[7th EAI Academy] IV. North Korea Issues and the Future of the Korean Peninsula

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mg-89JmZlMY

Video Script

Historical Background and the Complexity of North Korea Issues

First, before directly addressing the North Korean issue, we will examine our current era and how it connects to the North Korean problem. This section may overlap somewhat with the lectures covered previously. Following that, we will explain North Korea's unification policy toward South Korea, that is, why North Korea says, 'Let's live separately from Manchuria, let's live as two adversarial states,' then discuss how to view North Korea's current nuclear and missile threats, and finally, the future of the Korean Peninsula. I believe the current era is one where geopolitics, economics, and science and technology are intricately intertwined.

In addition to this, we are burdened with the North Korean issue. In other words, the reality for Korea is that we are burdened with the North Korean issue while the world and the era are changing. If we visualize this, the current era is one where the ghost of the Cold War lingers even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The year I went to study abroad, 1991, was the year the Soviet Union collapsed. I went to study socialist systems, but the subject of my study disappeared. The reason I studied socialist systems was because I believed it was necessary to first study the Soviet Union, the heartland of socialism, to understand North Korea.

The world order has changed significantly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the time I was studying, Ukraine was considered a very important country because it was a buffer state between Europe and Russia. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine faced economic difficulties, recording negative growth for a long period. Russia also saw its GDP decrease by 40% after the collapse of the Soviet Union, meaning its GDP fell from 100 to 60.

As a result, the West thought Russia was finished and forgot about the Ukraine issue. In the meantime, Ukraine faced even greater difficulties than Russia, with its GDP decreasing by 60%. Amidst this, Ukraine was being forgotten. Of course, Ukraine later democratized, but economically, it lagged far behind Russia. This is the lingering ghost of the old Cold War that still haunts the era. Furthermore, there is talk of a new Cold War. While there is debate about whether the term 'new Cold War' is accurate, if used in contrast to the old Cold War, it would refer to the US-China hegemonic competition. This has already begun.

In a sense, this era is experiencing the overlap of two Cold Wars. It is a very unstable situation. Are you all okay? It can be dangerous. When I was the Director of the National Future Strategy Institute at Seoul National University, I collaborated with The Heritage Foundation in the United States. The Heritage Foundation is a conservative think tank in the US that plays a role in developing and providing policy recommendations when a Republican administration comes into power. I had a conversation with Mr. Edwin Feulner, the founder and president at the time.

When I asked him how long he thought the US-China hegemonic competition would last, he answered with one word: 'Indefinite.' In the US, they talk about a 'Decisive Decade,' referring to ten years, but his answer, from a master of geopolitics and American politics, was that it is unknown whether this will be ten years, twenty years, or longer. And then, the North Korean issue is entangled with this.

When we link the North Korean issue to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, this issue also connects to the Russia-Ukraine war. Even during the Russia-Ukraine war, people thought, 'How could a war happening so far away possibly affect us?' However, the artillery shells falling so far away are now forming a front line and casting a dark cloud over the Korean Peninsula. The US-China hegemony competition is structurally bound to be connected with us. We can see how vulnerable we are. The old Cold War and the new Cold War are intertwined, and the North Korean issue is connected to both, making this an immense challenge we must navigate going forward.

Furthermore, new volatilities and developments in science and technology, including the AI revolution, are occurring. What a complex era this is. Last year, on a day when a typhoon was forecast, I said at the beginning of the lecture, 'This is an era like the weather today. It's an era of wind and storms where we don't know what will happen.' This is precisely the era we live in now. It is highly uncertain and volatile, and we must always be prepared for surprises. Yet, amidst this, we must calmly find our way to survive. If possible, we need to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to where the era is heading and how it will affect us. I drew a picture for a lecture once.

In the past, the relationships between the US, China, and Russia were stable, like Lego blocks with fixed positions. Now, as you can see, the Lego blocks can wobble, and a slight shock can cause them to collapse. I encourage you to consider the current era using this analogy. Of course, the US and China are superpowers, and Russia is a major power. These countries possess symbolic significance; Russia, though ranked in the top 10 globally by GDP, has military strength and the influence of a former peer of the US. However, if any shock is applied to these three nations, we can imagine a structure where we don't know how they will combine or collapse. The sparks of conflict and confrontation are likely to be found in the issues of Taiwan and North Korea. Additionally, we experienced economic shocks, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic. Central banks must now make interest rate decisions cautiously. Wrong decisions could fail to curb inflation and worsen the economic situation.

However, maintaining low interest rates for too long can lead to economic downturns, crises, or financial crises. They face the burden of making balanced decisions on a very narrow path. This is also true for Korea. The United States is particularly important. China's economy is in a very poor state. In other words, the economy and geopolitics are intertwined. If China's economy deteriorates further, there will be limits to the power China can project. Even if they want to do something, internal difficulties might prevent them from acting freely. Alternatively, they might divert attention outward to address internal problems. This is a complex era. We must understand this complexity. The greatest enemy of policymakers and politicians is simplicity. They fail to grasp complex issues and try to define them in a single sentence. I came to Korea in 2003, having lived in the UK for 12 years before coming as a professor. Reflecting on the perception of North Korea when I first arrived in 2003 compared to now, after 20 years have passed, and considering how much knowledge should have increased in the AI era, how North Korea policy should have evolved, and how perceptions of North Korea should have become more accurate, 20 years is a significant period that should have seen substantial progress.

When I came to Korea in 2003, how one viewed North Korea was the most important criterion dividing conservatives and progressives. The question, 'What do you think of North Korea?' was enough to determine whether the other person was conservative or progressive. Not long after I arrived, I attended a seminar. Someone asked me, 'What is your ideology, Professor?' For an academic to be asked about ideology at a seminar means they ultimately want to know the other person's premises for perception. They wanted me to reveal whether I was conservative or progressive. I myself am not sure whether I am conservative or progressive.

I have been writing columns for the JoongAng Ilbo since 2014. A column of mine was published today as well. Having written about North Korea for about 10 years, it is likely the longest-running column on the subject. It is difficult to write columns about North Korea for an extended period because they quickly become outdated. We cannot visit North Korea, meet Kim Jong-un, or access sufficient data. Predictions are impossible, so columns are often proven wrong soon after publication. This leads the media outlets to suggest discontinuing them. However, I have been writing for 10 years. Looking back at my evaluations over this time, I am unsure of my own identity. Some people call me 'red.' You know what that implies. Others also view me as someone who would be considered 'normal' by those who call extreme conservatives 'ordinary.'

