[North Korea and the World] Continued Defections by the Elite… Has the 5th North Korean Sudden Change Event Arrived?

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9nphXp4Bc2Q

Video Script

Theoretical Background for Discussing North Korean Contingencies

This theory posits that for a dictatorial state to endure, the dictator only needs to appease the core elites of the winning coalition. This has been extensively studied and is relevant as it is based on analyses of numerous dictatorial states, not mere speculation. It is also a topic actively discussed domestically. The crucial aspect here is the formation of a very small winning coalition, with insufficient economic incentives provided to the rest of the populace. As the saying goes, 'The hungry have no capacity to overthrow the leader,' it is argued that if ordinary citizens become economically comfortable or have surplus resources, they might challenge the leadership. Therefore, maintaining their impoverished state is beneficial for the regime. This is an uncomfortable theory, but it is a mechanism dictators can employ and is significantly applicable to North Korea. There is considerable research utilizing this concept. If this theory is applied to North Korea, the key question becomes the size of the elite group constituting the winning coalition that North Korea maintains. If this group is small, the critical issue would be whether the defection of elites, reaching a certain level, could undermine the winning coalition itself, which forms the bedrock of the North Korean regime. This presents a challenge.

This is because it is extremely difficult to ascertain the precise number of the so-called winning coalition between North Korea's elites and Kim Jong-un. While there is considerable related research, estimates vary widely, from a minimum of 300 to as many as several thousand or tens of thousands. The exact determination is challenging due to North Korea's systemic closure and information opacity. The crucial point is whether the winning coalition has been eroded to a significant degree, which is also difficult to assess. If the erosion has not reached such a level, the current observed defections of North Korean elites might be a form of escape. According to Albert Hirschman's 1970 classic, 'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty,' individuals dissatisfied with dictatorial or authoritarian regimes have three options: first, exit; second, 'voice' their discontent within the system; and third, exhibit 'loyalty' despite dissatisfaction. Exit and voice must occur in tandem, and their scale must be sufficient to undermine the fundamental framework of the winning coalition. While we observe exit, voices of dissent from within are not audible. Therefore, predicting and analyzing whether the winning coalition is being eroded requires extreme caution. Furthermore, to erode or dismantle the winning coalition, the elites must possess alternatives to the Suryong system; the existence of such alternatives also requires substantial analysis.

Even if such alternatives do not exist, North Korean elites would likely contemplate what alternatives to the Suryong system might be more advantageous to them. One such alternative is a collective leadership system. North Korea professes a unique form of collective leadership that is difficult to categorize as a socialist state. From the perspective of the elite, a collective leadership system is advantageous. It resembles the political systems in the Soviet Union after Stalin or in China before Xi Jinping's ascent, where the state is operated by the core elites, centered around the Politburo Standing Committee. This system could be more appealing to North Korean elites than the Suryong system. In the Suryong system, all power is concentrated in one person, who can make decisions arbitrarily, outside the bounds of law and institutions, at any time. Just as the Party Charter supersedes the North Korean Constitution, and the Suryong's directives supersede the Charter, the Suryong wields absolute power. Therefore, would elites prefer a system where their safety can be threatened based solely on the Suryong's intentions, without institutionalization or legal basis, or would they prefer a leadership system where power is dispersed among several individuals, allowing their voices to be heard? Naturally, they would prefer the latter. Consequently, if such a collective leadership system were established, meaning if such an alternative existed, elite defections could increase. This leads to ongoing discussions domestically.

The expectation of the Suryong as a leader of the people, or as a reformist monarch, or as a driver of reform, is essentially asking for the impossible. The Suryong system operates when absolute control is maintained from the apex of power. Dividing power or choosing reform and openness is entirely impossible. For North Korea to become a normal socialist state as a party-state, the fundamental prerequisite is the disappearance of the current Suryong system. Therefore, under the continued existence of the current North Korean regime, a change in the Suryong system appears impossible.

Then, will the Suryong system be abandoned? To date, Kim Jong-un has shown no inclination to abandon it. A more serious issue here is North Korea's hereditary succession. The fact that succession has been possible, with discussions of a third and even fourth hereditary transfer, is due to the Suryong system. Under the Suryong system, absolute power is wielded, and the legitimacy of the predecessors can be inherited. If this is abolished, the fourth hereditary succession would inevitably be challenged. For these reasons, my current assessment is that it is difficult for the Suryong system to change or for the elites to adopt alternative systems at present. I will mention one more related theory. This is also theoretical: the concept of a critical mass.

Critical mass, that is, the critical populace. Research on the collapse and fundamental transformation of dictatorial states indicates the necessity of a critical mass emerging to a certain extent. A small number of individuals confronting a dictator does not lead to the collapse or fundamental change of the regime. The regime changes only when a large-scale opposition force emerges in the form of popular uprisings, exceeding a certain threshold. When researching scenarios for North Korean contingencies, this discussion inevitably arises. Academically, the term 'critical mass' is used, but whether such a critical mass can emerge within North Korea is a very difficult question.

Historical Context of Discussions on North Korean Contingencies

This is a discussion about North Korean contingencies. What exactly are North Korean contingencies? While there are various definitions, a North Korean contingency generally refers to a situation of severe crisis within North Korea leading to the collapse of the current regime or the disintegration of North Korea itself. The collapse of the current regime implies the downfall of the Kim Jong-un regime. What kind of regime would follow involves numerous variables. However, one major scenario is the continued existence of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as it is, and another is the complete disappearance of North Korea. This evokes the post-Cold War era, when the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia emerged, or when Eastern European socialist states disintegrated and new forms of states appeared. North Korean contingencies encompass both of these possibilities, and what I wish to discuss today is whether such North Korean contingencies are indeed likely to occur.

The reason I am raising this point is that recently, discussions about North Korean contingencies, or the theory of North Korean collapse, have been prevalent on the internet and in various contexts. Today, I must approach this from a theoretical perspective to discuss its validity. Given that this is a controversial topic with a strong future-oriented aspect, I will preface by stating that to avoid the fallacy of cherry-picking favorable evidence, we must approach it through existing theories and historical precedents. The background to this is that at least four times, scenarios of North Korean contingencies or collapse have been proposed, but ultimately, all four proved incorrect. The first instance was during the late 1990s, following Kim Il-sung's death, during Kim Jong-il's succession.

At that time, there was a large-scale supply shortage called the 'Arduous March,' which nearly collapsed the North Korean system and caused severe economic problems, leading to the deaths of between 300,000 and 2 million people from starvation. Many predicted at the time that North Korea could not possibly endure, with Robert Collin's theory of collapse in seven stages being a representative study. This can be seen as the first period of North Korean sudden change or collapse scenarios.

The second period was the early to mid-2000s. During this time, rather than a severe collapse, various future scenarios emerged regarding the possibility of North Korea choosing reform and opening, similar to China. Following the 'Arduous March,' as North Korea was in the process of rebuilding its state system, various future prospects arose, and scenarios of sudden change in North Korea were discussed as one of them. Representative studies also existed at that time. The third period was around 2008 when Kim Jong-il suddenly collapsed. During Kim Il-sung's era, Kim Jong-il had long secured his position as successor, providing a safety net for the sustainability of the North Korean system. However, in 2008, Kim Jong-un had not yet emerged, and the succession structure was uncertain, leading to significant doubts about whether the unprecedented hereditary succession of three generations would be possible. Consequently, much discussion took place regarding the high probability of sudden change in North Korea.

Recent Basis and Prospects for the North Korean Contingency Theory

The fourth period was the emergence of the Kim Jong-un regime in 2012. At that time, the Arab Spring led to the collapse of dictatorial regimes that had lasted for 30 to 40 years and the downfall of dictators, raising possibilities for democratization. Accordingly, there were many studies suggesting the possibility of a situation similar to the Arab Spring occurring in North Korea. This marks the fourth period of discussion on sudden change in North Korea. As mentioned earlier, in all four of these instances, North Korea did not experience sudden change or collapse. In other words, the predictions of sudden change in North Korea proved incorrect. However, there are several reasons why this topic is being discussed again recently. The first is the increasing defection of North Korea's elite class.

This is true. According to data from the Ministry of Unification, from 1997 to December 2011, during Kim Jong-il's regime, there were 54 defections by North Korean elites. Here, 'elites' refers to high-ranking North Koreans who are subject to special management upon defecting to South Korea. Under the Kim Jong-un regime, this number increased significantly to 134. More importantly, while the proportion of elites among all defectors during the Kim Jong-un era was 0.23% (54 out of 12,025 defectors), the proportion of elites among defectors in the Kim Jong-un era increased to 1.22% (134 out of 12,025 defectors), a 5.3-fold increase compared to the Kim Jong-il era. Therefore, it is clear that the defection of elites has increased phenomenally. North Korea itself has acknowledged this. At the 8th Party Congress in August 2021, the establishment of revolutionary discipline within the party was emphasized as highly important, leading to the creation of the Party Discipline Investigation Department and the Legal Affairs Department. This demonstrates a strong will to control the party, particularly the elite class. The convening of the first training course for Party Discipline Investigation Department officials in January 2024 highlights the necessity of strengthening regulations and internal control over party discipline. This is interpreted as North Korea's measure to control and consolidate the elite class more firmly than before. If the defection of elites is severe, it will undoubtedly impact the regime. However, a very cautious assessment is needed regarding the level, scope, and intensity of defection that could lead to rapid changes connecting to a sudden collapse of North Korea.

North Korea's Suryong System and Elite Cohesion

The characteristic of North Korea's 'Suryong' system is one-man rule. One of the phenomena observed in one-man dictatorial systems is a significant degree of alignment between the leader and the elite class. For a sudden change to occur within North Korea, an alternative to the Kim Jong-un regime must be present. In other words, the elite class must have options other than Kim Jong-un's Suryong system. Second, if they choose such an option, the elites must have guarantees for their lives after defection, even if large-scale defections continue. However, such assurances are uncertain. A cautious approach is necessary regarding whether the elite class will abandon the vested interests they enjoy under the Kim Jong-un regime to defect. There is a theory called the 'golden parachute' theory, which suggests that when a dictatorial regime collapses or shows signs of collapse, measures such as not holding elites accountable and providing financial compensation are necessary to induce their defection. In other words, they need to be given a 'golden parachute.' As such, the degree of alignment between the elite and the leadership, especially under a one-man system, is historically and theoretically quite high. Therefore, it is necessary to approach with caution whether the current defection of elites will lead to a fundamental weakening of the North Korean system's durability and result in sudden change, or if it is merely a partial defection occurring during the process of consolidating the cadre class for the control of the general populace.

Let me explain another theory here. It is called the 'winning coalition.' It is based on the 'selectorate theory' proposed by Bruce Mesquita and Alastair Smith of the United States. It is presented in the book 'The Dictator's Handbook,' published in Korean. According to this theory, in dictatorial countries, the dictator and the core elite class that supports them form a coalition to run the country, creating a 'winning coalition.' The majority of the populace not belonging to this winning coalition lives under this winning coalition.

For a dictatorial state to endure, the theory posits that the dictator only needs to manage the core members of the winning coalition, i.e., the elite class. This theory has been extensively researched and holds relevance based on cases from various dictatorial countries. It is also a topic actively discussed domestically. The crucial point here is that a very small winning coalition is formed, and sufficient economic incentives are not provided to the rest of the population. As the saying goes, 'the hungry have no strength to overthrow the leader,' if the general populace becomes economically comfortable or gains financial leeway, they may challenge the leadership. Therefore, maintaining their lives in hardship is considered advantageous. This is a very uncomfortable theory, but it is something dictators can maintain and applies significantly to North Korea. There are quite a few studies utilizing this concept. If this theory is assumed to apply to North Korea, the key question is the size of the elite class that constitutes the winning coalition North Korea maintains. If that size is small, it becomes important whether the defection of elites, once it reaches a certain level, can undermine the winning coalition itself, which forms the foundation of the North Korean system. Herein lies the difficulty.

This is because it is extremely difficult to determine the exact number of the so-called winning coalition between the North Korean elite class and Kim Jong-un. While there are numerous related studies, the estimates vary widely, from a minimum of 300 to as many as several thousand or tens of thousands. Accurate determination is difficult due to North Korea's systemic closure and opaque information environment. The crucial question is whether the winning coalition has been damaged to a significant extent, and this is also difficult to ascertain. If it has not reached that level of damage, the current defection of North Korean elites could be a form of escape. According to Albert Hirschman's classic work 'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty' (1970), individuals dissatisfied with dictatorial or authoritarian regimes have three options: first, exit; second, 'voice' (protest) to resolve dissatisfaction within the system; and third, 'loyalty' (acquiescence) despite dissatisfaction. Exit and voice must move together, and their scale must be sufficient to undermine the basic framework of the winning coalition. Currently, we see signs of exit, but we do not hear voices of protest from within. Therefore, very cautious prediction and analysis are needed regarding whether the winning coalition is being undermined. Furthermore, to undermine or dismantle the winning coalition, the elite class must have alternatives to the Suryong system, and the existence of such alternatives requires considerable analysis.

Even if such alternatives do not exist, North Korean elites would likely contemplate what alternatives would be more advantageous to them beyond the Suryong system. One such alternative is a collective leadership system. North Korea espouses a unique form of collective leadership that is difficult to categorize as a socialist state. From the perspective of the elite class, a collective leadership system is advantageous. It is a system where the state is run by the Politburo Standing Committee as the core of the elite class, similar to the political systems in the Soviet Union after Stalin or in China before Xi Jinping's ascent to power. This system could be more attractive to the North Korean elite than the Suryong system. In the Suryong system, all power is concentrated in one person, who can make decisions arbitrarily, outside the bounds of laws and regulations, at any time. Just as the Party Rules supersede the North Korean Constitution, and the Suryong's directives are above the Party Rules, the Suryong wields absolute power. Therefore, would elites prefer a system where their safety can be threatened based solely on the Suryong's intentions, without institutionalization or legal basis, or would they prefer a leadership system where power is dispersed among several individuals, allowing them to voice their opinions? Naturally, they would prefer the latter. Thus, if such a collective leadership system were to be formed, meaning if such an alternative existed, the defection of the elite class could increase. This leads to ongoing discussions domestically.

The expectation of the Suryong as a leader of humanity, or as a reforming monarch, or as a leader driving reform, is essentially discussing the impossible. The Suryong system operates when absolute control is maintained from the pinnacle of power. Dividing other powers or choosing reform and opening is entirely impossible. For North Korea to become a normal socialist state with a party-state system, the complete disappearance of the current Suryong system is the primary prerequisite. Therefore, under the condition that the current North Korean system is maintained, a change in the Suryong system appears impossible.

Then, will the Suryong system be abandoned? To date, Kim Jong-un has no possibility of abandoning it. A more serious problem here is North Korea's hereditary succession. In a situation where third, and even fourth, hereditary successions are discussed, the reason succession has been possible is due to the Suryong system. It is because, under the Suryong system, absolute power could be wielded and the legitimacy of the predecessors inherited. If this is abolished, the fourth hereditary succession will inevitably be challenged. For these reasons, it is difficult for the Suryong system to change, or for the elite class to have other alternatives, which is my current assessment. Let me mention one more related theory. This is also theoretical: the concept of critical mass.

The Possibility and Limitations of Critical Mass Emergence

Critical mass, that is, a critical populace. Research on the collapse and fundamental change of dictatorial states indicates the necessity of the emergence of a critical mass of a certain level. The system does not collapse or fundamentally change if only a small number of people confront the dictator. The system changes only when a large-scale opposition force is formed in the form of a popular uprising exceeding a certain threshold. When researching scenarios of sudden change in North Korea, discussions about this inevitably arise. Academically, the term 'critical populace' is used, but the question of whether such a critical populace can emerge within North Korea is a very difficult problem.

For the masses to emerge, several conditions must be met, which are very difficult within the North Korean system. North Korea imposes severe penalties even for minor offenses. For instance, watching South Korean dramas can result in a prison sentence of 5 to 15 years for reasons such as "anti-socialist" activities or "anti-ideological and cultural penetration." The severity of punishment for actions that could threaten the regime signifies a very high initial cost for opposition. It is a situation where one must risk their life to oppose. The problem is that individual opposition is meaningless. For pioneering opposition, there must be comrades who join, and mobilizing such comrades is also extremely difficult. The North Korean regime constantly suppresses communication among its citizens through coercive methods. As you know, there's a saying that if three people gather, one of them might be affiliated with the State Security Department.

This demonstrates that one of the characteristics of the North Korean system is the thorough suppression and prevention of voices of opposition emerging through communication among citizens. Therefore, the emergence of such a mass movement is not easy. Furthermore, a leadership group is needed to guide the resistance. Historical revolutions and the collapse of dictatorial regimes show that a leadership group existed to guide the masses. It is questionable whether North Korea can create such a leadership group. Consequently, even if small-scale protests occur, the majority of the population is likely to remain observant. This is the theoretical aspect. However, caution is needed here: due to these limitations, will a critical mass emerge? A critical mass has emerged, leading to the collapse of many dictatorial states. This is how these theories are formulated and concepts develop. While various factors are involved, the most crucial one is that the emergence of the masses increases as violent control weakens. If this violent coercive mechanism weakens, the emergence of the masses will increase.

Weakening of Violent Control and Potential for Mass Mobilization

As mentioned earlier, strong violent control makes communication among citizens impossible, hindering collective action. If this violent coercive mechanism weakens, the emergence of the masses will increase. Furthermore, there is little room for debate regarding whether the majority of North Korean citizens believe in the Juche ideology promoted by North Korea or the "people-first" and "love for the people" principles advocated by Kim Jong-un. This was sufficiently confirmed by the public opinion survey results of approximately 5,000 North Korean residents in this year's Ministry of Unification's Economic and Social Survey. In other words, North Korean citizens are controlled through coercive mechanisms rather than voluntary obedience. If that mechanism falters and cracks appear, the possibility of a critical mass emerging increases proportionally. Here, I would like to mention another cautious possibility: the three notorious laws passed by North Korea since 2020, which they call the "three evil laws" – the Law on the Ban of Anti-Socialist and Non-Revolutionary Behavior, the Law on Youth Ideological Education, and the Pyongyang Cultural Protection Law – are examples of North Korea itself showing cracks in its control. If control had been thorough and effective, there would have been no need for these laws to be passed. As I have explained multiple times, the content of these laws demonstrates North Korea's failure, despite its utmost efforts, to prevent the spread of what it calls "puppet culture" from South Korea. Therefore, they were compelled to create legal regulations and impose extreme penalties.

Passage of Three Major Laws and Loopholes in Control

This signifies that the oppressive and violent control that North Korea has employed is showing gaps. Furthermore, as I mentioned the importance of communication among citizens, I believe that by passing these three laws, North Korea has paradoxically facilitated smoother communication and opened up possibilities for it. From the perspective of North Korean citizens, they have been secretly watching South Korean dramas and movies. With the passage of these laws, the perception that "I'm not the only one watching; people around me are too" has spread. This is a very important aspect. If these thoughts are commonly formed among North Korean citizens and spread more widely, the possibility of them connecting to a common goal within the community increases proportionally. To summarize, it is difficult to see an immediate and visible possibility of a sudden change in North Korea at this moment. However, considering various possibilities, it is difficult to say that the possibility is entirely absent. As it is in the realm of the future, it is certainly worth continuous observation. My analysis is that it is necessary to approach with caution any assertion that North Korea will collapse immediately, as is currently being discussed. Thank you for watching.

Conclusion: A Cautious Approach to the Possibility of North Korean Contingencies

This implies that gaps are appearing in North Korea's oppressive and violent control. Furthermore, as I mentioned the importance of communication among citizens, I believe that by passing these three laws, North Korea has paradoxically facilitated smoother communication and opened up possibilities for it. From the perspective of North Korean citizens, they have been secretly watching South Korean dramas and movies. With the passage of these laws, the perception that "I'm not the only one watching; people around me are too" has spread. This is a very important aspect. If these thoughts are commonly formed among North Korean citizens and spread more widely, the possibility of them connecting to a common goal within the community increases proportionally. To summarize, it is difficult to see an immediate and visible possibility of a sudden change in North Korea at this moment. However, considering various possibilities, it is difficult to say that the possibility is entirely absent. As it is in the realm of the future, it is certainly worth continuous observation. My analysis is that it is necessary to approach with caution any assertion that North Korea will collapse immediately, as is currently being discussed. Thank you for watching.

It is not easy to see an immediate possibility of a sudden change in North Korea. However, considering various possibilities, it is difficult to say that the possibility is entirely absent. As it is in the realm of the future, it is certainly worth continuous observation. My analysis is that it is necessary to approach with caution any assertion that North Korea will collapse immediately, as is currently being discussed. Thank you for watching.

■ Park Won Gon _ Director, North Korea Research Center, East Asia Institute. Professor, Department of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Management and Editing: Park Han Soo _ EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr