to escape the 24-hour surveillance network. Therefore, the transparency of North Korea's nuclear weapon operations has completely changed with the introduction of AI.

In the past, even if North Korea threatened the US with nuclear weapons, the US considered it bluster. This was because they judged that North Korea lacked the capabilities, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or nuclear submarines, that could reach the US mainland. However, AI technology is changing this assessment. AI can track the location of North Korea's nuclear weapons every 15 minutes, altering the US perception of North Korea's nuclear threat. Furthermore, AI has brought about innovations in the operational methods of tactical nuclear weapons. While in the past, nuclear bombs were dropped from the air, now, with AI-guided systems, they can be precisely targeted to destroy even underground bunkers.

The effect of AI on nuclear weapons has become much greater than previously anticipated. If North Korea were to launch a nuclear weapon, South Korea's transparency in response has increased enormously due to the adoption of AI. In the past, a simple logic of retaliation, 'If you fire, you die,' might have sufficed, but now every move by North Korea is meticulously tracked by AI. In the case of the United States, advancements in AI technology have enabled real-time monitoring of North Korea's every action in cyberspace. This means that Kim Jong Un's 24-hour activities are fully exposed, indicating a maximization of transparency. Even if hiding in an underground bunker, it is difficult to evade the 24-hour surveillance network. Therefore, the adoption of AI has completely altered the transparency surrounding North Korea's nuclear weapon operations.

The development of these autonomous weapon systems will accelerate further. Currently, it is at the level of identifying and attacking targets via algorithms, as with drones, but in the future, AI will likely evolve to analyze data and make judgments independently to attack. Furthermore, existing weapon systems like tanks are likely to become unmanned, operating without human crews. AI will maximize the efficiency of military operations through these changes. In South Korea's case, with robotic or AI systems replacing tasks like border patrol, significant changes are expected in the military structure.

Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Rise of Cognitive Warfare

AI-based military systems, coupled with the declining birthrate, will bring about revolutionary changes in military structures. Nuclear weapons, in particular, remain the greatest threat due to their massive destructive capability. As autonomous weapon systems advance and human intervention decreases, the risk of unintended conflicts escalating into nuclear war increases. Therefore, the importance of 'Cognitive War' is being emphasized more. Cognitive warfare aims to psychologically subjugate the enemy by taking control of their minds.

Sun Tzu's Art of War also identifies 'winning without fighting' as the highest strategy. Cognitive warfare aims to reduce the likelihood of war by manipulating the enemy's cognitive processes, going beyond the stage of information perception. This is closely related to AI technology. Therefore, the nature of future warfare will be very different from what we have imagined. The military AI conference to be held in Seoul next month will be an important venue for discussing these changes. While non-military AI and semiconductor technology are important, military AI will have a decisive impact on future security.

AI technology is expected to take on very complex forms around 2050, and discussions on its governance are urgently needed. Entrusting military decisions solely to AI is dangerous; humans must play a crucial role as control towers in AI's information gathering, policy decision-making, and command processes. The 'Broken Arrow' incident in the Soviet Union in 1984 is a prime example of a nuclear war crisis due to AI malfunction. At that time, the Soviet radar detected a US missile launch, but the duty officer, suspecting a machine malfunction, withheld the final decision, thus averting nuclear war.

The 'black box' problem of AI remains an unresolved challenge. It is often difficult to clearly explain why an AI makes a particular decision. Recently, research comparing AI and human intelligence has also been conducted. For complex questions like inter-Korean relations, AI can generate plausible answers, but sometimes these may contain inaccurate or biased information. This is due to the limitations of AI's training data and algorithms.

AI Governance and the Issue of Accountability

Even if the accuracy of AI-generated answers is high, a 10-20% error rate can lead to serious consequences. If a problem arises due to AI's misjudgment, discussions are needed on who should bear responsibility. The core of 'Responsible AI' is precisely clarifying this accountability. Reducing the black box of AI models and increasing transparency are crucial tasks for AI technology development.

In this changing landscape, South Korea's future hinges on the architecture of a 'K-Complex State.' This signifies a complex national concept that transcends national borders, encompassing inter-Korean networks and surrounding cyber territories. It will be difficult to survive without keeping pace with the knowledge order based on cutting-edge technology. Therefore, even for those not from science and engineering backgrounds, understanding advanced technologies like AI is essential. Efforts are needed to understand the minimum level of advanced technology in one's field, such as culture, ecology, or climate change, and to integrate it.

The transition from modern states to complex states is inevitable. Like the expression 'wolf spider,' it will be a form that combines past methods with new ones. This demands not only technological advancement but also unavoidable changes in all areas, including politics, economics, military affairs, and global governance.

The K-Complex State and a Future of Coexistence

Amidst the military risks posed by the US-China conflict and AI technological advancements, 'Symbiosis' will be a key keyword for survival in the 21st century. This is not merely about the survival of individual nations but is an essential element for the sustainable development of all humanity. BTS's music carries such international political significance, and songs like 'Fake Love' and 'Mikrokosmos' explore the essence of love and offer deep reflections on relationships with others.

'Fake Love' explores the duality of false and true love, which connects to important ideas in international politics. 'Mikrokosmos' sings of a world where self-love and love for others coexist harmoniously, like small candles gathering to shine together. These songs carry deeper meanings than the complexities of domestic politics.

The complex states to be built in the mid-to-late 21st century will transcend the concept of modern states. They will develop in a form that is centered on the state but encompasses sub-state networks. Security, circular culture, and ecology will occupy the central stage, supported by technology, information, and knowledge at the base. Ultimately, a way of life that pursues 'Co-evolution' beyond 'Self-organization' will become important.

Humanity must pursue a life of 'symbiosis,' moving forward together with others, beyond self-sufficiency for survival. If we ignore such symbiosis and continue to struggle until the end, humanity will face the risk of mutual destruction in the era of the 'Nuclear Plus AI Nexus,' where nuclear weapons and AI are combined. This will possess destructive power incomparable to past wars and will fundamentally threaten humanity's future.

Deep contemplation on these issues is occurring in 21st-century theology, but international politics is developing slowly. South Korea, in particular, is failing to respond adequately to these changes amidst the division issue and domestic political turmoil. The world is changing rapidly, and we must prepare for the future through proactive contemplation.

The Threat of Human Annihilation and South Korea's Challenges in the 21st Century

If the 30 of you gathered here take the lead in this contemplation, it will serve as the 'candlelight' within the Korean Peninsula that BTS speaks of. Thank you for your hard work over the past eight weeks, and I hope you continue to share interesting discussions.

The 21st century, particularly the latter half, will see the construction of complex states that transcend the concept of modern states. These will be centered around the state but will evolve to encompass sub-state networks. Security, culture, and ecology will form the core stage, underpinned by technology, information, and knowledge. Ultimately, a way of life pursuing 'co-evolution' beyond 'self-organization' will become crucial.

If humanity turns its back on such symbiosis and continues to fight until the end, it will face the risk of mutual destruction in the era of the 'Nuclear Plus AI Nexus,' where nuclear weapons and AI are combined. This will possess destructive power incomparable to past wars and will fundamentally threaten humanity's future.

■ Ha Young-sun_ Chairman of the East Asia Institute, Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University.