When I wrote a column opposing South Korea's nuclear armament recently, although I rarely read comments, I occasionally saw evaluations calling me a 'pro-North Korea leftist.' The reasoning was, 'We need nuclear weapons to counter North Korea and possess deterrence, so you, who clearly collude with North Korea, are advocating against nuclear armament because you are pro-North Korea, pro-Juche, or leftist.' Today, I wrote a column about North Korea's exchange rates, and I don't know how that will be evaluated. Once, when South Korea was considering withdrawing from GSOMIA in response to Japan's export restrictions, I wrote a column arguing that both South Korea and Japan should adopt perspectives that consider each other's interests. Among the comments I received, one remains memorable and is my favorite.

The comment read, 'This guy is a native Japanese collaborator. Arrest him immediately and use him in Gwanghwamun.' Based on the evaluations I have received over time, I have been assessed so diversely that I am unsure of my own identity. This ultimately signifies that the South Korean public views North Korea through a single, fixed lens. In this complex era, is it possible to view North Korea through just one lens? When I occasionally watch presidential candidate debates, if a candidate is asked, 'Is North Korea an enemy?', they are told to answer 'Yes' or 'No.' If they try to explain the issue, they are instructed to answer 'Yes' or 'No.' Someone who asks questions like that can never become president. Can North Korea be viewed so simplistically?

This is true not only for North Korea but for the world as well. The world is complex, but if our thinking is overly simplistic, we will lose. Yet, people with such simplistic thinking become policymakers. This should not happen. However, we have continued to elect such individuals. So, will the North Korean issue be resolved? After 20 years? The reason I don't often give lectures but do so occasionally is that while changing politicians is important, I believe our citizens must understand the complexity of the North Korean issue. Only then can we see a path forward. The perception of North Korea has not changed at all in 20 years; I came out today with the question of how to address this. You all know this, but I intend to lecture when time permits.

Vulnerability of the Korean Economy and Geopolitical Threats

What I have said so far is intended to motivate you. Now, let's look at some facts to understand how complex and difficult an era we live in. This is also true for our economy. The Seoul National University Institute for Future Strategy created an economic security index through its Economic Security Cluster. According to the evaluation of this index, when we export to other countries, those countries must purchase a significant amount of products from Korea. Specifically, Korea exports more than 40% of the products that country imports, and Korea produces more than 10% of those products globally. If problems arise in this importing country, or if the country imposes regulations on Korea (as China did during the THAAD deployment), Korea can retaliate through economic sanctions by ceasing exports.

Our ability to deter other countries by ceasing exports is ranked 14th globally. This is relatively high. However, our vulnerability when other countries engage in economically hostile actions against Korea or impose economic sanctions to coerce Korea into their will is ranked first in the world. This is understandable. Korea has grown by importing vast amounts of raw materials from around the world and manufacturing highly complex products. This strategy worked best during the era of globalization. We imported raw materials from countries with the lowest costs and best quality to produce and sell complex products like semiconductors. Now, this has become a vulnerability. Complexity implies numerous stages in product manufacturing. If even one of these stages is disrupted, the product cannot be made. The semiconductor manufacturing process involves 100 to 400-500 steps, and if even one is missed, semiconductors cannot be produced. Japan exploited this.

How vulnerable are we? Korea is the most vulnerable country in the world in many aspects. Therefore, this presents our difficulties and concerns. A few years ago, we assessed the probability of crises that could occur within the next two to three years. The probability of a North Korean nuclear test or a similar crisis was estimated at 35%, the probability of Russia using nuclear weapons at 10%, and the probability of China invading Taiwan at 5%. The total is 50%. This means there is a 50% chance within approximately three years that a crisis will occur that we must seriously consider, become entangled in, and respond to.

Korea has grown by importing numerous raw materials from around the world, manufacturing highly complex products, and selling them. This strategy was most effective during the era of globalization. Specifically, we imported raw materials from countries with the lowest costs to produce and sell complex products like semiconductors. However, this approach has now become a vulnerability. Manufacturing complex products requires many steps, and if even one step is disrupted, the product cannot be made. The semiconductor production process involves hundreds of steps, and if even one is omitted, semiconductors cannot be produced. Japan exploited this.

Korea is the most vulnerable country in the world in many aspects. Therefore, this presents our difficulties and concerns. Last year, we assessed the probability of crises that could occur within the next two to three years. The probability of a North Korean nuclear test or nuclear weapon use was estimated at 35%, the probability of Russia using nuclear weapons at 10%, and the probability of China invading Taiwan at 5%. The sum indicates a 50% chance within three years that a crisis will occur requiring our serious consideration and response.

Is your heart fluttering a little, or are you quite calm? It's good that you are calm. There's no need to be so agitated. If we know in advance, we can respond much more calmly. If China invades Taiwan, can Korea remain separate? No. North Korea, China, and Russia might act in concert. If Russia uses nuclear weapons, will it end there? Looking at North Korea now, there's little chance that Russia's nuclear use would end there. Considering only North Korea's nuclear tests, their impact would be smaller than other events.

However, North Korea conducting another nuclear test is a signal flare for another upheaval. Why would North Korea do it? It's not just to test something. They would want to shake up the game. Then, if that shaken game, like in 2016-17, doesn't just shake North Korea but shakes the Chinese and Russian plates as well, like tectonic plates shifting during an earthquake, this is the era we live in. Yet, if we go with a simple statement like 'North Korea is the enemy,' or 'North Korea is our brethren, so welcome them,' or 'North Korea is the enemy, so let's destroy them,' it seems that all that will be left for Korea is a race to see how quickly we will face our demise and perish. I mentioned this last year, so it's no longer a secret. This year's June 25th marks a completely different era from the one I've lived in. But looking at politics, they are fighting over such pathetic and trivial issues, and our citizens are also focused on these trivial matters.

The Need to Understand the Fixity and Complexity of Perceptions of North Korea

They are too concerned with pathetic things. They have little interest in important matters. Can this work? If we can't push the country towards rapid ruin, shouldn't we stop? I've spoken in a way to scare you all for the sake of motivating you. Now, let me temper my remarks slightly and discuss what we can do about North Korea. I've spoken about the background, and why we need to understand North Korea. In truth, the reason I've written for the past 10 years is not because I have a special understanding of North Korea.

Then, doesn't writing for 10 years imply that my analyses are largely correct and accurate? What is special about it? I think there are two things. One is economics. Are there any economics students here? Excellent. Are there any who wish to study economics? Then why is economics so special? Some of you might be disappointed to hear it's special. Because it allows us to see things most coolly. Coolly. In economics, there's no room for emotion. Well, perhaps I shouldn't put it that way. But when I teach introductory economics in college, students say, 'You've come for economics, right? Then I'll give up.' They say this. The students wonder, 'Give up what?' They say, 'Give up your dreams.' Why do they find this so strange? 'Professor, you tell us to have dreams, but this professor is strange. Why tell us to give up our dreams?' I tell them, 'If you want to dream, go to the humanities department.'

The humanities department. I apologize. Economics is about problem-solvers. Will dreams alone solve problems? Will good words alone solve them? In such a complex and difficult era, can ideals alone solve problems? No. We need people who can solve them. I use this analogy: A doctor has a vision. A patient comes in with a broken arm. A whole person can use their arm, but why can't this person use theirs? Saying this won't help. If it's broken, it needs to be fixed. The person who fixes it saves them. Sociologists are social doctors.

Doctors. But economics is even more so. Because economics analyzes things most coolly, the probability of error is lower than in other fields. In other disciplines, it's hard to find answers, isn't it? It could be this way, or it could be that way. Then we must prepare for 'this way,' and how to respond to 'that way.' In comparison, political science or diplomacy are like playing chess. If they move this way, what problems might arise, and what opportunities are there, so let's try. What is economics? Economics is like peeling an onion. Why peel an onion? You know onions.

Peel, peel, peel until it can't be peeled anymore. It goes to the deepest level. Therefore, those who study economics see the unshakeable foundation at the very bottom. From there, they build upwards. Because they see the foundation, their view of what's above is accurate, right? More accurate than other fields. No matter how accurate one's thinking, how accurate can it be? When I talk about Kim Jong-un, I might even laugh reading my own columns. He might think, 'How well does he know me?' But I've probably gotten many things right. Because I don't trust Kim Jong-un much. What I trust most is not his words, but the fact that he is a dictator, a human being. That's undeniable. His most important objective function is to maintain power as a dictator.

Is that the foundation? After seeing it all, the most important code that Kim Jong-un understands is maintaining power. Maintaining power. Regarding nuclear weapons, the reason he considers giving them up difficult is that they are the most important tool for maintaining power. Not power maintenance itself, but one of the most crucial means to achieve it. Seen this way, the idea that some people suggest, that if we treat North Korea well, Kim Jong-un will give up his nuclear weapons, is a product of incredible imagination, isn't it? I don't possess such imagination.

And another thing is what I mentioned as the power of economics. Second, I lived in Russia for about two years. I went there in '92, lived there for a year in '93-'94, and continued to visit during my breaks. When I was writing my doctoral dissertation, I began reading Soviet master's and doctoral theses as part of my fieldwork in Russia to verify what I knew. I must have read about 300 theses. I gathered all the master's and doctoral theses and started reading them in Russian. I read them in two months. When people hear that I read master's and doctoral theses in two months, they think I have a special ability because it's in Russian. I have no special ability.

What made it possible was that the content of the master's and doctoral theses lacked substance. This is true for North Korea as well, but it was the same for the Soviet Union. Initially, about 20-30% of a thesis would be citations: 'Marx said this. Lenin said that.' North Korea is the same. Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and so on, filling about 20% of the doctoral thesis. It's too easy. After that, they would repeat what they called 'the imperative' or 'what should be.' It wasn't about 'this is the case,' but 'this is how it should be.' The thesis was filled with imperatives, imperatives, imperatives. So, when you read them, there are no numbers, no facts. You only learn what 'should be.' I already know that. I know what socialism should be like. But by repeating it, they obtained their doctoral degrees.

It's hollow. It might be a good system for obtaining a doctorate. But it wasn't just master's and doctoral theses. Many official documents that the Soviet Union published, both domestically and internationally, were the same. Imperatives. They selectively presented what was necessary for socialist propaganda, but did not publish statistics or content that would allow for an understanding of the society. However, in Korea, some people view North Korean documents as if they represent the entirety of the situation. When analyzing North Korea, due to the lack of data and the underdeveloped systematic academic structure, North Korean research has faced difficulties.

So, they diligently read North Korea's Rodong Sinmun, diligently listen to what Kim Jong-il says. But if this is an imperative, propaganda for their own purposes, how relevant would what we read be? Consequently, there are difficulties in properly understanding North Korea. Another problem arises. Some people, therefore, completely disregard internal North Korean affairs, or in extreme cases, focus only on what North Korea wants to show, such as nuclear tests, ICBM launches, or Kim Jong-il's speeches. Seeing this, they might think, 'Oh no, this is a disaster. North Korea has so many nuclear weapons and is continuously advancing them. We are in big trouble.'

Therefore, our policies and understanding of North Korea require knowledge that allows us to see inside North Korea. We need to look inside North Korea and understand the relationship between the internal situation and what North Korea shows or wants to show. However, to understand the internal situation of North Korea, we cannot rely solely on what North Korea says. Thus, when we observe North Korea, we must constantly work to connect the internal situation with what we can see externally or what is being shown. Otherwise, for example, if we are truly cornered, thinking 'North Korea already has 50 nuclear weapons and is continuously advancing them. We don't know how much further they will develop, perhaps even SLBMs. Or perhaps they can launch multiple nuclear warheads with a single test.' This would lead to the thought, 'Oh no, Korea must quickly develop its own nuclear weapons to counter this.' But if we look inside North Korea, we can see where the ugliness lies, where North Korea is strong, what opportunities we have, and how we can...

respond, and see it three-dimensionally. We must look at the internal situation of North Korea together. This time, North Korea removing its unification plan from its unification proposals is also in this context. Why are they doing this? It's a serious concern, a matter of life and death. They even spoke of pacifying South Korea. Could war break out? You might worry. Early this year, a businessman asked to meet me. He had previously donated to my university, so I met him as a courtesy. We had a meal together, and he wanted to ask me one thing: 'Will there be war?' That's what he wanted to ask. From late last year to early this year, they removed the concept of unification and even spoke of pacifying South Korea in case of emergency. Business people must be very worried. So he asked me.

There will be no war this year. Yes, almost none. Furthermore, there will be no nuclear tests this year. Some people predicted North Korean nuclear tests last year and continue to do so now, but I believe there will be no nuclear tests this year. I have explained my reasons for thinking so. If you only look at what North Korea says, it might seem like they are about to do something drastic, but if you look at the internal situation of North Korea and Kim Jong-un's circumstances, you can see how feasible that is. We should not look at Kim Jong-un's mouth, but at his structural situation. We must look at the structure. From this perspective, why did North Korea change its unification plan?

Changes in North Korea's Strategy Towards South Korea and Their Background

Or why did they decide not to pursue unification? I will omit this discussion for now. The traditional unification plan of North Korea was a low-level federation. That is, they proposed that South and North Korea form a federation. However, if the federation were too advanced, diplomacy and national defense could be merged. So, they suggested not doing that, but maintaining their respective systems and respecting each other in a loose federation. This was North Korea's traditional unification plan. Kim Jong-un also stated early on that he would follow this unification plan. However, at the end of last year, he declared that inter-Korean relations are no longer those of a single people, but of two hostile states. He further stated that they have become completely solidified as two belligerent nations in a state of war. He then announced that this would be codified into law, making it constitutional, and that South Korea would be designated as the primary, unwavering enemy, and this would be taught. Since then, various practical measures have been taken. The monument commemorating the three charters for national unification was demolished, and institutions that had been involved in various cooperative projects with South Korea were abolished. Furthermore, words like 'unification,' 'compatriots,' and 'reconciliation' are being removed from North Korean textbooks. This shows how firmly Kim Jong-un has resolved this. So, why did this change occur? Did Kim Jong-un fundamentally change his principles, or was it due to some reason? Some international reason, perhaps? Of course, even before Kim Jong-un's change, his policy towards South Korea was hostile. After the breakdown of the summit in 2019, as you may recall, the inter-Korean joint liaison office was blown up. And in 2022, South Korea was clearly defined as the enemy.

So, we can analyze the reasons for this shift through three factors: internal North Korean dynamics (domestic), South Korea policy (inter-Korean), and external factors (international). I will explain these. The most crucial factor is internal North Korean dynamics, i.e., domestic factors. However, inter-Korean and international factors are also intertwined, so let's examine them one by one. Broadly speaking, North Korea is in a state of promise. It possesses nuclear weapons, but its economy is in dire straits, and its institutional foundation is weak. Therefore, it expects something from South Korea. Always. What does it expect? Economic benefits, of course. Also, in nuclear negotiations, it might hope that South Korea would help persuade the US to allow North Korea to give up only some of its nuclear weapons, rather than all of them. Furthermore, diplomatic benefits. For instance, it might hope that South Korea would take the lead in dismantling UN sanctions or easing them. These are the expectations.

and stipulated. Now, we can analyze the reasons for this shift into three factors: North Korea's internal, South Korea-oriented, and external factors. I will explain this. The most important factor is North Korea's internal, or domestic, factors. However, since South Korea-oriented and external factors are also included in the plan, we will look at them one by one. Ultimately, North Korea is, broadly speaking, a promise. It has nuclear weapons, but its economy is in dire straits, and its institutional foundation is also weak. Therefore, it expects something from South Korea. Always. What could it expect? There would be economic benefits. Also, when negotiating nuclear weapons, North Korea might hope that South Korea would persuade the US well to have North Korea give up only some of its nuclear weapons, not all, and facilitate a deal. Then there are diplomatic benefits. For example, if South Korea takes the lead in dismantling sanctions like UN sanctions, or in cooperating with countries that are suspending these sanctions. It would be good if they could do that. Such expectations might exist. However, these

expectations did not yield any results. After the breakdown of the North Korea-US summit, one can imagine Kim Jong-un's sense of loss and disappointment. After that, it seems South Korea had already broken away from the sanctions cooperation. Even if it strained relations with the US, if it had pursued inter-Korean economic cooperation projects like the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the sanctions cooperation would have collapsed, leading to the lifting of sanctions, which would have been beneficial for North Korea. However, even the previous administration did not do that. Would the Yoon administration do so? Certainly not. Therefore, it would naturally conclude that there are no benefits to be gained from South Korea. It would judge that even if relations with South Korea improve, there is nothing South Korea can do to help. When considering whether to sever ties or not, the benefits are almost zero. The benefits from South Korea are negligible. The costs, however, are increasing. The costs are intertwined with internal factors; unification with South Korea becomes a burden for maintaining the regime. The costs are increasing, while the benefits are zero. Therefore, from a transactional

perspective, severing relations would be the normal course of action. Then, a good reason to sever ties with South Korea emerged. Russia is doing what South Korea could have done. Russia is. China is doing it. Especially Russia, which vetoed the UN expert panel that monitored sanctions against North Korea. Russia did not extend its mandate. South Korea cannot do that. We are not a superior power. However, Russia, a superior power, has blocked a UN body that functions to enforce sanctions, something South Korea cannot do. Russia can provide food, and oil. Although providing oil would violate UN sanctions, would they do that now? Probably not. A country that can provide much more than South Korea has emerged.

Russia and China are the same. Therefore, if they receive support from Russia, they believe there is no need to receive it from South Korea. Looking further ahead, as Kim Jong-un repeatedly says, the world is changing into a multipolar system. In the past, it was a unipolar system centered on the US, but now the world is becoming multipolar. Therefore, one can speak of a Russian bloc and a Chinese bloc. By aligning with these blocs, they aim to survive. That is, since those countries will not give up nuclear weapons, possessing nuclear weapons is not an issue, and if they gain more power, they may violate UN sanctions further. If they live in a different bloc, China and Russia will take care of and support North Korea economically, so North Korea will have no problems. In other words, there will be no talk of denuclearization, and the economy will function. Thus, the world is becoming multipolar, so let's go this way, is this not the reasoning? This is the judgment.

Changes in North Korean Residents' Consciousness and the Dilemma of Power Maintenance

If this is one of the reasons, the most important reason is attitude. While studying Lenin, I met many of his disciples. Although I directly met only Bukharin, I encountered many through their theses and books. I encountered Lenin, Stalin, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev as dictators through their writings. When determining whether a dictator is a dictator, the most crucial factor is the maintenance of power, and the person most influenced by this power maintenance is not an outsider but an insider, that is, internal factors. Some may think dictators do not care about their citizens, but no such person exists.

No. The same applies to Stalin and Mao. Ultimately, they know that if the majority of their citizens do not support them and abandon them, their power will weaken. Therefore, they always pay attention to the survival of their citizens, and perhaps more directly, to the elites surrounding them. These are the key figures for power maintenance. However, in a chain of events, unifying with South Korea has progressed in a way that hinders this power maintenance. First, North Korea developed nuclear weapons, leading to sanctions against it. Then, COVID-19 broke out.

The economy has become a crisis. Consequently, public discontent is increasing. Therefore, they must endure this; only by enduring can North Korea become a nuclear-armed state without abandoning its nuclear weapons. However, public discontent is growing. So, what will they do? They must suppress it. However, suppressing it for a long time is difficult. For example, if people are starving, imagine the Arduous March in the mid-to-late 1990s lasting for ten years. Would it be sustainable? Even with ideological control, to make it last longer, discontent must eventually be eliminated. Upon closer examination, where is this discontent amplified? Like an amplifier for music, where is it amplified? It is in the markets. Those engaged in market activities tend to favor capitalism more, and as market activities occur, information and news spread from there.

Because people gather there. Previously, North Korean residents went to work, lived their lives, and received rations for information, so they had no opportunity to encounter strangers and hear new information or news. However, the market is a place where anonymous people meet to buy and sell. While they may not have deep conversations, they can convey general knowledge. More importantly, they sell USB drives containing South Korean culture, right? And South Korean products are circulated, right? Therefore, the minds of North Korean residents are leaning towards capitalism on one side, and towards South Korea on the other.

You know, Kim Jong-il would have been terrified. He would have thought, 'How great a dictator am I, I've done so well.' In a sense, he might have felt his foundation crumbling. He thought the North Korean people were on his side, but upon closer inspection, even though they outwardly appeared to be on his side, he saw that pro-capitalist and pro-South Korean tendencies were emerging in the markets. Therefore, he would have thought, 'I must eliminate this. So, I must abolish the markets, and if possible, eliminate South Korea and capitalism, so that I can maintain ideological control and continue.'

This is it. So, what did North Korea do? In an attempt to eliminate South Korean culture, they said, 'Don't use South Korean language, don't watch South Korean dramas,' didn't they? I will return to this. The law... it seems to be related. So, they enacted strict laws, such as imprisonment for watching South Korean dramas and the death penalty for distributing them. But even with these laws, people want to watch them, right? So, they execute people. But to eliminate this, what would be necessary? To instill more strongly the idea that 'one must not be exposed to these dramas or South Korean culture,' it would not be beneficial to say, 'We must unify with South Korea,' would it? Then, in the minds of North Korean residents, this is not a major resistance. 'We are of the same people, and we will unify later,' if you say this, then telling them not to watch dramas becomes incomprehensible, doesn't it? Why shouldn't they watch? They are enjoyable. Therefore, by designating South Korea as an enemy, Kim Jong-un has made it so that it is not an object of unification,

but has designated it as a hostile nation in a state of war. The goal is to erase the word 'South Korea' from the minds of North Korean residents. Only then can the pro-South Korean sentiments of North Korean residents be eliminated. In the future, if we say, 'This is a relationship we will get along well with,' people think, 'Let's practice getting along well in advance.' But instead, he wants to instill the idea that 'There is no unification, they are the enemy, and if necessary, we will conquer them.' So, I mentioned the market, South Korean culture, and capitalism, right? The question is, how strongly have these entered the minds of North Korean residents? That's the question. To understand this, we need to understand marketization. Originally, the market, according to Marx, is the most crucial component of capitalism. Therefore, the socialist revolution is about abolishing the market, as per Marx's socialism. Philosophically, the market is exchange. What is exchanged? According to Marx, capitalism annihilates humanity. Because when a person labors and creates something, that creation is like their alter ego. Like a child. But capitalism is a system where one must sell their child to survive, he thinks.

This may sound philosophical, but he defined humans as laboring beings. That labor is the most important identity of a human. How much alienation does the human condition of having to sell what they labor to create in the market for survival cause? It is about abolishing the market. And in his later work, 'Das Kapital,' he pointed out the unequal exchange that occurs in the market. The market should not exist. However, North Korea, unlike any other country in the world, has seen its socialism collapse. North Korea is the most marketized socialist society. Unprecedented. How much? In South Korea, the proportion of market income in household income is 16%. But in North Korea, it's said to be 70%, but even if it were 100%, I wouldn't mark it as incorrect. That is, almost all income is market income. If you go to work, you don't receive much salary. The monthly salary... Before the recent wage increase, it was 3,000 won in North Korea, and before the recent exchange rate surge, the North Korean exchange rate was 8,000 won per dollar. So, even if you work hard for a month, your salary would be about 30 cents. Can you live on that? Even in North Korea, how can one live on 30 cents? The price of rice is 5,000 to 6,000 won per kilogram. So, with a month's salary, you can buy 500 grams of rice. How can you live? Everyone earns money in the market. So, since most North Korean residents earn money in the market to live, that is, market income, as seen in this table, it accounts for almost all of their total income. However, before the sanctions, which were imposed in 2016-17, and became effective in 2017, the average monthly income of North Korean residents before the sanctions took effect, in 2014-16, and after they took effect, in 2017-19, was $49, as shown at the very bottom.

Though somewhat philosophical, Marx defined humans as laboring beings, and that labor is the most important aspect of human identity. He questioned the alienation caused by the human fate of having to sell the fruits of their labor in the market for survival, and proposed eliminating the market itself. In his later work, 'Das Kapital,' he pointed out the occurrence of unequal exchange in the market, concluding that markets should not exist. However, North Korea has experienced a collapse of socialism unprecedented in the world. North Korea is the most marketized socialist country. It is unparalleled. To what extent? In South Korea, the proportion of household income derived from the market is 16%. In North Korea, this figure is stated as 70%, but this is a minimum estimate; even if it were 100%, I would not mark it as incorrect. In other words, almost all income is market income. Even if you go to work, the salary you receive is negligible. The monthly salary... Before the recent wage increase, it was 3,000 won in North Korea, and before the recent surge in the exchange rate, the North Korean exchange rate was 8,000 won to 1 dollar. Therefore, even if you work hard for a month, your salary amounts to 30 cents. Can one live on that? Even in North Korea, how can one survive on 30 cents? The price of rice is 5,000 to 6,000 won per kilogram. Thus, with a month's salary, one can buy only 500 grams of rice. How can one survive? Everyone earns money in the market. Consequently, most North Korean residents survive by earning money in the market, meaning market income constitutes almost all of their total income, as seen in this chart. However, this income was affected by sanctions imposed before 2016-17. The sanctions began to take effect in 2017. Therefore, comparing the period before the sanctions took effect (2014-16) with the period after they took effect (2017-19), and looking at the very bottom, the average monthly income of North Korean residents before the sanctions, converted to dollars, was $49.

is $49. As mentioned earlier, the income earned officially from employment is less than $1. This means that almost all of the $49 income is earned in the market. However, after the sanctions, this decreased to $37, a 25% reduction. How do we know this? The Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies surveys about 100 individuals annually who have defected from North Korea and arrived in South Korea without staying abroad for an extended period. These individuals come from various backgrounds, different social strata, and age groups. They are sampled to create a statistically uniform sample. This is what is meant by screening, a somewhat technical term. This is how the sample was created. We are also analyzing North Korea through nighttime satellite imagery. In the past, when North Korea continuously conducted nuclear tests and launched missiles, I wrote columns to provoke them, saying, 'Kim Jong-un, you don't know North Korea well; we know North Korea much better than you do.' I did that. Perhaps, who are the people who know the North Korean economy best in the world? Are they in North Korea? In the US? China? South Korea? Where do you think? Jeongseon-ah? Suddenly? In this context, it must be South Korea. I think so. Because it is difficult to gather statistics within North Korea. If you ask a North Korean resident, 'What is your monthly income?' who would answer truthfully? If you visit a North Korean enterprise and ask, 'How much do you make per month?' how accurately would they answer? However, as we have seen, we can analyze North Korea through nighttime satellite imagery, measure air pollution levels, take satellite photos to see the size and location of buildings, and track population movement. And using the defector data I mentioned earlier, we can gain the most objective insight into North Korea.

...is likely in South Korea. Based on this analysis, similar to the decrease in resident income mentioned earlier, research using nighttime lighting estimates that the sanctions have reduced North Korea's manufacturing production by about 20% and its GDP by 12%. Naturally, the most important concern for North Korean residents is their livelihood, right? Or at least not starving, right? As you can see here, we also asked about Kim Jong-un's approval rating. This is from the same data from the Seoul Institute for Unification Studies. 'How much do your neighbors in North Korea seem to support Kim Jong-un?' we asked. This is a rough estimate. During Kim Jong-il's time, it was around 56%. However, after Kim Jong-un came to power, it increased. At its highest, it was 78%. When inter-Korean summits were held, how much pride did North Korean residents feel? At that time, there were even statements like 'Kim Jong-un is at the center of international politics.' During that period of popularity, it was 73%. However, after the Hanoi summit and as the economy worsened, it dropped sharply.

So, the last data is from those who arrived in 2019. According to them, it dropped to 63%. They became similar to their fathers. Currently, due to border closures, there are few defectors. Therefore, although we have no data, I would speculate that it is likely much lower than their father's popularity rating of 56%. This would be almost directly proportional to the economic downturn. Of course, some might argue that it is still higher than the leaders of capitalist democratic countries, around 50%. If you read the news, you might find such claims, but what was it? In a democracy, they at least registered their vote, right? Would they discard a leader with only 20% popularity now?

However, a dictator, whether through a coup or succeeding their father, must ultimately show results, right? A 50% approval rating is very unstable support. How much do they know now? Some people might say, 'The economy was most difficult during the Arduous March, and it's better now, so North Korea has no problems.' That's incorrect. That premise assumes that the consciousness of the residents then and now is the same. There is a vast difference. The thoughts of North Korean residents today are likely this: 'The most important thing in my life...

...is to make money, to live well.' In the mid-1990s, during the Arduous March, North Korean residents probably couldn't think like that. Suddenly hungry. They might have thought, 'I want to resent this ruler, but it's probably due to natural disasters or US sanctions, rather than the failure of the Kim Jong-il regime.' Today's North Korean residents, although I skipped this earlier, mostly know why North Korea is failing. The reason they are poor is because they do not reform and open up, because of Kim Jong-un, because of the power capitalists. This is the answer. How insightful is that? Insight. If Kim Jong-il fought a battle on flat ground, Kim Jong-un is fighting a battle while climbing a hill, an 'uphill battle' in English. It's that difficult. If the economic situation is equally bad, then the support for the regime now would be much lower, meaning its durability has decreased. So, if I were to categorize the human type of North Korean residents into a table, I would say they are economic beings. Previously, North Korean residents were beings of Juche ideology. Now, the most important thing is to live well. They acknowledge Kim Jong-un's power, but they will say, 'Don't touch economic issues. We will take care of ourselves by making a living in the market. As long as you don't interfere with this, we don't care if you rule autocratically.' This is likely their sentiment. Considering these changes in the populace, Kim Jong-un's power maintenance is in a worse environment than during his father's time. Is there evidence? I mentioned that the market and capitalist mindset have infiltrated, but I haven't provided the evidence. This is the evidence. We conducted experiments and surveys with defectors from North Korea. We investigated which group, compared to South Korean residents, supports capitalism more. While capitalism can be defined in various ways, the most important aspects are accepting private ownership instead of state ownership, accepting competition, and accepting differentiated wages based on performance, right? When we ask questions like this, a score of 30 out of 100 represents a perfect score. However, if you look at the graph, the light green group among the three groups represents residents from South Korea.

As I mentioned, I couldn't provide the evidence, but this is the evidence. We conducted experiments and surveys with defectors. We investigated which group, compared to South Korean residents, supports capitalism more. Capitalism can be defined in various ways, but the most important aspect is accepting private ownership rather than state ownership, competition, and differentiated wages based on performance. When asked these questions, on a scale of 100, a score of 30 is considered perfect. Looking at the graph, among the three groups, there is the light green group, which consists of residents from South Korea.

Kim Jong-il fought a battle on flat ground, while Kim Jong-un is fighting a battle climbing a hill, which can be called an 'uphill battle.' It is that difficult. Even if the economic situation is equally bad, the support for the regime now would be much lower, meaning its durability has decreased. So, when I summarize the human type of North Korean residents in a table, I see them as economic beings. Previously, North Korean residents were beings of Juche ideology. Now, the most important thing is to live well. They acknowledge Kim Jong-un's power, but they will say, 'Don't touch economic issues. We will take care of ourselves by making a living in the market. As long as you don't interfere with this, we don't care if you rule autocratically.' Considering these changes in the populace, Kim Jong-un's power maintenance is in a worse environment than during his father's time. Is there evidence? I mentioned that the market and capitalist mindset have infiltrated, and I will provide the evidence.

The Impact of Marketization on the Consciousness of North Korean Residents

Kim Jong-il fought a battle on level ground, while Kim Jong-un is fighting a battle uphill, an 'uphill battle.' It is that difficult. Even if the economic situation is equally bad, the support for the regime is likely much lower now, meaning its durability has decreased. Therefore, when I organize the types of North Korean residents into a table, I see them as economic beings. Previously, North Korean residents were beings of Juche ideology. Now, the most important thing is to live well. They may acknowledge Kim Jong-un's authority but will likely tell him not to interfere with economic matters. 'We will make a living in the market on our own; as long as you don't touch this, we don't care if you rule alone.' Considering these changes in the residents, Kim Jong-un's power maintenance is in a less favorable environment than during his father's time. Is there evidence? I mentioned that market and capitalist mindsets have infiltrated, and I will provide the evidence.

As I mentioned, I couldn't provide the evidence, but this is the evidence. We conducted experiments and surveys with defectors. We investigated which group, compared to South Korean residents, supports capitalism more. Capitalism can be defined in various ways, but the important aspects are accepting private property rights, embracing competition, and differentiated wages based on performance. When asked these questions, on a scale of 100, about 30% gave a perfect score for capitalism. Looking at the graph, among the three groups, the light green group consists of residents from South Korea.

Kim Jong-il fought a battle on flat ground, while Kim Jong-un is fighting a battle climbing a hill, an 'uphill battle.' It is that difficult. Even if the economic situation is equally bad, the support for the regime now would be much lower, meaning its durability has decreased. So, when I summarize the human type of North Korean residents, I see them as economic beings. Previously, North Korean residents were beings of Juche ideology. Now, the most important thing is to live well. They acknowledge Kim Jong-un's power, but they will say, 'Don't touch economic issues. We will take care of ourselves by making a living in the market. As long as you don't interfere with this, we don't care if you rule autocratically.' Considering these changes in the populace, Kim Jong-un's power maintenance is in a worse environment than during his father's time. Is there evidence? I mentioned that the market and capitalist mindset have infiltrated, and I will provide the evidence.

Simply put, the market is a space where those whose bodies are in North Korea but whose minds have shifted to South Korean capitalism are born and grow organically within North Korea. That is, if we set the support for capitalism among South Korean residents as 100, and the support for capitalism among defectors who did not experience the market while in North Korea as 0, then those who experienced the market favor capitalism by about 40%. They like it more. So, about half of them understand. That is, it's the same, but the market in North Korea is creating capitalist individuals. What happens if this continues? Kim Jong-un's foundation crumbles. In fact, internal documents, which are rarely seen, show that pride in Juche ideology, support for Kim Jong-un, and various other factors are determined by two main factors at the end: market activity and contact with South Korean culture. When there is contact with South Korean culture and market activity, these North Korean residents move towards pro-capitalism and pro-South Korea.

From that perspective, how dangerous is this? Initially, I did not write columns about the transformative effects of the market because I thought if Kim Jong-un knew, he would try to stop it. So, I didn't talk about it. Then, because I considered it almost irreversible, I started writing columns and even published papers. It is likely that these research findings from South Korea will enter North Korea. Once they do, even though market activities intuitively seem to favor capitalism, seeing the results of analysis based on solid data must cause great concern. He must think, 'I need to stop this.' Therefore, he must block South Korean culture, capitalism, and markets – this set of three – so that instead of unifying with South Korea,

Our Response to Changes in North Korea's Unification Policy

factor. Such changes are evident. So, I have discussed everything. Now, what should we do? Ultimately, what I have explained is that the various changes in North Korea's strategy towards South Korea are the most important reasons for abandoning the unification plan. And it judged that there were no benefits to be gained from South Korea, and considering China, especially Russia, it changed its policy, didn't it? This means that in Kim Jong-un's mind, it is straightforward. He believes that unifying with South Korea is a significant loss for his survival. Therefore, he decided not to pursue it, didn't he? So, we too must adapt accordingly. If North Korea decides not to unify

Therefore, the decision not to unify is too simplistic an interpretation of North Korea's policy change regarding unification, driven by transactional reasons. If we decide not to unify, then we must consider various aspects. For example, what about the North Korean residents? They would likely have expectations. If something were to happen in North Korea, they would expect South Korea to help, as they are of the same ethnicity. Such expectations exist, don't they? They know we are doing well; almost all of them know that. They would have such expectations, but if South Korea decides not to unify and to live separately, their expectations would diminish. Would that be beneficial for us?

Yes, we have also considered such aspects. I believe this. We must create a bridge for North Korea to return to dialogue and cooperation, and continuously send messages to the North Korean residents, stating that we are always ready to help as neighbors and compatriots. However, the obstacle between us and North Korea is nuclear weapons, isn't it? Therefore, we are strengthening our defenses against nuclear weapons and imposing sanctions on North Korea. However, this is something we must do to move towards a better future, not a relationship that must last forever. We must continue to communicate this. Such a strategy is necessary.

North Korea-China-Russia Relations and the Geopolitical Future of the Korean Peninsula

You can see. Now, in about 5 minutes, I will explain the close North Korea-Russia ties. If I don't finish today, then the day before yesterday, I had a meeting with the Korean Studies Institute at George Washington University in the US. I gave a presentation for about 10 minutes, followed by Q&A. That will be released soon on YouTube. Please watch it. Yes. But it's in English. Yes. You can all understand my English. Yes. My English is better than your Korean, right? So you can all understand. In a nutshell, I am very concerned. As I mentioned earlier, the port in Europe, that port. It's just that port, but at some point, it becomes a dark cloud over the Korean Peninsula. We don't know where it will lead.

The start, right? It's the shortage of shells, right? Putin's war. He thought it would be easy. So, he likely didn't have enough shells. But he used too many. They used tens of thousands of shells per day in the beginning, trying to end it quickly. So, the shell reserves were depleted rapidly. Building production facilities to produce more takes time. They have built them now. Russia now has a shell production capacity about three to four times greater than before. However, since the shell reserves were so depleted, right? They need short-term financing. That's a bridge loan.

A bridge loan. I have money coming in the future, but I don't have money right now. What would I do? Go to the bank, right? What do we call that? Borrowing short-term funds. Isn't that similar? So, I have written about this in my column, so please read it. This is how it works. When I first analyzed this, the essence was short-term funds, and therefore a small deal. That is, North Korea provides shells to Russia, and Russia likely provides economic support, food and energy, and possibly military technology, which would be a huge gamble for Putin.

Because that would mean severing ties with South Korea, wouldn't it? Right? But the war will end someday. When the war ends, will North Korea be more important to Putin than South Korea? What can North Korea do? The economic security relationship between North Korea and Russia is essentially the export of North Korean labor to Russia for low wages. To attract investment in the Far East, South Korean companies need to be involved, and the South Korean market is large. North Korea's market is so small; what can it sell? Even if it sells gas or oil from Russia, it would be to the South Korean market, not the North Korean market. Ultimately, Putin knows that South Korea is more important. Therefore, since this is a small deal,

I said there's no need to overreact. And I still think that way, but we don't know how this war will unfold, do we? That is, if Putin becomes more desperate, right? He becomes more isolated, the war goes poorly, and he's cornered, he can't think about the future, can he? The future of returning to South Korea. Who knows if that future will ever come? Then, if Putin grabs Kim Jong-un by the collar and begs for help, is there any guarantee he won't? We are not at that stage yet. In my opinion, Kim Jong-un is now holding Putin by the collar.

Putin. But since Putin is a gambler, he might pretend to accept while not actually doing so. Yes. This is the nature of the relationship. However, as I mentioned earlier, depending on how the war progresses, the relationship will be determined, which is why there is great uncertainty. I wrote about the shell war. In the short term, Kim Jong-un's regime will naturally be consolidated. Because Putin visited, right? Kim Jong-un's prestige, lost in Hanoi, is being restored through Putin's visit. From Kim Jong-un's perspective, he has gained considerably. However, even if Putin receives food and energy, the economy will not recover.

It might improve slightly, but the effect will disappear over time. In other words, the economy continues to trend downwards, and this will only slightly slow the pace, not reverse it. To reverse it, the most crucial condition is for North Korea to reform. Not reversal, but a much more important relationship is the North Korea-China relationship. North Korea-China trade accounts for over 95% of its total trade, and since Chinese trade is complementary, it naturally flows, creating a win-win situation. However, the North Korea-Russia relationship is not structured to naturally flow and create a win-win situation. There is not much they can do. Right? However, China is becoming somewhat displeased. Or perhaps it's semi-displeased? Wouldn't that be the case? Right? In the past, North Korea was a country completely within their territory, but now sharing it equally with Russia is something no country would be happy about. Of course, they will pretend to be fine on the surface. Right? If you ask Chinese people, they might say, 'We don't really care. We respect each country's sovereignty.' Or even further,

they might say, 'It's good that they are getting along with Russia.' However, inwardly, China would be displeased. So, what will they do? Even if they say it's fine for North Korea and Russia to get along, they will turn around and exert various pressures on North Korea-China trade. Therefore, this is not necessarily all good for North Korea. How the competition and balance between these great powers will affect North Korea's system is also important. So, now, for my final point, I will conclude my remarks.

The Korean Peninsula, a piece on a giant geopolitical chessboard. What should we do? I believe our government should cultivate grand strategists, right? And listen carefully to their advice. Keeping the entire geopolitical chessboard in mind, right? Like Kissinger. Right? And the US, being a superpower, has many people who have studied these things. But in South Korea, we haven't produced many such people. Why? Because scholarship is often specialized. Economists don't know politics, politicians don't know economics, and humanities scholars don't know science. But if you go to the US, you find people in think tanks or government who connect all these fields. These are the people who make policy, aren't they? We lack these grand strategists. Even if we have them,

even if we have them, I doubt if the current political climate would allow us to consult and utilize such grand strategists. In South Korea. So, first, we need people who can see the big picture. The overall structure, right? Russia, Ukraine, the US, China, Taiwan, science and technology, semiconductors, North Korea internally and externally. We need someone who can see all of this in a balanced way and understand how a change in one area will lead to a positive outcome for us through a certain circuit. Furthermore, second, isn't North Korea the most important issue for us? Right? While we participate in other crucial matters, we are the most important stakeholder in the North Korean issue. Therefore, we need people who can see not only the big picture spatially but also temporally, looking not just at the present but also into the future. The future. We must look into the future. Some people misunderstand all policies from a short-term perspective.

Let's give up. Because there are no nuclear weapons. Or let's collapse North Korea. We are the same people, so let's not impose sanctions and just say goodbye to the US and start economic activities right away. This is the foolishness of people who only see the short term. Therefore, we need people who can see the short, medium, and long term simultaneously, viewing the entire world as a chessboard in their minds. Perhaps the East Asia Institute has invited you all here for this reason. So, I hope that some of you among those present will become such individuals in the future. And until then, I hope Korea remains safe. Yes. Thank you. Yes.

■ Kim Byung-yeon_ Distinguished Professor of Economics, Seoul National University.