North Korea and the World: Why North Korea Wants a Nuclear War It Cannot Initiate

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pKHAv7IYJ68

Video Script

In Memoriam of Professor Hwang Il-do and Reflections on North Korea's Nuclear Strategy

North Korea harbors revisionist ambitions, ultimately targeting South Korea. Therefore, it might use nuclear weapons early in a conflict. Even disregarding all rationality, it might pursue that path to achieve such ultimate goals. Greetings to everyone watching Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. I sincerely thank you. This will be a somewhat different Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. This is because it will be a tribute to Professor Hwang Il-do of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, with whom I had a personal friendship and whom I respected, who passed away last December. He was a colleague scholar with whom I had pondered the North Korean issue, especially the North Korean nuclear issue, for a considerable period, and a friend who had deeply considered these issues from both research and practical policy perspectives more than anyone else, but he suddenly passed away. I still cannot hide my profound grief and once again offer my deepest condolences and sincere sympathy to his bereaved family.

Therefore, today, we will examine North Korea's nuclear issue, focusing on the research achievements of the late Professor Hwang Il-do. His primary concern was that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons and has introduced a very aggressive nuclear strategy in the last two to three years. Specifically, they have consistently stated their will and capability to escalate a conventional war into a nuclear war early in a conflict. However, it is difficult to consider North Korea as having effectively acquired the capability to use nuclear weapons. If North Korea were to use nuclear weapons against South Korea, Japan, or indeed the United States, it would face certain and devastating retaliation from the overwhelming nuclear capabilities of the United States. In international policy, this is referred to as nuclear deterrence and assured retaliation capability.

In English, this is called 'assured retaliation.' The United States possesses the capability to retaliate against North Korea decisively, potentially eliminating it from the face of the earth, a capability North Korea does not possess in response to the U.S. Therefore, for a state lacking this capability to initiate a nuclear war fundamentally contradicts basic nuclear deterrence theory. Thus, Professor Hwang Il-do and I have spent the last three to four years contemplating why North Korea, in this situation, continues to announce its highly aggressive nuclear strategy and make such statements. What is the reason behind this?

North Korea's Aggressive Nuclear Strategy and Lowering the Nuclear Threshold

Today, I will focus on this content, particularly on the analysis by our Professor Hwang Il-do. Professor Hwang Il-do's research is available on the website of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, where his major works are published. He also has research published in leading domestic and international academic journals. I highly recommend referring to them. First, North Korea's aggressive nuclear strategy is exemplified by its deliberate lowering of the threshold between conventional warfare and nuclear war. For instance, in September 2022, Kim Yo-jong explicitly stated that if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea can use nuclear weapons against South Korea at any time to secure the initiative in the war. In other words, they are consistently stating that even in a conventional war, escalation to a nuclear war is possible at any time. As I mentioned, I also wondered why this was the case. Professor Hwang Il-do raised the same question. His research paper includes the following statement:

It would be appropriate to interpret this as intentionally lowering the distinction between conventional strategy and tactical nuclear strategy. This indicates that he shared the same judgment and concern regarding North Korea's nuclear doctrine. North Korea has demonstrated this concretely in numerous ways. To provide a few examples, on April 25, 2022, in a speech, Kim Jong-un stated that the nuclear weapons they are developing have two missions. The first is the mission of preventing war. The second mission is, and I quote, 'Our nuclear forces that infringe upon the fundamental interests of our state will fulfill the second mission.' This means that if North Korea's survival interests are threatened, they will use nuclear weapons. However, as you might consider, the concept of a state's interests is very ambiguous. I looked into what North Korea considers state interests. It turns out that raising human rights issues in North Korea by South Korea or the international community, joint exercises between South Korea and the United States, or the deployment of strategic assets are all considered to harm North Korea's state interests. Even economic sanctions imposed by the international community on North Korea are seen as harming its state interests. In essence, what North Korea defines as state interests can be anything they claim it to be. Therefore, the second mission of nuclear weapons, linked to the ambiguous concept of state interests, implies that they can use nuclear weapons at any time, as decided by Kim Jong-un. No existing nuclear power has lowered the threshold for nuclear use to this extent in their nuclear strategy doctrines. Furthermore, in September of the same year, 2022, North Korea outlined five conditions for nuclear weapon use in its nuclear legislation. Taken together, these conditions also imply that they can use nuclear weapons whenever and however they wish. The conditions are extremely broad and comprehensive. This is also subject to Kim Jong-un's decision. A more recent example is from April and May of last year, when North Korea discussed nuclear alerts and nuclear fire drills, stating that they have a nuclear control system.

This includes operational plans, including nuclear directives, a command system for nuclear use, and designated units for executing nuclear use orders. They can use them very rapidly, and this naturally includes preemptive strikes. Therefore, North Korea, with its highly aggressive nuclear strategy, demonstrates at every level—from legislation to Kim Jong-un's speeches to its entire system—that it can use nuclear weapons at any time. This is the primary point of concern that Professor Hwang Il-do and I began with. In this context, for North Korea to use nuclear weapons without achieving nuclear parity with the United States, what we call Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), is essentially an act of suicide, as theory and researchers agree. This is because if one side possesses overwhelming nuclear capabilities that can completely annihilate the other, and the other side lacks such capabilities, initiating an attack would inevitably lead to its own destruction, making it impossible to start a war. North Korea has not yet secured that capability. As I will discuss further, it is highly unlikely they will secure it in the future. Given this situation, why have they engaged in this behavior? Professor Hwang Il-do meticulously addresses this in his research papers. He reviews various existing theories. Kenneth Waltz, one of the most prominent scholars in international politics, a representative figure of structural realism, or neorealism, argues that due to the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons, their use would lead to the complete destruction of the state at the moment of use. Therefore, states must think in a highly cautious manner, and such thinking must ultimately be determined by a very high level of rationality. This is what we refer to as nuclear deterrence theory or the peaceful effect of nuclear weapons. Because nuclear weapons are such terrifying instruments, states possessing them are compelled to make very prudent and rational judgments, and the outcome of these rational judgments is not to use nuclear weapons.

Limitations of North Korea's Nuclear Capabilities and Theoretical Leaps

Therefore, according to scholars like Kenneth Waltz, possessing nuclear weapons actually guarantees security. Professor Hwang Il-do uses this logic to question why North Korea, which has not achieved this, seeks to use nuclear weapons. In a similar vein, I have also conducted research and written papers on this topic. It is extremely difficult for North Korea to secure even the minimal deterrence capability against the United States, the world's strongest nuclear power. In all aspects—deterrence of use, defense during use, and retaliation after use—North Korea is inherently at a disadvantage compared to the U.S. Especially with the commencement of Trump's second term, one of the primary focuses was to significantly enhance existing nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, they developed low-yield nuclear weapons, or tactical nuclear weapons, that can be practically used. In fact, by 2020, submarines equipped with ballistic missiles carrying low-yield warheads, known as W76-2, were deployed in operational status. These weapon systems are capable of striking targets, including North Korea, and with the start of the second term, U.S. officials, including Hagerty, have begun discussing further advancements.

Given this situation, it is highly improbable that North Korea, with its technological and financial disadvantages, will be able to acquire the capability for assured retaliation against the United States in the future. Another point, which I believe is a truly insightful observation by Professor Hwang Il-do, is that North Korea has a small territory, as does South Korea. Even if they were to deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) based on their territory, these could be detected, identified, and, if necessary, destroyed by the United States. Therefore, the ultimate stage of nuclear weapons, the 'terminator,' refers to nuclear ballistic missiles launched from nuclear-powered submarines. Nuclear-powered submarines are extremely difficult to detect and identify. Only with such weapon systems could they possess even a minimal capability to attack the United States, a capability that North Korea is almost certainly incapable of acquiring. Consequently, even with mobile launchers for ICBMs like the Hwasong-19 and Hwasong-18, which North Korea claims to possess, they remain vulnerable to detection and identification by the U.S., defense by the U.S. missile defense system, and, if breached, complete retaliation from the U.S. In such circumstances, can North Korea truly use nuclear weapons? Furthermore, the extended deterrence developed by South Korea and the United States is effective. This means that if North Korea were to use even a single nuclear weapon against South Korea, South Korea and the United States have consistently stated, at the highest levels through U.S. strategic documents, that this would result in the end of the North Korean regime. This implies that the U.S. possesses the capability to ensure the destruction of the North Korean regime if it uses nuclear weapons, a fact that North Korea likely understands best.

does not. Therefore, Kenneth Waltz and others argue that possessing nuclear weapons actually guarantees security. Professor Hwang Il-do, using this logic, questioned why North Korea would seek to use nuclear weapons when it has not achieved these objectives. I have also conducted research and written papers on similar lines, but it is extremely difficult for North Korea to secure even minimal deterrence capabilities against the United States, the world's strongest nuclear power. In all aspects—deterrence of use, defense during use, and retaliation after use—North Korea is inevitably inferior to the United States.

Notably, the Trump administration, now in its second term, focused heavily in its first term on significantly advancing existing nuclear capabilities. They developed low-yield nuclear weapons, or tactical nuclear weapons, that could be practically used. In fact, by 2020, submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles equipped with low-yield warheads, known as the W76-2, were operationally deployed. These weapon systems, capable of striking targets not only in North Korea but elsewhere, are now complete. With the commencement of a second term, US officials, including Hagerty, have already begun advocating for further advancements in this area.

Given this situation, it is highly improbable that North Korea, which is at a disadvantage in terms of technology and financial resources, will be able to possess the capability for assured retaliation and punitive response against the United States in the future. Another point, which I believe demonstrates Professor Hwang Il-do's keen observation, is that North Korea has a small territory. South Korea is also small. Even if North Korea were to establish intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) bases, these could be detected, identified, and destroyed by the United States preemptively. Therefore, the ultimate stage of nuclear weapons, referred to as the 'terminator,' involves nuclear-armed ballistic missiles launched from nuclear-powered submarines. Detecting and identifying nuclear-powered submarines is extremely difficult. Possessing such weapon systems would be the bare minimum capability to threaten the United States, and it is highly unlikely that North Korea can acquire this capability. Consequently, North Korea's claimed intercontinental ballistic missiles, such as the Hwasong-19 and Hwasong-18, even if launched from mobile launchers, are vulnerable to detection, identification, and defense by the US missile defense (MD) system. If, by any chance,

Therefore, the idea of North Korea using nuclear weapons early in a conflict to secure the initiative, or using them in various scenarios as if they were conventional weapons, is fundamentally inconsistent with these principles. If we consider the theoretical and practical aspects, the maximum extent to which North Korea might be able to use nuclear weapons, as analyzed by Professor Hwang Il-do, is likely as follows: The most rational war objective for Pyongyang is to ensure the survival of its top leadership or the maintenance of its regime after a major conflict. This is a defensive objective. This is because North Korea's regime under Kim Jong-un is a unique leadership system, essentially a cult of personality. His own survival is paramount. Therefore, all national defense efforts must ultimately be focused on protecting Kim Jong-un personally. In such a situation, rather than using offensive nuclear weapons, they would use them for self-protection. Or, developing this further, if a war breaks out and North Korea launches an attack, South Korea and the United States would initially defend and then counterattack. If, during the counterattack, they reach a point of no return, they might consider using nuclear weapons. This would not be at the beginning of the war or as a preemptive strike. It would only be in a situation where they are maximally pushed back, as described in the book by Vipin Narang and MIT professors, a 'last resort' scenario. This contradicts North Korea's continuous claims of using nuclear weapons early in a conflict. Professor Hwang Il-do reiterates his argument: Therefore, no country that has not yet crossed the threshold of assured retaliation capability has publicly discussed the operationalization of tactical nuclear weapons. This is correct. I have also researched this, and there are no such instances. Even countries like Pakistan and India, which officially possess nuclear weapons, do not do so. Nor do the five officially recognized nuclear-weapon states. Israel does not either. North Korea is uniquely making such claims.

North Korea's Nuclear Use Scenarios and Theoretical Limitations

Let us push this thought further. Setting aside all previous assumptions, let's consider the possibility that North Korea has indeed achieved a level of nuclear capability sufficient for assured retaliation against the United States. This is Professor Hwang Il-do's argument. Even if they reached that point, they still could not use nuclear weapons. This is because, as I mentioned, in a situation of mutual deterrence, the use of nuclear weapons would lead to the complete annihilation of both sides. This is where assured destruction, MAD, comes into play. Therefore, North Korea's claims of being able to use nuclear weapons at any time, lowering the threshold for their use, and so on, are unrealistic. Another point is the high taboo against nuclear use. Looking at the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia has frequently threatened nuclear use not only against Ukraine but also against NATO countries in Europe. Despite the current military situation not being entirely favorable to Russia, they have not achieved Putin's initial objectives in Ukraine, even with a significant disparity in military power. Ukraine does not possess nuclear weapons, nor is it a NATO member, so NATO has not directly intervened. The fact that Russia cannot use nuclear weapons against such a country, even with North Korea's assistance, indicates that the primary taboo against nuclear use is extremely high. The absence of any nuclear use experience since 1945 is also due to these reasons. In this context, is it truly possible for North Korea to use nuclear weapons? Based on rational judgment and nuclear deterrence theory, the probability is very low. This is the shared concern that Professor Hwang Il-do and I have consistently held. So, despite this situation, why does North Korea continue to claim it will use nuclear weapons? Professor Hwang Il-do proposes the scenario North Korea desires: North Korea wants a limited nuclear war. In a crisis, Pyongyang would use nuclear weapons restrictively against U.S. allies like South Korea or Japan, and in return, it expects the United States not to retaliate with its far more destructive nuclear weapons against North Korea, believing it can control, or wishes to control, this nuclear war. In other words, North Korea is using the operationalization of tactical nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip in a limited nuclear war scenario. This is North Korea's hope, but it is highly unlikely to materialize in reality. This is also based on Professor Hwang Il-do's research. For example,

let's assume North Korea fires a nuclear weapon at South Korea. A single shot has a high probability of being intercepted by South Korea's missile defense system. Therefore, to inflict significant damage on South Korea, multiple nuclear weapons would need to be launched from various platforms in a deceptive manner. However, consider this: if nuclear weapons are used in such a manner, it would inevitably escalate into an all-out war. If North Korea fires multiple nuclear weapons, South Korea and the United States, and their alliance, cannot remain idle. Consequently, this would directly lead to a certain and devastating retaliation from the United States against North Korea, a situation North Korea would be entering of its own accord. In this regard, it is also impossible. Furthermore, in terms of theory and academic discussion, the prevailing argument is that such control is impossible. I will not go into all the details here, but the dominant theory is that a limited nuclear war itself is impossible due to political and technical issues, the chain reaction of nuclear deployment, and the collapse of command structures, among many other factors.

The brilliance of Professor Hwang Il-do's research does not stop there. He meticulously analyzes whether North Korea truly does not know this, or if there are other reasons for doing so despite knowing. He then presents several alternative hypotheses, with one of his most keenly interested arguments, perhaps a hypothesis, focusing on internal North Korean factors: organizational culture, strategic culture, and leadership elements. The first is the myth of offensive superiority held by the North Korean military. What does this mean? Both in North Korea and during the Soviet era, there was a belief that offense is the best defense. Therefore, in times of conflict or confrontation, it is crucial to launch a swift, preemptive attack to subdue the adversary. He researched this. Professor Hwang Il-do's basis for this argument is that the Soviet Union operated in this manner. The Soviet myth of offensive superiority, and its key proponent, the Soviet military theorist Mikhail Frunze, learned this military doctrine during his studies abroad and brought it back. Therefore, he argues that the myth of offensive superiority is deeply ingrained in the North Korean military. Another point is that Kim Il-sung's memoirs, 'With the Century,' validate that defense is a highly favored policy. This is according to his research paper. In other words, within North Korea's organizational culture, particularly in its deep strategic thinking, the myth of offensive superiority exists. Because of this myth, despite the limitations of existing nuclear deterrence theory—which suggests that using nuclear weapons would essentially be an act of suicide for North Korea—they continuously advocate for the possibility of using nuclear weapons in a highly aggressive and preemptive manner.

Another point, which Professor Hwang Il-do argues and I also believe is possible after considerable contemplation, relates to the nature of the North Korean state. This is often referred to as the setting of offensive objectives. It means that North Korea harbors revisionist ambitions, implying a clear objective of militarily occupying South Korea. This is why they might use nuclear weapons early in a conflict. Even disregarding all rationality, they might pursue that path to achieve such ultimate goals. In summary, Professor Hwang Il-do's analysis of North Korea's strategic culture suggests that it partially explains why North Korea possesses such an aggressive nuclear doctrine, even when it defies rationality. Another concept North Korea discusses is the sense of encirclement, referred to in English as 'encirclement.' North Korea consistently claims to be surrounded by neighboring countries and to be in a defensive position. However, to break through this encirclement, they argue that a highly aggressive and offensive posture is necessary. This idea did not originate with North Korea but emerged from the socialist bloc, specifically the Soviet Union. Tracing it further back, such ideas can be found in China. These notions of perceived encirclement are embedded in their strategic culture, leading to these issues. Nevertheless, Professor Hwang Il-do's overall conclusion, which I also agree with, is that despite the various possibilities discussed earlier, the likelihood of North Korea using nuclear weapons remains very low. There are many reasons, and as I briefly mentioned, despite limitations in achieving military success or objectives, one of the biggest reasons is North Korea's regime. This is a point I emphasize further: North Korea's unique leadership system, the 'sole leader system,' as I briefly mentioned earlier.

In such a situation, Kim Jong-un's safety is paramount. Would he make a choice that even slightly threatens his safety and existence? North Korea's system is a unique leadership system. Kim Jong-un's power is absolute. The characteristic of absolute power is not to gain more power but to protect the power one already possesses. It is about not losing one's power and preventing any erosion of it. Therefore, from Kim Jong-un's perspective, while occupying South Korea through war might be desirable, attempting such an action could compromise the power he already fully possesses and enjoys, and critically, could lead to the end of his regime and his own demise. Kim Jong-un is aware of these extremely high risks. Therefore, such a choice remains very difficult for Kim Jong-un. Professor Hwang Il-do also concludes his argument by stating that the actual decision for North Korea to use nuclear weapons is likely to remain constrained by the asymmetric uncertainties explained at the beginning. This is what Professor Hwang Il-do has argued and presented as research findings. So, what should be done? He offers a profound and resonant proposal: We must ensure that North Korea cannot use nuclear weapons. The starting point for this is to consider how to strengthen the influence of universal or rational factors that can affect North Korea's decision to use nuclear weapons, and how to minimize the influence of unique or irrational factors. In simpler terms, according to conventional theory, North Korea cannot use nuclear weapons if it has not achieved Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), as this is rational, and Kim Jong-un makes such judgments. Therefore, we must create conditions that further reinforce that judgment. We must also consider ways to minimize the influence of North Korea's organizational cultural characteristics, such as the myth of offensive superiority and other irrational elements I mentioned earlier. This is a very meaningful thought. Professor Hwang Il-do also used the expression 'cold reality' of nuclear deterrence, stating that North Korea must be made to fully recognize this reality by sending sophisticated deterrence messages. To elaborate, if North Korea uses nuclear weapons, the U.S. and South Korea's extended deterrence will ensure the end of the regime. If this message is conveyed at the highest level, through U.S. documents, and through practical ROK-U.S. joint exercises and the deployment of strategic assets, Kim Jong-un will rationally have to believe that using nuclear weapons will result in the end of his regime. I believe this is the situation that will be created.

North Korea's Limited Nuclear War Scenarios and Their Realism

Will it truly be able to use nuclear weapons? Based on rational judgment and nuclear deterrence theory, the possibility is very low. This is the shared concern that Professor Hwang Il-do and I have consistently held. Then, despite this situation, why does North Korea continue to talk about using nuclear weapons? Professor Hwang Il-do outlines North Korea's desired scenario as follows: North Korea desires a limited nuclear war. In a contingency, Pyongyang would use nuclear weapons restrictively against South Korea or Japan, U.S. allies, and in return, would expect the United States not to retaliate with more destructive nuclear weapons against North Korea, implying that they believe they can control, or wish to control, such a nuclear war. In other words, North Korea is in the process of securing tactical nuclear weapons for actual battlefield use as a bargaining chip within the framework of a limited nuclear war. This is, in fact, North Korea's hope, but it is practically impossible to achieve. This is also Professor Hwang Il-do's research. For example,

■ Park Won-gon: Director, Center for North Korean Studies, East Asia Institute; Professor, Department of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

The Myth of North Korea's Offensive Primacy and Strategic Culture

■ Management and Editing: Park Han-soo, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr

Soviet military theorist Mikhail Frunze learned these military doctrines while studying at the Military Academy. Therefore, he argues that the myth of offensive primacy is deeply ingrained in the North Korean military. Furthermore, Kim Il-sung's memoirs, "With the Century," verify that defense is a highly preferred policy. This is revealed in this research paper. In other words, the myth of offensive primacy exists in North Korea's organizational culture, particularly in its deep strategic thinking. Possessing such a myth, it is argued that North Korea can continuously pursue highly aggressive and preemptive nuclear use, despite the limitations of existing nuclear deterrence theory, which posits that nuclear use would essentially be an act of suicide.

Furthermore, Professor Hwang Il-do argues, and I also continue to ponder and acknowledge as a possibility, a characteristic of the North Korean state. This is often referred to as setting offensive objectives, meaning North Korea harbors revisionist ambitions. Ultimately, there is a clear objective within North Korea to militarily occupy South Korea. Therefore, it might use nuclear weapons early in a conflict. Even disregarding all rationality, it might pursue that path to achieve such ultimate goals. In summary, the specific state strategic culture argued by Professor Hwang Il-do partially explains why North Korea possesses an aggressive nuclear doctrine even when it disregards rationality. North Korea also speaks of a sense of encirclement, referred to in English as 'encirclement.' North Korea always claims to be surrounded by neighboring countries and to be in a defensive position. However, to break through this encirclement, it argues that highly aggressive and offensive actions are necessary. This idea did not originate with North Korea but emerged from the socialist bloc, specifically the Soviet Union. Going further back, such ideas can be traced to China.

These ideas, mobilized by the sense of being surrounded, are embedded in their strategic culture, leading to these issues. Nevertheless, Professor Hwang Il-do's overall conclusion, which I also agree with, is that despite the aforementioned specialization and various possibilities, the likelihood of North Korea using nuclear weapons remains very low. There are several reasons, and as I briefly mentioned earlier, while it limits military achievement or goal attainment, one of the biggest reasons is, I believe, North Korea's regime. This is a point I wish to emphasize further: North Korea's unique leader system, as I briefly mentioned earlier.

In such a situation, Kim Jong-un's safety is paramount. Would he really make a choice that even slightly threatens his safety and existence? The North Korean system is a unique leader system. Kim Jong-un's power is absolute. The characteristic of absolute power is not to gain more power, but to protect the power one holds. It is about not losing one's power and preventing even the slightest leakage. Therefore, while Kim Jong-un might ideally wish to wage war and occupy all of South Korea, he is aware of the very high risk that attempting such an action could undermine the power he already possesses and enjoys, and critically, could lead to the end of his regime and his own demise.

Policy Recommendations for Deterring North Korea's Nuclear Use

Therefore, such a choice remains very difficult for Kim Jong-un. Professor Hwang Il-do also states the final conclusion of this argument as follows: Ultimately, North Korea's actual decision to use nuclear weapons is likely to remain constrained by the limitations of asymmetric uncertainty explained at the outset. This is what Professor Hwang Il-do argues and presents his research findings on. So, what should be done? He offers a suggestion that resonates deeply: We must ensure that North Korea cannot use nuclear weapons. The starting point will be to consider measures that can increase the influence of universal or rational factors that can affect North Korea's decision to use nuclear weapons, while minimizing the influence of its unique or irrational factors.

To elaborate, as previously discussed, it is rational that North Korea cannot use nuclear weapons unless it achieves mutually assured destruction, and Kim Jong-un makes such a judgment. Therefore, we must strengthen that judgment. We must also consider measures to minimize the organizational and cultural characteristics of North Korea, such as the myth of offensive primacy and other irrational aspects. I believe this is a very meaningful idea. Professor Hwang Il-do also used the expression 'cold reality' of nuclear deterrence, stating that we must ensure North Korea fully recognizes this reality and send a sophisticated deterrence message. To elaborate, if North Korea uses nuclear weapons, the ROK-U.S. extended deterrence will ensure the end of the regime. If this is conveyed through messages at the highest level, through U.S. documents, and through practical ROK-U.S. combined exercises and the deployment of strategic assets, as is currently done, Kim Jong-un will have no choice but to realistically believe that using his nuclear weapons would result in the end of his regime.

Ultimately, I believe Professor Hwang Il-do's final policy recommendations do not significantly deviate from what has just been discussed. Today, I have spoken with a heavy heart. It is still deeply painful that such an excellent researcher, who conducted such brilliant research and with whom I had collaborated for so long, is no longer with us. However, I will strive to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and achieve true peace on the Korean Peninsula by carrying forward the research and considerations of the late Professor Hwang Il-do. Once again, I offer my condolences to the late Professor Hwang Il-do and my sympathies to his bereaved family. Thank you.

■ Park Won Gon_Director of the North Korea Research Center, East Asia Institute. Professor of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Han Soo_EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr