North Korea and the World: Prospects for North Korea's Foreign Policy in 2025 - World Order, the Russia-Ukraine War, and North Korea-U.S. Relations

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xjo0G2VfE8s

Video Script

I will now discuss the possibility of negotiations between North Korea and the United States, and vice versa, which is of greatest interest and has been the subject of much discussion. As mentioned earlier, unlike in 2018 and 2019, the current situation is different because North Korea is intricately entangled with the Russia-Ukraine issue. To end or achieve a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine war, the issue of North Korean troops deployed there must be resolved. If so, there appears to be a possibility for negotiations, similar to the Trump administration era. Hello. It has been a while. Welcome to Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. Many things happened last December, which is why Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World could not film videos for a month. Starting this year, I will film and upload videos at least twice a month. Thank you again for your viewership and support.

2025 North Korea Foreign Relations Outlook: Key Variables and Predictions

As this is the first broadcast of the year, I will focus on what kind of world North Korea will face in 2025. First, I will provide an outlook for North Korea's external relations for the year, and in the next video, I will summarize the internal situation of North Korea. As you all know, it seems like a year with many significant events. Consequently, it will be a year of greatly increased uncertainty. Of course, the starting point is the second term of the Donald Trump administration, which will be inaugurated in 2025. We have already experienced Trump's first term from 2016 to 2017 and up to 2020. During that period, many things happened, and in particular, we experienced three unprecedented summits between North Korea and the United States. Therefore, many people are keenly interested in and analyzing what the future of US-North Korea relations will be like if Trump returns to power.

Furthermore, I believe there are changes compared to the situation back then. The conflict between the US and China has become much more acute, and the situation where North Korean troops are deployed in the Russia-Ukraine war is significantly different from the security environment of the Korean Peninsula peace process in 2018 and 2019. I believe that how these connections are untangled will be very important this year. However, the process does not appear to be easy or straightforward. I will cautiously begin to predict the changes in the world that will unfold in 2025, and especially how North Korea will respond and what strategies it will adopt. North Korea holds a plenary session at the end of every year following the Fifth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee. This time, the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee was held, where the year is summarized and plans for the next year are announced. Sometimes, the Supreme People's Assembly is also convened in January.

At that time, Kim Jong Un, the General Secretary, delivers a policy speech. As of the moment of filming today, I have not yet seen the policy speech of the Supreme People's Assembly, so I will exclude that part from my discussion. Despite various variables at the year-end plenary session, there is a significant difference compared to the plenary session in November 2023. At that time, there were very detailed contents, and as you may recall, the 'two states hostile to each other' theory was announced. However, at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee last December, unlike the previous plenary session, not much content was released.

There seems to be a deliberate aspect of keeping the strategy somewhat ambiguous, and perhaps an intentional decision not to explicitly state a position on South Korea's unfavorable political situation. What is important is that, despite this, North Korea's fundamental worldview and order have not changed. In Kim Jong Un's remarks at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee at the end of last year, expressions such as 'sphere of independent forces' and 'sphere of hegemonic forces' still appear. Kim Jong Un does not use the term 'new Cold War.' He first used it in 2021 and continued to use it until 2023, but since 2023, at least in Kim Jong Un's speeches, the term 'new Cold War' has not been used. This is because China has repeatedly expressed its discomfort with it.

North Korea's Pursuit of Bloc Alignment and the Impact of US-China Relations

China officially and unofficially states that it opposes the confrontational alignment of a "new Cold War." This is because China has responded to the United States, particularly the Biden administration, which has sought to isolate China as a communist and authoritarian state while pursuing diplomacy. Therefore, they have opposed such Cold War-like divisions and bloc politics. Perhaps Kim Jong Un is fully aware of this, which is why he does not use the term "new Cold War." However, what North Korea ultimately desires is the formation of a bloc similar to the Cold War era between the US and the Soviet Union. Wouldn't that be natural? Only by forming such a bloc can North Korea, along with China, Russia, and recently Iran, play a role not as an international pariah or rogue state, but as a core pillar of a bloc.

This is a situation that North Korea naturally desires and hopes for. Although the term "new Cold War" was not used this time, content emphasizing bloc politics is indeed included in Kim Jong Un's speech. Therefore, the key question is whether a bloc, even if not a "new Cold War," can be formed to the extent North Korea desires. However, this does not seem easy. To be more precise, the relationship between the US and China is crucial for the formation of this "new Cold War." Especially since Trump has already foreshadowed very strong measures and policies against China, the future of US-China relations after Trump takes office will determine whether a Cold War and bloc politics will be re-established. Currently, two predictions are being made regarding US-China relations. One is the so-called "ideological war" initiated by Trump towards the end of his first term. At that time, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called China a "bankrupt totalitarian state" and began an ideological war by no longer referring to Xi Jinping as "President" but as "Communist Party General Secretary." He then attempted a complete separation from China, including supply chains and the global economy, which you are all familiar with as "decoupling." Therefore, one prediction is that an ideological war of this nature may resume in Trump's second term.

Another prediction is that during Trump's first term, what Trump emphasized most was the issue of the enormous trade surplus that China held with the United States, the problem of trade imbalance. Thus, he continued to wage a trade war, and later reached an agreement with China, whereby China agreed to purchase a significant amount of American goods, effectively adjusting the trade imbalance. As you know, Trump is a figure who approaches everything through transactions and seeks to significantly enhance America's interests through them. In this regard, while confronting China, if China provides a certain level of economic benefit to the United States,

there may be less likelihood of engaging in wars based on ideology. Because Trump is a businessman who thinks in terms of transactional costs, these two predictions have emerged. I believe we must predict cautiously how things will unfold, but I suspect the latter possibility is somewhat more likely. Therefore, if you are interested, I recommend looking into it. Chairman Ha Young-sun of the East Asia Institute, who is also our chairman, made an overall forecast for this year, predicting that the US-China relationship will be characterized by transactional cost-based conflict. I tend to agree with that. If this is the case, it could become more difficult for North Korea. The more the ideological conflict between the US and China intensifies, the more room for maneuver North Korea will have. In such a scenario, China will have to build a bloc, whether it wants to or not, and North Korea, along with Russia, is likely to be one of the countries entering that bloc. Within such a framework,

the space will widen significantly for North Korea. Otherwise, as I mentioned, if the U.S. and China manage and stabilize their relationship at a certain level, it will be difficult for North Korea to build the kind of bloc it desires with China and receive what it wants from it. The strained relationship between North Korea and China, and China and North Korea, has been confirmed in various forms over the past year, and similarly the year before. Particularly last year, which marked the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between North Korea and China, it is accurate to say that virtually nothing was done. For example, in June last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Pyongyang and grandly celebrated the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between North Korea and Russia. In comparison, the level of celebration between North Korea and China was very low.

This indicates that the North Korea-China relationship is not smooth. From China's perspective, it is uncomfortable that North Korea has dispatched troops to the Russia-Ukraine war. To maintain good relations with European countries, China needs to build a coalition that can support it in its strategic competition with the U.S. Therefore, China seems inclined to draw a line regarding North Korea's dispatch of troops to the Russia-Ukraine war, which threatens European security. As I mentioned, there is also discomfort with Kim Jong-un's calls for bloc politics in a 'new Cold War.' It is a delicate situation.

The Russia-Ukraine War and North Korea's Strategic Choices

This relationship is likely to continue this year. Although there are signs of change in the Russia-Ukraine war, it is unlikely that everything will be resolved quickly. In that context, my first prediction is that North Korea's room to maneuver within the context of U.S.-China conflict, albeit a managed and transactional one, will likely not be enough to build the bloc it desires and operate within it. My second point is the Russia-Ukraine war. I believe this is very important.

As I have repeatedly said, this is because North Korea has dispatched troops there, making the Russia-Ukraine war inseparable from the Korean Peninsula issue. As you know, one of Donald Trump's campaign promises throughout his presidential run was that if elected, he would bring about a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine within 24 hours. While that is likely impossible, it is clear that he intends to prioritize resolving the Russia-Ukraine war with significant foreign policy focus. In such a situation, how will North Korea act, and what will be its room for maneuver? I believe ending the Russia-Ukraine war is very difficult, and a ceasefire or armistice is more likely. One often discussed scenario is a 'frozen conflict,' where an armistice agreement is reached based on occupied territories. None of this is favorable to Ukraine.

There are recent reports of North Korea being dispatched to the Kursk region, and that Russia, with North Korea's assistance, is recapturing significant portions of territory previously occupied by Russia. However, the crucial question is whether North Korea has received the expected benefits in return for dispatching troops to the Russia-Ukraine war. I have considerable doubt about this. To elaborate on a larger scale, the state of Russia itself has clearly weakened considerably by initiating the Ukraine war.

This year, the percentage of Russia's GDP allocated to defense spending is likely to exceed 40%. Russia has already experienced over 99% inflation, suggesting the possibility of further inflation as an internal economic problem. Before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia's economy was not significantly different in size from South Korea's. The same applied to defense spending levels. While it is now reported to be one to two times that of South Korea due to the ongoing war, this is a special circumstance. However, it is highly questionable whether Russia, with its military and economic capabilities, can continue to play the role of a global superpower. While Russia is indeed a military power possessing nuclear weapons, it is highly doubtful whether it can maintain its role as a global superpower solely with nuclear capabilities. Especially as this Russia-Ukraine war is managed and concluded, Russia is likely to lose Europe, its largest economic partner and market.

Europe is already foregoing Russian natural gas, and has been for a long time. Companies like Gazprom, a state-owned enterprise that accounts for a significant portion of Russia's national wealth, have seen their total revenue decline by more than 40% since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war. Specifically, it has been confirmed that imports decreased by as much as 50% between 2020 and 2023.

Consequently, Russia's economic power is bound to shrink, especially given the difficulty of restoring relations with Europe after the war. Former President Obama stated that Russia would remain a regional power, not a global superpower. I believe these trends are likely to accelerate. Therefore, I have significant doubts as to whether North Korea can achieve what it expected by closely aligning with Russia, and by sending its young people to the battlefield, and whether Russia has the capacity to provide it. In particular, the most crucial benefit North Korea might expect from Russia is related to nuclear technology, which I believe North Korea has not yet fully developed. This includes technologies for multi-warhead missiles required for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), re-entry technologies, and nuclear-powered submarines, which were a key project in North Korea's five-year defense development plan announced at the 8th Party Congress in 2021.

I believe Russia is very unlikely to provide such technologies. Since the Soviet era, such sensitive technologies have not been shared even with allies or friendly nations. Moreover, with Trump advocating for an end to the Russia-Ukraine war, if such technologies were provided, they would enable North Korea to strike the U.S. mainland, posing a significant threat to Trump's America. This would compel Russia to antagonize the U.S. once again, making such a choice highly improbable for Russia.

Trump's Return and the Possibility and Challenges of North Korea-US Negotiations

What benefits, then, can North Korea realistically obtain? As has been mentioned, these include crude oil, food, and fertilizer. While North Korea may receive cash payments for troop deployment, this would fall significantly short of the economic development or military achievements North Korea desires. Furthermore, the international isolation North Korea seeks to escape is being exacerbated by its association with Russia, leading to increased disadvantages in the international community. Therefore, I believe Kim Jong-un's close alignment with Russia is a significant miscalculation. Lastly, the third point, and the one that interests you most and is discussed most frequently: Will Trump meet Kim Jong-un? Regarding the possibility of negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea, I strongly believe it is unlikely to happen easily. This is because, from Trump's perspective, the most crucial issues currently are resolving the Russia-Ukraine war and the Middle East situation. This is included in the Republican Party platform and

confirmed in Trump's statements, and it is clearly a foreign policy priority for a second Trump administration. In comparison, the North Korean issue ranks lower. However, as mentioned earlier, unlike in 2018 and 2019, North Korea is now intricately linked with the Russia-Ukraine issue. To end or ceasefire the Russia-Ukraine war, the issue of North Korean troops deployed there must be resolved. Therefore, it seems plausible that Trump might restore a certain level of communication channel with Kim Jong-un, as he did during his presidency. The appointment of figures like former Ambassador to Germany Grenell and Alex Wong suggests an effort to maintain such channels. However, restoring these channels is a vastly different matter from personally investing time, effort, and political capital to meet Kim Jong-un directly in a summit, as was done in 2018 and 2019. My primary assessment is that it is possible that efforts will be made to prevent North Korea from acting as a hindrance in resolving the Russia-Ukraine war.

I believe it is possible that preventing this will take precedence. Furthermore, I do not believe it is highly likely that Kim Jong Un will easily meet with Trump. This is because Kim Jong Un already experienced humiliation in Hanoi in February 2019. In such a situation, would he hold a summit with Trump without any conditions, as he did in 2018? I do not think so. North Korea has analyzed the situation since then and concluded that their primary strategic misstep was the insufficient advancement of their nuclear capabilities. This is evident from the declaration of a 'frontal breakthrough strategy' at the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee in 2020. From this perspective, they have made their utmost efforts to advance their nuclear capabilities over the past several years, and therefore, it is possible they will present certain preconditions for dialogue this time.

One concern is that North Korea consistently raises the issue of suspending ROK-US joint military exercises and the deployment of strategic assets as preconditions. However, Trump also holds a very negative view of ROK-US joint military exercises and the deployment of strategic assets. This has been a point of discussion since the Singapore summit in 2018, with him describing them as very expensive and provocative, and as a cost-sensitive individual, he raises concerns. Therefore, it is possible that an agreement on this could be reached at the outset of dialogue between North Korea and the US, or the US and North Korea. This would involve the US suspending joint exercises and strategic asset deployments in exchange for North Korea suspending ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) and nuclear tests, a kind of 'dual suspension' as proposed by China. This could potentially be the initial point of agreement. However, even this alone poses a significant challenge to South Korea's security. This is because the nature of the joint military exercises conducted by South Korea and the US has changed since the latter half of last year. The deployment of strategic assets has also changed. They have shifted to specifically counter North Korea's nuclear capabilities. Starting in August of last year,

the exercise known as 'Ulchi Freedom Shield' included, for the first time, not only deterrence against North Korea's nuclear capabilities but also training on how to respond if North Korea uses nuclear weapons. Consequently, the types and levels of strategic assets deployed by the US to South Korea have fundamentally changed. These two elements are considered the core pillars of the extended deterrence provided by the US to South Korea. However, if these are suspended, it could significantly undermine the credibility of the extended deterrence that the US provides to South Korea, which is a cause for concern.

North Korea's Nuclear Capability Advancement and the Difficulties in Denuclearization Negotiations

I will conclude my remarks here. However, the crucial point is what kind of agreement North Korea and the US can reach after this, after the dual suspension takes effect. My assessment is that this will not be easy. While I am well aware that complete denuclearization by North Korea is difficult, the situation now is different from 2018 and 2019. Firstly, in February 2019, at Hanoi, Trump demanded the freezing and verification, and essentially the dismantling, of North Korea's entire nuclear production capacity, which included not only plutonium production but also highly enriched uranium facilities. In return, he offered sanctions relief, but I believe those conditions are no longer valid. For Trump, the minimum condition would be to limit North Korea's ability to strike the US mainland, an ability that North Korea has continued to develop and enhance since then. In late October of last year, they completed their ultimate ICBM, the Hwasong-19, and the Hwasong-18 appears to be a solid-fuel-based ballistic missile with multiple warheads. These are weapon systems that did not exist in 2018. Therefore, from Trump's perspective, the minimum level for negotiation and agreement with North Korea would likely involve the complete elimination, or at least the establishment of a roadmap for the elimination, of these weapon systems that possess the capability to strike the US mainland.

In exchange for that, he offered sanctions relief, but I believe those conditions are no longer valid. For Trump, the minimum condition would be to limit North Korea's ability to strike the US mainland, an ability that North Korea has continued to develop and enhance since then. In late October of last year, they completed their ultimate ICBM, the Hwasong-19, and the Hwasong-18 appears to be a solid-fuel-based ballistic missile with multiple warheads. These are weapon systems that did not exist in 2018. Therefore, from Trump's perspective, the minimum level for negotiation and agreement with North Korea would likely involve the complete elimination, or at least the establishment of a roadmap for the elimination, of these weapon systems that possess the capability to strike the US mainland.

On the other hand, from North Korea's perspective, its situation has changed. It possesses nuclear capabilities and likely feels confident in its ability to strike not only South Korea and Japan but also ships in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, the advancement of its capabilities to strike the U.S. mainland is beyond dispute. Therefore, North Korea may seek nuclear disarmament negotiations, essentially acknowledging it as a nuclear-weapon state. Nuclear disarmament negotiations involve dismantling only a portion of existing nuclear weapons. Additionally, unlike before, North Korea may not link improving relations with the U.S. or establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula to its denuclearization, as was done in the Singapore agreement. Instead, North Korea might boldly assert that the U.S. is its adversary, and that nations with adversarial relations should control their nuclear arsenals and manage them stably to prevent unintended nuclear war due to miscalculation and mistrust. This is akin to the nuclear arms control talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

I believe the likelihood of North Korea demanding such an approach has significantly increased. Therefore, returning to the original question, would Trump be able to accept this? And would Kim Jong-un be willing to relinquish the capability to strike the U.S. mainland? If they were to abandon this capability, their nuclear capabilities would be severely restricted to the Korean Peninsula and the surrounding region. Could they achieve their political and military objectives with such limited capabilities? I believe this is highly unlikely. For instance, if North Korea's nuclear capabilities remain at that level, and if the U.S.'s extended deterrence for South Korea is reliably maintained, the Biden administration repeatedly states that any North Korean nuclear launch would result in the end of the regime. The U.S. certainly possesses sufficient retaliatory capabilities. If this is maintained, the perceived utility of North Korea's nuclear weapons would be significantly diminished. If a single North Korean nuclear launch means the end of their regime, would they easily launch a nuclear weapon? To maintain that deterrent, they would still need to develop the capability to strike the U.S. mainland, which Trump would likely not accept. This seems to be the core issue. Therefore, even if negotiations were to begin, the negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea would inevitably become very difficult, and it is clear that the U.S. still possesses a definitive retaliatory capability against North Korea. Thus, the utility of North Korea's nuclear weapons is likely to remain considerably limited, in my judgment. I have presented three points today. I believe that the new year that Kim Jong-un faces in 2025 will not be easy, given the global geopolitical landscape and environment. Kim Jong-un's bet on Russia is a miscalculation. The U.S. under Trump will not be easily swayed, and it still possesses a firm nuclear deterrence capability. Furthermore, the U.S.-China conflict is unlikely to escalate to the level of bloc politics that North Korea desires.

North Korea's Challenges in 2025 and the Uncertainty of the Trump Administration

Furthermore, to add one more point, unlike previous U.S. presidents and the Biden administration, Trump refers to his foreign policy as 'peace through strength,' but he employs it in a highly erratic and unpredictable manner. Even when dealing with adversary nations, a traditional government like the Biden administration operates within a rules-based international order. It responds to adversaries while adhering to predictable global order norms and principles. However, Trump disregards these, which can increase unpredictability for North Korea. For instance, it is possible that in seeking to end the Russia-Ukraine war, Trump might demand that North Korea withdraw its troops from Ukraine and cease close security cooperation with Russia. Similarly, in the context of U.S.-China conflict, while targeting China, he might suddenly bring up the North Korean agenda and demand that China cease cooperation with North Korea. From North Korea's perspective, the bloc politics of North Korea, China, and Russia that they most desire, and the counter-bloc of the U.S. and South Korea,

operating as they traditionally have, is likely to function very differently. Therefore, I do not believe that 2025 will be an easy year for Kim Jong-un. Thank you for watching.

■ Park Won-gon, Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute, and Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Management and Editing: Park Han-soo, EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr

■ 담당 및 편집: 박한수_EAI 연구원

문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr