[7th EAI Academy] ③ Japan's Grand Strategy and the Future of Korea-Japan Relations

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wmh8xDjyt9I

Video Script

My part concerns Japan's foreign strategy and the future of Korea-Japan relations. As the lecture slides have been distributed, I will speak for about an hour based on them. I intend to consider the current challenges facing Japan by looking ahead 20 years, to 2045, which will mark the 100th anniversary of Korea's liberation and the 100th anniversary of Japan's post-war era.

The East Asian Order 20 Years Ago and Current Changes

Looking 20 years ahead from this point, I aim to discuss what aspects we have paid less attention to and what issues will emerge when viewed over a longer time horizon. First, I will critically self-reflect on what I, as a budding scholar, misperceived or missed 20 years ago, in 2004. Second, I will examine the characteristics of Japanese diplomacy. The chapter by Kenneth Pyle you received summarizes 150 years of Japanese diplomacy, and we can consider its persuasive and less persuasive aspects.

Third, I will question whether Japan currently possesses a grand strategy for the 21st century, and if so, whether it is a forward-looking strategy, and whether Japan has the means and capabilities to execute it. If a strategy exists, I will discuss its implications for Korea-Japan relations, that is, the future of Korea-Japan relations. Finally, I will offer some thoughts on what can be considered for the future of Korea-Japan relations for your consideration.

First, let's look back at 2004. At that time, Korea-Japan relations were in a relatively good period. Relations had steadily improved for about four to five years following the Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Declaration, and the primary focus of South Korean diplomacy was the Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea's nuclear program. In the process of discussing the North Korean nuclear issue with representatives from six countries—North Korea, South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia—South Korea and Japan were in a position of needing to cooperate. Furthermore, discussions about an East Asian community were active at the time.

Twenty years ago, regional cooperation initiatives at the East Asian level were strong, and China and Japan were engaged in diplomatic competition for leadership. There were also efforts to amplify the voice of ASEAN, and South Korea, under the Roh Moo-hyun administration, also sought to increase its regional influence by advocating for an 'Northeast Asian Era.' Following the 1998 foreign exchange crisis, South Korean society was undergoing a period of neoliberal globalization and reform. South Korea and Japan also sought avenues for cooperation within the framework of globalization.

Discussions on a Korea-Japan FTA were active at the time; negotiations began but were suspended in 2004 and have not resumed since. Cultural exchange was also vibrant; 'Winter Sonata' was immensely popular in Japan at the time, and recently, Korean dramas like 'Itaewon Class' have gained popularity.

This optimistic atmosphere soon waned due to issues concerning comfort women and forced labor, leading to a significant cooling of Korea-Japan relations, often described as a 'lost decade.' The Six-Party Talks and East Asian community discussions are now difficult to find; instead, we are facing a nuclear missile crisis. Rather than regional cooperation, the strategic competition between the US and China is leading to a division of the region. Neoliberal globalization has shifted towards deglobalization, economic nationalism, and the strengthening of economic security, with the flow of goods, capital, and labor across borders increasingly constrained by national barriers.

The Rise of China and the Resurgence of Nationalism

While Korean Wave culture continues in Korea-Japan cultural exchange, there are also signs of identity conflicts. The changes over the past 20 years have been predominantly negative. One aspect that the academic community at the time failed to seriously consider was the rise of China. China was then viewed as an economic opportunity for South Korea, and the Chinese market played a significant role in South Korea's rapid recovery after the foreign exchange crisis. However, China has evolved beyond being an economic opportunity for South Korea; it is now a major power engaged in strategic competition with the United States and seeking to dominate Asia.

We failed to adequately consider this rise of China and its hegemonic challenge, nor did we predict the changes in Sino-Japanese relations, particularly the reversal of national power in 2010. Furthermore, we did not foresee the intensification of US-China strategic competition. Second, we did not sufficiently anticipate that nationalism would re-emerge within the trend of globalization, leading to confrontation and conflict between Korea and Japan, and that this could negatively impact not only identity conflicts but also the economy and security. In essence, we overlooked two key trends: the challenge posed by China and the resurgence of nationalism.

Had these factors been seriously considered at the time, we would have pursued more innovative policy initiatives and would likely be in a much better environment today. Now, let's look at future projections. Observing the trends in global GDP, the share of the United States and Japan in global GDP is projected to decline over the next 20 years, while China's share is expected to rise sharply.

Since 2000, Japan's GDP share has been on a downward trend, while China's GDP share has been rising rapidly. In 2000, China's GDP was about 40% of Japan's; by 2020, Japan's GDP was about 40% of China's, marking a reversal. As of 2024, China is expected to be approximately three times larger than Japan.

A similar trend is observed in military spending. China surpassed Japan in military spending around 2000 and currently spends about five times more than Japan. This gap is projected to widen to eightfold by 2030 and exceed tenfold by 2045.

Japan's Grand Strategy and Future Challenges

In this context, when a neighbor like China, with whom Japan shares a border and territorial disputes, faces a decline in national power from 40% to 10%, Japan's options are to either submit to China or pursue a balancing diplomacy by expanding its military and economic capabilities and strengthening its alliance with the United States. This situation is similar to South Korea's. As China grows more than 20 times larger, South Korea must consider its own strategy.

Furthermore, Japan, which pursues an open economy, must consider what grand strategy to adopt amidst the trend of increasing protectionism, such as the erection of trade barriers. Not only goods and capital but also cultural globalization is facing growing backlash, manifesting in phenomena like immigration restrictions.

In Korea-Japan relations, aspects of competition and conflict are being highlighted over cultural exchange, which was one facet of the Korea-Japan conflict in 2010. The challenge lies in how to navigate forward amidst this expanding trend of nationalism.

Japan's most critical future challenge is China. China's pursuit of regional hegemony poses a decisive challenge to Japan's diplomatic, economic, and political interests. I believe that how Japan manages this challenge is the core of its future endeavors. As you learned last time about 'The China Dream,' China's ambitions are immense.

What should be done when a neighbor with whom one shares a border and even territorial disputes, whose national power has declined from 40% to 30% and now to 10%, is faced with such a situation? There are broadly two options: submission, or 'inter-balancing' by expanding military and economic power in preparation for uncertainty. The most immediate necessity is to meticulously manage the alliance, particularly the relationship with the United States. Based on international relations theory, Japan's choices can be summarized as either submitting to China's will or balancing against it. If Japan formulates a grand strategy, it will grapple with these considerations. The same applies to us. China possesses ten times our national power, and this gap could widen to over twentyfold for us.

At some point, we could become insignificant. If so, we must face the same dilemma. Protectionism, or the erection of trade barriers, can be divided into harmful forms and beneficial forms of regulation. As the world clearly moves in a certain direction, countries like Japan, with high trade dependency or an externally open economy, must include this element in their grand strategy when facing changes in the economic environment. What strategy should Japan adopt as the world moves in this direction? This issue arises not only concerning goods and capital but also indicates a growing backlash against globalization culturally. 'Protect' is a prime example.

Immigration is a key issue in many European countries that are no longer accepting immigrants. Consequently, measures such as building barriers are being implemented. In Korea-Japan relations, there is a tendency for competition and conflict to be highlighted over mutual exchange and sharing, which can be seen as a facet of the Korea-Japan conflict in the 2010s. The spread of nationalism is emerging as a new trend, and the challenge of how to overcome this trend lies before us.

Japan's core future challenge remains China. As a country pursuing regional hegemony, China poses a decisive challenge to Japan's interests, which have historically exerted diplomatic, economic, and political influence in the region, and is already seeking to surpass them. Therefore, how Japan manages China is the crux of its future challenges. As discussed last time regarding China, its ambitions are vast.

The Crisis of the Liberal International Order and Japan's Response

Japan's position amidst the rise of China is currently considered a very serious issue. This is not just a problem of today, but one that has been continuously pondered and explored since the power reversal phenomenon occurred in 2010. Second, Japan describes this as a 'crisis of the liberal international order.' Both former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida have used this expression. Japan's greatest challenge is precisely China.

Japan describes this as a 'crisis of the liberal international order.' The liberal international order refers to the order created and maintained under U.S. hegemony since 1945. The core of this order is not only the importance of national interests such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national survival, but also respect for and emphasis on international norms and rules, international law, and the institutions based on them. It also includes free and open economic principles based on market logic, negotiation and compromise based on democracy, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The international community has reached a general consensus that these norms and principles 'must be upheld.'

This consensus could be maintained because major powers, particularly the United States, possessed a strong will to uphold it. However, this order is currently being shaken. Japan views the core of the crisis in the liberal international order as the decline of US hegemony coupled with the rise of China's hegemonic power. This is consistent with the aforementioned issue of China. Furthermore, Japan perceives the liberal international order as being shaken by the revival of geopolitics, leading to the Russia-Ukraine war, heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the retreat of globalization, the 'Trump phenomenon,' and the resurgence of authoritarianism. Therefore, Japan must formulate a grand strategy to respond to these challenges. This is the background against which Japan's 'Grand Strategy for the 21st Century' began to take shape.

Does South Korea have a grand strategy? Does it have smaller strategies? Of course, it must. A grand strategy is the art of governance, or strategy, that sets the major goals of a nation and deploys and utilizes available means to achieve them. Grand strategies are typically formulated by major powers. However, in a situation where its existence is uncertain, formulating long-term strategies might be a luxury. Daily survival could be the highest virtue.

However, at a certain level of development, a grand strategy becomes necessary. In Japan's case, there is debate about whether it possesses a grand strategy. Yet, throughout its approximately 180-year history since its modernization in 1868, or the mid-19th century, Japan has formulated and pursued several grand strategies. Some were successful, while others failed. The failure of 1945 is well-known. A successful example is modernization and Westernization through the Meiji Restoration. At the time, the term 'modernization' did not exist, but there was a recognition that Japan needed to Westernize to preserve its independence and develop.

To this end, pursuing the slogan of 'Fukoku Kyohei' (enrich the country, strengthen the military) was Japan's grand strategy, and it was quite successful. In pursuing that grand strategy, its primary rival was China. Until the mid-18th century, the national powers of Japan and China were incomparable. China was the world's largest economy in the early 19th century, but Japan won the competition against China under its 'Fukoku Kyohei' grand strategy.

This victory occurred on the Korean Peninsula. After winning the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895, Japan acquired Taiwan and strengthened its influence over the Korean court. Ultimately, it achieved great success by colonizing Taiwan and Korea, while China fell into a state of semi-colonialism. China's 'century of humiliation' began in 1895 with its decisive defeat by Japan on the Korean Peninsula. Terms like G7 refer to cooperative frameworks among major powers to manage regions like Asia. After World War I, the G5 managed this region, and naval disarmament conferences regulated the number of battleships in the Pacific. In the 1930s, Japan aimed to co-manage this region with the United States.

This strategy led to war, but its excessive success ultimately resulted in war with the United States. After 1945, Japan sought a new strategy. The fundamental premise of that strategy was the relationship between the victor, the United States, and the vanquished, Japan. The grand strategy newly sought by defeated Japan was the 'Yoshida Doctrine,' which aimed to survive as a secondary power under US hegemony. With a lightly armed military and within the US alliance system, the US military would protect Japan's security, while Japan would pursue economic growth through an economy-first strategy. This strategy was immensely successful, surpassing West Germany in 1968 to become the second-largest economy in the capitalist world, and by the 1980s, it grew to 40% of US GDP.

Considering that China grew to 40% of US GDP in 2008, one can imagine Japan's growth rate at the time. There was even a period when Japan's GDP reached 70% of US GDP due to exchange rate fluctuations. This can be considered Japan's golden age. With such great success, the question arises of how Japan will now deal with China. An economy-first strategy alone is insufficient to catch up with China, which has already far surpassed Japan. Second is the defense and military power competition. Japan's defense principle is 'Zensho Boei,' meaning a purely defensive strategy. If China were to occupy one of Japan's southwestern islands, including Okinawa, it would be difficult to retake with a purely defensive posture. This would require a marine corps, offensive weapons, and counter-attack capabilities. Therefore, Japan's basic military posture must also change.

Shinzo Abe and Japan's Grand Strategy for the 21st Century

Above all, internal balance alone has its limits. In a situation where the GDP gap is widening, pursuing only internal balance will not suffice. Therefore, the relationship with the United States must be further strengthened. To achieve this, Japan must accommodate US demands. Since there must be US interests in protecting Japan, the interests must be balanced. A new grand strategy is needed to address these issues. Japan's grand strategy for the 21st century can be summarized as follows. The key figure who sought and pursued this grand strategy was former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Although former Prime Minister Abe was tragically assassinated, his name was controversial in South Korea due to discussions about potential Nobel Prize nominations. His emergence stemmed from a realistic assessment that Japan was experiencing relative economic decline and prolonged stagnation, leading to a widening gap with China.

The 'Japan Model' of the past was a model of success, but it began to be perceived as a model of failure, unable to adapt to the globalized economic order. This relative decline in national power triggered significant backlash within Japan, with Shinzo Abe at its center. He was ideologically a right-wing figure, and his slogan was one of nostalgic and reactionary nationalism. Similar to 'Make America Great Again,' he declared his intention to make Japan great again, four years before President Trump. He aimed to restore past glories.

When reporters asked 'When is the past?', he referred to the Meiji era. The goal was to restore the glorious past of escaping the threat of colonization through the Meiji Restoration, pursuing 'Fukoku Kyohei,' defeating China, acquiring Taiwan and Korea, and rising to G7 status. He did not explicitly state whether this glory included Japanese imperialism and expansionism after that period, up to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in the 1930s, but his right-wing ideology was clear. The Japanese people felt that the giant of China was surpassing and humiliating them. In 2010, the year of the GDP reversal between China and Japan, during the Senkaku Islands dispute, China imposed restrictions on rare earth exports and detained Japanese nationals, thereby forcing Japan to yield.

The Japanese right wing felt completely humiliated by this. The following year, the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred, making the Japanese society aware of the potential collapse of its systems. These experiences, combined with the right-wing ideology of recalling and restoring past glory, became intertwined. Abe rode this domestic trend to formulate a new grand strategy, with China at its core. He proposed pursuing joint leadership with the United States to restore the liberal international order in opposition to China. This is also reflected in Prime Minister Kishida's speeches. He argues that the international order is in crisis, and US power alone is insufficient, thus Japan will exercise joint leadership. Of course, this is a role as a junior partner rather than equal leadership. This is the core of Japan's new strategy, continuing from Prime Minister Kishida. In essence, it involves thoroughly embracing the United States. By cooperating with the militarily strongest nation, the US, Japan will fill in the gaps where the US is lacking.

Japan's Indo-Pacific Strategy and Factors of Challenge

To this end, Japan has also declared its intention to increase defense spending to 2% of GDP. This is a target to be achieved by 2028, up from the current level of approximately 1.6-1.7% of GDP. The United States has greatly welcomed this decision by Japan. Second is the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.' This is a regional strategy, indicating that Japan recognizes that the US alone cannot forge a path forward. The key partner in this strategy is India. By 2050, India's GDP is projected to grow to 40% of US GDP. Therefore, the key partners in the Indo-Pacific strategy are India and ASEAN, and it is believed that securing their commitment is crucial. Furthermore, Japan aims to strengthen multilateral cooperation with countries sharing a developed nation identity, such as the G7, Quad, Korea-US-Japan, US-India, and US-Japan alliances.

This strategy significantly overlaps with the US strategy. Japan's grand strategy is composed of these elements. However, there are challenges to this strategy. For instance, joint leadership with the United States could face difficulties if a Trump administration comes into power. The question is whether Japan can maintain joint leadership by accommodating all of the Trump administration's demands, and whether Japanese domestic politics can support this. Similar to South Korea, if a Trump administration demands an increase in defense cost-sharing and the Yoon Suk-yeol government accepts it, it will face strong opposition from the opposition party. The same applies to Japan. Strengthening military power and increasing defense spending as a percentage of GDP can also become controversial within Japanese society. The plan to increase defense spending by 1.7 times by 2028...

From Japan's superior position, they felt completely humiliated. The year after that incident, on March 11, the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred. Experiencing the Great East Japan Earthquake, there was self-reflection within Japan that 'Wow, the Japanese social system can collapse like this,' and these events became intertwined with the right-wing ideology of recalling and restoring past glory. Therefore, Abe, riding this domestic trend, formulated a new grand strategy. The following points outline that strategy. Behind all of these is China.

To restore the liberal international order in opposition to China, we will pursue joint leadership with the United States. What does that mean? In the brief text I provided you, from this year or last year, I included a portion of Prime Minister Kishida's speech, which mentions this. It states that the international order is in crisis, and US power alone is insufficient. US hegemony has significantly declined, so Japan will help. Japan will exercise joint leadership. Of course, it is Japan's role as a junior partner rather than equal leadership. This is the core of Japan's new strategy, continuing from Kishida onwards. It means thoroughly embracing the United States. Militarily, since the US is the strongest in the world, while doing that, 'we will fill in the parts you lack,' thus pursuing joint leadership is the first point. Second, for that purpose, Japan will also spend money. It plans to increase defense spending to 2% of GDP to strengthen deterrence. That is probably the current...

It is approximately 1.6 to 1.7% of defense spending. It is declared that defense spending will be increased to about 1.6 to 1.7%. This is planned to be achieved by 2028. The country that welcomed this most enthusiastically was the United States, as they believe they can achieve burden-sharing. That is the second point. And the third is the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. That is a regional strategy, and Japan knows that simply clinging to the US will not open up new avenues. It is shown in the diagram. And this diagram was created by the Japanese. Initially, according to the projections of Japanese elites, such as Mitsubishi Research Institute, regarding global GDP, even if they hold onto the US, it will not be enough. Therefore, an Indo-Pacific strategy must be pursued, and its core partner is India. India is on the rise, isn't it? By 2050, it is projected to reach 40% of US GDP.

Therefore, the two core partners in the Indo-Pacific strategy, India and ASEAN, must be thoroughly secured. I believe this is the core of Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy. Do you understand what that means? Furthermore, it aims to strengthen solidarity with like-minded countries, referred to as 'like-minded nations.' Here, 'like-minded' refers to developed nations. Countries that share a developed nation identity, such as the G7, Quad, Korea-US-Japan, US-India, and US-Japan alliances. It plans to pursue multilateral cooperation with such countries.

Doesn't that overlap significantly with the US strategy? You covered that in the first lecture, didn't you? Yes, it overlaps considerably. Therefore, Japan's grand strategy is structured in this way. Now, points 1, 2, 3, and 4 all have challenging factors. Regarding joint leadership with the United States, what if a Trump administration takes office? Can joint leadership be maintained while accommodating all of the Trump administration's demands and engaging in burden-sharing? Can Japan's domestic politics support this? For example, it's the same for us. If a Trump administration takes office and demands a sixfold increase in our defense cost-sharing, and if the Yoon Suk-yeol government were to agree to this, Korean society would erupt like a swarm of bees, calling it humiliating diplomacy. It's the same for Japan. This includes the immediate domestic issues of strengthening military power and deterrence, and increasing GDP as a percentage of defense spending. If the government were to announce a 1.7-fold increase in military spending, considering it is now 2028...

It is 4 years away, until 2027. What will you do? Social security costs, pensions, and other issues are causing turmoil. In this context, domestic challenges will be considerable. The 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,' meaning diplomacy towards India and ASEAN, is by no means easy. It requires significant diplomatic effort to make these countries allies. Finally, a grand strategy must be pursued while considering all these factors. This is the diplomatic challenge currently facing Japan.

U.S.-China Strategic Competition and the Future of Korea-Japan Relations

If asked what the biggest factor for improving Korea-Japan relations is, I would answer that the U.S. factor was the largest. That U.S. factor is the strengthening of ROK-U.S. security cooperation. The reason the U.S. emphasizes ROK-U.S. security cooperation is due to China. Japan also believes ROK-U.S. security cooperation is necessary, partly due to North Korea, but also due to China. The increase in security and strategic incentives for improving Korea-Japan relations, if we go back to the beginning and consider U.S.-China strategic competition as one of the decisive variables that will shape future international politics, then we can consider the value of South Korea and Japan in the context of intensifying competition. From the U.S. perspective, the value of these two countries would be their participation in checking China, and from China's perspective...

It would hope that South Korea and Japan would withdraw from the US-centric alliance system. South Korea should diligently pursue the Korea-US alliance, but only directed towards North Korea. Japan, while pursuing a joint system for North Korea's nuclear and missile threats for its own defense, should not extend this to militarily containing China or pursuing military balance in the Western Pacific. In other words, China would demand that Japan not cross that line. Therefore, fundamentally, because Korea and Japan are cooperating under strong US demands, it is true that this is acting as a major driving force for improving Korea-Japan relations. Given the significant role of the US and the underlying trend of US-China strategic competition, looking ahead 20 years, Korea-Japan relations will depend on US-China relations.

Intergenerational Perceptions and New Possibilities for Korea-Japan Relations

If US-China relations evolve into a new Cold War, the positions of South Korea and Japan will become increasingly difficult, eventually forcing them to choose sides. However, if the order becomes multipolar and coexistence between orders is secured, there could be another context. Let's consider these points as we move to the next page. The historical issues are already well-known, so I will not repeat them separately. Please read them. I will speak for about 3-4 more minutes here. As mentioned earlier, I view the historical issue in Korea-Japan relations as a conflict between nationalisms. It is a conflict between nationalistic identities. From Japan's perspective, they aim to restore past glories.

Korean technology will be specifically incorporated into the restoration of that past glory. However, we cannot accept that. In such a case, conflict arises. In other words, if South Korea defines its identity as anti-Japanese nationalism, it will inevitably lead to an identity conflict. The other side will interpret it in the completely opposite way. This is what happened in the Korea-Japan conflict of 2010.

Furthermore, interpreting it this way is a very old-generation way of thinking. Are you interested in the debate about the founding of the nation? Do you believe that whether South Korea was founded in 1948, 1945, or 1919 decisively determines our spirit and identity? You might think so. However, the students I taught did not think so, and the public opinion poll data I analyzed does not show that. The younger generation today... Of course, they are called the 'MZ generation,' but I am unsure if that term is accurate.

The term I use is 'developed nation identity.' In any case, they are people born in developed countries, and their perspective on Japan and its history differs from mine, someone with a weak nation identity, who harbors both inferiority towards Japan and a sense of moral superiority. As seen in the political and historical issues of Korea-Japan relations, they possess intense shame due to such factors and think it is a great achievement to overcome Japan, as in the Olympics or World Cup. Therefore, those old generations, and Japan too...

South Korea is a country that Japan helped to develop. Japanese leaders were taught this way. During the colonial period, they thought, 'We are sorry, but didn't we modernize them? Although we did many bad things, Korea was modernized under Japan's hand.' Second, after 1945, and even after 1965, they believe that Park Chung-hee's modernization of the country was achieved with Japan's help. In other words, South Korea is a country that Japan helped, a country that has come this far under a tutor, and they cannot accept South Korea standing as an equal to Japan. Japanese politicians of the older generation are psychologically unprepared to accept this. It is similar to how China could not psychologically accept it in 2010. It is not that South Korea has surpassed Japan, but that Japan's older generation cannot easily accept that South Korea has significantly advanced. South Korea's older generation holds the mentality I described earlier. If this continues, and the younger generation in Japan absorbs the educational stereotypes of the older generation in Japan, and if the view of Japan held by your parents' generation is unconsciously absorbed by you, then by 2040, it will be similar. The relationship will continue in a similar vein. However, if the younger generations in both countries can overcome such past nationalisms, Korea-Japan relations will enter a new dimension. We see many such signs even now. However, it is characteristically divided by generation. According to my analysis, power is held by the older generation in both Japan and South Korea, and because the political systems of Japan and South Korea are not sufficiently democratic to accommodate such voices, the views of the older generation on Japan and Korea still prevail. However, if these change, Korea-Japan relations will be significantly different.

If they change in that way, then the future relationship could broadly involve the following considerations. The value of coexistence. While economic competition is necessary for both countries to prosper economically, cooperation in addressing issues related to future coexistence is important. There are many such items between Korea and Japan. For example, relatively... Whether you want to accept it or not, it is true that our country's GDP is declining.

Countries like Indonesia are rapidly rising, and by 2045, Indonesia will be in the top 4 or top 5. Indonesia has established a Future Committee and is conducting the 2045 Project with national funding. I have also received survey data. It concerns what Indonesia should do in 2049 and how it should prepare when it becomes a top 4 or top 5 country globally. We don't even prepare for three years from now. Therefore, as a declining developed country, based on the identity of a prosperous developed nation, there will be issues that need to be resolved together. I believe these are the kinds of issues. Therefore, I hope for a relationship where we can put our heads together and cooperate on these matters, and with that, I will conclude. Thank you.

Countries like Indonesia are rapidly rising, and by 2045, Indonesia will be in the top 4 or top 5. Indonesia has established a Future Committee and is conducting the 2045 Project with national funding. I have also received survey data. It concerns what Indonesia should do in 2049 and how it should prepare when it becomes a top 4 or top 5 country globally. We don't even prepare for three years from now. Therefore, as a declining developed country, based on the identity of a prosperous developed nation, there will be issues that need to be resolved together. I believe these are the kinds of issues. Therefore, I hope for a relationship where we can put our heads together and cooperate on these matters, and with that, I will conclude. Thank you.

Yeol Son, President of the East Asia Institute and Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University.